

BRITAIN'S PART IN THE WAR

AS TOLD IN OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATED WITH NINE MAPS

VOLUME -II

PIONEER PRESS, ALLAHABAD

PREFACE.

WITH the exception of Sir Douglas Haig's despatch, which has just been published at Home and the text of which has not yet reached India, this volume contains all the despatches that have been issued since the first volume of "Britain's Part in the War" appeared eleven months ago.

Sir Douglas Haig's despatch is dated the 19th May and is the first despatch from him to be issued since he took over command of the British troops in France from Lord French in December last. Consequently the only despatches treating of the war in the Western theatre that will be found in the present volume are two from Sir John French (as he then was) dealing with the battles of Ypres (the Second Battle), Festubert and Loos.

The greater part of the present volume is, it will be seen, taken up with the Gallipoli and Mesopotamian operations. In the Gallipoli section we have a complete account of the campaign in that peninsula from the first landing of British troops to their subsequent withdrawal. The story of the ill-fated venture that came so very near succeeding is told in graphic language in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatches which, on account both of their wealth of "live human detail" and the heroic nature of the fighting they record, must always have an absorbing interest for the lay reader as well as the military student.

The Mesopotamian despatches reproduced in this volume cover the operations in that theatre of the war from the capture of Qurnah down to General Townshend's advance to Ctesiphon and retreat to Kut-el-Amarah. A

brief summary of the campaign has been added as an introduction to this section

In the interval that has elapsed since the first volume of this book made its appearance yet another African campaign has been brought to a successful conclusion. As no despatches on the Cameroon operations have yet been issued, a short history of the campaign there has been compiled from such information as has been made public.

In regard to the Egyptian and East African sections of this volume a slightly different plan has been followed. The official communiqués that have been issued concerning General Smuts' campaign in East Africa and General Peyton's operations against the Arabs on the western frontier of Egypt have been reproduced, the War Office announcements in the latter case being supplemented by additional details supplied to the *Pioneer* by its Cairo correspondent.

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**THE KING-EMPEROR
AND HIS INDIAN
TROOPS.**

MESSAGE TO ARMY CORPS LEAVING FRANCE.

The following message from His Majesty the King-Emperor to the troops of the Indian Army Corps leaving France was delivered by the Prince of Wales on the 26th November, 1915 :—

“ Officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Indian Army Corps,—More than one year ago I summoned you from India to fight for the safety of my Empire and the honour of my pledged word on the battlefields of Belgium and France. The confidence which I then expressed in your sense of duty, your courage and your chivalry you have since then nobly justified. I now require your services in another field of action, but before you leave France I send my dear and gallant son, the Prince of Wales, who has shared with my armies the dangers and hardships of the campaign, to thank you in my name for your services and to express to you my satisfaction. British and Indian comrades in arms, yours has been a fellowship in toils and hardships, in courage and endurance. Often against great odds, in deeds nobly done, in days of ever memorable conflict, in a warfare waged under new conditions and in peculiarly trying circumstances, you have worthily upheld the honour of the Empire and the great traditions of my army in India. I have followed your fortunes with the deepest interest and watched your gallant actions with pride and satisfaction. I mourn with you the loss of many gallant officers and men. Let it be your consolation, as it was their pride, that they freely gave their lives in a just cause for the honour of their sovereign and the safety of my Empire. They died as gallant soldiers and I shall ever hold their sacrifice in grateful remembrance. You leave France with a just pride in the honour of the deeds already achieved and with my assurance of confidence that your proved valour and experience will contribute to further victories in the fields of action to which you go. I pray God to bless and guard you and to bring you back safely when the final victory is won each to his own home, there to be welcomed with honour among his own people.”

A LOYAL ADDRESS AND HIS MAJESTY'S GRACIOUS REPLY.

The King, accompanied by the Queen, received on the 11th February at Buckingham Palace a loyal Address presented by 26 Indian Officers from the Convalescent Home at Barton. The Ladies and Gentlemen of the Household in Waiting were in attendance, and the Right Honourable Austen Chamberlain, M.P., Secretary of State for India, General Sir Charles Egerton, General Sir Edmund Barrow, Colonel Sir Walter Lawrence and Colonel Sir James Dunlop Smith were also present.

Subadar Sher Singh, 34th Sikh Pioneers, on behalf of the Indian Officers, read the Address, to which His Majesty was graciously pleased to read a reply.

The Indian Officers were presented to Their Majesties by Colonel J. Chaytor White, I.M.S., Commandant of the Convalescent Home at Barton.

The following is a translation of the text of the Address presented :—

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY :

We, the Officers of Indian troops at the Indian Convalescent Home, Barton, on behalf of the soldiers of the Indian Army and ourselves, heartily thank your Majesty for the honour you have given us to come to Europe and to fight side by side with the Europeans in the great war and to give us the chance of showing our loyalty and fighting capacity on this occasion.

When we were leaving India we had mixed feelings of pleasure and misgivings : we were pleased as we were coming to serve our kind and just Monarch we had misgivings as to our being able to keep our religious and caste prejudices, which are dearer to us than our life, but those misgivings disappeared when we landed in France. Your Majesty made such complete arrangements to keep our prejudices in difficult and trying circumstances, that we could not even dream of them for this kind consideration we are specially thankful to your Majesty.

Your Majesty's Officers in charge of arrangements allot lodgings to men of the same religion or persuasion which make

us happy and content: they take care to get our food cooked according to the dictates of our respective religions though we are seven thousand miles away from home we get things to eat that we were accustomed to do in our country.

Your Majesty has provided motor-cars to take us round turn by turn, for sightseeing in this neighbourhood: and under your orders the India Office has arranged for excursions to London twice a week, where we do the sightseeing and have our meals.

Your Majesty has opened an Indian Club here specially for our recreation and entertainment, where we have all sorts of sport, and besides, we hear Indian songs by gramophone records. All these comforts and luxuries have made us forget the pang of being "homesick."

The kind treatment of Your Majesty's subjects has made a deep impression on our hearts. Wherever we happen to see the British people either in London or elsewhere, we receive welcome by their cheerful faces, and by their waving hands and handkerchiefs; besides they send us religious books, sweets, cigarettes, and many other things for our needs and comforts; we shall never forget their kindness.

When we go back to India we shall talk about the comforts and luxuries we have had here to our people and in our homes, and sing praises of Your Majesty's officers, doctors, and the British public, for the kind treatment we have had from them.

Your Majesty has left no stone unturned in providing things for our need and comfort either in England, France or any other place where we are sent; Your Majesty has captivated our hearts, specially, by providing us with places of worship here according to our religious persuasions. As we are about to leave this country we thank Your Majesty again, and show our gratitude by praying to God that He may be gracious enough to give Your Majesty complete success in this great war, and that Your Majesty may rule over us for ever and that our country may prosper under the just rule of our King-Emperor.

His Majesty replied as follows:—

SIRDARS,—I am glad to receive here in person to-day a body of Indian officers who have faithfully borne their share of the present conflict and upheld the honour of my Indian Army on the European battlefield of the world-wide war in which my Empire and my Allies are engaged. Wounded as you have been in battle with a formidable western foe on the neighbouring fields of

France, our glorious Ally, and nursed and tended here at the heart of the Empire, you represent the fighting men of your races in presenting a loyal address to your King-Emperor in the capital city of his Dominions. I note that you speak not only for yourselves but for the whole of my Indian Army. I welcome your presence as a symbol of the unity of the Empire, and as setting a seal on the heroic efforts and sacrifices in which my Indian soldiers, yourselves amongst them, have borne a common part with all my forces from overseas, and from the mother country. I am duly touched by your declarations of loyalty and gratitude to myself, but not less than by the generous recognition which you pay to the kindness and brotherly feeling which you have met at the hands of all your fellow subjects, the inhabitants of these islands. They are conscious, as I am, that the loyal devotion of India to the common heritage for which we are fighting—a devotion to which we have never looked in vain—has been consecrated afresh by the blood of India's sons, shed far from their homes and in a quarrel which, whilst the might of the Empire protects India's shores, does not come near to the lives and fortunes of their kith and kin. But the liberties of the Empire were put into the scale, and with them the liberties which India has enjoyed under our rule, and which, please God, she will enjoy in increasing measurement as she advances in the path of social improvement and political experience. I welcome the expression of your thanks for the careful and scrupulous regard which all my officers, under my directions, have paid to the requirements of your religious usages. I honour the concern which you tell me you felt lest the circumstances of your life in a strange country might imperil the due observance of the rites which are sanctioned for you by the dictates of your religions, and the immemorial customs of your forefathers. I recall to mind the words in which my revered predecessor, the Queen-Empress Victoria, declared to her Indian subjects of whatever creed, on assuming sway over their lives, her will that "none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law, and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure." It will ever be the cherished duty of my house and throne to guard the sacred promise then given, in the letter and in the spirit. Sirdars, I thank you for your loyal address.

**SIR JOHN FRENCH'S
DESPATCHES.**

THE DEFENCE OF YPRES AND THE BATTLE OF FESTUBERT.

APRIL—MAY 1915.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, *15th June 1915*

MY LORD,—I have the honour to report that since the date of my last despatch (5th April) the army in France under my command has been heavily engaged opposite both flanks of the line held by the British forces

1. In the north the town and district of Ypres have once more in this campaign been successfully defended against vigorous and sustained attacks made by large forces of the enemy, and supported by a mass of heavy and field artillery which, not only in number but also in weight and calibre, is superior to any concentration of guns which has previously assailed that part of the line.

In the south a vigorous offensive has again been taken by troops of the First Army, in the course of which a large area of entrenched and fortified ground has been captured from the enemy whilst valuable support has been afforded to the attack which our Allies have carried on with such marked success against the enemy's positions to the east of Arras and Lens

2. I much regret that during the period under report the fighting has been characterised on the enemy's side by a cynical and barbarous disregard of the well-known usages of civilised war and a flagrant defiance of the Hague Convention

All the scientific resources of Germany have apparently been brought into play to produce a gas of so virulent and poisonous a nature that any human being brought into contact with it is first paralysed and then meets with a lingering and agonising death.

The enemy has invariably preceded, prepared, and supported his attacks by a discharge in stupendous volume of these poisonous gas fumes whenever the wind was favourable.

Such weather conditions have only prevailed to any extent in the neighbourhood of Ypres, and there can be no doubt that the effect of these poisonous fumes materially influenced the operations in that theatre, until experience suggested effective counter measures, which have since been so perfected as to render them innocuous.

The brain power and thought which has evidently been at work before this unworthy method of making war reached the pitch of efficiency which has been demonstrated in its practice shows that the Germans must have harboured these designs for a long time.

As a soldier I cannot help expressing the deepest regret and some surprise that an army which hitherto has claimed to be the chief exponent of the chivalry of war should have stooped to employ such devices against brave and gallant foes

3. On the night of Saturday, April 17th, a commanding hill which afforded the enemy excellent artillery observation toward the west and north-west was successfully mined and captured. This hill, known as Hill 60, lies opposite the northern extremity of the line held by the 2nd Corps

The operation was planned and the mining commenced by Major-General Bulfin before the ground was handed over to the troops under Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson, under whose supervision the operation was carried out.

The mines were successfully fired at 7 P.M. on the 17th instant, and immediately afterwards the hill was attacked and gained, without difficulty, by the 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers. The attack was well supported by the Divisional Artillery, assisted by French and Belgian batteries.

During the night several of the enemy's counter-attacks were repulsed with heavy loss, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place; but on the early morning of the 18th the enemy succeeded in forcing back the troops holding the right of the hill to the reverse slope, where, however, they hung on throughout the day.

On the evening of the 18th these two battalions were relieved by the 2nd Battalion, West Riding Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, who again stormed the hill under cover of heavy artillery fire, and the enemy was driven off at the point of the bayonet.

In this operation 53 prisoners were captured, including four officers.

On the 20th and following days many unsuccessful attacks by the enemy were made on Hill 60, which was continuously shelled by heavy artillery.

On May 1st another attempt to recapture Hill 60 was supported by great volumes of asphyxiating gas, which caused nearly all the men along a front of about 400 yards to be immediately struck down by its fumes.

The splendid courage with which the leaders rallied their men and subdued the natural tendency to panic (which is inevitable on such occasions), combined with the prompt intervention of supports, once more drove the enemy back.

A second and more severe "gas" attack, under much more favourable weather conditions, enabled the enemy to recapture this position on May 5th.

The enemy owes his success in this last attack entirely to the use of asphyxiating gas. It was only a few days later that the means, which have since proved so effective, of counter-acting this method of making war were put into practice. Had it been otherwise, the enemy's attack on May 5th would most certainly have shared the fate of all the many previous attempts he had made.

4. It was at the commencement of the second battle of Ypres, on the evening of the 22nd April, referred to in paragraph 1 of this report, that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre's request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:—

From Steenstraete to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcapelle Road, a French Division.

Thence, in a south-easterly direction toward the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road, the Canadian Division.

Thence a Division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another Division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the Corps on its right.

Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An Infantry Brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.

Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French Division at about 5 P.M., using asphyxiating gases for the

first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 P.M. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden Railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French Division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realise what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about 50 guns.

I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French Division for this unfortunate incident.

After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French Division would have stood firm.

The left flank of the Canadian Division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east. In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage, and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences. They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets.

Throughout the night the enemy's attacks were repulsed, effective counter-attacks were delivered, and at length touch was gained with the French right and a new line was formed.

The 2nd London Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the Canadian Division, was posted behind the right of the French Division and, being involved in their retreat, fell into the enemy's

hands. It was recaptured by the Canadians in their counter-attack, but the guns could not be withdrawn before the Canadians were again driven back.

During the night I directed the Cavalry Corps and the Northumbrian Division, which was then in general reserve, to move to the west of Ypres, and placed these troops at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Second Army. I also directed other reserve troops from the Third Corps and the First Army to be held in readiness to meet eventualities.

In the confusion of the gas and smoke the Germans succeeded in capturing the bridge at Steenstraate and some works south of Luzerne, all of which were in occupation by the French.

The enemy having thus established himself to the west of the Ypres Canal, I was somewhat apprehensive of his succeeding in driving a wedge between the French and Belgian troops at this point. I directed, therefore, that some of the reinforcements sent north should be used to support and assist General Putz, should he find difficulty in preventing any further advance of the Germans west of the canal.

At about ten o'clock on the morning of the 23rd connection was finally ensured between the left of the Canadian Division and the French right, about 800 yards east of the canal, but as this entailed the maintenance by the British troops of a much longer line than that which they had held before the attack commenced on the previous night, there were no reserve available for counter-attack until reinforcements, which were ordered up from the Second Army, were able to deploy to the east of Ypres.

Early on the morning of the 23rd I went to see General Foch, and from him I received a detailed account of what had happened, as reported by General Putz. General Foch informed me that it was his intention to make good the original line and regain the trenches which the French Division had lost. He expressed the desire that I should maintain my present line, assuring me that the original position would be re-established in a few days. General Foch further informed me that he had ordered up large French reinforcements, which were now on their way, and that troops from the north had already arrived to reinforce General Putz.

I fully concurred in the wisdom of the General's wish to re-establish our old line, and agreed to co-operate in the way he desired, stipulating, however, that if the position was not re-established within a limited time I could not allow the British

troops to remain in so exposed a situation as that which the action of the previous 24 hours had compelled them to occupy.

During the whole of the 23rd the enemy's artillery was very active, and his attacks all along the front were supported by some heavy guns which had been brought down from the coast in the neighbourhood of Ostend

The loss of the guns on the night of the 22nd prevented this fire from being kept down and much aggravated the situation. Our positions, however, were well maintained by the vigorous counter-attacks made by the Fifth Corps

During the day I directed two brigades of the Third Corps and the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps to be moved up to the Ypres area and placed at the disposal of the Second Army

In the course of these two or three days many circumstances combined to render the situation east of the Ypres Canal very critical and most difficult to deal with.

The confusion caused by the sudden retirement of the French Division and the necessity for closing up the gap and checking the enemy's advance at all costs led to a mixing up of units and a sudden shifting of the areas of command, which was quite unavoidable. Fresh units, as they came up from the south, had to be pushed into the firing line in an area swept by artillery fire which, owing to the capture of the French guns, we were unable to keep down.

All this led to very heavy casualties, and I wish to place on record the deep admiration which I feel for the resource and presence of mind evinced by the leaders actually on the spot

The parts taken by Major-General Snow and Brigadier-General Hull were reported to me as being particularly marked in this respect.

An instance of this occurred on the afternoon of the 24th, when the enemy succeeded in breaking through the line at St. Julien.

Brigadier-General Hull, acting under the orders of Lieutenant-General Alderson, organised a powerful counter-attack with his own brigade and some of the nearest available units. He was called upon to control, with only his brigade staff, parts of battalions from six separate divisions which were quite new to the ground. Although the attack did not succeed in retaking St. Julien it effectually checked the enemy's further advance.

It was only on the morning of the 25th that the enemy were able to force back the left of the Canadian Division from the point where it had originally joined the French line.

During the night and the early morning of the 25th the enemy directed a heavy attack against the division at Broodseinde cross-roads, which was supported by a powerful shell fire, but he failed to make any progress.

During the whole of this time the town of Ypres and all the roads to the east and west were uninterruptedly subjected to a violent artillery fire, but in spite of this the supply of both food and ammunition was maintained throughout with order and efficiency.

During the afternoon of the 25th many German prisoners were taken, including some officers. The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, and the enemy suffered heavy loss.

During the 26th the Lahore Division and a Cavalry Division were pushed up into the fighting line, the former on the right of the French, the latter in support of the 5th Corps.

In the afternoon the Lahore Division, in conjunction with the French right, succeeded in pushing the enemy back some little distance towards the north, but their further advance was stopped owing to the continual employment by the enemy of asphyxiating gas.

On the right of the Lahore Division the Northumberland Infantry Brigade advanced against St. Julien and actually succeeded in entering, and for a time occupying the southern portion of that village. They were, however, eventually driven back, largely owing to gas, and finally occupied a line short way to the south. This attack was most successfully and gallantly led by Brigadier-General Riddell, who, I regret to say, was killed during the progress of the operation.

Although no attack was made on the south-eastern side of the salient, the troops operating to the east of Ypres were subjected to heavy artillery fire from this direction, which took some of the battalions, which were advancing north to the attack, in reverse.

Some gallant attempts made by the Lahore Division on the 27th, in conjunction with the French, pushed the enemy further north; but they were partially frustrated by the constant fumes of gas to which they were exposed. In spite of this, however, a certain amount of ground was gained.

The French had succeeded in retaking Lizerne, and had made some progress at Steenstraate and Het Sas, but up to the evening of the 28th no further progress had been made towards the recapture of the original line.

I sent instructions, therefore, to Sir Herbert Plumer, who was now in charge of the operation, to take preliminary measures for the retirement to the new line which had been fixed upon.

On the morning of the 29th I had another interview with General Foch, who informed me that strong reinforcements were hourly arriving to support General Putz, and urged me to postpone issuing orders for any retirement until the result of his attack, which was timed to commence at daybreak on the 30th, should be known. To this I agreed, and instructed Sir Herbert Plumer accordingly.

No substantial advance having been made by the French, I issued orders to Sir Herbert Plumer at one o'clock on May 1st to commence his withdrawal to the new line.

The retirement was commenced the following night, and the new line was occupied on the morning of May 4th.

I am of opinion that this retirement, carried out deliberately with scarcely any loss, and in the face of an enemy in position, reflects the greatest possible credit on Sir Herbert Plumer and those who so efficiently carried out his orders

The successful conduct of this operation was the more remarkable from the fact that on the evening of May 2nd, when it was only half completed, the enemy made a heavy attack, with the usual gas accompaniment, on St. Julien and the line to the west of it.

An attack on a line to the east of Fortuin was made at the same time under similar conditions.

In both cases our troops were at first driven from their trenches by gas fumes, but on the arrival of the supporting battalions and two brigades of a Cavalry Division, which were sent up in support from about Potijze, all the lost trenches were regained at night.

On the 3rd May, while the retirement was still going on, another violent attack was directed on the northern face of the salient. This was also driven back with heavy loss to the enemy.

Further attempts of the enemy during the night of the 3rd to advance from the woods west of St. Julien were frustrated entirely by the fire of our artillery.

The Second Battle of Ypres.



Scale - 3 miles to 1 inch

During the whole of the 4th the enemy heavily shelled the trenches we had evacuated, quite unaware that they were no longer occupied. So soon as the retirement was discovered the Germans commenced to entrench opposite our new line and to advance their guns to new positions. Our artillery, assisted by aeroplanes, caused him considerable loss in carrying out these operations.

Up to the morning of the 8th the enemy made attacks at short intervals, covered by gas, on all parts of the line to the east of Ypres, but was everywhere driven back with heavy loss.

Throughout the whole period since the first break of the line on the night of April 22nd all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible whilst under so vastly superior fire of artillery to dig efficient trenches, or properly to reorganise the line, after the confusion and demoralisation caused by the first great gas surprise and the subsequent almost daily gas attacks. Nor was it until after this date (May 8th) that effective preventatives had been devised and provided. In these circumstances a violent bombardment of nearly the whole of the 5th Corps front broke out at 7 A.M. on the morning of the 8th, which gradually concentrated on the front of the division between north and south of Frezenberg. This fire completely obliterated the trenches and caused enormous losses.

The artillery bombardment was shortly followed by a heavy infantry attack, before which our line had to give way.

I relate what happened in Sir Herbert Plumer's own words:—

“The right of one brigade was broken about 10-15 A.M.; then its centre, and then part of the left of the brigade in the next section to the south. The Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, however, although suffering very heavily, stuck to their fire or support trenches throughout the day. At this time two battalions were moved to General Headquarters second line astride the Menin road to support and cover the left of their division.

“At 12-25 P.M. the centre of a brigade further to the left also broke; its right battalion, however, the 1st Suffolks, which had been refused to cover a gap, still held on and were apparently surrounded and overwhelmed. Meanwhile three more battalions had been moved up to reinforce, two other battalions were moved up in support to General Headquarters line, and an Infantry Brigade came up to the grounds of Vlamartinghe Chateau in corps reserve.

“ At 11-30 A M a small party of Germans attempted to advance against the left of the British line, but were destroyed by the 2nd Essex Regiment.

“ A counter-attack was launched at 3-30 P M by the 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, 3rd Middlesex Regiment, 2nd East Surrey Regiment, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and the 1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment. The counter-attack reached Frezenberg, but was eventually driven back and held up on a line running about north and south through Verlorenhoek, despite repeated efforts to advance. The 12th London Regiment on the left succeeded at great cost in reaching the original trench line, and did considerable execution with their machine-gun.

“ The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the 1st East Lancashire Regiment attacked in a north-easterly direction towards Wieltje, and connected the old trench line with the ground being consolidated during the night.

“ During the night orders were received that two Cavalry Divisions would be moved up and placed at the disposal of the 5th Corps, and a Territorial Division would be moved up to be used if required.

“ On the 9th the Germans again repeated their bombardment. Very heavy shell fire was concentrated for two hours on the trenches of the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment and 2nd Cameron Highlanders, followed by an infantry attack which was successfully repulsed. The Germans again bombarded the salient, and a further attack in the afternoon succeeded in occupying 150 yards of trench. The Gloucesters counter-attacked, but suffered heavily, and the attack failed. The salient being very exposed to shell fire from both flanks, as well as in front, it was deemed advisable not to attempt to retake the trench at night, and a retrenchment was therefore dug across it.

“ At 3 P.M. the enemy started to shell the whole front of the centre division, and it was reported that the right brigade of this division was being heavily punished, but continued to maintain its line.

“ The trenches of the brigades on the left centre were also heavily shelled during the day and attacked by infantry. Both attacks were repulsed.

“ On the 10th instant the trenches on either side of the Menin-Ypres road were shelled very severely all the morning. The 2nd Cameron Highlanders, 9th Royal Scots, and the 3rd and 4th King's

Royal Rifles, however, repulsed an attack made, under cover of gas, with heavy loss. Finally, when the trenches had been practically destroyed and a large number of the garrison buried, the 3rd King's Royal Rifles and 4th Rifle Brigade fell back to the trenches immediately west of Bellewaarde Wood. So heavy had been the shell fire that the proposal to join up the line with a switch through the wood had to be abandoned, the trees broken by the shells forming an impassable entanglement.

"After a comparatively quiet night and morning (10th-11th) the hostile artillery fire was concentrated on the trenches of the 2nd Cameron, Highlanders and 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at a slightly more northern point than on the previous day. The Germans attacked in force and gained a footing in part of the trenches, but were promptly ejected by a supporting company of the 9th Royal Scots. After a second short artillery bombardment the Germans again attacked about 4-15 P.M., but were again repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire. A third bombardment followed, and this time the Germans succeeded in gaining a trench—or rather what was left of it—a local counter-attack failing. However, during the night the enemy were again driven out. The trench by this time being practically non-existent, the garrison found it untenable under the very heavy shell fire the enemy brought to bear upon it, and the trench was evacuated. Twice more did the German snipers creep back into it, and twice more they were ejected. Finally, a retrenchment was made, cutting off the salient which had been contested throughout the day. It was won owing solely to the superior weight in number of the enemy's guns, but both our infantry and our artillery took a very heavy toll of the enemy, and the ground lost has proved of little use to the enemy.

"On the remainder of the front the day passed comparatively quietly, though most parts of the line underwent intermittent shelling by guns of various calibres.

"With the assistance of the Royal Flying Corps the 31st heavy battery scored a direct hit on a German gun, and the North Midland heavy battery got on to some German howitzers with great success.

"With the exception of another very heavy burst of shell fire against the right division early in the morning, the 12th passed uneventfully.

“ On the night of the 12th-13th the line was reorganised, the centre division retiring into army reserve to rest, and their places being taken in the trenches by the two Cavalry Divisions; the artillery and engineers of the centre division, forming with them what was known as the ‘ Cavalry Force ’ under the command of General de Lisle.

“ On the 13th, the various reliefs having been completed without incident, the heaviest bombardment yet experienced broke out at 4-30 A M , and continued with little intermission throughout the day. At about 7-45 A M., the Cavalry Brigade astride the railway having suffered very severely and their trenches having been obliterated, fell back about 800 yards. The North Somerset Yeomanry on the right of the brigade, although also suffering severely, hung on to their trenches throughout the day, and actually advanced and attacked the enemy with the bayonet. The brigade on its right also maintained its position; as did also the Cavalry Division, except the left squadron which when reduced to sixteen men fell back.

“ The 2nd Essex Regiment, realising the situation, promptly charged and retook the trench, holding it till relieved by the Cavalry. Meanwhile a counter-attack by two Cavalry Brigades was launched at 2-30 P.M , and succeeded, in spite of very heavy shrapnel and rifle fire, in regaining the original line of trenches, turning out the Germans who had entered it, and in some cases pursuing them for some distance. But a very heavy shell fire was again opened on them and they were again compelled to retire to an irregular line in rear, principally the craters of shell holes. The enemy in their counter-attack suffered very severe losses.

“ The fighting in other parts of the line was little less severe. The 1st East Lancashire Regiment were shelled out of their trenches, but their support company and the 2nd Essex Regiment, again acting on their own initiative, won them back. The enemy penetrated into the farm at the north-east corner of the line, but the 1st Rifle Brigade, after a severe struggle, expelled them. The 1st Hampshire Regiment also repelled an attack, and killed every German who got within fifty yards of their trenches. The 5th London Regiment, despite very heavy casualties, maintained their position unflinching. At the southern end of the line, the left Brigade was once again heavily shelled, as indeed was the whole front.

“ At the end of a very hard day's fighting our line remained in its former position, with the exception of the short distance lost by one Cavalry Division. Later, the line was pushed forward, and a new line was dug in a less exposed position slightly in rear of that originally held. The night passed quietly.

“ Working parties of from 1,200 to 1,800 men have been found every night by a Territorial Division and other units for work on rear lines of defence, in addition to the work performed by the garrisons in reconstructing the front line trenches which were daily destroyed by shell fire.

“ The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has been invaluable. Apart from the hostile aeroplanes actually destroyed, our airmen have prevented a great deal of aerial reconnaissance by the enemy, and have registered a large number of targets with our artillery.

“ There have been many cases of individual gallantry. As instances may be given the following.—

‘ During one of the heavy attacks made against our infantry gas was seen rolling forward from the enemy trenches. Private Lynn, of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, at once rushed to the machine-gun without waiting to adjust his respirator. Single-handed he kept his gun in action the whole time the gas was rolling over, actually hoisting it on the parapet to get a better field of fire. Although nearly suffocated by the gas, he poured a stream of lead into the advancing enemy and checked their attack. He was carried to his dug-out, but, hearing another attack was imminent, he tried to get back to his gun. Twenty-four hours later he died in great agony from the effects of the gas.

“ A young subaltern in a Cavalry Regiment went forward alone one afternoon to reconnoitre. He got into a wood, 1,200 yards in front of our lines, which he found occupied by Germans, and came back with the information that the enemy had evacuated a trench and were digging another—information which proved most valuable to the artillery as well as to his own unit.

“ A patrol of two officers and a non-commissioned officer of the 1st Cambridgeshires went out one night to reconnoitre a German trench 350 yards away. Creeping along the parapet of the trench, they heard sounds indicating the presence of six or seven of the enemy. Further on they heard deep snores apparently proceeding from a dug-out immediately beneath them. Although they knew that the garrison of the trench outnumbered them, they

decided to procure an identification. Unfortunately, in pulling out a clasp knife with which to cut off the sleeper's identity disc, one of the officers' revolvers went off. A conversation in agitated whispers broke out in the German trench, but the patrol crept safely away, the garrison being too startled to fire.

"Despite the very severe shelling to which the troops had been subjected, which obliterated trenches and caused very many casualties, the spirit of all ranks remains excellent. The enemy's losses, particularly on the 10th and 13th, have unquestionably been serious. On the latter day they evacuated trenches (in face of the cavalry counter-attack) in which were afterwards found quantities of equipment and some of their own wounded. The enemy have been seen stripping our dead, and on three occasions men in khaki have been seen advancing."

The fight went on by the exchange of desultory shell and rifle fire, but without any remarkable incident until the morning of May 24th. During this period, however, the French on our left had attained considerable success. On the 15th instant they captured Steenstraete and the trenches in Het Sas, and on the 16th they drove the enemy headlong over the canal, finding two thousand Germans dead. On the 17th they made a substantial advance on the east side of the canal and, on the 20th, they repelled a German counter-attack, making a further advance in the same direction, and taking one hundred prisoners.

On the early morning of the 24th a violent outburst of gas against nearly the whole front was followed by heavy shell fire, and the most determined attack was delivered against our position east of Ypres.

The hour of attack commenced at 2-45 A.M. A large proportion of the men were asleep, and the attack was too sudden to give them time to put on their respirators.

The 2nd Royal Irish and the 9th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, overcome by gas fumes, were driven out of a farm held in front of the left division, and this the enemy proceeded to hold and fortify.

All attempts to retake this farm during the day failed, and during the night of the 24th-25th the General Officer Commanding the left division decided to take up a new line which, although slightly in rear of the old one, he considered to be a much better position. This operation was successfully carried out.

Throughout the day the whole line was subjected to one of the most violent artillery attack which it had ever undergone; and the 5th Corps and the Cavalry Divisions engaged had to fight hard to maintain their positions. On the following day, however, the line was consolidated, joining the right of the French at the same place as before, and passing through Wieltje (which was strongly fortified) in a southerly direction on to Hooge, where the cavalry have since strongly occupied the chateau, and pushed our line further east

5. In pursuance of a promise which I made the French Commander-in-Chief to support an attack which his troops were making on the 9th May between the right of my line and Arras, I directed Sir Douglas Haig to carry out on that date an attack on the German trenches in the neighbourhood of Rougebanc (north-west of Fromelles) by the 4th Corps, and between Neuve Chapelle and Givenchy by the 1st and Indian Corps.

The bombardment of the enemy's positions commenced at 5 A.M.

Half-an-hour later the 8th Division of the 4th Corps captured the first line of German trenches about Rougebanc, and some detachments seized a few localities beyond this line. It was soon found, however, that the position was much stronger than had been anticipated, and that a more extensive artillery preparation was necessary to crush the resistance offered by his numerous fortified posts.

Throughout the 9th and 10th repeated efforts were made to make further progress. Not only was this found to be impossible, but the violence of the enemy's machine-gun fire from his posts on the flanks rendered the captured trenches so difficult to hold that all the units of the 4th Corps had to retire to their original position by the morning of the 10th.

The 1st and Indian Divisions south of Neuve Chapelle met with no greater success, and on the evening of the 10th I sanctioned Sir Douglas Haig's proposal to concentrate all our available resources on the southern point of attack.

The 7th Division was moved round from the 4th Corps area to support this attack and I directed the General Officer Commanding the First Army to delay it long enough to ensure a powerful and deliberate artillery preparation.

The operations of the 9th and 10th formed part of a general plan of attack which the Allies were conjointly conducting on a

line extending from the north of Arras to the south of Armentieres; and, although immediate progress was not made during this time by the British forces, their attack assisted in securing the brilliant successes attained by the French forces on their right, not only by holding the enemy in their front but by drawing off a part of the German reinforcements which were coming up to support their forces east of Arras.

It was decided that the attack should be resumed on the night of the 12th instant, but the weather continued very dull and misty, interfering much with artillery observation. Orders were finally issued, therefore, for the action to commence on the night of the 15th instant.

On the 15th May I moved the Canadian Division into the 1st Corps area and placed them at the disposal of Sir Douglas Haig.

The infantry of the Indian Corps and the 2nd Division of the 1st Corps advanced to the attack of the enemy's trenches which extended from Richebourg l'Avoue in a south-westerly direction.

Before daybreak the 2nd Division had succeeded in capturing two lines of the enemy's trenches, but the Indian Corps were unable to make any progress owing to the strength of the enemy's defences in the neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoue.

At daybreak the 7th Division, on the right of the 2nd, advanced to the attack, and by 7 A.M. had entrenched themselves on a line running nearly north and south, half-way between their original trenches and La Quinque Rue, having cleared and captured several lines of the enemy's trenches, including a number of fortified posts.

As it was found impossible for the Indian Corps to make any progress in face of the enemy's defences Sir Douglas Haig directed the attack to be suspended at this point and ordered the Indian Corps to form a defensive flank.

The remainder of the day was spent in securing and consolidating positions which had been won, and endeavouring to unite the inner flanks of the 7th and 2nd Divisions, which were separated by trenches and posts strongly held by the enemy.

Various attempts which were made throughout the day to secure this object had not succeeded at nightfall in driving the enemy back.

The German communications leading to the rear of their positions were systematically shelled throughout the night.

About two hundred prisoners were captured on the 16th instant

Fighting was resumed at daybreak, and by eleven o'clock the 7th Division had made a considerable advance, capturing several more of the enemy's trenches. The task allotted to this division was to push on in the direction of Rue d'Ouvert, Chateau St Roch, and Canteleux.

The 2nd Division was directed to push on when the situation permitted towards the Rue de Maisis and Violaines.

The Indian Division was ordered to extend its front far enough to enable it to keep touch with the left of the 2nd Division when they advanced.

On this day I gave orders for the 51st (Highland) Division to move into the neighbourhood of Estaires to be ready to support the operations of the First Army

At about noon the enemy was driven out of the trenches and posts which he occupied between the two divisions, the inner flanks of which were thus enabled to join hands

By nightfall the 2nd and 7th Divisions had made good progress, the area of captured ground being considerably extended to the right by the successful operation of the latter

The state of the weather on the morning of the 18th much hindered an effective artillery bombardment, and further attacks had, consequently, to be postponed.

Infantry attacks were made throughout the line in the course of the afternoon and evening; but, although not very much progress was made, the line was advanced to the La Quinque Rue-Bethune road before nightfall.

On the 19th May the 7th and 2nd Divisions were drawn out of the line to rest. The 7th Division was relieved by the Canadian Division and the 2nd Division by the 51st (Highland) Division

Sir Douglas Haig placed the Canadian and 51st Divisions, together with the artillery of the 2nd and 7th Divisions, under the command of Lieutenant-General Alderson, whom he directed to conduct the operations which had hitherto been carried on by the General Officer Commanding First Corps; and he directed the 7th Division to remain in Army Reserve.

During the night of the 19th-20th a small post of the enemy in front of La Quinque Rue was captured.

During the night of the 20th-21st the Canadian Division brilliantly carried on the excellent progress made by the 7th Division by seizing several of the enemy's trenches and pushing forward their whole line several hundred yards. A number of prisoners and some machine-guns were captured.

On the 22nd instant the 51st (Highland) Division was attached to the Indian Corps, and the General Officer Commanding the Indian Corps took charge of the operations at La Quinque Rue. Lieutenant-General Alderson with the Canadians conducting the operations to the north of that place.

On this day the Canadian Division extended their line slightly to the right and repulsed three very severe hostile counter-attacks.

On the 24th and 25th May the 47th Division (2nd London Territorial) succeeded in taking some more of the enemy's trenches and making good the ground gained to the east and north

I had now reason to consider that the battle which was commenced by the First Army on the 9th May and renewed on the 16th having attained for the moment the immediate object I had in view should not be further actively proceeded with, and I gave orders to Sir Douglas Haig to curtail his artillery attack and to strengthen and consolidate the ground he had won.

In the battle of Festubert above described the enemy was driven from a position which was strongly entrenched and fortified, and ground was won on a front of four miles to an average depth of 600 yards.

The enemy is known to have suffered very heavy losses, and in the course of the battle 785 prisoners and 10 machine-guns were captured. A number of machine-guns were also destroyed by our fire.

During the period under report the army under my command has taken over trenches occupied by some other French Divisions.

I am much indebted to General D'Urbal, commanding the 10th French Army, for the valuable and efficient support received throughout the battle of Festubert from three groups of French 75 centimetre guns.

In spite of very unfavourable weather conditions, rendering observation most difficult, our own artillery did excellent work throughout the battle.

6. During the important operations described above, which were carried on by the First and Second Armies, the 3rd Corps was particularly active in making demonstrations with a view to holding the enemy in its front and preventing reinforcements reaching the threatened areas

As an instance of the successful attempts to deceive the enemy in this respect it may be mentioned that on the afternoon of the 24th instant a bombardment of about an hour was carried out by the 6th Division with the object of distracting attention from the Ypres salient

Considerable damage was done to the enemy's parapets and wire; and that the desired impression was produced on the enemy is evident from the German wireless news on that day, which stated, "West of Lille the English attempts to attack were nipped in the bud."

In previous reports I have drawn attention to the enterprise displayed by the troops of the 3rd Corps in conducting night reconnaissances, and to the courage and resource shown by officers and other patrols in the conduct of these minor operations

Throughout the period under report this display of activity has been very marked all along the 3rd Corps front, and much valuable information and intelligence have been collected

7. I have much pleasure in again expressing my warm appreciation of the admirable manner in which all branches of the medical services now in the field, under the direction of Surgeon-General Sir Arthur Sloggett, have met and dealt with the many difficult situations resulting from the operations during the last two months.

The medical units at the front were frequently exposed to the enemy's fire, and many casualties occurred amongst the officers of the regimental medical service. At all times the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, and nurses carried out their duties with fearless bravery and great devotion to the welfare of the sick and wounded.

The evacuation of casualties from the front to the base and to England was expeditiously accomplished by the administrative medical staffs at the front and on the lines of communication. All ranks employed in units of evacuation and in base hospitals have shown the highest skill and untiring zeal and energy in alleviating the condition of those who passed through their hands.

The whole organisation of the medical services reflects the highest credit on all concerned.

I have once more to call your Lordship's attention to the part taken by the Royal Flying Corps in the general progress of the campaign, and I wish particularly to mention the invaluable assistance they rendered in the operations described in this report, under the able direction of Major-General Sir David Henderson

The Royal Flying Corps is becoming more and more an indispensable factor in combined operations. In co-operation with the artillery, in particular, there has been continuous improvement both in the methods and in the technical material employed. The ingenuity and technical skill displayed by the officers of the Royal Flying Corps, in effecting this improvement, have been most marked.

Since my last despatch there has been a considerable increase both in the number and in the activity of German aeroplanes on our front. During this period there have been more than sixty combats in the air, in which not one British aeroplane has been lost. As these fights take place almost invariably over or behind the German lines, only one hostile aeroplane has been brought down in our territory. Five more, however, have been definitely wrecked behind their own lines, and many have been chased down and forced to land in most unsuitable ground.

In spite of the opposition of hostile aircraft, and the great number of anti-aircraft guns employed by the enemy, air reconnaissance has been carried out with regularity and accuracy.

I desire to bring to your Lordship's notice the assistance given by the French military authorities, and in particular by General Hirschauer, director of the French aviation service, and his assistants, Colonel Bottieaux and Colonel Stammfer, in the supply of aeronautical material, without which the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps would have been seriously impaired.

9. In this despatch I wish again to remark upon the exceptionally good work done throughout this campaign by the Army Service Corps and by the Army Ordnance Department, not only in the field but also on the lines of communication and at the base ports.

To foresee and meet the requirements in the matter of ammunition, stores, equipment, supplies, and transport has entailed on the part of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of these services a sustained effort, which has never been relaxed.

since the beginning of the war, and which has been rewarded by the most conspicuous success.

The close co-operation of the Railway Transport Department, whose excellent work, in combination with the French railway staff, has ensured the regularity of the maintenance services, has greatly contributed to this success.

The degree of efficiency to which these services have been brought was well demonstrated in the course of the second battle of Ypres.

The roads between Poperinghe and Ypres, over which transport, supply, and ammunition columns had to pass, were continually searched by hostile heavy artillery during the day and night; whilst the passage of the canal through the town of Ypres, and along the roads east of that town, could only be effected under most difficult and dangerous conditions as regards hostile shell fire. Yet throughout the whole five or six weeks during which these conditions prevailed the work was carried on with perfect order and efficiency.

10 Since the date of my last report some divisions of the "New" Army have arrived in this country.

I made a close inspection of one division, formed up on parade, and have at various times seen several units belonging to others.

These divisions have as yet had very little experience in actual fighting, but, judging from all I have seen, I am of opinion that they ought to prove a valuable addition to any fighting force.

As regards the infantry, their physique is excellent, whilst their bearing and appearance on parade reflects great credit on the officers and staffs responsible for their training. The units appear to be thoroughly well officered and commanded. The equipment is in good order and efficient.

Several units of artillery have been tested in the firing line behind the trenches, and I hear very good reports of them. Their shooting has been extremely good, and they are quite fit to take their places in the line.

The Pioneer Battalions have created a very favourable impression, the officers being keen and ingenious and the men of good physique and good diggers. The equipment is suitable. The training in field works has been good, but, generally speaking, they require the assistance of Regular Royal Engineers as regards

laying out of important works. Man for man, in digging the battalions should do practically the same amount of work as an equivalent number of sappers, and in riveting, entanglement, etc., a great deal more than the ordinary infantry battalions.

11. During the months of April and May several divisions of the Territorial Force joined the army under my command.

Experience has shown that these troops have now reached a standard of efficiency which enables them to be usefully employed in complete divisional units.

Several divisions have been so employed, some in the trenches, others in the various offensive and defensive operations reported in this despatch.

In whatever kind of work these units have been engaged, they have all borne an active and distinguished part, and have proved themselves thoroughly reliable and efficient.

The opinion I have expressed in former despatches as to the use and value of the Territorial Force has been fully justified by recent events.

12. The Prime Minister was kind enough to accept an invitation from me to visit the army in France, and arrived at my Headquarters on the 30th May.

Mr. Asquith made an exhaustive tour of the front, the hospitals, and all the administrative arrangements made by corps commanders for the health and comfort of men behind the trenches.

It was a great encouragement to all ranks to see the Prime Minister amongst them, and the eloquent words which on several occasions he addressed to the troops had a most powerful and beneficial effect.

As I was desirous that the French Commander-in-Chief should see something of the British troops, I asked General Joffre to be kind enough to inspect a division on parade.

The General accepted my invitation, and on the 27th May, he inspected the 7th Division, under the command of Major-General H. de la P. Gough, C.B., which was resting behind the trenches.

General Joffre subsequently expressed to me in a letter the pleasure it gave him to see the British troops, and his appreciation of their appearance on parade. He requested me to make this known to all ranks.

The Moderator of the Church of Scotland, the Right Rev. Dr. Wallace Williamson, Dean of the Order of the Thistle, visited the army in France between the 7th and 17th May, and made a tour of the Scottish regiments with excellent results.

13 In spite of the constant strain put upon them by the arduous nature of the fighting which they are called upon to carry out daily and almost hourly, the spirit which animates all ranks of the army in France remains high and confident. They meet every demand made upon them with the utmost cheerfulness.

This splendid spirit is particularly manifested by the men in hospital, even amongst those who are mortally wounded.

The invariable question which comes from lips hardly able to utter a sound is, "How are things going on at the front?"

14 In conclusion, I desire to bring to your Lordship's special notice the valuable services rendered by General Sir Douglas Haig in his successful handling of the troops of the First Army throughout the Battle of Festubert, and Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Plumer for his fine defence of Ypres throughout the arduous and difficult operations during the latter part of April and the month of May.—I have the honour, etc.

J. D. P. FRENCH, FIELD-MARSHAL,

Commanding-in-Chief, the British Army in France.

THE BATTLE OF LOOS.

WAR OFFICE, 1st November 1915

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the British Army in France :- -

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE,
15th October 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to report the operations of the Forces under my command since the date of those described in my last despatch dated 15th June 1915.

1. Those of the greatest importance took place during the last days of the period under report. Nevertheless the Army under my command was constantly engaged throughout the whole time in enterprises which, although not securing the same important results, have yet had considerable influence on the course of events.

2. On 2nd June the enemy made a final offensive in the Ypres salient with the object of gaining our trenches and position at Hooge. The attack was most determined and was preceded by a severe bombardment. A gallant defence was made by troops of the 3rd Cavalry Division and 1st Indian Cavalry Division, and our position was maintained throughout.

During the first weeks of June the front of the Second Army was extended to the north as far as the village of Boesinghe.

3. After the conclusion of the Battle of Festubert the troops of the First Army were engaged in several minor operations.

By an attack delivered on the evening of 15th June, after a prolonged bombardment, the 1st Canadian Brigade obtained possession of the German front line trenches north-east of Givenchy, but were unable to retain them owing to their flanks being too much exposed.

4. On 16th June an attack was carried out by the 5th Corps on the Bellewaarde Ridge, east of Ypres.

The enemy's front line was captured, many of his dead and wounded being found in the trenches.

The troops, pressing forward, gained ground as far east as the Bellewaarde Lake, but found themselves unable to maintain this advanced position. They were, however, successful in securing and consolidating the ground won during the first part of the attack, on a front of a thousand yards, including the advanced portion of the enemy's salient north of the Ypres-Menin Road.

During this action the fire of the artillery was most effective, the prisoners testifying to its destructiveness and accuracy. It also prevented the delivery of counter-attacks, which were paralysed at the outset.

Over 200 prisoners were taken, besides some machine-guns, trench material, and gas apparatus.

Holding attacks by the neighbouring 2nd and 6th Corps were successful in helping the main attacks, whilst the 36th French Corps co-operated very usefully with artillery fire on Pilkem.

Near Hill 60 the 15th Infantry Brigade made four bombing attacks, gaining and occupying about 50 yards of trench.

On 6th July a small attack was made by the 11th Infantry Brigade on a German salient between Boesinghe and Ypres, which resulted in the capture of a frontage of about 500 yards of trench and a number of prisoners.

In the course of this operation it was necessary to move a gun of the 135th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, into the front line to destroy an enemy sap-head. To reach its position the gun had to be taken over a high canal embankment, rafted over the canal under fire, pulled up a bank with a slope of nearly 45 degrees, and then dragged over three trenches and a sky line to its position 70 yards from the German lines. This was carried out without loss.

This incident is of minor importance in itself, but I quote it as an example of the daily difficulties which officers and men in the trenches are constantly called upon to overcome, and of the spirit of initiative and resource which is so marked a feature amongst them.

From the 10th to the 12th July the enemy made attempts, after heavy shelling, to recapture the lost portion of their line; but our artillery, assisted by that of the French on our left, prevented

any serious assault from being delivered. Minor attacks were constant, but were easily repulsed by the garrison of our trenches.

On 19th July an enemy's redoubt at the western end of the Hooze defences was successfully mined and destroyed, and a small portion of the enemy's trenches was captured.

5. Since my last despatch a new device has been adopted by the enemy for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet.

Thus supported, an attack was made on the trenches of the Second Army at Hooze, on the Menin Road, early on 30th July. Most of the infantry occupying these trenches were driven back, but their retirement was due far more to the surprise and temporary confusion caused by the burning liquid than to the actual damage inflicted.

Gallant endeavours were made by repeated counter-attacks to recapture the lost section of trenches. These, however, proving unsuccessful and costly, a new line of trenches was consolidated a short distance farther back.

Attacks made by the enemy at the same time west of Bellewaarde Lake were repulsed.

On 9th August these losses were brilliantly regained, owing to a successful attack carried out by the 6th Division. This attack was very well executed and resulted in the recapture, with small casualties, not only of the whole of the lost trenches, but, in addition, of four hundred yards of German trench north of the Menin Road.

At the end of this engagement it was estimated that between four and five hundred German dead were lying on the battlefield.

Valuable help was rendered by two batteries of French Artillery lent by General Hely d'Oissel, commanding 36th French Corps.

6. From the conclusion of the above-mentioned operations until the last week in September there was relative quiet along the whole of the British line, except at those points where the normal conditions of existence comprised occasional shelling or constant mine and bomb warfare. In these trying forms of encounter all ranks have constantly shown the greatest enterprise and courage, and have consistently maintained the upper hand.

The close accord and co-operation which has always existed between the Commander-in-Chief of our Allies and myself has

been maintained, and I have had constant meetings with General Joffre, who has kept me informed of his views and intentions, and explained the successive methods by which he hopes to attain his ultimate object.

After full discussion of the military situation, a decision was arrived at for joint action, in which I acquiesced.

It was arranged that we should make a combined attack from certain points of the Allied line during the last week in September.

The reinforcements I have received enabled me to comply with several requests which General Joffre has made that I should take over additional portions of the French line.

7 In fulfilment of the rôle assigned to it in these operations, the Army under my command attacked the enemy on the morning of the 25th September.

The main attack was delivered by the 1st and 4th Corps between the La Bassée Canal on the north and a point of the enemy's line opposite the village of Grenay on the south.

At the same time a secondary attack, designed with the object of distracting the enemy's attention and holding his troops to their ground, was made by the 5th Corps on Bellewaarde Farm, situated to the east of Ypres. Subsidiary attacks with similar objects were delivered by the 3rd and Indian Corps north of the La Bassée Canal and along the whole front of the Second Army.

The object of the secondary attack by the 5th Corps was most effectively achieved, for not only was the enemy contained on that front, but we have reason to believe that reserves were hurried towards that point of the line.

The attack was made at daybreak by the 3rd and 14th Divisions, and at first the greater part of the enemy's front line was taken; but, owing to the powerful artillery fire concentrated against them, the troops were unable to retain the ground, and had to return to their original trenches toward nightfall. The 5th Corps succeeded, however, in capturing two officers and 138 other prisoners.

Similar demonstrations with equally good results were made along the whole front of the Second Army.

With the same object in view, those units of the First Army occupying the line north of the Bethune-La Bassée Canal were detailed to carry out some minor operations.

Portions of the 1st Corps assaulted the enemy's trenches at Givenchy. The Indian Corps attacked the Moulin du Piètre, while the 3rd Corps was directed against the trenches at Le Bridoux.

These attacks started at daybreak and were at first successful all along the line. Later in the day the enemy brought up strong reserves, and, after hard fighting and variable fortunes, the troops engaged in this part of the line reoccupied their original trenches at nightfall. They succeeded admirably, however, in fulfilling the rôle allotted to them, and in holding large numbers of the enemy away from the main attack.

The 8th Division of the 3rd Corps and the Meerut Division of the Indian Corps were principally engaged in this part of the line.

On the front of the Third Army subsidiary operations of a similar nature were successfully carried out.

The Wing of the Royal Flying Corps attached to this Army performed valuable work by undertaking distant flights behind the enemy's lines and by successfully blowing up railways, wrecking trains, and damaging stations on his line of communication by means of bomb attacks.

Valuable assistance was rendered by Vice-Admiral Bacon and a squadron of His Majesty's ships operating off Zeebrugge and Ostend.

8 The general plan of the main attack on the 25th September was as follows:—

In co-operation with an offensive movement by the 10th French Army on our right, the 1st and 4th Corps were to attack the enemy from a point opposite the little mining village of Grenay on the south to the La Bassée Canal on the north. The Vermelles-Hulluch Road was to be the dividing line between the two Corps, the 4th Corps delivering the right attack, the 1st Corps the left.

In view of the great length of line along which the British troops were operating, it was necessary to keep a strong reserve in my own hand. The 11th Corps, consisting of the Guards, the 21st and the 24th Divisions, were detailed for this purpose.

This reserve was the more necessary owing to the fact that the 10th French Army had to postpone its attack until one o'clock in the day; and, further, that the Corps operating on the French

left had to be directed in a more or less south-easterly direction, involving, in case of our success, a considerable gap in our line.

To ensure, however, the speedy and effective support to the 1st and the 4th Corps in the case of their success, the 21st and 24th Divisions passed the night of the 24th/25th on the line Beuvry (to the east of Béthune)-Nœux les Mines. The Guards Division was in the neighbourhood of Lillers on the same night.

I also directed the General Officer Commanding Second Army to draw the 28th Division back to Bailleul and to hold it in readiness to meet unexpected eventualities.

The British Cavalry Corps, less 3rd Cavalry Division, under General Fanshawe, was posted in the neighbourhood of St. Pol and Bailleul les Pernes; and the Indian Cavalry Corps, under General Rimington, at Doullens; both in readiness to co-operate with the French Cavalry in exploiting any success which might be attained by the combined French and British Forces. Plans for effective co-operation were fully arranged between the Cavalry Commanders of both Armies.

The 3rd Cavalry Division, less one brigade, was assigned to the General Officer Commanding First Army as a reserve, and moved into the area of the 4th Corps on the 21st and 22nd September.

9. Opposite the front of the main line of attack the distance between the enemy's trenches and our own varied from about 100 to 500 yards.


The country over which the advance took place is open and overgrown with long grass and self-sown crops.

From the canal southward our trenches and those of the enemy ran, roughly, parallel up an almost imperceptible rise to the south-west.

From the Vermelles-Hulluch Road southward the advantage of height is on the enemy's side as far as the Béthune-Lens Road. There the two lines of trenches cross a spur in which the rise culminates, and thence the command lies on the side of the British trenches.

Due east of the intersection of spur and trenches, and a short mile away, stands Loos. Less than a mile further south-east is Hill 70, which is the summit of the gentle rise in the ground.

The Battle of Loos.



Other notable tactical points in our front were —

“*Fosse 8*” (a thousand yards south of Auchy), which is a coal mine with a high and strongly defended slag heap

“*The Hohenzollern Redoubt*.”—A strong work thrust out nearly five hundred yards in front of the German lines and close to our own. It is connected with their front line by three communication trenches abutting into the defences of *Fosse 8*.

Cité St. Elie.—A strongly defended mining village lying fifteen hundred yards south of Haisnes

“*The Quarries*” —Lying half way to the German trenches west of *Cité St. Elie*.

Hulluch.—A village strung out along a small stream, lying less than half a mile south-east of *Cité St. Elie* and 3,000 yards north-east of *Loos*.

Half a mile north of Hill 70 is “*Puits 14 bis*,” another coal mine, possessing great possibilities for defence when taken in conjunction with a strong redoubt situated on the north-east side of Hill 70.

10. The attacks of the 1st and 4th Corps were delivered at 6-30 A.M., and were successful all along the line, except just south of the *La Bassée Canal*.

The enemy met the advance by wild infantry fire of slight intensity, but his artillery fire was accurate and caused considerable casualties.

The 47th Division on the right of the 4th Corps rapidly swung its left forward and occupied the southern outskirts of *Loos* and a big double slag heap opposite *Grenay*, known as the *Double Crassier*. Thence it pushed on, and, by taking possession of the cemetery, the enclosures and chalk pits south of *Loos*, succeeded in forming a strong defensive flank.

This London Territorial Division acquitted itself most creditably. It was skilfully led and the troops carried out their task with great energy and determination. They contributed largely to our success in this part of the field.

On the left of the 47th Division a Scottish Division of the New Armies (15th Division) assaulted *Loos*, Hill 70, and *Fosse 14 bis*.

The attack was admirably delivered, and in a little more than an hour parts of the division occupied *Loos* and its northern out-

skirts, Puits 14 bis and Hill 70, whilst some units had pushed on as far as Cité St. Auguste, a mile east of Hill 70

The 15th Division carried out its advance with the greatest vigour, in spite of its left flank being exposed, owing to the 1st Division on its left having been checked.

About 1 P.M. the enemy brought up strong reserves, and the advanced portions of the division at Fosse 14 bis and on the far side of Hill 70 were driven in. We had, however, secured the very substantial gain of Loos and the western portion of Hill 70.

11. At 9-30 A.M. I placed the 21st and 24th Divisions at the disposal of the General Officer commanding First Army, who at once ordered the General Officer commanding the 11th Corps to move them up in support of the attacking troops.

Between 11 A.M. and 12 noon the central brigades of these divisions filed past me at Béthune and Nœux les Mines respectively. At 11-30 A.M. the heads of both divisions were within three miles of our original trench line.

As the success of the 47th Division on the right of the 4th Corps caused me less apprehension of a gap in our line near that point, I ordered the Guards Division up to Nœux les Mines, and the 28th Division to move in a southerly direction from Bailleul.

12. The 1st Division, attacking on the left of the 15th, was unable at first to make any headway with its right brigade.

The brigade on its left (the 1st) was, however, able to get forward and penetrated into the outskirts of the village of Hulluch, capturing some gun positions on the way.

The determined advance of this brigade, with its right flank dangerously exposed, was most praiseworthy, and, combined with the action of divisional reserves, was instrumental in causing the surrender of a German detachment some 500 strong which was holding up the advance of the right brigade in the front system of trenches.

The inability of the right of this division to get forward had, however, caused sufficient delay to enable the enemy to collect local reserves behind the strong second line.

The arrangements, the planning and execution of the attack, and the conduct of the troops of the 4th Corps were most efficient and praiseworthy.

13 In the attack of the 1st Corps the 7th Division was directed on the Quarries. The 9th Division was to capture the Hohenzollern Redoubt and then to push on to Fosse 8.

The assault of the 7th Division succeeded at once, and in a very short time they had reached the western edge of the Quarries, Cité St. Elie, and even the village of Haisnes, the tendency of the action having been to draw the troops northward.

On the right of the 9th Division the 26th Brigade secured Fosse 8 after heavy fighting, and the 28th Brigade captured the front line of the German trenches east of Vermelles railway. At the latter point the fighting was extremely severe; and this brigade, suffering considerable losses, was driven back to its own trenches.

At nightfall, after a heavy day's fighting and numerous German counter-attacks, the line was, roughly, as follows:—

From the Double Crassier, south of Loos, by the western part of Hill 70, to the western exit of Hulluch; thence by the Quarries and western end of Cité St. Elie, east of Fosse 8, back to our original line.

Throughout the length of the line heavy fighting was in progress, and our hold on Fosse 8, backed as it is by the strong defences and guns of Auchy, was distinctly precarious.

Heavy rain fell throughout the day, which was very detrimental to efficient observation of fire and reconnaissance by aircraft.

In the course of the night 25th/26th September the enemy delivered a series of heavy counter-attacks along most of our new front. The majority of these were repulsed with heavy loss; but in parts of the line, notably near the Quarries, our troops were driven back a certain distance.

At 6 P.M. the Guards Division arrived at Nœux les Mines, and on the morning of the 26th I placed them at the disposal of the General Officer commanding First Army.

14. The situation at the Quarries, described above, was re-adjusted by an attack of the 7th Division on the afternoon of September 26th; and on that evening very heavy attacks delivered by the enemy were repulsed with severe loss.

On the 4th Corps front attacks on Hulluch and on the redoubt on the east side of Hill 70 were put in operation, but were anticipated by the enemy organising a very strong offensive from that

direction. These attacks drove in the advanced troops of the 21st and 24th Divisions, which were then moving forward to attack.

Reports regarding this portion of the action are very conflicting, and it is not possible to form an entirely just appreciation of what occurred in this part of the field.

At nightfall there was no change up to Hill 70, except for a small gain of ground south of Loos. From Hill 70 the line bent sharply back to the north-west as far as Loos-La Bassée Road, which it followed for a thousand yards, bearing thence north-eastward to near the west end of Hulluch. Thence northward it was the same as it had been on the previous night.

The night of September 26th/27th was as disturbed as the previous night, for many further counter-attacks were made and constant pressure was maintained by the enemy.

A dismounted cavalry brigade was thrown into Loos to form a garrison.

On this day I placed the 28th Division at the disposal of the General Officer commanding First Army.

I regret to say that Major-General Sir Thompson Capper, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., commanding 7th Division, was severely wounded on the 26th and died on the morning of the 27th. He was a most distinguished and capable leader, and his loss will be severely felt.

15. Soon after dawn on the 27th it became apparent that the brigade holding Fosse 8 was unable to maintain its position, and eventually it was slowly forced back until at length our front at this point coincided with the eastern portion of the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

I regret to say that during this operation Major-General G. H. Thesiger, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.C., commanding the 9th Division, was killed whilst most gallantly endeavouring to secure the ground which had been won.

In the afternoon of this day the Guards Division, which had taken over part of the line to the north of the 4th Corps, almost restored our former line, bringing it up parallel to and slightly west of the Lens-La Bassée Road.

This Division made a very brilliant and successful attack on Hill 70 in the afternoon. They drove the Germans off the top of the hill, but could not take the redoubt, which is on the north-east slopes below the crest. They also took the Chalk Pit which

lies north of Puits 14, and all the adjacent woods, but were unable to maintain themselves in the Puits itself, which was most effectively commanded by well-posted machine-guns.

The 47th Division on the right of the Guards captured a wood further to the south and repulsed a severe hostile counter-attack.

The 28th was passed in consolidating the ground gained and in making a certain number of internal moves of divisions, in order to give the troops rest and to enable those units whose casualties had been heavy to refill their ranks with reinforcements.

The 47th Division made a little more ground on the south, capturing one field gun and a few machine-guns.

On the evening of this day the situation remained practically unchanged.

16 The line occupied by the troops of the First Army south of the canal became now very much extended by the salient with which it indented the enemy's line.

The French 10th Army had been very heavily opposed, and I considered that the advance they were able to make did not afford sufficient protection to my right flank.

On representing this to General Joffre he was kind enough to ask the Commander of the northern group of the French Armies to render me assistance.

General Foch met these demands in the same friendly spirit which he has always displayed throughout the course of the whole campaign, and expressed his readiness to give me all the support he could.

On the morning of the 28th we discussed the situation, and the General agreed to send the 9th French Corps to take over the ground occupied by us extending from the French left up to and including that portion of Hill 70 which we were holding, and also the village of Loos.

This relief was commenced on the 30th September, and completed on the two following nights.

17. During the 29th and 30th September and the first days of October fighting was almost continuous along the northern part of the new line, particularly about the Hohenzollern Redoubt and neighbouring trenches, to which the enemy evidently attached great value. His attacks, however, invariably broke down with very heavy loss under the accurate fire of our infantry and artillery.

The Germans succeeded in gaining some ground in and about the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but they paid heavily for it in the losses they suffered.

Our troops all along the front were busily engaged in consolidating and strengthening the ground won, and the efficient and thorough manner in which this work was carried out reflects the greatest credit upon all ranks. Every precaution was made to deal with the counter-attack which was inevitable.

During these operations the weather has been most unfavourable, and the troops have had to fight in rain and mud and often in darkness. Even these adverse circumstances have in no way affected the magnificent spirit continually displayed alike by officers and men. In the Casualty Clearing and Dressing Stations, of which I visited a great number during the course of the action, I found nothing but the most cheery optimism among the wounded.

I have to deplore the loss of a third most valuable and distinguished General of Division during these operations.

On the afternoon of 2nd October Major-General F. D. V. Wing, C. B., commanding the 12th Division, was killed.

18. On the afternoon of 8th October our expectations in regard to a counter-attack were fulfilled. The enemy directed a violent and intense attack all along the line from Fosse 8 on the north to the right of the French 9th Corps on the south. The attack was delivered by some twenty-eight battalions in first line, with larger forces in support, and was prepared by a very heavy bombardment from all parts of the enemy's front.

At all parts of the line except two the Germans were repulsed with tremendous loss, and it is computed on reliable authority that they left some eight to nine thousand dead lying on the battlefield in front of the British and French trenches.

On the right the attack succeeded in making a small and unimportant lodgment on the Double Crassier held by the French; whilst on the left the trench held by troops of the Guards Division to the north-east of the Hohenzollern Redoubt was temporarily captured. The latter was, however, speedily retaken, and at midnight on the 9th October the line held by the First Army was identically the same as that held before the enemy's attack started.

The main enemy attacks on the front held by our troops had been against the 1st Division in the neighbourhood of the Chalk Pit and the Guards Division in the neighbourhood of the Hohen-

zollern Redoubt. Both attacks were repulsed, and the enemy lost heavily from machine-gun and artillery fire

From subsequent information it transpired that the German attack was made by about twelve battalions against the line Loos-Chalk Pit, and that a subsidiary attack by six to eight battalions was made from the direction of the Hohenzollern Redoubt against the Guards Division

Some eight or ten German battalions were directed against the French 9th Corps

19. The position assaulted and carried with so much brilliancy and dash by the 1st and 4th Corps on 25th September was an exceptionally strong one. It extended along a distance of some 6,500 yards, consisted of a double line, which included works of considerable strength, and was a network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Some of the dug-outs and shelters formed veritable caves thirty feet below the ground, with almost impenetrable head cover. The enemy had expended months of labour upon perfecting these defences.

The total number of prisoners captured during these operations amounted to 57 officers and 3,000 other ranks. Material which fell into our hands included 26 field-guns, 40 machine-guns and 3 minenwerfer.

I deeply regret the heavy casualties which were incurred in this battle, but in view of the great strength of the position, the stubborn defence of the enemy, and the powerful artillery by which he was supported, I do not think they were excessive. I am happy to be able to add that the proportion of slightly wounded is relatively very large indeed.

20. Since the date of my last despatch the Army has received strong reinforcements, and every reinforcement has had its quota of Field Artillery. In addition, numerous batteries of heavy guns and howitzers have been added to the strength of the heavy artillery. The arrival of these reinforcements in the field has tested the capacity of the Artillery as a whole to expand to meet the requirements of the Army, and to maintain the high level of efficiency that has characterised this arm throughout the campaign. Our enemy may have hoped, not perhaps without reason, that it would be impossible for us, starting from such small beginnings, to build up an efficient Artillery to provide for the very large expansion of the Army. If he entertained such hopes, he has now good reason to know that they have not been justified by the result.

The efficiency of the Artillery of the New Armies has exceeded all expectations, and during the period under review excellent services have been rendered by the Territorial Artillery.

The necessity to denude the old batteries of Regular Horse and Field Artillery of officers and non-commissioned officers, in order to provide for the expansion referred to, has not in any way impaired their efficiency, and they continue to set an example to all by their high standard and devotion to duty

I must give a special word of praise to the officers and rank and file of the Royal Garrison Artillery for the admirable way in which they have accustomed themselves to the conditions of active service in the field, to which for the most part they were unaccustomed, and for the manner in which they have applied their general knowledge of gunnery to the special problems arising in trench warfare. The excellence of their training and the accuracy of their shooting have, I feel sure, made a marked impression on the enemy.

21. The work of the Artillery during the daily life in the trenches calls for increasing vigilance and the maintenance of an intricate system of communications in a thorough state of efficiency in order that the guns may be ever ready to render assistance to the infantry when necessity arises. A high standard of initiative is also required in order to maintain the moral ascendancy over the enemy, by impeding his working parties, destroying his works, and keeping his artillery fire under control.

To the many calls upon them the Artillery has responded in a manner that is altogether admirable.

In the severe offensive actions that have taken place it is not too much to say that the first element of success has been the artillery preparation of the attack. Only when this preparation has been thorough have our attacks succeeded. It is impossible to convey in a despatch an adequate impression of the amount of care and labour involved in the minute and exact preparations that are the necessary preliminaries of a bombardment preparatory to an attack in a modern battle.

The immense number of guns that it is necessary to concentrate, the amount of ammunition to be supplied to them, and the diversity of the tasks to be carried out, demand a very high order of skill in organisation and technical professional knowledge

22. The successful attacks at Hooge on 9th August and of the First Army on 25th September show that our Artillery officers

possess the necessary talents and the rank and file the necessary skill and endurance to ensure success in operations of this character.

Moreover, the repulse of the enemy's attack on 8th October in the neighbourhood of Loos and Hulluch with such heavy losses shows the capacity of the Artillery to concentrate its fire promptly and effectively at a moment's notice for the defence of the front.

I cannot close these remarks on the Artillery without expressing my admiration for the work of the observing officers and the men who work with them. Carrying out their duties, as they do, in close proximity to the front line in observing stations, that are the special mark of the enemy's guns, they are constantly exposed to fire, and are compelled to carry on their work, involving the use of delicate instruments and the making of nice calculations, in circumstances of the greatest difficulty and danger. That they have never failed in their duties, and that they have suffered very heavy casualties in performing them, are to their lasting credit and honour.

The work of the Artillery in co-operation with the Royal Flying Corps continues to make most satisfactory progress, and has been most highly creditable to all concerned.

The new weapons that have been placed in the field during the period under review have more than fulfilled expectations, and the enemy must be well aware of their accuracy and general efficiency.

23 I have on previous occasions called your Lordship's attention to the admirable work of the Corps of the Royal Engineers.

This work covers a very wide field, demanding a high standard of technical knowledge and skill, as well as unflagging energy; and throughout the supreme test of war these qualities have never been found wanting, thus reflecting the greatest credit on the organisation of the Corps as a whole, and on the training of the officers and men individually.

The spirit which is imbued in all ranks from the base ports to the front trenches and beyond is the same.

No matter where or how the *personnel* of the Corps has been employed, devotion to duty and energy have been ever present.

In this despatch I wish particularly to draw attention to the work of the Field Units and Army Troops Companies, which must almost invariably be performed under the most trying circum-

stances by night as well as by day. Demanding qualities of whole-hearted courage and self-sacrifice, combined with sound judgment and instant action, the work of officers, non-commissioned officers and men has been beyond all praise.

The necessity for skilled labour at the front has been so continuous that Royal Engineer units have frequently been forced to forego those periods of rest which at times it has been possible to grant to other troops; but, in spite of this, they have responded loyally to every call on their services.

Notwithstanding the heavy casualties sustained by all ranks, the esprit de corps of the Royal Engineers is such that the new material is at once animated by the same ideals, and the same devotion to duty is maintained.

24. I desire to call your Lordship's attention to the splendid work carried out by the Tunnelling Companies. These companies, officered largely by mining engineers, and manned by professional miners, have devoted themselves whole-heartedly to the dangerous work of offensive and defensive mining, a task ever accompanied by great and unseen dangers.

It is impossible within the limits of a despatch to give any just idea of the work of these units, but it will be found, when their history comes to be written, that it will present a story of danger, of heroism, and of difficulties surmounted worthy of the best traditions of the Royal Engineers, under whose general direction their work is carried out.

25. Owing to the repeated use by the enemy of asphyxiating gases in their attacks on our positions, I have been compelled to resort to similar methods; and a detachment was organised for this purpose, which took part in the operations commencing on the 25th September for the first time.

Although the enemy was known to have been prepared for such reprisals, our gas attack met with marked success, and produced a demoralising effect in some of the opposing units, of which ample evidence was forthcoming in the captured trenches.

The men who undertook this work carried out their unfamiliar duties during a heavy bombardment with conspicuous gallantry and coolness; and I feel confident in their ability to more than hold their own should the enemy again resort to this method of warfare.

26. I would again call your Lordship's attention to the work of the Royal Flying Corps.

Throughout the summer, notwithstanding much unfavourable weather, the work of co-operating with the Artillery, photographing the positions of the enemy, bombing their communications and reconnoitring far over hostile territory has gone on unceasingly.

The volume of work performed steadily increases; the amount of flying has been more than doubled during this period. There have been more than 240 combats in the air, and in nearly every case our pilots have had to seek the enemy behind his own lines, where he is assisted by the fire of his movable anti-aircraft guns; and in spite of this they have succeeded in bringing down four of the German machines behind our trenches and at least twelve in the enemy's lines, and many more have been seen to dive to earth in a damaged condition or to have retired from the fight. On one occasion an officer of the Royal Flying Corps engaged four enemy machines and drove them off, proceeding on his reconnaissance. On another occasion two officers engaged six hostile machines and disabled at least one of them.

Artillery observation and photography are two of the most trying tasks the Royal Flying Corps is called upon to perform, as our airmen must remain for long periods within easy range of the enemy's anti-aircraft guns.

The work of observation for the guns from aeroplanes has now become an important factor in artillery fire, and the personnel of the two arms work in the closest co-operation.

As evidence of the dangers our flying officers are called upon to face I may state that on one occasion a machine was hit in no fewer than 300 places soon after crossing the enemy's lines, and yet the officer successfully carried out his mission.

The Royal Flying Corps has on several occasions carried out a continuous bombing of the enemy's communications descending to 500 feet and under in order to hit moving trains on the railway. This has in some cases been kept up day after day, and, during the operations at the end of September, in the space of five days nearly six tons of explosives were dropped on moving trains, and are known to have practically wrecked five, some containing troops, and to have damaged the main railway line in many different places.

For the valuable work carried out by the Royal Flying Corps I am greatly indebted to their commander, Brigadier-General H. M. Trenchard, C.B., D.S.O., A.-D.-C.

27. Throughout the campaign the financial requirements of the Army have been successfully met by the Army Pay Department. The troops have been paid, and all claims against the Army discharged, with unbroken regularity, and the difficulties inseparable from a foreign banking system and a strange currency have been overcome.

The work of the department has been greatly assisted by the Bank of France, the administration of which has spared no effort to help.

28. While the circumstances of this campaign have brought no exceptional strain on horses, great credit is due to all concerned for the excellent arrangements in the Remount Dépôts and Veterinary Hospitals.

29. I am pleased to be able once more to report very favourably on the divisions of the New Armies which have arrived in this country since the date of my last report.

It is evident that great trouble and much hard work have been expended on these units during training at home, and it is found that they have received such sound teaching that a short period of instruction in trench life under fire soon enables them to take their places with credit beside their acclimatised comrades of the older formations.

30. The Territorial Force units have continued to merit the favourable remarks I have made on them in previous despatches, and have taken a prominent part in many of the active operations in which the Army has been engaged.

31. A new Division has been sent from Canada and has joined the Army in the field. The material of which it is composed is excellent; and this Division will, I am convinced, acquit itself as well in face of the enemy as the 1st Canadian Division has always done.

32. During the period under report I have been very glad once more to receive the Prime Minister at my Headquarters, as well as the Secretary of State for War.

The Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of Militia and Defence of Canada also came to France for a few days and visited the troops of the Canadian Contingent.

The Chief Rabbi paid a short visit to the front and interested himself in the members of the large Jewish community now serving with the Army in the field.

33 I cannot conclude the account of these operations without expressing the deep admiration felt by all ranks of the Army under my command for the splendid part taken by our French Allies in the battle which opened on 25th September. Fortified positions of immense strength, upon which months of skill and labour had been expended, and which extended for many miles, were stormed and captured by our French comrades with a bravery and determination which went far to instil hope and spirit into the Allied Forces.

The large captures of men and material which fell into their hands testified to the completeness of their victory.

The close co-operation between the two Armies of the Allied Powers, which has been so marked a feature throughout the whole campaign, has been as prominent as ever in the work of the last three weeks.

I have already referred to the cordial and willing help rendered by General Foch in the support of the 9th French Corps, and I have also once again to express my deep indebtedness to General d'Urbal, commanding the 10th French Army, operating on my right; and to General Hely d'Oissel, commanding the French Forces in the North.

34. The part taken by the troops of His Majesty the King of the Belgians was very effective in holding the enemy in front of them to his positions.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

J D. P FRENCH, FIELD-MARSHAL,

Commanding-in-Chief, The British Army in France,

SIR JOHN FRENCH'S FAREWELL ORDER.

Sir John French issued the following Order of the Day to the troops on his retirement from the command in France :—

In relinquishing the Command of the British Army in France, I wish to express to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, with whom I have been so closely associated during the last 16 months, my heartfelt sorrow in parting with them before the campaign, in which we have been so long engaged together, has been brought to a victorious conclusion.

I have, however, the firmest conviction that such a glorious ending to their splendid and heroic efforts is not far distant, and I shall watch their progress towards this final goal with intense interest, but in the most confident hope.

The success so far attained has been due to the indomitable spirit, dogged tenacity which knows no defeat, and the heroic courage so abundantly displayed by the rank and file of the splendid Army which it will ever remain the pride and glory of my life to have commanded during over 16 months of incessant fighting.

Regulars and Territorials, Old Army and New Army, have ever shown these magnificent qualities in equal degree.

From my heart I thank them all.

At this sad moment of parting, my heart goes out to those who have received lifelong injury from wounds, and I think with sorrow of that great and glorious host of my beloved comrades who have made the greatest sacrifice of all by laying down their lives for their country

In saying good-bye to the British Army in France, I ask them once again to accept this expression of my deepest gratitude and heartfelt devotion towards them, and my earnest good wishes for the glorious future which I feel to be assured.

(Signed) J D. P FRENCH, FIELD-MARSHAL,

Commanding-in-Chief, British Army in France.

18th December 1915.

THE LANDING OPERATIONS IN GALLIPOLI.

From the General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,

20th May 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including the 5th May

In accordance with your Lordship's instructions I left London on 13th March with my General Staff by special train to Marseilles, and thence in H M S Phaeton to the scene of the naval operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, reaching Tenedos on the 17th March shortly afternoon.

Immediately on arrival I conferred with Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet; General d'Amade, Commanding the French Corps Expéditionnaire; and Contre Amiral Guepratte, in command of the French Squadron. At this conference past difficulties were explained to me, and the intention to make a fresh attack on the morrow was announced. The amphibious battle between warships and land fortresses took place next day, the 18th of March. I witnessed these stupendous events, and thereupon cabled your Lordship my reluctant deduction that the co-operation of the whole of the force under my command would be required to enable the Fleet effectively to force the Dardanelles.

By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a south-westerly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a breadth of 12 miles. The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape

Suvla The precipitous fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Gaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dag, beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kild Bahr; whilst the toe is that promontory five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.

The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to be.—

- (1) Sariban Mountain, running up in a succession of almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.
- (2) Kild Bahr plateau, which rises, a natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the Aegean.
- (3) Achi Baba, a hill 600 feet in height, dominating at long field gun range what I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that from Achi Baba to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and confused underfeatures.

Generally speaking the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W), and half a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles farther up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same cliffs (Y 2), and yet another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham, by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort. By Eski Hissarlık, on the east of Morto Bay (S), was another small beach, which was, however, dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good landing-places on either side of Gaba Tepe. Farther to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and

difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success, whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force.

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.

Before doing anything else I had to redistribute the troops on the transports to suit the order of their disembarkation. The bulk of the forces at my disposal had, perforce, been embarked without its having been possible to pay due attention to the operation upon which I now proposed that they should be launched.

Owing to lack of facilities at Mudros redistribution in that harbour was out of the question. With your Lordship's approval, therefore, I ordered all the transports, except those of the Australian Infantry Brigade and the details encamped at Lemnos Island, to the Egyptian ports. On the 24th March I myself, together with the General Staff, proceeded to Alexandria, where I remained until 7th April, working out the allocation of troops to transports in minutest detail as a prelude to the forthcoming disembarkation. General d'Amade did likewise.

On the 1st April the remainder of the General Headquarters, which had not been mobilised when I left England, arrived at Alexandria.

Apart from the rearrangements of the troops, my visit to Egypt was not without profit, since it afforded me opportunities of conferring with the G O C Egypt and of making myself acquainted with the troops, drawn from all parts of the French Republic and of the British Empire, which it was to be my privilege to command.

By the 7th April my preparations were sufficiently advanced to enable me to return with my General Staff to Lemnos, so as to put the finishing touches to my plan in close co-ordination with the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet.

The covering force of the 29th Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V, W, X and Y. Of these, V, W and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5-30 A.M. after half an hour's bombardment from the Fleet.

The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and, escorted by the 3rd Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory, the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships

and Colonel Koe was obliged to entrench. From this time onward his small force was subjected to strong and repeated attacks, supported by field artillery, and owing to the configuration of the ground, which here drops inland from the edge of the cliff, the guns of the supporting ships could render him little assistance. Throughout the afternoon and all through the night the Turks made assault after assault upon the British line. They threw bombs into the trenches, and, favoured by darkness, actually led a pony with a machine-gun on its back over the defences and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted.

The British repeatedly counter-charged with the bayonet, and always drove off the enemy for the moment, but the Turks were in a vast superiority and fresh troops took the place of those who temporarily fell back. Colonel Koe (since died of wounds) had become a casualty early in the day, and the number of officers and men killed and wounded during the incessant fighting was very heavy. By 7 A.M. on the 26th only about half of the King's Own Scottish Borderers remained to man the entrenchment made for four times their number. These brave fellows were absolutely worn out with continuous fighting, it was doubtful if reinforcements could reach them in time, and orders were issued for them to be re-embarked. Thanks to H.M.S. Goliath, Dublin, Amethyst and Sapphire, thanks also to the devotion of a small rearguard of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which kept off the enemy from lining the cliff, the re-embarkation of the whole of the troops, together with the wounded, stores, and ammunition, was safely accomplished, and both battalions were brought round the southern end of the peninsula. Deplorable as the heavy losses had been, and unfortunate as was the tactical failure to make good so much ground at the outset, yet, taking the operation as it stood, there can be no doubt it has contributed greatly to the success of the main attack, seeing that the plucky stand made at Y beach had detained heavy columns of the enemy from arriving at the southern end of the peninsula during what it will be seen was a very touch-and-go struggle.

The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by 8 yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the 1st Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from H.M.S. Implacable in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 A.M.

H M S Implacable, with a boldness much admired by the Army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the 87th Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the 87th Brigade, had been wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.

The landing on V beach was planned to take place on the following lines :—

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the Fleet, three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier River Clyde (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The River Clyde had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the River Clyde was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine-guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area

contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about 4 feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.

At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the Fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action, but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the *débris* of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine-guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond with the intentions of the Commander. The River Clyde came into position off Sedd-el-Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were

approaching the landing-place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the River Clyde to pour forth her living freight, but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way, but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporised pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade-Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 A.M., about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but few

of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine-guns on the River Clyde, which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a camber just east of Sedd-el-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to Y beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach, but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major had been killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment,

had been killed and the Adjutant had been wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the River Clyde, had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril.

Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organise an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately General Hunter-Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Sedd-el-Bahr village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie, and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 A.M. They encountered a most stubborn opposition and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well concealed riflemen and machine-guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gun fire, they pushed forward and soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village, under a galling fire. And now when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 P.M.

The beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously, but, in the centre, a number of

sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing-place into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine-guns also were cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about 20 feet broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finger feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of 25th April.

The landing at W had been entrusted to the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 A.M. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the 88th Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore, and, fired at from right, left, and centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly reformed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114 whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 A.M. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured

About 9-30 A.M. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade-Major of the 86th Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General Staff 29th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organise a further advance.

At 2 P.M. after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered and by 4 P.M. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating

defences of the enemy. To help them out the 86th Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 fort grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell, the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the 2nd London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24th, escorted by the 2nd Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2-30 A.M. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, H.M.S. Queen (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3-30 A.M. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows and at 4-10 A.M. the destroyers were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have

silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.

The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Sarı Bair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—every one remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So

vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.

This attack was carried out by the 3rd Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair MacLagan, D.S.O. The 1st and 2nd Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 P.M., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field guns, to stand farther out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position with its right about a mile north of Gaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the 9th and 10th Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

From 11 A.M. to 3 P.M. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the 3rd Brigade and the left of the 2nd Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6-30 P.M. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the 3rd Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the 8th Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24/25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.

It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine-guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganisation could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges—in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on the 28th and 29th April.

On the night of May 2nd a bold effort was made to seize a commanding knoll in front of the centre of the line. The enemy's enfilading machine-guns were too scientifically posted, and 800 men were lost without advantage beyond the infliction of a corresponding loss to the enemy. On May 4th an attempt to seize Gaba Tepe was also unsuccessful, the barbed wire here being something beyond belief. But a number of minor operations have been carried out, such as the taking of a Turkish observing station; the strengthening of entrenchments, the reorganisation of units, and the perfecting of communication with the landing-place. Also a constant strain has been placed upon some of the best troops of the enemy, who, to the number of 24,000, are constantly kept fighting and being killed and wounded freely, as the Turkish sniper is no match for the Kangaroo shooter, even at his own game.

The assistance of the Royal Navy, here as elsewhere, has been invaluable. The whole of the arrangements have been in Admiral Thursby's hands, and I trust I may be permitted to say what a trusty and powerful friend he has proved himself to be to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.

Concurrently with the British landings a regiment of the French Corps was successfully disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French Fleet, and remained ashore till the morning of the 26th, when they were re-embarked. 500 prisoners were captured by the French on this day.

This operation drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V beach on to Kum Kale, and contributed largely to the success of the British landings.

On the evening of the 26th the main disembarkation of the French Corps was begun, V beach being allotted to our Allies for this purpose, and it was arranged that the French should hold the portion of the front between the telegraph wire and the sea.

The following day I ordered a general advance to a line stretching from Hill 236 near Eski Hissarlık Point to the mouth of the stream two miles north of Tekke Burnu. This advance, which was commenced at midday, was completed without opposition, and the troops at once consolidated their new line. The forward movement relieved the growing congestion on the beaches, and by giving us possession of several new wells afforded a temporary solution to the water problem, which had hitherto been causing me much anxiety.

By the evening of the 27th the Allied forces had established themselves on a line some three miles long, which stretched from the mouth of the nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu, to Eski Hissarlık Point, the three brigades of the 29th Division less two battalions on the left and in the centre, with four French battalions on the right, and beyond them again the South Wales Borderers on the extreme right.

Owing to casualties this line was somewhat thinly held. Still, it was so vital to make what headway we could before the enemy recovered himself and received fresh reinforcements that it was decided to push on as quickly as possible. Orders were therefore issued for a general advance to commence at 8 A.M. next day.

The 29th Division were to march on Krithia, with their left brigade leading, the French were directed to extend their left in conformity with the British movements and to retain their right on the coast-line south of the Kereves Dere.

The advance commenced at 8 A.M. on the 28th, and was carried out with commendable vigour, despite the fact that from the moment of landing the troops had been unable to obtain any proper rest.

The 87th Brigade, with which had been incorporated the Drake Battalion, Royal Naval Division, in the place of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and South Wales Borderers, pushed on rapidly, and by 10 A.M. had advanced some two miles. Here the further progress of the Border Regiment was barred by a strong work on the left flank. They halted to concentrate and make dispositions

to attack it, and at that moment had to withstand a determined counter-attack by the Turks. Aided by heavy gun fire from H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, they succeeded in beating off the attack, but they made no further progress that day, and when night fell entrenched themselves on the ground they had gained in the morning.

The Inniskilling Fusiliers, who advanced with their right on the Krithia ravine, reached a point about three-quarters of a mile south-west of Krithia. This was, however, the farthest limit attained, and later on in the day they fell back into line with other corps.

The 88th Brigade on the right of the 87th progressed steadily until about 11-30 A.M., when the stubbornness of the opposition, coupled with a dearth of ammunition, brought their advance to a standstill. The 86th Brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Casson, which had been held in reserve, were thereupon ordered to push forward through the 88th Brigade in the direction of Krithia.

The movement commenced at about 1 P.M., but though small reconnoitring parties got to within a few hundred yards of Krithia, the main body of the brigade did not get beyond the line held by the 88th Brigade. Meanwhile, the French had also pushed on in the face of strong opposition along the spurs on the western bank of the Kereves Dere, and had got to within a mile of Krithia with their right thrown back and their left in touch with the 88th Brigade. Here they were unable to make further progress; gradually the strength of the resistance made itself felt, and our Allies were forced during the afternoon to give ground.

By 2 P.M. the whole of the troops with the exception of the Drake Battalion had been absorbed into the firing line. The men were exhausted, and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transport available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing-places.

Hopes of getting a footing on Achi Baba had now perforce to be abandoned—at least for this occasion. The best that could be expected was that we should be able to maintain what we had won, and when at 3 P.M. the Turks made a determined counter-attack with the bayonet against the centre and right of our line,

even this seemed exceedingly doubtful. Actually a partial retirement did take place. The French were also forced back, and at 6 P.M. orders were issued for our troops to entrench themselves as best they could in the position they then held, with their right flank thrown back so as to maintain connexion with our Allies. In this retirement the right flank of the 88th Brigade was temporarily uncovered, and the Worcester Regiment suffered severely.

Had it been possible to push in reinforcements in men, artillery, and munitions during the day, Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.

Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose.

For, after all, we had pushed forward quite appreciably on the whole. The line eventually held by our troops on the night of the 28th ran from a point on the coast three miles north-west of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French south-east to the coast.

Much inevitable mixing of units of the 86th and 88th Brigades had occurred during the day's fighting, and there was a dangerous *reentrant* in the line at the junction of the 87th and 88th Brigades near the Krithia nullah. The French had lost heavily, especially in officers, and required time to reorganise.

The 29th April was consequently spent in straightening the line, and in consolidating and strengthening the positions gained. There was a certain amount of artillery and musketry fire, but nothing serious.

Similarly, on the 30th, no advance was made, nor was any attack delivered by the enemy. The landing of the bulk of the artillery was completed, and a readjustment of the line took place, the portion held by the French being somewhat increased.

Two more battalions of the Royal Naval Division had been disembarked, and these, together with three battalions of the 88th Brigade withdrawn from the line, were formed into a reserve.

This reserve was increased on the 1st May by the addition of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, which released the three

battalions of the 88th Brigade to return to the trenches. The Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient had disembarked the whole of their infantry and all but two of their batteries by the same evening

At 10 P.M. the Turks opened a hot shell fire upon our position, and half an hour later, just before the rise of the moon, they delivered a series of desperate attacks. Their formation was in three solid lines, the men in the front rank being deprived of ammunition to make them rely only upon the bayonet. The officers were served out with coloured Bengal lights to fire from their pistols, red indicating to the Turkish guns that they were to lengthen their range, white that our front trenches had been stormed, green that our main position had been carried. The Turkish attack was to crawl on hands and knees until the time came for the final rush to be made. An eloquent hortative was signed by Von Zowensern and addressed to the Turkish rank and file who were called upon, by one mighty effort, to fling us all back into the sea.

“ Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him !

“ We shall not retire one step, for, if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish !

“ Soldiers ! The world is looking at you ! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt ! ”

The first momentum of this ponderous onslaught fell upon the right of the 86th Brigade, an unlucky spot, seeing all the officers thereabouts had already been killed or wounded. So when the Turks came right on without firing and charged into the trenches with the bayonet they made an ugly gap in the line. This gap was instantly filled by the 5th Royal Scots (Territorials), who faced to their flank and executed a brilliant bayonet charge against the enemy, and by the Essex Regiment detached for the purpose by the Officer Commanding 88th Brigade. The rest of the British line held its own with comparative ease, and it was not found necessary to employ any portion of the reserve. The storm next broke in fullest violence against the French left, which was held by the Senegalese. Behind them were two British Field Artillery Brigades and a Howitzer Battery. After several charges and counter-charges the Senegalese began to give ground, and a company of the Worcester Regiment and some gunners were sent forward to hold the gap. Later, a second company of the Worcester Regiment was also sent up, and the position was then main-

tained for the remainder of the night, although about 2 A.M. it was found necessary to despatch one battalion Royal Naval Division to strengthen the extreme right of the French.

About 5 A.M. a counter-offensive was ordered and the whole line began to advance. By 7-30 A.M. the British left had gained some 500 yards, and the centre had pushed the enemy back and inflicted heavy losses. The right also had gained some ground in conjunction with the French left, but the remainder of the French line was unable to progress. As the British centre and left were now subjected to heavy cross-fire from concealed machine-guns, it was found impossible to maintain the ground gained, and therefore, about 11 A.M., the whole line withdrew to its former trenches.

The net result of the operations was the repulse of the Turks and the infliction upon them of very heavy losses. At first we had them fairly on the run, and had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine-guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba. As it was, all brigades reported great numbers of dead Turks in front of their lines, and 350 prisoners were left in our hands.

On the 2nd, during the day, the enemy remained quiet, burying his dead under a red crescent flag, a work with which we did not interfere. Shortly after 9 P.M., however, they made another attack against the whole Allied line, their chief effort being made against the French front, where the ground favoured their approach. The attack was repulsed with loss.

During the night 3rd/4th the French front was again subjected to a heavy attack, which they were able to repulse without assistance from my general reserve.

The day of the 4th was spent in reorganisation, and a portion of the line held by the French, who had lost heavily during the previous night's fighting, was taken over by the 2nd Naval Brigade. The night passed quietly.

During the 5th the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Division was disembarked and placed in reserve behind the British left.

Orders were issued for an advance to be carried out next day, and these and the three days' battle which ensued will be dealt with in my next despatch.

The losses, exclusive of the French, during the period covered by this despatch, were, I regret to say, very severe, numbering —

177 Officers and 1,990 other ranks killed.

412 Officers and 7,807 other ranks wounded

13 Officers and 3,580 other ranks missing.

From a technical point of view it is interesting to note that my Administrative Staff had not reached Mudros by the time when the landings were finally arranged. All the highly elaborate work involved by these landings was put through by my General Staff working in collaboration with Commodore Roger Kayes, C B , M.V.O., and the Naval Transport Officers allotted for the purpose by Vice-Admiral de Robeck. Navy and Army carried out these combined duties with that perfect harmony which was indeed absolutely essential to success.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck, to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy was transformed by the Commander of the Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Sedd-él-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le Général d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W R Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C B , C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Gaba Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C B., D S O , was tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful, and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a Commander of troops in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C B., is the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON, GENERAL,

Commanding Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

THE NAVY'S PART IN THE LANDING.

ADMIRALTY, *August 16th, 1915.*

The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral John M. de Robeck, reporting the landing of the Army on the Gallipoli Peninsula, 25th-26th April 1915 —

TRIAD, *July 1st, 1915*

SIR,—I have the honour to forward herewith an account of the operations carried out on the 25th and 26th April 1915, during which period the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was landed and firmly established in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

The landing commenced at 4-20 A.M. on 25th. The general scheme was as follows :—

Two main landings were to take place, the first at a point just north of Gaba Tepe, the second on the southern end of the peninsula. In addition a landing was to be made at Kum Kale, and a demonstration in force to be carried out in the Gulf of Xeros near Bulair.

The night of the 24th-25th was calm and very clear, with a brilliant moon, which set at 3 A.M.

The first landing, north of Gaba Tepe, was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral C. F. Thursby, C.M.G. His squadron consisted of the following ships :—

Battleships.	Cruiser	Destroyers	Seaplane Carrier.
Queen London Prince of Wales Triumph Majestic	Bacchante — Trawlers 15	Beagle Bulldog Foxhound Scourge Colne Usk Chelmer Ribble	Ark Royal. — Balloon Ship. Manica.

To Queen, London, and Prince of Wales was delegated the duty of actually landing the troops, to Triumph, Majestic, and Bacchante the duty of covering the landing with gun fire

In this landing a surprise was attempted. The first troops to be landed were embarked in the battleships Queen, London, and Prince of Wales

The squadron then approached the land at 2-58 A. M. at a speed of 5 knots. When within a short distance of the beach selected for landing the boats were sent ahead. At 4-20 A. M. the boats reached the beach and a landing was effected.

The remainder of the infantry of the covering force were embarked at 10 P. M., 24th

The troops were landed in two trips, the operation occupying about half an hour, this in spite of the fact that the landing was vigorously opposed, the surprise being only partially effected

The disembarkation of the main body was at once proceeded with. The operations were somewhat delayed owing to the transports having to remain a considerable distance from the shore in order to avoid the howitzer and field guns' fire brought to bear on them and also the fire from warships stationed in the Narrows, Chanak

The beach here was very narrow and continuously under shell fire. The difficulties of disembarkation were accentuated by the necessity of evacuating the wounded, both operations proceeded simultaneously. The service was one which called for great determination and coolness under fire, and the success achieved indicates the spirit animating all concerned. In this respect I would specially mention the extraordinary gallantry and dash shown by the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade (Colonel E. G. Sinclair MacLagan, D. S. O.), who formed the covering force. Many individual acts of devotion to duty were performed by the personnel of the Navy, these are dealt with below. Here I should like to place on record the good service performed by the vessels employed in landing the second part of the covering force; the seamanship displayed and the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on the beach is deserving of the highest praise

On the 26th the landing of troops, guns and stores continued throughout the day; this was a most trying service, as the enemy kept up an incessant shrapnel fire, and it was extremely difficult to locate the well-concealed guns of the enemy. Occasional bursts

of fire from the ships in the Narrows delayed operations somewhat, but these bursts of fire did not last long, and the fire from our ships always drove the enemy's ships away.

The enemy heavily counter-attacked, and though supported by a very heavy shrapnel fire he could make no impression on our line which was every minute becoming stronger. By nightfall on the 26th April our position north of Gaba Tepe was secured.

The landing at the southern extremity of the Gallipoli peninsula was carried out under the orders of Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C M G., M. V O, his squadron consisting of the following ships :—

Battleships.	Cruisers.	Fleet Sweepers	Trawlers.
Swiftsure Implacable Cornwallis Albion Vengeance Lord Nelson Prince George	Euryalus Talbot Minerva Dublin	6	14

Landings in this area were to be attempted at five different places; the conditions at each landing varied considerably. The position of beaches is given below.—

Position of Beach—"Y" beach, a point about 7,000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. "X" beach, 1,000 yards north-east of Cape Tekeh. "W" beach, Cape Tekeh—Cape Helles. "V" beach, Cape Helles—Sedd-el-Bahr. Camber, Sedd-el-Bahr. "S" beach, Eski Hissarlık Point.

Taking these landings in the above order :—

Landing at "Y" Beach.—The troops to be first landed, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, embarked on the 24th in the Amethyst and Sapphire and proceeded with the transports Southland and Braemar Castle to a position off Cape Tekeh. At 4 A.M. the boats proceeded to "Y" beach, timing their arrival there at 5 A.M. and pulled ashore covered by fire from H.M.S. Goliath. The landing was most successfully and expeditiously carried out, the troops gaining the top of the high cliffs overlooking this beach.

without being opposed; this result I consider due to the rapidity with which the disembarkation was carried out and the well-placed covering fire from ships

The Scottish Borderers were landed in two trips, followed at once by the Plymouth Battalion Royal Marines. These troops met with severe opposition on the top of the cliffs, where fire from covering ships was of little assistance and, after heavy fighting, were forced to re-embark on the 26th. The re-embarkation was carried out by the following ships—Goliath, Talbot, Dublin, Sapphire and Amethyst. It was most ably conducted by the beach personnel and covered by the fire of the warships, who prevented the enemy reaching the edge of the cliff, except for a few snipers.

Landing at "X" Beach.—The 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers (two companies and M G Section) embarked in Implacable on 24th, which ship proceeded to a position off the landing-place, where the disembarkation of the troops commenced at 4-30 A M, and was completed at 5-15 A M.

A heavy fire was opened on the cliffs on both sides. The Implacable approached the beach, and the troops were ordered to land, fire being continued until the boats were close into the beach. The troops on board the Implacable were all landed by 7 A.M. without any casualties. The nature of the beach was very favourable for the covering fire from ships, but the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model.

Landing at "W" Beach.—The 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers embarked in Euryalus and Implacable on the 24th, who proceeded to positions off the landing-place, where the troops embarked in the boats at about 4 A.M. Shortly after 5 A.M. Euryalus approached "W" beach and Implacable "X" beach. At 5 A.M. the covering ships opened a heavy fire on the beach, which was continued up to the last moment before landing. Unfortunately this fire did not have the effect on the extensive wire entanglements and trenches that had been hoped for, and the troops, on landing at 6 A M, were met with a very heavy fire from rifles, machine-guns, and pom-poms, and found the obstructions on the beach undamaged. The formation of this beach lends itself admirably to the defence, the landing-place being commanded by sloping cliffs offering ideal positions for trenches and giving a perfect field of fire. The only weakness in the enemy's position was on the flanks, where it was just possible to land on the rocks

and thus enfilade the more important defences. This landing on the rocks was effected with great skill, and some Maxims, cleverly concealed in the cliffs and which completely enfiladed the main beach, were rushed with the bayonet. This assisted to a great extent in the success of the landing, the troops, though losing very heavily, were not to be denied and the beach and the approaches to it were soon in our possession.

The importance of this success cannot be overestimated; "W" and "V" beaches were the only two of any size in this area on which troops, other than infantry, could be disembarked, and failure to capture this one might have had serious consequences, as the landing at "V" was held up. The beach was being continuously sniped, and a fierce infantry battle was carried on round it throughout the entire day and the following night. It is impossible to exalt too highly the service rendered by the 1st Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers in the storming of the beach, the dash and gallantry displayed were superb. Not one whit behind in devotion to duty was the work of the beach personnel, who worked untiringly throughout the day and night, landing troops and stores under continual sniping. The losses due to rifle and machine-gun fire sustained by the boats' crews, to which they had not the satisfaction of being able to reply, bear testimony to the arduous nature of the service.

During the night of the 25th-26th enemy attacked continuously, and it was not till 1 P.M. on the 26th, when "V" beach was captured, that our position might be said to be secure.

The work of landing troops, guns, and stores continued throughout this period and the conduct of all concerned left nothing to be desired.

Landing at "V" Beach.—This beach, it was anticipated, would be the most difficult to capture; it possessed all the advantages for defence which "W" beach had, and in addition the flanks were strongly guarded by the old castle and village of Sedd-el-Bahr on the east and perpendicular cliffs on the west; the whole foreshore was covered with barbed wire entanglements which extended in places under the sea. The position formed a natural amphitheatre with the beach as stage.

The first landing here, as at all other places, was made in boats, but the experiment was tried of landing the remainder of the covering force by means of a collier, the River Clyde. This steamer had been specially prepared for the occasion under the

directions of Commander Edward Unwin; large ports had been cut in her sides and gangways built whereby the troops could reach the lighters which were to form a bridge on to the beach.

"V" beach was subjected to a heavy bombardment similarly to "W" beach, with the same result, *i e*, when the first trip attempted to land they were met with a murderous fire from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun, which was not opened till the boats had cast off from the steamboats.

A landing on the flanks here was impossible and practically all the first trip were either killed or wounded, a few managing to find some slight shelter under a bank on the beach, in several boats all were either killed or wounded, one boat entirely disappeared, and in another there were only two survivors. Immediately after the boats had reached the beach the River Clyde was run ashore under a heavy fire rather towards the eastern end of the beach, where she could form a convenient breakwater during future landing of stores, etc.

As the River Clyde grounded, the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore were run out ahead of the collier, but unfortunately they failed to reach their proper stations and a gap was left between two lighters over which it was impossible for men to cross, some attempted to land by jumping from the lighter which was in position into the sea and wading ashore, this method proved too costly, the lighter being soon heaped with dead and the disembarkation was ordered to cease.

The troops in the River Clyde were protected from rifle and machine-gun fire and were in comparative safety.

Commander Unwin, seeing how things were going, left the River Clyde and, standing up to his waist in water under a very heavy fire, got the lighters into position, he was assisted in this work by Midshipman G. L. Drewry, R N R, of H M.S. Hussar; Midshipman W. St A Malleson, R N, of H M S Cornwallis; Able Seaman W. C. Williams, O N. 186774 (R F.R. B 3766), and Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N. 2408A, both of H.M S. Hussar.

The bridge to the shore, though now passable, could not be used by the troops, anyone appearing on it being instantly shot down, and the men in River Clyde remained in her till nightfall.

At 9-50 A.M. Albion sent in launch and pinnace manned by volunteer crews to assist in completing bridge, which did not

quite reach beach; these boats, however, could not be got into position until dark owing to heavy fire.

It had already been decided not to continue to disembark on "V" beach, and all other troops intended for this beach were diverted to "W."

The position remained unchanged on "V" beach throughout the day, men-of-war and the maxims mounted in River Clyde doing their utmost to keep down the fire directed on the men under partial shelter on the beach.

During this period many heroic deeds were performed in rescuing wounded men in the water.

During the night of the 25th-26th the troops in River Clyde were able to disembark under cover of darkness and obtain some shelter on the beach and in the village of Sedd-el-Bahr, for possession of which now commenced a most stubborn fight.

The fight continued, supported ably by gun fire from H.M.S. Albion, until 1-24 P.M., when our troops had gained a position from which they assaulted Hill 141, which dominated the situation. Albion then ceased fire, and the hill, with old fort on top, was most gallantly stormed by the troops, led by Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, General Staff, who fell as the position was won. The taking of this hill effectively cleared the enemy from the neighbourhood of the "V" beach, which could now be used for the disembarkation of the Allied armies. The capture of this beach called for a display of the utmost gallantry and perseverance from the officers and men of both services—that they successfully accomplished their task bordered on the miraculous.

Landing on the Camber, Sedd-el-Bahr—One half company Royal Dublin Fusiliers landed here, without opposition, the Camber being "dead ground." The advance from the Camber, however, was only possible on a narrow front, and after several attempts to enter the village of Sedd-el-Bahr this half company had to withdraw after suffering heavy losses.

Landing at "De Totts" "S" Beach—The 2nd South Wales Borderers (less one company) and a detachment 2nd London Field Company R.E. were landed in boats, convoyed by Cornwallis, and covered by that ship and Lord Nelson.

Little opposition was encountered, and the hill was soon in the possession of the South Wales Borderers. The enemy attacked this position on the evening of the 25th and during the 26th, but

our troops were firmly established, and with the assistance of the covering ships all attacks were easily beaten off.

Landing at Kum Kale.—The landing here was undertaken by the French.

It was most important to prevent the enemy occupying positions in this neighbourhood, whence he could bring gun fire to bear on the transports off Cape Helles. It was also hoped that by holding this position it would be possible to deal effectively with the enemy's guns on the Asiatic shore immediately east of Kum Kale, which could fire into Sedd-el-Bahr and De Totts.

The French, after a heavy preliminary bombardment, commenced to land at about 10 A.M., and by the afternoon the whole of their force had been landed at Kum Kale. When they attempted to advance to Yem Shehr, their immediate objective, they were met by heavy fire from well-concealed trenches, and were held up just south of Kum Kale village.

During the night of the 25th-26th the enemy made several counter-attacks, all of which were easily driven off, during one of these 400 Turks were captured, their retreat being cut off by the fire from the battleships.

On the 26th, when it became apparent that no advance was possible without entailing severe losses and the landing of large reinforcements, the order was given for the French to withdraw and re-embark, which operation was carried out without serious opposition.

I now propose to make the following more general remarks on the conduct of the operations.—

From the very first the co-operation between Army and Navy was most happy, difficulties which arose were quickly surmounted, and nothing could have exceeded the tactfulness and forethought of Sir Ian Hamilton and his staff.

The loyal support which I received from Contre-Amiral E. P. A. Guepratte simplified the task of landing the Allied armies simultaneously.

The Russian Fleet was represented by H.I.R.M.S. Askold, which ship was attached to the French squadron. Contre-Amiral Guepratte bears testimony to the value of the support he received from Captain Ivanoff, especially during the landing and re-embarkation of the French troops at Kum Kale.

The detailed organisation of the landing could not be commenced until the Army Headquarters returned from Egypt on the

10th April The work to be done was very great, and the naval personnel and material available small.

Immediately on the arrival of the Army Staff at Mudros, committees, composed of officers of both services, commenced to work out the details of the landing operations, and it was due to these officers' indefatigable efforts that the expedition was ready to land on the 22nd April The keenness displayed by the officers and men resulted in a good standard of efficiency, especially in the case of the Australian and New Zealand Corps, who appear to be natural boatmen.

Such actions as the storming of the Sedd-el-Bahr position by the 29th Division must live in history for ever; innumerable deeds of heroism and daring were performed, the gallantry and absolute contempt for death displayed alone made the operations possible

At Gaba Tepe the landing and the dash of the Australian Brigade for the cliffs was magnificent--nothing could stop such men. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in this, their first battle, set a standard as high as that of any army in history, and one of which their countrymen have every reason to be proud

In closing this despatch I beg to bring to their Lordships' notice the names of certain officers and men who have performed meritorious service. The great traditions of His Majesty's Navy were well maintained, and the list of names submitted of necessity lacks those of many officers and men who performed gallant deeds unobserved and therefore unnoted This standard was high, and if I specially mention one particular action it is that of Commander Unwin and the two young officers and two seamen who assisted him in the work of establishing communication between River Clyde and the beach. Rear-Admirals R E Wemyss, C M G., M.V O , C. F. Thursby, C.M.G., and Stuart Nicholson, M V.O., have rendered invaluable service Throughout they have been indefatigable in their efforts to further the success of the operations, and their loyal support has much lightened my duties and responsibilities.

I have at all times received the most loyal support from the Commanding Officers of His Majesty's ships during an operation which called for the display of great initiative and seamanship.

Captain R. F. Phillimore, C.B., M.V O , A -D -C., as principal Beach Master, and Captain D L. Dent, as principal Naval Transport Officer, performed most valuable service.

Commander EDWARD UNWIN, R.N.

While in River Clyde, observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under a murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to save some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion.

Midshipman GEORGE L. DREWRY, R.N.R.

Assisted Commander Unwin at the work of securing the lighters under heavy rifle and maxim fire. He was wounded in the head, but continued his work and twice subsequently attempted to swim from lighter to lighter with a line.

Midshipman WILFRED ST. A. MALLESON, R.N.

Also assisted Commander Unwin, and after Midshipman Drewry had failed from exhaustion to get a line from lighter to lighter, he swam with it himself and succeeded. The line subsequently broke, and he afterwards made two further but unsuccessful attempts at his self-imposed task.

Able Seaman WILLIAM CHAS. WILLIAMS, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766).

Held on to a line in the water for over an hour under heavy fire, until killed.

Seaman R.N.R. GEORGE MCKENZIE SAMSON, O.N. 2408A

Worked on a lighter all day under fire, attending wounded and getting out lines; he was eventually dangerously wounded by maxim fire.

Lieut.-Commander RALPH B. JANVRIN, R.N.

Conducted the trawlers into Morto Bay, for the landing at "De Totts," with much skill.

This officer showed great judgment and coolness under fire, and carried out a difficult task with great success.

Lieut. John A. V. MORSE, R.N.

Assisted to secure the lighters at the bows of the River Clyde . under a heavy fire, and was very active throughout the 25th and 26th at " V " beach.

Surgeon P. B. KELLY, R.N., attached to R.N.A.S.

Was wounded in the foot on the morning of the 25th in River Clyde. He remained in River Clyde until morning of 27th, during which time he attended 750 wounded men, although in great pain and unable to walk during the last twenty-four hours.

Lieut.-Commander ADRIAN ST. V. KEYES, R.N.

General Sir Ian Hamilton reports as follows.—

" Lieutenant-Commander Keyes showed great coolness, gallantry, and ability. The success of the landing on ' Y ' beach was largely due to his good services. When circumstances compelled the force landed there to re-embark, this officer showed exceptional resource and leadership in successfully conducting that difficult operation."

I entirely concur in General Hamilton's opinion of this officer's services on the 25th-26th April

Commander WILLIAM H. COTTRELL, R.N.V.R.

This officer has organised the entire system of land communication; has laid and repaired cables several times under fire; and on all occasions shown zeal, tact, and coolness beyond praise.

The work accomplished by the destroyer flotillas fully maintained the high standard they have established in these waters.

On the 25th and 26th Wolverine (Commander O. J. Prentis) (killed in action), Scorpion (Lieut.-Commander (now Commander) A. B. Cunningham), Renard (Lieut.-Commander L. G. B. A. Campbell), Grampus (Lieut.-Commander R. Bacchus), Pincher (Lieut.-Commander H. W. Wyld), and Rattlesnake (Lieut.-Commander P. G. Wodehouse), carried out mine-sweeping operations under Captain Heneage inside the Dardanelles in a most satisfactory manner, being frequently under heavy fire. On the 26th the French sweepers Henriette (Lieut. de Vaisseau Auverny), Marius Chambon (Lieut. de Vaisseau Blanc), and Camargue (Lieut. de Vaisseau Bergeon) assisted them, Henriette doing particularly well.

Beagle (Commander (now Captain) H. R. Godfrey), Bulldog (Lieut.-Commander W. B. Mackenzie), Scourge (Lieut.-Commander H. de B. Tupper), Foxhound (Commander W. G. Howard), Colne (Commander C. Seymour), Chelmer (Lieut.-Commander (now Commander) H. T. England), Usk (Lieut.-Commander W. G. C. Maxwell), and Ribble (Lieut.-Commander R. W. Wilkinson) assisted in the disembarkation at Gaba Tepe.

Rear-Admiral Thursby reports as follows on the work accomplished by these boats :—

“ The destroyers under Captain C. P. R. Coode (Captain ‘ D ’) landed the second part of the covering force with great gallantry and expedition, and it is in my opinion entirely due to the rapidity with which so large a force was thrown on the beach that we were able to establish ourselves there ”

I entirely concur in Admiral Thursby’s remarks on the good work performed by this division

No officer could have been better served by his staff than I have been during these operations. The energy and resource of my Chief of Staff, Commodore R. J. B. Keyes, was invaluable, and, in combination with Major-General Braithwaite—Chief of the General Staff—he established a most excellent working agreement between the two services.

Captain George P. W. Hope, of Queen Elizabeth, acted as my flag Captain. His gift of organisation was of the greatest assistance in dealing with the mass of details inseparable from an operation of such magnitude.

Commander the Hon. A. R. M. Ramsay has used his sound practical knowledge of gunnery to great advantage in working out, in connection with the military, the details of gun fire from the covering ships.

Captain William W. Godfrey, R. M., a staff officer of great ability, has given me invaluable assistance throughout the operations.

I would also mention my secretary, Mr. Basil F. Hood, Acting Paymaster, and secretarial staff, whose good services under the direction and example of Mr. Edward W. Whittington-Ince, Assistant Paymaster, will form the subject of a later separate report. Also Lieut.-Commander James F. Sommerville (Fleet

Wireless Telegraph Officer), and Flag Lieutenants L. S. Ormsby-Johnson, Hugh S. Bowlby, and Richard H. L. Bevan, who have performed good service in organising with the military the inter-communication between the Allied Fleets and Armies.

I have, etc ,

J. M. DE ROBECK, VICE-ADMIRAL.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

ADMIRALTY, *August 16th, 1915.*

The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to the undermentioned Officers and men for the conspicuous acts of bravery mentioned in the despatch.—

Commander Edward Unwin, R.N.

Midshipman Wilfred St. Aubyn Malleson, R.N.

Midshipman George Leslie Drewry, R.N.R.

Able Seaman William Chas. Williams, O.N. 186774 (R.F.R. B.3766) (since killed)

Seaman R.N.R. George McKenzie Samson, O.N., 2408A

The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant-Commander (now Commander) Eric Gascoigne Robinson, R.N., for the conspicuous act of bravery specified below :—

Lieutenant-Commander Robinson on the 26th February advanced alone, under heavy fire, into an enemy's gun position, which might well have been occupied, and destroying a four-inch gun, returned to his party for another charge with which the second gun was destroyed. Lieutenant-Commander Robinson would not allow members of his demolition party to accompany him, as their white uniforms rendered them very conspicuous. Lieutenant-Commander Robinson took part in four attacks on the mine fields—always under heavy fire.

OPERATIONS IN MAY AND JUNE.

The following report from General Sir Ian Hamilton, General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, dated August 26th, was published in a supplement to the *London Gazette* of the 21st September :—

At the close of the ten days and ten nights described in my first despatch our troops had forced their way forward for some 5,000 yards from the landing places at the point of the peninsula. Opposite them lay the Turks, who since their last repulse had fallen back about half a mile upon previously prepared redoubts and entrenchments. Both sides had drawn heavily upon their stock of energy and munitions, but it seemed clear that whichever could first summon up spirit to make another push must secure at least several hundreds of yards of the debatable ground between the two fronts. And several hundred yards, whatever it might mean to the enemy, was a matter of life or death to a force crowded together under gun fire on so narrow a tongue of land. Such was the situation on the 5th of May, the date last mentioned in my despatch of the 20th of that month.

On that day I determined to continue my advance, feeling certain that even if my tired troops could not carry the formidable opposing lines they would at least secure the use of the intervening ground. Orders were forthwith issued for an attack.

The many urgent calls for reinforcements made during the previous critical fighting had forced me to disorganise and mix together several of the formations in the southern group, to the extent even of the French on our right having a British battalion holding their own extremest right. For the purpose of the impending fight it became therefore necessary to create temporarily a Composite Division, consisting of the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades (withdrawn for the purpose from the Northern Section), together with a Naval Brigade formed of the Plymouth and Drake battalions. The 29th Division was reconstituted into four brigades *i.e.*, the 88th and 87th Brigades, the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade (T.F.), and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. The French Corps Expéditionnaire was

reinforced by the 2nd Naval Brigade, and the new Composite Division formed my General Reserve

The 29th Division, whose left rested on the coast about three miles north-east of Cape Tekke, was ordered to direct its right moving on the south-east edge of Krithia, while the Corps Expéditionnaire, with the 2nd Naval Brigade, had assigned to them for their first point of attack the commanding ridge running from north to south above the Kereves Dere. A foothold upon this ridge was essential, as its capture would ensure a safe pivot on which the 29th Division could swing in making any further advance. Communication between these two sections of the attack was to be maintained by the Plymouth and Drake battalions

During the three days (6th-8th May) our troops were destined to be very severely tried. They were about to attack a series of positions scientifically selected in advance which, although not yet joined up into one line of entrenchment, were already strengthened by works on their more important tactical features

The 29th Division led off at 11 A.M., the French Corps followed suit at 11-30 A.M., every yard was stubbornly contested; some Brigades were able to advance, others could do no more than maintain themselves. Positions were carried and held, other positions were carried and lost; but, broadly, our gunners kept lengthening the fuses of their shrapnel, and by 1-30 P.M. the line had been pushed forward two to three hundred yards. Here and there this advance included a Turkish trench, but generally speaking the main enemy position still lay some distance ahead of our leading companies.

By 4-30 P.M. it became clear that we should make no more progress that day. The French Corps were held up by a strong field work. They had made good a point upon the crest line of the lower slope of the Kereves Dere ridge, but there they had come under a fire so galling that they were unable, as it turned out, to entrench until nightfall. The 88th Brigade could not carry a clump of fir trees to their front; company after company made the perilous essay, but the wood swept by hidden machine-guns proved a veritable death trap. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade also were only just barely holding on, and were suffering heavy losses from these same concealed machine-guns. The troops were ordered to entrench themselves in line and link up their flanks on either side,

At night, save for rifle fire, there was quiet along the whole British line. On the right a determined bayonet charge was made upon the French, who gave ground for the moment, but recovered it again at dawn.

Next morning (the 7th May) we opened with shrapnel upon the enemy's trenches opposite our extreme left, and at 10 A.M. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade began the attack. But our artillery had not been able to locate the cleverly sited German machine-gun batteries, whose fire rendered it physically impossible to cross that smooth glacis. Next to the right the 88th Brigade swept forward, and the 1/5th Royal Scots, well supported by artillery fire, carried the fir trees with a rush.

This time it was discovered that not only the enfilading machine-guns had made the wood so difficult to hold. Amongst the branches of the trees Turkish snipers were perched, sometimes upon small wooden platforms. When these were brought down the surroundings became much healthier. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, of the 87th Brigade, were pushed up to support the left of the 88th, and all seemed well, when, at 1-20 P.M., a strong Turkish counter-attack drove us back out of the fir clump. As an offset to this check the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers captured three Turkish trenches and a second battalion of the 87th Brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, was sent forward on the left to make these good.

At 3 P.M. the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade again reported they were definitely held up by the accurate cross-fire of batteries of machine-guns concealed in the scrub on the ridge between the ravine and the sea, batteries which also enfiladed the left flank of the 88th Brigade as it endeavoured to advance in the centre. Unless we were to acquiesce in a stalemate the moment for our effort had arrived, and a general attack was ordered for 4-45 P.M., the whole of the 87th Brigade to reinforce the 88th Brigade, and the New Zealand Brigade to support it.

Despite their exhaustion and their losses the men responded with a will. The whole force, French and British, rose simultaneously and made a rush forward. All along the front we made good a certain amount of ground, excepting only on our extreme left. For the third time British bayonets carried the fir clump in our centre, and when darkness fell the whole line (excepting always the left) had gained from 200 to 300 yards, and had occupied or passed over the first line of Turkish trenches.

The troops were now worn out; the new lines needed consolidating, and it was certain that fresh reinforcements were reaching the Turks. Balancing the actual state of my own troops against the probable condition of the Turks, I decided to call upon the men to make one more push before the new enemy forces could get into touch with their surroundings.

Orders were therefore issued to dig in at sundown on the line gained: to maintain that line against counter-attack, and to prepare to advance again next morning. The Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade was withdrawn into reserve, and its place on the left was taken by the Brigade of New Zealanders.

General Headquarters were shifted to an entrenchment on a hill in rear of the left of our line. Under my plan for the fresh attack the New Zealand Brigade was to advance through the line held during the night by the 88th Brigade and press on towards Krithia. Simultaneously, the 87th Brigade was to threaten the works on the west of the ravine, whilst endeavouring, by means of parties of scouts and volunteers, to steal patches of ground from the areas dominated by the German machine-guns.

At 10-15 A.M. heavy fire from ships and batteries was opened on the whole front, and at 10-30 A.M. the New Zealand Brigade began to move, meeting with strenuous opposition from the enemy, who had received his reinforcements. Supported by the fire of the batteries and the machine-guns of the 88th Brigade, they pushed forward on the right and advanced their centre beyond the fir trees, but could make little further progress. By 1-30 P.M. about 200 yards had been gained beyond the previously most advanced trenches of the 88th Brigade.

At this hour the French Corps reported they could not advance up the crest of the spur west of Kereves Dere till further progress was made by the British.

At 4 P.M. I gave orders that the whole line, reinforced by the 2nd Australian Brigade, would fix bayonets, slope arms, and move on Krithia precisely at 5-30 P.M.

At 5-15 P.M. the ships' guns and our heavy artillery bombarded the enemy's position for a quarter of an hour, and at 5-30 P.M. the field guns opened a hot shrapnel fire to cover the infantry advance.

The co-operation of artillery and infantry in this attack was perfect, the timing of the movement being carried out with great

and the sea, but once more the enemy machine-guns thinned the ranks of the leading companies of the South Wales Borderers, and again there was nothing for it but to give ground. But when night closed in the men of the 87th Brigade of their own accord asked to be led forward, and achieved progress to the extent of just about 200 yards. During the darkness the British troops everywhere entrenched themselves on the line gained.

On the night, the French column, last seen as it grew dark, had stormed and still held the redoubt round which the fighting had centred until then. Both General d'Amade and General Simonin had been present in person with this detachment and had rallied the Senegalese and encouraged the white troops in their exploit. With their bayonets these brave fellows of the 8th Colonials had inflicted exceedingly heavy losses upon the enemy.

The French troops whose actions have hitherto been followed belonged, all of them, to the 2nd Division. But beyond the crest of the ridge the valley of the Kereves Dere lies dead to anyone occupying my post of command. And in this area the newly-arrived Brigade of the French 1st Division had been also fighting hard. Here they had advanced simultaneously with the 2nd Division and achieved a fine success in their first rush, which was jeopardised when a battalion of Zouaves was forced to give way under a heavy bombardment. But, as in the case of the 2nd Division, the other battalions of the 1st Regiment de Marche d'Afrique, under Lieutenant-Colonel Nieger, restored the situation, and in the end the Division carried and held two complete lines of Turkish redoubts and trenches.

The net result of the three days' fighting had been a gain of 600 yards on the right of the British line and 400 yards on the left and centre. The French had captured all the ground in front of the Farm Zimmerman, as well as a redoubt, for the possession of which there had been obstinate fighting during the whole of the past three days.

This may not seem very much, but actually more had been won than at first meets the eye. The German leaders of the Turks were quick to realise the fact. From nightfall till dawn on the 9th-10th efforts were made everywhere to push us back. A specially heavy attack was made upon the French, supported by a hot cannonade and culminating in a violent hand-to-hand conflict in front of the Brigade Simonin. Everywhere the assailants were repulsed, and now for the first time I felt that we had

planted a fairly firm foothold upon the point of the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Meanwhile in the northern zone also the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps had strengthened their grip on Turkish soil. Whilst in the south we had been attacking and advancing they had been defending and digging themselves more and more firmly into those cliffs on which it had seemed at first that their foothold was so precarious.

On the 11th May, the first time for eighteen days and nights, it was found possible to withdraw the 29th Division from the actual firing line and to replace it by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, and by the 42nd Division, which had completed its disembarkation two days previously. The withdrawal gave no respite from shells, but at least the men were, most nights, enabled to sleep.

The moment lent itself to reflection, and during this breathing space I was able to realise we had now nearly reached the limit of what could be attained by mingling initiative with surprise. The enemy was as much in possession of my numbers and dispositions as I was in possession of their first line of defence; the opposing fortified fronts stretched parallel from sea to straits; there was little scope left now, either at Achi Baba or at Gaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. Advances must more and more tend to take the shape of concentrated attacks on small sections of the enemy's line after full artillery preparation. Siege warfare was soon bound to supersede manœuvre battles in the open. Consolidation and fortification of our front, improvement of approaches, selection of machine-gun emplacements and scientific grouping of our artillery under a centralised control must ere long form the tactical basis of our plans.

So soon, then, as the troops had enjoyed a day or two of comparative rest I divided my front into four sections. On the left was the 29th Division, to which the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was attached. In the left centre came the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division, on the right centre stood the Royal Naval Division, and at my right was the Corps Expéditionnaire. Thus I secured organisation in depth as well as front, enabling each division to arrange for its own reliefs, supports, and reserves, and giving strength for defence as well as attack. Hitherto the piecemeal arrival of reinforcements had forced a hand-to-mouth

procedure upon headquarters, now the control became more decentralised

Already, before the new system of local efforts had come into working order, the 29th Indian Brigade had led the way towards it by a brilliant little affair on the night of the 10th-11th May. The Turkish right rested upon the steep cliff north-east of 'Y' beach, where the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion, Royal Naval Division, had made their first landing. Since those days the enemy had converted the bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine-guns had held up the left of our attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing on this cliff on the 8th and 9th May had both of them failed.

During the night of the 10th-11th May the 6th Gurkhas started off to seize this bluff. Their scouts descended to the sea, worked their way for some distance through the broken ground along the shore, and crawled hands and knees up the precipitous face of the cliff. On reaching the top they were heavily fired on. As a surprise the enterprise had failed, but as a reconnaissance it proved very useful. On the following day Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, submitted proposals for a concerted attack on this bluff (now called Gurkha Bluff), and arrangements were made with the Navy for co-operation. These arrangements were completed on 12th May; they included a demonstration by the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division and by our artillery and the support of the attack from the sea by the guns of H. M. S. Dublin and H. M. S. Talbot. At 6-30 P.M. on the 12th May the Manchester Brigade and the 29th Divisional Artillery opened fire on the Turkish trenches, and under cover of this fire a double company of the 1/6th Gurkhas once more crept along the shore and assembled below the bluff. Then, the attention of the Turks being taken up with the bombardment, they swiftly scaled the cliffs and carried the work with a rush. The machine-gun section of the Gurkhas was hurried forward, and at 4-30 A.M. a second double company was pushed up to join the first.

An hour later these two double companies extended and began to entrench to join up their new advance left diagonally with the right of the trenches previously held by their battalion.

At 6 A.M. a third double company advanced across the open from their former front line of trenches under a heavy rifle and

machine-gun fire, and established themselves on this diagonal line between the main ravine on their right and the newly captured redoubt. The fourth double company moved up as a support, and held the former firing line.

Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all attempts on the 6th-8th was now, by stratagem, advanced nearly 500 yards. Purchased as it was with comparatively slight losses (21 killed, 92 wounded), this success was due to careful preparation and organisation by Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding 1/6th Gurkhas, and Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) F. A. Wynter, R.G.A., commanding the Artillery Group supporting the attack. The co-operation of the two cruisers was excellent, and affords another instance of the admirable support by the Navy to our troops.

On May 14th General Goumaud arrived and took over from General d'Amade the command of the Corps Expéditionnaire. As General d'Amade quitted the shores of the peninsula he received a spontaneous ovation from the British soldiers at work upon the beaches.

The second division of the Corps Expéditionnaire, commanded by General Bailloud, had now completed disembarkation.

From the time of the small local push forward made by the 6th Gurkhas on the night of the 10th-11th May until the 4th of June the troops under my command pressed against the enemy continuously by sapping, reconnaissance, and local advances, whilst, to do them justice, they (the enemy) did what they could to repay us in like coin. I have given the escalade of Gurkha Bluff as a sample; no 48 hours passed without something of the sort being attempted or achieved either by the French or ourselves.

Turning now to where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were perched upon the cliffs of Sari Bair, I must begin by explaining that their rôle at this stage of the operations was—first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them, so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle to Cape Helles, a part out of harmony with the dare-devil spirit animating those warriors from the South, and so it has come about that, as your Lordship will now see, the defensive of the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the character of an attack.

The line held during the period under review by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps formed a rough semi-circle inland from the beach of Anzac Cove, with a diameter of about 1,100 yards. The firing line is everywhere close to the enemy's trenches, and in all sections of the position sapping, counter-sapping and bomb attacks have been incessant. The shelling both of the trenches and beaches has been impartial and liberal. As many as 1,400 shells have fallen on Anzac within the hour, and these of all calibres, from 11 inches to field shrapnel. Around Quinn's Post, both above and below ground, the contest has been particularly severe. This section of the line is situated on the circumference of the Anzac semi-circle at the furthest point from its diameter. Here our fire trenches are mere ledges on the brink of a sheer precipice falling 200 feet into the valley below. The enemy's trenches are only a few feet distant.

On 9th May a night assault, supported by enfilade fire, was delivered on the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post. The trenches were carried at the point of the bayonet, troops established in them, and reinforcements sent up.

At dawn on the 10th May a strong counter-attack forced our troops to evacuate the trenches and fall back on Quinn's Post. In opposing this counter-attack our guns did great execution, as we discovered later from a Turkish officer's diary that two Turkish regiments on this date lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.

On the night of 14th-15th May a sortie was made from Quinn's Post with the object of filling in Turkish trenches in which bomb-throwers were active. The sortie, which cost us some seventy casualties, was not successful.

On 14th May Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood was slightly wounded, but, I am glad to say, he was not obliged to relinquish the command of his Corps.

On 15th May I deeply regret to say Major-General W. T. Bridges, commanding the Australian Division, received a severe wound, which proved fatal a few days later. Sincere and single-minded in his devotion to Australia and to duty, his loss still stands out even amidst the hundreds of other brave officers who have gone.

On the 18th May Anzac was subjected to a heavy bombardment from large calibre guns and howitzers. At midnight of the 18th-19th the most violent rifle and machine-gun fire yet experienced broke out along the front. Slackening from 3 A.M. to 4 A.M., it then broke out again, and a heavy Turkish column assaulted

the left of No. 2 Section This assault was beaten off with loss. Another attack was delivered before daylight on the centre of this section; it was repeated four times and repulsed each time with very serious losses to the enemy. Simultaneously a heavy attack was delivered on the north-east salient of No. 4 Section, which was repulsed and followed up, but the pressing of the counter-attack was prevented by shrapnel. Attacks were also delivered on Quinn's Post, Courtney's Post, and along the front of our right section. At about 5 A.M. the battle was fairly joined, and a furious cannonade was begun by a large number of enemy guns, including 12-inch and 9'2-inch, and other artillery that had not till then opened. By 9-30 A.M. the Turks were pressing against the left of Courtney's and the right of Quinn's Post At 10 A.M. this attack, unable to face fire from the right, swung round to the left, where it was severely handled by our guns and the machine-guns of our left section. By 11 A.M. the enemy, who were crowded together in the trenches beyond Quinn's Post, were giving way under their heavy losses.

According to prisoners' reports, 30,000 troops, including five fresh regiments, were used against us. General Liman von Sanders was himself in command.

The enemy's casualties were heavy, as may be judged from the fact that over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches. A large proportion of these losses were due to our artillery fire. Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded, including 9 officers wounded

The next four days were chiefly remarkable for the carrying through of the negotiations for the suspension of arms, which actually took place on 24th May About 5 P.M. on 20th May white flags and red crescents began to appear all along the line. In No. 2 Section a Turkish staff officer, two medical officers, and a company commander came out and were met by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding the Australian Division, half-way between the trenches.

The staff officer explained that he was instructed to arrange a suspension of arms for the removal of dead and wounded. He had no written credentials, and he was informed that neither he nor the General Officer Commanding Australian Division had the power to arrange such a suspension of arms, but that at 8 P.M. an opportunity would be given of exchanging letters on the subject, and that meanwhile hostilities would recommence after 10 minutes'

grace. At this time some stretcher parties on both sides were collecting wounded, and the Turkish trenches opposite ours were packed with men standing shoulder to shoulder two deep. Matters were less regular in front of other sections, where men with white flags came out to collect wounded. Meanwhile it was observed that columns were on the march in the valley up which the Turks were accustomed to bring up their reinforcements.

On hearing the report of these movements, General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, ordered his trenches to be manned against possible attack. As the evening drew in the enemy's concentration continued, and everything pointed to their intention of making use of the last of the daylight to get their troops into position without being shelled by our artillery. A message was therefore sent across to say that no clearing of dead or wounded could be allowed during the night, and that any negotiations for such a purpose should be opened through the proper channel and initiated before noon on the following day.

Stretcher and other parties fell back, and immediately fire broke out. In front of our right section masses of men advanced behind lines of unarmed men holding up their hands. Firing became general all along the line, accompanied by a heavy bombardment of the whole position, so that evidently this attack must have been prearranged. Musketry and machine-gun fire continued without interruption till after dark, and from then up to about 4 A.M. next day.

Except for a half-hearted attack in front of Courtney's Post, no assault was made till 1-20 A.M., when the enemy left their trenches and advanced on Quinn's Post. Our guns drove the Turks back to their trenches, and beat back all other attempts to assault. By 4-30 A.M. on 21st May musketry fire had died down to normal dimensions.

As the Turks seemed anxious to bury their dead, and as human sentiment and medical science were both of one accord in favour of such a course, I sent Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the General Staff, on 22nd May to assist Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, commanding the Army Corps, in coming to some suitable arrangements with the representative sent by Essad Pasha. The negotiations resulted in a suspension of arms from 7-30 A.M. to 4-30 P.M. on 24th May. The procedure

laid down for this suspension of arms was, I am glad to inform your Lordship, correctly observed on both sides

The burial of the dead was finished about 3 P.M. Some 3,000 Turkish dead were removed or buried in the area between the opposing lines. The whole of these were killed on or since 18th of May. Many bodies of men killed earlier were also buried.

On the 25th May, with the assistance of two destroyers of the Royal Navy, a raid was carried out on Nibrunesı Point. A fresh telephone line was destroyed and an observing station demolished.

On 28th May, at 9 P.M., a raid was made on a Turkish post overlooking the beach 1,200 yards north of Gaba Tepe, His Majesty's ship Rattlesnake co-operating. A party of 50 rifles rushed the post, killing or capturing the occupants. A similar raid was made against an enemy trench to the left of our line which cost the Turks 200 casualties, as was afterwards ascertained.

From 28th May till 5th June the fighting seemed to concentrate itself around Quinn's Post. Three enemy galleries had been detected there, and work on them stopped by counter-mines, which killed 20 Turks and injured 30. One gallery had, however, been overlooked, and at 3-30 A.M., on 29th May, a mine was sprung in or near the centre of Quinn's Post. The explosion was followed by a very heavy bomb attack, before which our left centre subsection fell back, letting in a storming party of Turks. This isolated one subsection on the left from the two other subsections on the right.

At 5-30 A.M. our counter-attack was launched, and by 6 A.M. the position had been retaken with the bayonet by the 15th Australian Infantry Battalion, led by Major Quinn, who was unfortunately killed. All the enemy in the trench were killed or captured, and the work of restoration was begun.

At 6-30 A.M. the Turks again attacked, supported by artillery, rifle, and machine-gun fire and by showers of bombs from the trenches. The fine shooting of our guns and the steadiness of the infantry enabled us to inflict upon the enemy a bloody repulse, demoralising them to such an extent that the bomb throwers of their second line flung the missiles into the middle of their own first line.

At 8-15 A.M. the attack slackened, and by 8-45 A.M. the enemy's attacks had practically ceased.

Our casualties in this affair amounted to 2 officers and 31 other ranks killed, 12 officers and 176 other ranks wounded. The enemy's losses must have been serious, and were probably equal to those sustained on 9th/10th May. Except for the first withdrawal in the confusion of the mine explosion, all ranks fought with the greatest tenacity and courage

On 30th May preparations were made in Quinn's Post to attack and destroy two enemy saps, the heads of which had reached within five yards of our fire trench. Two storming parties of 35 men went forward at 1 P.M., cleared the sap heads, and penetrated into the trenches beyond, but they were gradually driven back by Turkish counter-attacks, in spite of our heavy supporting fire, our casualties being chiefly caused by bombs, of which the enemy seem to have an unlimited supply

During 31st May close fighting continued in front of Quinn's Post.

On 1st June, an hour after dark, two Sappers of the New Zealand Engineers courageously crept out and laid a charge of guncotton against a timber and sandbag bomb-proof. The structure was completely demolished.

After sunset on the 4th of June three separate enterprises were carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. These were undertaken in compliance with an order which I had issued that the enemy's attention should be distracted during an attack I was about to deliver in the Southern Zone.—

(1) A demonstration in the direction of Gaba Tepe, the Navy co-operating by bombarding the Turkish trenches

(2) A sortie at 11 P.M. towards a trench 200 yards from Quinn's Post. This failed, but a second sortie by 100 men took place at 2-55 A.M. on 5th June and penetrated to the Turkish trench; demolished a machine-gun emplacement which enfiladed Quinn's Post, and withdrew in good order

(3) At Quinn's Post an assault was delivered at 11 P.M. A party of 60 men, accompanied by a bomb-throwing party on either flank, stormed the enemy's trench. In the assault many Turks were bayoneted and 28 captured. A working party followed up the attack and at once set to work. Meanwhile the Turkish trenches on the left of the post were heavily assailed with machine-gun fire and grenades, which drew from them a very heavy fire

After daybreak a strong bomb attack developed on the captured trench, the enemy using a heavier type of bomb than hitherto

At 6-30 A M. the trench had to be abandoned, and it was found necessary to retire to the original fire trench of the post and the bomb-proof in front of its left. Our casualties were 80; those of the enemy considerably greater.

On 5th June a sortie was made from Quinn's Post by two officers and 100 men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officer's Trench. A special party of ten men, with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales) Australian Imperial Force), made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the ten men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of five feet and another three at the same range through a loophole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained, the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were 36.

I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of the 4th of June.

From 25th May onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On the 25th May the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions crept 100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on the night of 28th/29th May the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that same night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was successful in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere.

All Turkish counter-attacks during 29th May were repulsed. On the night of 30th May two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment. But on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet.

On every subsequent night up to that of the 3rd/4th June assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches which ran from the west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea

Taking our line of battle from right to left the troops were deployed in the following order The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the 42nd (East Lancs) Division, and the 29th Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding 8th Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My General Headquarters for the day were at the command post on the peninsula.

At 8 A.M. on 4th June our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10-30 A.M. At 11 A.M. the bombardment recommenced and continued till 11-20 A.M., when a feint attack was made which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles At 11-30 A.M. all our guns opened fire and continued with increasing intensity till noon

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced.

The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French 1st Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French 2nd Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the 'Haricot,' for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.*

The 2nd Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed forward with great dash; the 'Anson' Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt which formed a salient in the enemy's line, the 'Howe' and 'Hood' Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12-15 P.M. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12-25 P.M.

The Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division advanced magnificently In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 10-30 P.M. the Brigade had carried with

a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.

On the left the 29th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the 88th Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the 88th Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the 88th Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, though the 14th Sikhs on the right flank pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the Brigade could make no headway. A company of the 6th Gurkhas on the left, skilfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the Brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left so that, if possible, a fresh attack might be organised. Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the 'Haricot.'

The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and, under cover of accurate shell fire, were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in doing so the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 P.M. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the 'Howe' and 'Hood' Battalions to enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1-30 P.M. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its original

position, the ' Collingwood ' Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1-30 P.M. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant Brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the Brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed, yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the Brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire and reinforcements were sent to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 P.M., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success.

By 6-30 P.M., therefore, the 42nd Division had to be extricated with loss from the second line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by this Brigade that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered nothing would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the 88th Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back.

At 4 P.M. under support of our artillery the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserve had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our centre, a front of nearly three miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated, not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night, except upon the trench captured by the French 1st Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400, including 11 officers; amongst these were five Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the Goeben. Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the 42nd Division under Major-General W. Douglas.

From the date of this battle to the end of the month of June the incessant attacks and counter-attacks which have so grievously swelled our lists of casualties have been caused by the determination of the Turks to regain ground they had lost, a determination clashing against our firm resolve to continue to increase our holding. Several of these daily encounters would have been the subject of a separate despatch in the campaigns of my youth and middle age, but, with due regard to proportion, they cannot even be so much as mentioned here. Only one example each from the French, British, and Australian and New Zealand spheres of action will be most briefly set down, so that your Lordship may understand the nature of the demands made upon the energies and fortitude of the troops :—

(1) At 4-30 A M on June 21st the French Corps Expéditionnaire attacked the formidable works that flank the Kereves Dere. By noon their 2nd Division had stormed all the Turkish first and second line trenches to their front, and had captured the Haricot redoubt. On their right the 1st Division took the first line of trenches, but were counter-attacked and driven out. French troops were brought up and launched upon another assault, but the Turks were just as obstinate and drove out the second party before

they had time to consolidate. At 2-45 P.M. General Gouraud issued an order that full use must be made of the remaining five hours of daylight, and that before dark these trenches must be taken and held, otherwise the gains of the 2nd Division would be sacrificed. At 6 P.M. the third assault succeeded. 600 yards of trenches remained in our hands, despite all the heavy counter-attacks made throughout the night by the enemy. In this attack the striplings belonging to the latest French drafts especially distinguished themselves by their forwardness and contempt of danger. Fifty prisoners were taken, and the enemy's casualties (mostly incurred during counter-attacks) were estimated at 7,000. The losses of the Corps Expéditionnaire were 2,500.

(2) The Turkish right had hitherto rooted itself with special tenacity into the coast. In the scheme of attack submitted by Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston, commanding 8th Army Corps, our left, pivoting upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, was to push forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If the operation was successful then, at its close, we should have driven the enemy back for a thousand yards along the coast, and the trenches of this left section of our line would be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east.

Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivotal right. Five Turkish trenches must be carried in the section nearest the sea: only two Turkish trenches in the section farthest from the sea. At 10-20 A.M. on the 28th June our bombardment began. At 10-45 A.M. a small redoubt known as the Boomerang was rushed by the Border Regiment. At 11 A.M. the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured three lines of Turkish trenches. On their right the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches allotted to them, but farther to the east; near the pivotal point the remainder of the 156th Brigade were unable to get on. Precisely at 11-30 A.M. the second attack took place. The 86th Brigade, led by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed over the trenches already captured by their comrades of the 87th Brigade, and, pushing on with great steadiness, took two more lines of trenches, thus achieving the five successive lines along the coast. This success was further improved upon by the Indian Brigade, who managed to secure, and to place into a state of defence, a spur running from the west of the farthest captured Turkish trench to the sea. Our casualties were small: 1,750 in all. The enemy suffered heavily, especially in the repeated

counter-attacks, which for many days and nights afterwards they launched against the trenches they had lost

(3) On the night of the 29th-30th June the Turks, acting, as we afterwards ascertained, under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha to drive us all into the sea, made a big attack on the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, principally on that portion of the line which was under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley. From midnight till 1-30 A.M. a fire of musketry and guns of greatest intensity was poured upon our trenches. A heavy column then advanced to the assault, and was completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. An hour later another grand attack took place against our left and left centre, and was equally cut to pieces by our artillery and rifle fire. The enemy's casualties may be judged by the fact that in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.

On the evening of this day, the 30th of June, the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force suffered grievous loss owing to the wounding of General Gouraud by a shell. This calamity, for I count it nothing less, brings us down to the beginning of the month of July.

The command of the Corps Expéditionnaire Français d'Orient was then taken over by General Bailloud, at which point I shall close my despatch.

During the whole period under review the efforts and expedients whereby a great army has had its wants supplied upon a wilderness have, I believe, been breaking world records.

The country is broken, mountainous, arid, and void of supplies; the water found in the areas occupied by our forces is quite inadequate for their needs; the only practicable beaches are small, cramped breaks in impracticable lines of cliffs; with the wind in certain quarters no sort of landing is possible; the wastage, by bombardment and wreckage, of lighters and small craft has led to crisis after crisis in our carrying capacity, whilst over every single beach plays fitfully throughout each day a devastating shell fire at medium ranges

Upon such a situation appeared quite suddenly the enemy submarines. On 22nd May all transports had to be despatched to Mudros for safety. Thenceforth men, stores, guns, horses, etc., etc., had to be brought from Mudros—a distance of 40 miles—in

fleet sweepers and other small and shallow craft less vulnerable to submarine attack. Every danger and every difficulty was doubled.

But the Navy and the Royal Engineers were not to be thwarted in their landing operations either by Nature or by the enemy, whilst the Army Service Corps, under Brigadier-General F W B Koe, and the Army Ordnance Corps, under Brigadier-General R W. M. Jackson, have made it a point of honour to feed men, animals, guns, and rifles in the fighting line as regularly as if they were only out for manœuvres on Salisbury Plain

I desire, therefore, to record my admiration for the cool courage and unfailing efficiency with which the Royal Navy, the beach personnel, the engineers, and the administrative services have carried out these arduous duties.

In addition to its normal duties the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel M G. E Bowman-Manifold, Director of Army Signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and has rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movements of General Headquarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the central telegraph office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high explosive shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003 Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within 39 minutes reopened communication by apologising for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency,

method, and even a certain quiet heroism have characterised the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.

In my three Commanders of Corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouiaud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daunt in danger and of calm in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his Chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute Commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attack, are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring, loyal assistance he has continued to render me ever since.

The thanks of everyone serving in the peninsula are due to Lieutenant-General Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of the force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again, some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life; but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

(Signed) IAN HAMILTON, GENERAL,

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

26th August 1915

THE GREAT "PUSH" TO THE NARROWS.

On the 6th January the War Office published in the shape of a special supplement to the *London Gazette* a further despatch from General Sir Ian Hamilton dealing with the operations in the Dardanelles

The text of the despatch is as follows —

WAR OFFICE, *January 6th, 1916.*

The following despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War from General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B. :—

1, HYDE PARK-GARDENS, LONDON, W.,

December 11th, 1915.

MY LORD,—For the understanding of the operations about to be described I must first set forth the situation as it appeared to me early in July.

The three days' battle of May 6th-8th had shown that neither of my forces, northern or southern, were strong enough to fight their way to the Narrows. On May 10th I had cabled asking that two fresh divisions might be sent me to enable me to press on and so prevent my attack degenerating into trench warfare. On May 17th I again cabled, saying that if we were going to be left to face Turkey on our own resources we should require two army corps additional to my existing forces at the Dardanelles. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had been sent me, but between their dates of despatch and arrival Russia had given up the idea of co-operating from the coast of the Black Sea. Thereby several Turkish divisions were set free for the Dardanelles, and the battle of June 4th, locally successful as it was, found us just as weak, relatively, as we had been a month earlier.

During June your Lordship became persuaded of the bearing of these facts, and I was promised three regular divisions plus the infantry of two Territorial divisions. The advance guard of these troops was due to reach Mudros by July 10th, by August 10th their concentration was to be complete.

Eliminating the impracticable, I had already narrowed down the methods of employing these fresh forces to one of the following four:—

- (a) Every man to be thrown on to the southern sector of the Peninsula to force a way forward to the Narrows.
- (b) Disembarkation on the Asiatic side of the Straits, followed by a march on Chanak
- (c) A landing at Enos or Ebrize for the purpose of seizing the neck of the isthmus at Bulair
- (d) Reinforcement of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, combined with a landing in Suvla Bay. Then with one strong push to capture Hill 305, and, working from that dominating point, to grip the waist of the Peninsula.

As to (a) I rejected that course—

- (1) Because there were limits to the numbers which could be landed and deployed in one confined area.
- (2) Because the capture of Krithia could no longer be counted upon to give us Achi Baba, an entirely new system of works having lately appeared upon the slopes of that mountain—works so planned that even if the enemy's western flank was turned and driven back from the coast the central and eastern portions of the mountain could still be maintained as a bastion to Kilid Bahr.
- (3) Because, if I tried to disengage myself both from Krithia and Achi Baba by landing due west of Kilid Bahr, my troops would be exposed to artillery fire from Achi Baba, the Olive Grove, and Kilid Bahr itself, the enemy's large reserves were too handy; there were not fair chances of success

As to (b), although much of the Asiatic coast had now been wired and entrenched, the project was still attractive. Thereby the Turkish forces on the peninsula would be weakened, our beaches at Cape Helles would be freed from Asiatic shells, the threat to the enemy's sea communications was obvious. But when I descended into detail I found that the expected reinforcements would not run to a double operation. I mean that, unless I could make a thorough, whole-hearted attack on the enemy in

the peninsula I should reap no advantage in that theatre from the transference of the Turkish peninsula troops to reinforce Asia, whereas, if the British forces landed in Asia were not strong enough in themselves seriously to threaten Chanak, the Turks for their part would not seriously relax their grip upon the peninsula.

To cut the land communications of the whole of the Turkish peninsular army, as in (c), was a better scheme on paper than on the spot. The naval objections appeared to my coadjutor, Vice-Admiral de Robeck, well nigh insurmountable. Already, owing to submarine dangers, all reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies had to be brought up from Mudros to Helles or Anzac by night in fleet-sweepers and trawlers. A new landing near Bulair would have added another fifty miles to the course such small craft must cover, thus placing too severe a strain upon the capacities of the flotilla. The landing promised special hazards owing to the difficulty of securing the transports and covering ships from submarine attack. Ebriye has a bad beach, and the distance to Enos, the only point suitable to a disembarkation on a large scale, was so great that the enemy would have had time to organise a formidable opposition from his garrisons in Thrace.

Four divisions at least would be required to overcome such opposition. These might now be found, but, even so, and presupposing every other obstacle overcome, it was by no manner of means certain that the Turkish army on the peninsula would thereby be brought to sue for terms, or that the Narrows would thereby be opened to the Fleet. The enemy would still be able to work supplies across the Straits from Chanak. The swiftness of the current, the shallow draft of the Turkish lighters, the guns of the forts, made it too difficult even for our dauntless submarine commanders to paralyse movement across these land-locked waters. To achieve that purpose I must bring my artillery fire to bear both on the land and water communications of the enemy.

This brings me to (d), the storming of that dominating height, Hill 305, with the capture of Maidos and Gaba Tepe as its sequel.

From the very first I had hoped that by landing a force under the heights of Sani Bair we should be able to strangle the Turkish communications to the southwards, whether by land or sea, and so clear the Narrows for the Fleet. Owing to the enemy's superiority both in numbers and in position, owing to under-

estimates of the strength of the original entrenchments prepared and sited under German direction, owing to the constant dwindling of the units of my force through wastage, owing also to the intricacy and difficulty of the terrain, these hopes had not hitherto borne fruit. But they were well founded. So much at least had clearly enough been demonstrated by the desperate and costly nature of the Turkish attacks. The Australians and New Zealanders had rooted themselves in very near to the vitals of the enemy. By their tenacity and courage they still held open the doorway from which one strong thrust forward might give us command of the Narrows.

From the naval point of view the auspices were also favourable. Suvla Bay was but one mile further from Mudros than Anzac, and its possession would ensure us a submarine-proof base and a harbour good against gales, excepting those from the southwest. There were, as might be expected, some special difficulties to be overcome, the broken, intricate country—the lack of water—the consequent anxious supply questions. Of these it can only be said that a bad country is better than an entrenched country, and that supply and water problems may be countered by careful preparation.

Before a man of the reinforcements had arrived my mind was made up as to their employment, and by means of a vigorous offensive from Anzac, combined with a surprise landing to the north of it, I meant to try and win through to Maidos, leaving behind me a well-protected line of communications starting from the bay of Suvla.

Another point which had to be fixed in advance was the date. The new troops would gain in fighting value if they could first be given a turn in the trenches. So much was clear. But the relief of the troops already holding those trenches would have been a long and difficult task for the Navy, and time was everything, seeing that everywhere the enemy was digging in as fast as he possibly could dig. Also, where large numbers of troops were to be smuggled into Anzac and another large force was to land by surprise at Suvla, it was essential to eliminate the moon. Unless the plunge could be taken by the second week in August the whole venture must be postponed for a month. The dangers of such delay were clear. To realise them I had only to consider how notably my prospects would have been bettered had these same reinforcements arrived in time to enable me to anticipate the moon of July.

Place and date having shaped themselves, the intervening period had to be filled in with as much fighting as possible. First, to gain ground; secondly, to maintain the moral ascendancy which my troops had by this time established; thirdly, to keep the enemy's eyes fixed rather upon Helles than Anzac.

Working out my ammunition allowance, I found I could accumulate just enough high explosive shell to enable me to deliver one serious attack per each period of three weeks. I was thus limited to a single effort on the large scale, plus a prescribed unceasing offensive routine, with bombing, sniping, and mining as its methods.

The action of July 12th and 13th was meant to be a sequel to the action of June 28th. That advance had driven back the Turkish right on to their second main system of defence just south of Krithia. But on my centre and right the enemy still held their forward system of trenches, and it was my intention on July 12th to seize the remaining trenches of this foremost system from the sea at the mouth of the Kereves Dere to the main Sedd-el-Bahr-Krithia road, along a front of some 2,000 yards.

On our right the attack was to be entrusted to the French Corps; on the right centre to the 52nd (Lowland) Division. On the 52nd Division's front the operation was planned to take place in two phases. Our right was to attack in the morning, our left in the afternoon. Diversions by the 29th Division on the left of the southern section and at Anzac were to take place on the same day, so as to prevent the enemy's reserves from reinforcing the real point of attack.

At 7-35 A.M., after a heavy bombardment, the troops, French and Scottish, dashed out of their trenches and at once captured two lines of enemy trenches. Pushing forward with fine élan, the 1st Division of the French Corps completed the task assigned to it by carrying the whole of the Turkish forward system of works, namely, the line of trenches skirting the lower part of the Kereves Dere. Further to the left the 2nd French Division and our 155th Brigade maintained the two lines of trenches they had gained. But on the left of the 155th Brigade the 4th Battalion, King's Own Scottish Borderers, pressed on too eagerly. They not only carried the third line of trenches, but charged on up the hill and beyond the third line, then advanced, indeed, until they came under the "feu de barrage" of the French artillery. Nothing could live under so cruel a cross-fire from friend and foe,

so the King's Own Scottish Borderers were forced to fall back, with heavy losses, to the second line of enemy trenches, which they had captured in their first rush

During this fighting telephone wires from forward positions were cut by enemy's shell fire, and here and there in the elaborate network of trenches, numbers of Turks were desperately resisting to the last. Thus though the second line of captured trenches continued to be held as a whole, much confused fighting ensued; there were retirements in parts of the line, reserves were rapidly being used up, and generally the situation was anxious and uncertain. But the best way of clearing it up seemed to be to deliver the second phase of the attack by the 157th Brigade, just as it had originally been arranged. Accordingly, after a preliminary bombardment, the 157th Brigade rushed forward under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and splendidly carried the whole of the enemy trenches allotted as their objective. Here, then, our line had advanced some 400 yards, while the 155th Brigade and the 2nd French Division had advanced between 200 and 300 yards. At six P.M. the 52nd Division was ordered to make the line good; it seemed to be fairly in our grasp.

All night long determined counter-attacks, one after another, were repulsed by the French and the 155th Brigade, but about 7.30 A.M. the right of the 157th Brigade gave way before a party of bombers, and our grip upon the enemy began to weaken.

I therefore decided that three battalions of the Royal Naval Division should reinforce a fresh attack to be made that afternoon, July 13th, on such portions of our original objectives as remained in the enemy's hands. This second attack was a success. The 1st French Division pushed their right down to the mouth of the Kereves Dere; the 2nd French Division attacked the trenches they had failed to take on the preceding day; the Nelson Battalion, on the left of the Royal Naval Division attack, valiantly advanced and made good, well supported by the artillery of the French. The Portsmouth Battalion, pressing on too far, fell into precisely the same error at precisely the same spot as did the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers on the 12th, an over-impetuosity which cost them heavy losses.

The 1-5th Royal Scots Fusiliers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Pollok-McCall; the 1-7th Royal Scots, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Peebles; the 1-5th King's Own Scottish Borderers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. J.

Millar; and the 1-6th Highland Light Infantry, commanded by Major J. Anderson, are mentioned as having specially distinguished themselves in this engagement.

Generally, the upshot of the attack was this. On our right and on the French left two lines had been captured, but in neither case was the third, or last, line of the system in their hands. Elsewhere a fine feat of arms had been accomplished, and a solid and enduring advance had been achieved, giving us far the best sited line for defence with much the best field for machine-gun and rifle fire we had hitherto obtained upon the peninsula.

A machine-gun and 200 prisoners were captured by the French; the British took a machine-gun and 329 prisoners. The casualties in the French Corps were not heavy, though it is with sorrow that I have to report the mortal wound of General Masnou, commanding the 1st Division. Our own casualties were a little over 3,000; those of the enemy about 5,000.

On July 17th Lieutenant-General Hunter Weston, commanding the 8th Corps, left the peninsula for a few days' rest, and to my very deep regret, was subsequently invalided home. I have already drawn attention to his invincible self-confidence, untiring energy, and trained ability.

As I was anxious to give the Commander of the new troops all the local experience possible I appointed Lieutenant-General Hon Sir Frederick Stopford, whose own Corps were now assembling at Mudros, temporarily to succeed Lieutenant-General Hunter Weston, but on July 24th, when General Stopford had to set to work with his own Corps, Major-General W Douglas, General Officer Commanding 42nd Division, took over temporary command of the 8th Corps; while Major-General W R Marshall, General Officer Commanding 87th Brigade, assumed temporary command of the 42nd Division.

Only one other action need be mentioned before coming to the big operations of August. On the extreme right of Anzac the flank of a work called Tasmania Post was threatened by the extension of a Turkish trench. The task of capturing this trench was entrusted to the 3rd Australian Brigade. After an artillery bombardment, mines were to be fired, whereupon four columns of fifty men each were to assault and occupy specified lengths of the trench. The regiment supplying the assaulting columns was the 11th Australian Infantry Battalion,

At 10-15 P M on July 31st the bombardment was opened Ten minutes later and the mines were duly fired The four assaulting parties dashed forward at once, crossed our own barbed wire on planks, and were into the craters before the whole of the débris had fallen Total casualties · 11 killed and 74 wounded, Turkish killed, 100.

By the time this action was fought a large proportion of my reinforcements had arrived, and, on the same principle which induced me to put General Stopford in temporary command at Helles, I relieved the war-worn 29th Division at the same place by the 13th Division under Major-General Shaw The experiences here gained, in looking after themselves, in forgetting the thousand and one details of peace soldiering and in grasping the two or three elementary rules of conduct in war soldiering, were, it turned out to be, of priceless advantage to the 13th Division throughout the heavy fighting of the following month.

And now it was time to determine a date for the great venture. The moon would rise on the morning of the 7th at about two A.M. A day or two previously the last reinforcements, the 53rd and 54th Divisions, were due to arrive. The first day of the attack was fixed for August 6th

Once the date was decided a certain amount of ingenuity had to be called into play so as to divert the attention of the enemy from my main strategical conception This—I repeat for the sake of clearness—was :

- 1 To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from land communication with Constantinople.

2. To gain such a command for my artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from sea traffic, whether with Constantinople or with Asia.

3. Incidentally, to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre

My schemes for hoodwinking the Turks fell under two heads : First, strategical diversions, meant to draw away enemy reserves not yet committed to the peninsula Secondly, tactical diversions meant to hold up enemy reserves already on the peninsula Under the first heading came a surprise landing by a force of 300 men on the northern shore of the Gulf of Xeros; demonstrations by French ships opposite Mitylene along the Syrian coast; concen-

tration at Mitylene, inspections at Mitylene by the Admiral and myself; making to order of a whole set of maps of Asia in Egypt, as well as secret service work, most of which bore fruit. Amongst the tactical diversions were a big containing attack at Helles; soundings, registration of guns, etc., by monitors between Gaba Tepe and Kum Tepe.

An attack to be carried out by Anzac on Lone Pine trenches, which lay in front of their right wing and as far distant as the local terrain would admit from the scene of the real battle. Thanks entirely to the reality and vigour which the Navy and the troops threw into them, each one of these ruses was, it so turned out, entirely successful, with the result that the Turks, despite their excellent spy system, were caught completely off their guard at dawn on August 7th.

Having settled upon the manner and time of the diversions, orders had to be issued for the main operation. And here I must pause a moment to draw your Lordship's attention to the extraordinary complexity of the staff work caused by the unique distribution of my forces. Within the narrow confines of the positions I held on the peninsula it was impossible to concentrate even as much as one-third of the fresh troops about to be launched to the attack. Nor could Mudros and Imbros combined absorb the whole of the remainder. The strategic concentration which precedes a normal battle had in my case to be a very wide dispersion. Thus, of the forces destined for my offensive, on the day before the battle, part were at Anzac, part at Imbros, part at Mudros, and part at Mitylene. These last three detachments were separated respectively by 14, 60 and 120 miles of sea from the arena into which they were simultaneously to appear.

To ensure the punctual arrival of all these masses of inexperienced troops at the right moment and spot, together with their material, munitions, stores, supplies, water, animals, and vehicles, was a prodigious undertaking demanding not only competence, but self-confidence, and I will say for my General Staff that I believe the clearness and completeness of their orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models in military academies. The need for economy in sea transport, the awkwardness and restriction of open beaches, the impossibility of landing guns, animals or vehicles rapidly—all these made it essential to create a special, separate organisation for every single unit taking part in the adventure. A pack mule

corps to supply 80,000 men had also to be organised for that specific purpose until such time as other transport could be landed.

As to water, that element of itself was responsible for a whole chapter of preparations. An enormous quantity had to be collected secretly, and as secretly stowed away at Anzac, where a high-level reservoir had to be built, having a holding capacity of 30,000 gallons, and fitted out with a regular system of pipes and distribution tanks. A stationary engine was brought over from Egypt to fill that reservoir. Petroleum tins, with a carrying capacity of 80,000 gallons, were got together, and fixed up with handles, etc., but the collision of the Moorgate with another vessel delayed the arrival of large numbers of these just as a breakdown in the stationary engine upset for a while the well-laid plan of the high-level reservoir. But Anzac was ever resourceful in face of misadventures, and when the inevitable accidents arose it was not with folded hands that they were met.

Turning to Suvla Bay, it was believed that good wells and springs existed both in the Büyük, Anafarta Valley, and in Suvla Plain. But nothing so vital could possibly be left to hearsay, and although, as it turned out, our information was perfectly correct, yet the War Office were asked to despatch with each reinforcing division water receptacles for pack transport at the rate of half a gallon per man.

The sheet-anchor on which hung the whole of these elaborate schemes was the Navy. One tiny flaw in the perfect mutual trust and confidence animating the two Services would have wrecked the whole enterprise. Experts at a distance may have guessed as much, it was self-evident to the rawest private on the spot. But with men like Vice-Admiral de Robeck, Commodore Roger Keyes, Rear-Admiral Christian and Captain F. H. Mitchell at our backs, we soldiers were secured against any such risk, and it will be seen how perfect was the precision the sailors put into their job.

The hour was now approaching, and I waited for it with as much confidence as is possible when to the inevitable uncertainties of war are to be added those of the weather. Apart from feints, the first blow was to be dealt in the southern zone.

In that theatre I had my own Poste de Commandement. But upon August 6th attacks in the south were only to form a subsidiary part of one great concerted attack. Anzac was to deliver the knock-down blow; Helles and Suvla were comple-

mentary operations. Were I to commit myself at the outset to any one of these three theatres I must lose my sense of proportion. Worse, there being no lateral communication between them, as soon as I landed at one I was cut off from present touch with both of the others. At Imbros I was forty-five minutes from Helles, forty minutes from Anzac, and fifty minutes from Suvla. Imbros was the centre of the cable system, and thence I could follow each phase of the triple attack and be ready with my two divisions of reserve to throw in reinforcements where they seemed most to be required. Therefore I decided to follow the opening moves from General Headquarters.

At Helles the attack of the 6th was directed against 1,200 yards of the Turkish front opposite our own right and right centre, and was to be carried out by the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division. Two small Turkish trenches enfilading the main advance had, if possible, to be captured simultaneously, an affair which was entrusted to the 42nd Division.

After bombardment the infantry assaulted at 5-30 P.M. On the left large sections of the enemy's line were carried, but on our centre and right the Turks were encountered in masses, and the attack, pluckily and perseveringly as it was pressed, never had any real success. The 1st Battalion Essex Regiment, in particular, forced their way into the crowded enemy trench opposite them, despite the most determined resistance, but, once in, were subjected to the heaviest musketry fire from both flanks, as well as in reverse, and were shattered by showers of bombs. Two separate resolute attacks were made by the 42nd Division, but both of them recoiled in face of the unexpected volume of fire developed by the Turks.

After dark officers' patrols were sent up to ascertain the exact position of affairs. Heavy Turkish counter-attacks were being pressed against such portions of the line we still retained. Many of our men fought it out where they stood to the last, but by nightfall none of the enemy's line remained in our possession.

Our setback was in no wise the fault of the troops. That ardour which only dashed itself to pieces against the enemy's strong entrenchments and numerous stubborn defenders on August 6th would, a month earlier, have achieved notable success. Such was the opinion of all. But the moral, as well as the strength of the Turks, had had time to rise to great heights since our last serious encounters with them on June 21st and 28th and

on July 12th On those dates all ranks had felt, as an army feels, instinctively, yet with certitude, that they had fairly got the upper hand of the enemy, and that, given the wherewithal, they could have gone on steadily advancing Now that self-same, half-beaten enemy were again making as stout a resistance as they had offered us at our original landing!

For this recovery of the Turks there were three reasons one moral, one material and one fortuitous —

- (1) The news of the enemy's advance on the eastern front had come to hand and had been advertised to us on posters from the Turkish trenches before we heard about it from home.
- (2) Two new divisions had come down south to Helles to replace those we had most severely handled.
- (3) The enemy trenches selected for our attack were found to be packed with troops, and so were their communication trenches, the reason being, as explained to us by prisoners, that the Turkish commander had meant to launch from them an attack upon us. We had, in fact, by a coincidence as strange as it was unlucky, anticipated a Turkish offensive by an hour or two at most!

Sure enough, next morning, the enemy in their turn attacked the left of the line from which our own troops had advanced to the assault A few of them gained a footing in our trenches, and were all killed or captured The remainder were driven back by fire

As the aim of my action in this southern zone was to advance if I could, but in any case to contain the enemy and prevent him reinforcing to the northwards, I persevered on the 7th with my plans, notwithstanding the counter-attack of the Turks which was actually in progress My objective this time was a double line of Turkish trenches on a front of about 800 yards between the Mal Tepe Dere and the west branch of the Kanli Dere. After a preliminary bombardment the troops of the 125th Brigade on the right, and the 129th on the left, made the assault at 9-40 A.M. From the outset it was evident that the enemy were full of fight and in great force, and that success would only be gained after a severe struggle. On the right and on the centre the first enemy line was captured, and small parties pushed on to the second line, where they were unable to maintain themselves for long. On the

left but little ground was gained, and by eleven A M what little had been taken had been relinquished. But in the centre a stiff battle raged all day up and down a vineyard some 200 yards long by 100 yards broad on the west of the Krithia road. A large portion of the vineyard had been captured in the first dash, and the East Lancashire men in this part of the field gallantly stood their ground here against a succession of vigorous counter-attacks. The enemy suffered very severely in these counter-attacks, which were launched in strength and at short intervals. Both our brigades had also lost heavily during the advance and in repelling the fierce onslaughts of the enemy, but, owing to the fine endurance of the 6th and 7th Battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers, it was found possible to hold the vineyard through the night, and a massive column of the enemy which strove to overwhelm their thinned ranks was shattered to pieces in the attempt.

On August 8th Lieut.-General Sir F J Davies took over command of the 8th Army Corps, and Major-General W. Douglas reverted to the command of the 42nd Division. For two more days his troops were called upon to show their qualities of vigilance and power of determined resistance, for the enemy had by no means yet lost hope of wresting from us the ground we had won in the vineyard. This unceasing struggle was a supreme test for battalions already exhausted by forty-eight hours' desperate fighting and weakened by the loss of so many good leaders and men, but the peculiar grit of the Lancastrians was equal to the strain, and they did not fail. Two specially furious counter-attacks were delivered by the Turks on August 8th, one at 4.40 A M and another at 8.30 P M, where again our bayonets were too much for them. Throughout the night they made continuous bomb attacks, but the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 4th East Lancashire Regiment stuck gamely to their task at the eastern corner of the vineyard. There was desperate fighting also at the northern corner, where the personal bravery of Lieutenant W T. Forshaw, 1/9th Manchester Regiment, who stuck to his post after his detachment had been relieved (an act for which he has since been awarded the V C), was largely instrumental in the repulse of three very determined onslaughts.

By the morning of August 9th things were quieter, and the sorely-tried troops were relieved. On the night of the 12th-13th the enemy made one more sudden, desperate dash for their vineyard—and got it! But, on the 13th, our bombers took the matter in hand. The Turks were finally driven out; the new fire

trenches were wired and loopholed, and have since become part of our line.

These two attacks had served their main purpose. If the local successes were not all that had been hoped for, yet a useful advance had been achieved, and not only had they given a fresh, hard fighting enemy more than he had bargained for, but they had actually drawn down Turkish reinforcements to their area. And how can a commander say enough for the troops who, aware that their task was only a subsidiary one, fought with just as much vim and resolution as if they were storming the battlements of Constantinople?

I will now proceed to tell of the assault on Chunuk Bair by the forces under General Birdwood, and of the landing of the 9th Corps in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay. The entire details of the operations allotted to the troops to be employed in the Anzac area were formulated by Lieut-General Birdwood, subject only to my final approval. So excellently was this vital business worked out on the lines of the instructions issued that I had no modifications to suggest, and all these local preparations were completed by August 6th in a way which reflects the greatest credit not only on the Corps Commander and his staff, but also upon the troops themselves, who had to toil like slaves to accumulate food, drink, and munitions of war. Alone the accommodation for the extra troops to be landed necessitated an immense amount of work in preparing new concealed bivouacs, in making interior communications, and in storing water and supplies, for I was determined to put on shore as many fighting men as our modest holding at Anzac could possibly accommodate or provision. All the work was done by Australian and New Zealand soldiers almost entirely by night, and the uncomplaining efforts of these much-tried troops in preparation are in a sense as much to their credit as their heroism in the battles that followed. Above all, the water problem caused anxiety to the Admiral, to Lieut-General Birdwood, and to myself. The troops to advance from Suvla Bay across the Anafarta valley might reckon on finding some wells—it was certain, at least, that no water was waiting for us on the crests of the ridges of Sarı Bair! Therefore, first, several days' supply had to be stocked into tanks along the beach and thence pumped up into other tanks half-way up the mountains; secondly, a system of mule transport had to be worked out, so that in so far as was humanly possible, thirst should not be allowed to overcome

the troops after they had overcome the difficulties of the country and the resistance of the enemy.

On the nights of August 4th, 5th and 6th the reinforcing troops were shipped into Anzac very silently at the darkest hours. Then, still silently, they were tucked away from enemy aeroplanes or observatories in their prepared hiding-places. The whole sea route lay open to the view of the Turks upon Achi Baba's summit and Battleship Hill. Aeroplanes could count every tent and every ship at Mudros or at Imbros. Within rifle fire of Anzac's open beach hostile riflemen were looking out across the Ægean no more than twenty feet from our opposing lines. Every modern appliance of telescope, telegraph, wireless was at the disposal of the enemy. Yet the instructions worked out at General Headquarters in the minutest detail (the result of conferences with the Royal Navy, which were attended by Brigadier-General Skeen, of General Birdwood's Staff) were such that the scheme was carried through without a hitch. The preparation of the ambush was treated as a simple matter by the services therein engaged, and yet I much doubt whether any more pregnant enterprise than this of landing so large a force under the very eyes of the enemy, and of keeping them concealed there three days, is recorded in the annals of war.

The troops now at the disposal of General Birdwood amounted in round numbers to 37,000 rifles and seventy-two guns, with naval support from two cruisers, four monitors, and two destroyers. Under the scheme these troops were to be divided into two main portions. The task of holding the existing Anzac position, and of making frontal assaults therefrom, was assigned to the Australian Division (plus the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades and two battalions of the 40th Brigade); that of assaulting the Chunuk Bair ridge was entrusted to the New Zealand and Australian Division (less the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades), to the 13th Division (less five battalions), and to the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and to the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade. The 29th Brigade of the 10th Division (less one battalion) and the 38th Brigade were held in reserve.

The most simple method of developing this complicated series of operations will be first to take the frontal attacks from the existing Anzac position, and afterwards to go on to the assault on the more distant ridges. During the 4th, 5th, and 6th of August the works on the enemy's left and centre were subjected

to a slow bombardment, and on the afternoon of August 6th an assault was made upon the formidable Lone Pine entrenchment. Although, in its essence, a diversion to draw the enemy's attention and reserves from the grand attack impending upon his right, yet, in itself, Lone Pine was a distinct step on the way across to Mardos. It commanded one of the main sources of the Turkish water-supply, and was a work, or, rather, a series of works, for the safety of which the enemy had always evinced a certain nervousness. The attack was designed to heighten this impression.

The work consisted of a strong point d'appui on the southwestern end of a plateau, where it confronted, at distances varying from 60 to 120 yards, the salient in the line of our trenches named by us the Pimple. The entrenchment was evidently very strong; it was entangled with wire, and provided with overhead cover, and it was connected by numerous communication trenches with another point d'appui known as Johnston's Jolly on the north, as well as with two other works on the east and south. The frontage for attack amounted at most to some 220 yards, and the approaches lay open to heavy enfilade fire, both from the north and from the south.

The detailed scheme of attack was worked out with care and forethought by Major-General H. B. Walker, commanding 1st Australian Division, and his thoroughness contributed, I consider, largely to the success of the enterprise.

The action commenced at 4-30 P.M. with a continuous and heavy bombardment of the Lone Pine and adjacent trenches, His Majesty's ship *Bacchante* assisting by searching the valleys to the north-east and east, and the monitors by shelling the enemy's batteries south of Gaba Tepe. The assault had been entrusted to the 1st Australian Brigade (Brigadier-General N. M. Smyth), and punctually at 5-30 P.M. it was carried out by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Australian Battalions, the 1st Battalion forming the Brigade reserve. Two lines left their trenches simultaneously, and were closely followed up by a third. The rush across the open was a regular race against death, which came in the shape of a hail of shell and rifle bullets from front and from either flank. But the Australians had firmly resolved to reach the enemy's trenches, and in this determination they became for the moment invincible. The barbed wire entanglement was reached and was

though it would be physically impossible to penetrate into the trenches. The overhead cover of stout pine beams resisted all individual efforts to move it, and the loopholes continued to spit fire. Groups of our men then bodily lifted up the beams and individual soldiers leaped down into the semi-darkened galleries amongst the Turks. By 5-47 P M the 3rd and 4th Battalions were well into the enemy's vitals, and a few minutes later the reserves of the 2nd Battalion advanced over their parapets, and driving out, killing or capturing the occupants, made good the whole of the trenches. The reserve companies of the 3rd and 4th Battalions followed, and at 6-20 P.M. the 1st Battalion (in reserve) was launched to consolidate the position.

At once the Turks made it plain, as they have never ceased to do since, that they had no intention of acquiescing in the capture of this capital work. At 7 P M a determined and violent counter-attack began, both from the north and from the south. Wave upon wave the enemy swept forward with the bayonet. Here and there a well-directed salvo of bombs emptied a section of a trench, but whenever this occurred the gap was quickly filled by the initiative of the officers and the gallantry of the men.

"The enemy allowed small respite. At 1-30 that night the battle broke out afresh. Strong parties of Turks swarmed out of the communication trenches, preceded by showers of bombs. For seven hours these counter-attacks continued. All this time consolidation was being attempted, although the presence of so many Turkish prisoners hampered movement and constituted an actual danger. In beating off these desperate counter-attacks very heavy casualties were suffered by the Australians. Part of the 12th Battalion, the reserve of the 3rd Brigade, had therefore to be thrown into the mêlée.

Twelve hours later, at 1-30 P M on the 7th, another effort was made by the enemy, lasting uninterruptedly at closest quarters till 5 P M. then being resumed at midnight and proceeding intermittently till dawn. At an early period of this last counter-attack the 4th Battalion were forced by bombs to relinquish a portion of a trench, but later on, led by their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel McNaghten, they killed every Turk who had got in.

During August 8th advantage was taken of every cessation in the enemy's bombing to consolidate. The 2nd Battalion,

which had lost its commanding officer and suffered especially severely, was withdrawn, and replaced by the 7th Battalion, the reserve to the 2nd Infantry Brigade

At 5 A.M. on August 9th the enemy made a sudden attempt to storm from the east and south-east, after a feint of fire attack from the north. The 7th Battalion bore the brunt of the shock, and handled the attack so vigorously that by 7-45 A.M. there were clear signs of demoralisation in the enemy's ranks. But although this marked the end of counter-attacks on the large scale, the bombing and sniping continued, though in less volume, throughout this day and night, and lasted till August 12th, when it at last became manifest that we had gained complete ascendancy. During the final grand assault our losses from artillery fire were large, and ever since the work has passed into our hands it has been a favourite daily and nightly mark for heavy shells and bombs.

Thus was Lone Pine taken and held. The Turks were in great force and very full of fight, yet one weak Australian brigade, numbering at the outset but 2,000 rifles, and supported only by two weak battalions, carried the work under the eyes of a whole enemy division, and maintained their grip upon it like a vice during six days' successive counter-attacks. High praise is due to Brigadier-General N. M. Smyth and to his battalion commanders. The irresistible dash and daring of officers and men in the initial charge were a glory to Australia. The stout-heartedness with which they clung to the captured ground in spite of fatigue, severe losses, and the continual strain of shell fire and bomb attacks may seem less striking to the civilian; it is even more admirable to the soldier. From start to finish, the artillery support was untiring and vigilant. Owing to the rapid, accurate fire of the 2nd New Zealand Battery, under Major Sykes, several of the Turkish onslaughts were altogether defeated in their attempts to get to grips with the Australians. Not a chance was lost by these gunners, although time and again the enemy's artillery made direct hits on their shields. The hand-to-hand fighting in the semi-obscurity of the trenches was prolonged, and very bitterly contested. In one corner eight Turks and six Australians were found lying as they had bayoneted one another. To make room for the fighting men the dead were ranged in rows on either side of the gangway. After the first violence of the counter-attacks had abated, 1,000 corpses—our own and Turkish—were dragged out from the trenches,

It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

(1) The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazlı Bert Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sarı Bair main ridge.

(2) The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damakjelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the 9th Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

(3) The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazlı Bert Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

(4) The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damakjelik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the 9th Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sarı Bair from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding

New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organised as follows.—

Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent, and New Zealand Field Troops.

Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters 40th Brigade, half the 72nd Field Company, 4th Battalion South Wales Borderers, and 5th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.

Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Divisional Reserve.—6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, and 8th Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the 39th Infantry Brigade and half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere.

The right covering column, it will be remembered, had to gain command of the Sazlı Beit Dere and the Aghyl Dere ravines, so as to let the assaulting column arrive intact within striking distance of the Chunuk Bair ridge. To achieve this object it had to clear the Turks off from their right flank positions upon Old No. 3 Post and Table Top.

Old No. 3 Post, connected with Table Top by a razor back, formed the apex of a triangular piece of hill sloping gradually down to our No. 2 and No. 3 outposts. Since its recapture from us by the Turks on May 30th working parties had done their best with unstinted material to convert this commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines of fire trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face—the only one accessible to us—and, with its head cover of solid timber baulks and its strongly revetted outworks, it dominated the approaches of both the Chailak Dere and the Sazlı Beit Dere.

Table Top is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400ft. above sea-level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite impracticable, but here and there a ravine, choked with scrub,

and under fire of enemy trenches, gives precarious foothold up the precipitous cliffs. The small plateau on the summit was honey-combed with trenches, which were connected by a communication alley with that under-feature of Sam Bai, known as Rhododendron Spur.

Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by his Majesty's ship Colne, had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at nine P.M., his Majesty's ship Colne threw the beam of her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten minutes' interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9-20 and ending precisely at 9-30 P.M.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes a searchlight's beam—came the right covering column. At 9-30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 P.M. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours!

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering columns carried on with their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 P.M. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by one o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed the river-bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but in

the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pah. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched, under cover of a heavy bombardment from His Majesty's ship Colne. No general on peace manoeuvres would ask troops to attempt so breakneck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valour can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognised in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order, hardly a rifle-shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured, as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition, and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realised.

The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beiz Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1-30 A.M. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy.

The left covering column, under Brigadier-General Travers, after marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Once the Chailak Dere was cleared the column moved by the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, disregarding the enfilade fire from sections of Bauchop's Hill still uncaptured. The rapid success of this movement was largely due to Lieutenant-Colonel

Gillespie, a very fine man, who commanded the advance guard consisting of his own regiment, the 4th South Wales Borderers, a corps worthy of such a leader. Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers until, having reached the pre-determined spot, the whole column was unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. Several Turkish trenches were captured at the bayonet's point, and by 1-30 A.M. the whole of the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of the Anzac attack.

Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Army, under good auspices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless and still in the starlight, garrisoned by those spectres of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier.

The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12-30 A.M., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pyjamas, enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction.

The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff climbing even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hair-breadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge off the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. The 4th Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.

Dawn broke and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvellous advance. The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asma Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the Farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs

to the north-east. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.

Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazlı Beit Dere. The remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not until 5.45 A.M. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. The whole force then moved up the spur, gaining touch with the left assaulting column by means of the 10th Gurkhas, in face of very heavy fire and frequent bayonet charges. Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—*i.e.*, of victory.

At 7 A.M. the 5th and 6th Gurkhas, belonging to the left assaulting column, had approached the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, whilst, on their left, the 14th Sikhs had got into touch with the 4th Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of the Asma Dere. The 4th Australian Brigade now received orders to leave half a battalion to hold the spur, and, with the rest of its strength, plus the 14th Sikhs, to assault Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). But by this time the enemy's opposition had hardened, and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by 9 A.M. the attack of the right assaulting column on Chunuk Bair was checked, and any idea of a further advance on Koja Chemen Tepe had, to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that could be done was to hold fast to the Asma Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, an attack to be supported by a fresh assault launched against Chunuk Bair itself.

At 9.30 A.M. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion as opposed to the gathering strength of the enemy's fresh troops began to tell—they had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured and strove to make ready for the night. At 11 A.M. three battalions of the 39th Infantry

Brigade were sent up from the general reserve to be at hand when needed, and at the same hour one more battalion of the reserve was despatched to the 1st Australian Division to meet the drain caused by all the desperate Lone Pine fighting.

By the afternoon the position of the two assaulting columns was unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation of Table Top, Old No 3 Post, and Bauchop Hill, which General Russell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of Mounted Rifles, so that he might have two other regiments and the Maori Contingent available to move as required. The left covering force held Damakjelik Bair. The forces which had attacked along the front of the original Anzac line were back again in their own trenches. The Lone Pine work was being furiously disputed. All had suffered heavily and all were very tired.

So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge. Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of General Birdwood when he says: "The troops had performed a feat which is without parallel."

Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their arrangements; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for their leading; but most of all, as every one of these officers will gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I omit to add that the true destroyer spirit with which His Majesty's ship Colne (Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and His Majesty's ship Chelmer (Commander Hugh T. England, R.N.) backed us up will live in the grateful memories of the Army.

In the course of this afternoon (August 7th) reconnaissances of Sari Bair were carried out and the troops were got into shape for a fresh advance in three columns, to take place in the early morning.

The columns were composed as follows:—

RIGHT COLUMN (Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston).—26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two battalions 13th Division, and the Maori contingent.

CENTRE AND LEFT COLUMNS (Major-General H. V. Cox).—21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), with 6th

Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade

The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge, the left column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Koja Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.

The attack was timed for 4-15 A.M. At the first faint glimmer of dawn observers saw figures moving against the skyline of Chunuk Bair. Were they our own men, or were they the Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted, the light grew stronger, men were seen climbing up from our side of the ridge, they *were* our own fellows—the topmost summit was ours!

On the right General Johnston's column, headed by the Wellington Battalion and supported by the 7th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the 8th Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori contingent, the whole most gallantly led by Lieut.-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one another up the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until, with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave Lieut.-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out the line to be held. The 7th Gloucesters suffered terrible losses here. The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company sergeant-major, or company quartermaster-sergeant was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates. Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank and file of an army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Yet here is at least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from midday till sunset, without *any* officers.

In the centre the 39th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Indian Brigade moved along the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge—the right moving south of the Farm on Chunuk Bair, the left up the spurs to the north-east of the Farm against a portion of the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, and the col to the

north of it. So murderous was the enemy's fire that little progress could be made, though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the Farm.

On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from the Asma Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running due north from Koca Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling to its right and advancing up the spur. Unnecessarily placed Turkish machine-guns and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for this move, and the brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually surrounded, and having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were withdrawn to their original position. Here they stood at bay, and, though the men were by now half dead with thirst and with fatigue, they bloodily repulsed attack after attack delivered by heavy columns of Turks.

So stood matters at noon. Enough had been done for honour and much ground had everywhere been gained. The expected support from Suvla hung fire, but the capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory; even the troops who had been repulsed were quite undefeated—quite full of fight—and so it was decided to hold hard as we were till nightfall, and then to essay one more grand attack, wherein the footing gained on Chunuk Bair would this time be used as a pivot.

In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine, where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water and food, no child's play, with their wretched lines of communication running within musketry range of the enemy.

That evening the New Zealand Brigade, with two regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Maoris, held Rhododendron Spur and the south-western slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. The front line was prolonged by the columns of General Cox and General Monash (with the 4th Australian Brigade). Behind the New Zealanders were the 38th Brigade in reserve, and in rear of General Monash two battalions of the 40th Brigade. The inner line was held as before, and the 29th Brigade (less two battalions) had been sent up from the general reserve, and remained still further in rear.

The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows :—

No 1 COLUMN (Brigadier-General F E Johnston) —26th Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two battalions of the 13th Division

No. 2 COLUMN (Major-General H. V Cox) —21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 4th Australian Brigade, 39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters, relieved), with the 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.

No. 3 COLUMN (Brigadier-General A H Baldwin, Commanding 38th Infantry Brigade) —Two battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades and one from the 40th Brigade.

No. 1 Column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 Column was to attack Hill Q on the Chunuk Bair ridge, and No. 3 Column was to move from the Chailak Dere, also on Hill Q. This last column was to make the main attack, and the others were to co-operate with it.

At 4-30 A.M. on August 9th the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed), took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5-15 A.M., when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to the sky. At 5-16 A.M. this tremendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence he was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to ensure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough, scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the con-

figuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm—Chunuk Bair—till 5-15 A.M. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way—through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed, careful reconnaissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the 6th South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell. These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw his chance, instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashire and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started.

But where was the main attack—where was Baldwin? When that bold but unlucky commander found he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight he deployed for attack where he stood, *i.e.*, at the Farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now his men were coming on in fine style, and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the 6th East Lancashire Regiment, together with the 10th Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chunuk Bair, and a few minutes earlier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, and, combined with them, would

have carried all before them. But the Turks by this time were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers.

The New Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung back from the height and then pressed still further down the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 Column still holding the south-west half of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And, if that summit meant so much to us, it meant even more to the Turks. For the ridge covered our landing-places, it is true, but it covered not only the Turkish beaches at Kilia, Lemna and Mardos, but also the Narrows themselves and the roads northward to Bulair and Constantinople.

That evening our line ran along Rhododendron Spur up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, where about 200 yards were occupied and held by some 800 men. Slight trenches had hastily been dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy had prevented solid work being done. The trenches in many places were not more than a few inches deep. They were not protected by wire. Also many officers are of opinion that they had not been well sited in the first instance. On the South African system the main line was withdrawn some twenty-five yards from the crest, instead of being actually on the crest-line itself, and there were not even look-out posts along the summit.

Boer skirmishers would thus have had to show themselves against the skyline before they could annoy. But here we were faced by regulars, taught to attack in mass with bayonet or bomb, and the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the true skyline in force. From Chunuk Bair the line ran down to the Farm, and almost due north to the Asma Dere southern watershed, whence it continued westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu. On the night the Australian Division was still holding its line, and Lone Pine was still being furiously attacked. The 1st Australian Brigade was now reduced from 2,900 to 1,000, and the total casualties up to 8 P.M. on the 9th amounted to about 8,500. But the troops were still in extraordinarily good heart, and nothing could damp their

keenness The only discontent shown was by men who were kept in reserve.

During the night of the 9th-10th, the New Zealand and New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved For three days and three nights they had been ceaselessly fighting. They were half-dead with fatigue. Their lines of communication, started from sea-level, ran across trackless ridges and ravines to an altitude of 800ft., and were exposed all the way to snipers' fire and artillery bombardment. It had become imperative, therefore, to get them enough food, water, and rest; and for this purpose it was imperative also to withdraw them. Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two battalions of the 13th Division, which were connected by the 10th Hampshire Regiment with the troops at the Farm. General Sir William Birdwood is emphatic on the point that the nature of the ground is such that there was no room on the crest for more than this body of 800 to 1,000 rifles.

The two battalions of the New Army chosen to hold Chunuk Bair were the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment. The first of these arrived in good time and occupied the trenches. Even in the darkness their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Levinge, recognised how dangerously these trenches were sited, and he began at once to dig observation posts on the actual crest and to strengthen the defences where he could. But he had not time given him to do much. The second battalion, the Wiltshires, were delayed by the intricate country. They did not reach the edge of the entrenchment until 4 A.M., and were then told to lie down in what was believed, erroneously, to be a covered position.

At daybreak on Tuesday, August 10th, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair-Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then, at 5-30 A.M., were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous mass of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column, which had to

give ground and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses

Now it was our turn. The warships and the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mounted Artillery Brigade, and the 69th Brigade Royal Field Artillery were getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge gaps were torn through their formation, and an iron rain fell on them as they tried to reform in the gullies.

Not here only did the Turks pay dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued to move up Battleship Hill under heavy and accurate fire from our guns, and still they kept topping the ridges and pouring down the western slopes of the Chunuk Bair as if determined to regain everything they had lost. But once they were over the crest they became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns, naval and military, but also to a battery of ten machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which played upon their serried ranks at close range until the barrels were red-hot. Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these ten machine-guns; and, of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line, only the merest handful ever struggled back to their own side of Chunuk Bair.

At this same time strong forces of the enemy (forces which I had reckoned would have been held back to meet our advance from Suvla Bay) were hurled against the Farm and the spurs to the north-east, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced, and the troops driven clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied by Staff Captain Street, who was there supervising the transport of food and water. Without a word, unhesitatingly, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged again into the midst of that series of struggles in which generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat.

So desperate a battle cannot be described. The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood. Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper and all their gallant men achieved great

glory. On this bloody field fell Brigadier-General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Cæsar's Camp at Ladysmith. There, too, fell Brigadier-General Cooper, badly wounded; and there, too, fell Lieut.-Colonel M H Nunn, commanding the 9th Worcestershire Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel H G Levinge, commanding the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and Lieut.-Colonel J. Carden, commanding the 5th Wiltshire Regiment.

Towards this supreme struggle the absolute last two battalions from the General Reserve were now hurried, but by 10 A M the effort of the enemy was spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, leaving a track of corpses behind them, and by night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turks was left upon our side of the slope.

That same day, August 10th, two attacks, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, were delivered on our positions along the Asma Dere and Damakjelik Bair. Both were repulsed with heavy loss by the 4th Australian Brigade and the 4th South Wales Borderers, the men of the New Army showing all the steadiness of veterans. Sad to say, the Borderers lost their intrepid leader, Lieut.-Colonel Gillespie, in the course of this affair.

By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000 and included a very large proportion of officers. The 13th Division of the New Army under Major-General Shaw had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten commanding officers out of thirteen had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The Warwicks and the Worcesters had lost literally every single officer. The old German notion that no unit would stand a loss of more than 25 per cent had been completely falsified. The 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division had lost more than twice that proportion, and, in spirit, were game for as much more fighting as might be required. But physically, though Birdwood's forces were prepared to hold all they had got, they were now too exhausted to attack—at least until they had rested and reorganised. So far they had held on to all they had gained, excepting only the footholds on the ridge between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, momentarily carried by the Gurkhas, and the salient of Chunuk Bair itself, which they had retained for forty-eight hours. Unfortunately, these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as they seemed, were worth, according to the ethics of war, 10,000

lives, for by their loss or retention they just marked the difference between an important success and a signal victory

At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they would have turned the scale. But each time the water troubles made me give up the idea, all ranks at Anzac being reduced to one pint a day. True thirst is a sensation unknown to the dwellers in cool, well-watered England. But at Anzac, when mules with water "pakhals" arrived at the front, the men would rush up to them in swarms, just to lick the moisture that had exuded through the canvas bags. It will be understood, then, that until wells had been discovered under the freshly-won hills, the reinforcing of Anzac by even so much as a brigade was unthinkable

The grand coup had not come off. The Narrows were still out of sight and beyond field-gun range. But this was not the fault of Lieut.-General Birdwood or any of the officers and men under his command. No mortal can command success; Lieut.-General Birdwood had done all that mortal man can do to deserve it. The way in which he worked out his instructions into practical arrangements and dispositions upon the terrain reflect high credit upon his military capacity. I also wish to bring to your Lordship's notice the valuable services of Major-General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division. He had under him at one time a force amounting to two divisions, which he handled with conspicuous ability. Major-General F. C. Shaw, commanding 13th Division, also rose superior to all the trials and tests of these trying days. His calm and sound judgment proved to be of the greatest value throughout the arduous fighting I have recorded.

As for the troops, the joyous alacrity with which they faced danger, wounds, and death, as if they were some new form of exciting recreation, has astonished me—old campaigner as I am. I will say no more, leaving Major-General Godley to speak for what happened under his eyes.—"I cannot close my report," he says, "without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian units had been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies had only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them had not been

previously under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army."

Although the Sari Bair ridge was the key to the whole of my tactical conception, and although the temptation to view this vital Anzac battle at closer quarters was very hard to resist, there was nothing in its course or conduct to call for my personal intervention.

The conduct of the operations which were to be based upon Suvla Bay was entrusted to Lieut-General the Hon Sir F. Stopford. At his disposal was placed the 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of the 10th Division.

We believed that the Turks were still unsuspecting about Suvla, and that their only defences near that part of the coast were a girdle of trenches round Lala Baba and a few unconnected lengths of fire trench on Hill 10 and on the hills forming the northern arm of the bay. There was no wire. Inland a small work had been constructed on Yilghin Burnu (locally known as Chocolate Hills), and a few guns had been placed upon these hills, as well as upon Ismail Oglu Tepe, whence they could be brought into action either against the beaches of Suvla Bay or against any attempt from Anzac to break out northwards and attack Chunuk Bair. The numbers of the enemy allotted for the defence of the Suvla and Ejelmer areas (including the troops in the Anafarta villages, but exclusive of the general reserves in rear of the Sari Bair) were supposed to be under 4,000. Until the Turkish version of these events is in our hands it is not possible to be certain of the accuracy of this estimate. All that can be said at present is that my Intelligence Department were wonderfully exact in their figures as a rule, and that, in the case in question, events, the reports made by prisoners, etc., seem to show that the forecast was correct.

Arrangements for the landing of the 9th Corps at Suvla were worked out in minute detail by my General Headquarters Staff in collaboration with the staff of Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and every precaution was taken to ensure that the destination of the troops was kept secret up to the last moment.

Whilst concentrated at the island of Imbros the spirit and physique of the 11th Division had impressed me very favourably. They were to lead off the landing. From Imbros they were to be

ferried over to the peninsula in destroyers and motor-lighters. Disembarkation was to begin at 10-30 P M., half an hour later than the attack on the Turkish outposts on the northern flank at Anzac, and I was sanguine enough to hope that the elaborate plan we had worked out would enable three complete brigades of infantry to be set ashore by daylight. Originally it had been intended that all three brigades should land on the beach immediately south of Nibrunesi Point, but in deference to the representations of the Corps Commander I agreed, unfortunately, as it turned out, to one brigade being landed inside the bay

The first task of the 9th Corps was to seize and hold the Chocolate and Ismail Oglu Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of Suvla Bay. If the landing went off smoothly, and if my information regarding the strength of the enemy were correct, I hoped that these hills, with their guns, might be well in our possession before daybreak. In that case I hoped, further, that the first division which landed would be strong enough to picket and hold all the important heights within artillery range of the bay, when General Stopford would be able to direct the remainder of his force, as it became available, through the Anafartas to the east of the Sarı Bair, where it should soon smash the mainspring of the Turkish opposition to Anzacs.

On July 22nd I issued secret instructions and tables showing the number of craft available for the 9th Corps Commander, their capacity, and the points whereat the troops could be disembarked; also what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores could be landed simultaneously. The allocation of troops to the ships and boats was left to General Stopford's own discretion, subject only to naval exigencies, otherwise the order of the disembarkation might not have tallied with the order of his operations.

The factors governing the hour of landing were: First, that no craft could quit Kephalos Bay before dark (about 9 P.M.), secondly, that nothing could be done which would attract the attention of the enemy before 10 P M, the moment when the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position were to be rushed.

General Stopford next framed his orders on these secret instructions, and after they had received my complete approval he proceeded to expound them to the General Officer Commanding 11th Division and General Officer Commanding 10th Division, who came over from Mudros for the purpose.

As in the original landing, the luck of calm weather favoured us, and all the embarkation arrangements at Kephalos were carried out by the Royal Navy in their usual ship-shape style. The 11th Division was to be landed at three places, designated and shown on the map as A, B, and C. Destroyers were told off for these landing-places, each destroyer towing a steam lighter and picket-boat. Every light was to be dowsed, and as they neared the shore the destroyers were to slip their motor-lighters and picket-boats, which would then take the beach and discharge direct on to it. The motor-lighters were new acquisitions since the first landing, and were to prove the greatest possible assistance. They moved five knots an hour under their own engines, and carried 500 men, as well as stores of ammunition and water. After landing their passengers they were to return to the destroyers, and in one trip would empty them also. Ketches with service launches and transport lifeboats were to follow the destroyers and anchor at the entrance of the bay, so that in case of accidents or delays to any one of the motor-lighters a picket-boat could be sent at once to a ketch to pick up a tow of lifeboats and take the place of a disabled motor-lighter. These ketches and tows were afterwards to be used for evacuating the wounded.

HIS Majesty's ship *Endymion* and His Majesty's ship *Theseus*, each carrying a thousand men, were also to sail from Imbros, after the destroyers, and, lying off the beach, were to discharge their troops directly the motor-lighters—three to each ship—were ready to convey the men to the shore, *i.e.*, after they had finished disembarking their own loads and those of the destroyers. When this was done—*i.e.*, after three trips—the motor-lighters would be free to go on transporting guns, stores, mules, *etc.*

The following crafts brought up the rear :—

- 1 Two ketches, each towing four horse-boats carrying four 18-pounder guns and twenty-four horses.
2. One ketch, towing horse-boats with forty horses.
- 3 The sloop *Aster*, with 500 men, towing a lighter containing eight mountain guns.
4. Three ketches, towing horse-boats containing eight 18-pounder guns and seventy-six horses

Water-lighters, towed by a tank steamer, were also timed to arrive at A beach at daylight. When they had been emptied they were to return at once to Kephalos to refill from the parent water-ship.

A specially fitted-out steamer, the Prah, with stores (shown by our experience of April 25th to be most necessary)—*i.e.*, water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, entrenching tools, and all ordnance stores requisite for the prompt development of wells or springs—was also sent to Suvla.

So much detail I have felt bound, for the sake of clearness, to give in the body of my despatch. The further detail, showing numbers landed, etc., will be found in the appendix and tables attached. (Not published.)

When originally I conceived the idea of these operations, one of the first points to be weighed was that of the water-supply in the Büyük Anafarta valley and the Suvla plain. Experience at Anzac had shown quite clearly that the whole plan must be given up unless a certain amount of water could be counted upon, and, fortunately, the information I received was reassuring. But in case of accidents, and to be on the safe side, so long ago as June had I begun to take steps to counter the chance that we might, from one cause or another, find difficulty in developing the wells. Having got from the War Office all that they could give me, I addressed myself to India and Egypt, and eventually from these three sources I managed to secure portable receptacles for 100,000 gallons, including petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags, and pakhals.

Supplementing these were lighters and water-ships, all under naval control. Indeed, by arrangement with the Admiral, the responsibility of the Army was confined to the emptying of the lighters and the distribution of the water to the troops, the Navy undertaking to bring the full lighters to the shore to replace the empty ones, thus providing a continuous supply.

Finally, 3,700 mules, together with 1,750 water-carts, were provided for Anzac and Suvla—this in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. Representatives of the Director of Supplies and Transport at Suvla and Anzac were sent to allot the transport which was to be used for carrying up whatever was most needed by units ashore, whether water, food or ammunition.

This statement, though necessarily brief, will, I hope, suffice to throw some light upon the complexity of the arrangements

thought out beforehand in order, so far as was humanly possible, to combat the disorganisation, the hunger and the thirst which lie in wait for troops landing on a hostile beach.

On the evening of August 6th the 11th Division sailed on its short journey from Imbros (Kephalos) to Suvla Bay and, meeting with no mischance, the landing took place, the brigades of the 11th Division getting ashore practically simultaneously; the 32nd and 33rd Brigades at B and C beaches, the 34th at A beach

The surprise of the Turks was complete. At B and C the beaches were found to be admirably suited to their purpose, and there was no opposition. The landing at A was more difficult, both because of the shoal water and because there the Turkish pickets and sentries—the normal guardians of the coast—were on the alert and active. Some of the lighters grounded a good way from the shore, and men had to struggle towards the beach in as much as four feet six inches of water. Ropes in several instances were carried from the lighters to the shore to help to sustain the heavily accoutred infantry. To add to the difficulties of the 34th Brigade the lighters came under flanking rifle fire from the Turkish outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. The enemy even, knowing every inch of the ground, crept down in the very dark night on to the beach itself, mingling with our troops and getting between our firing line and its supports. Fortunately the number of these enterprising foes was but few, and an end was soon put to their activity on the actual beaches by the sudden storming of Lala Baba from the south. This attack was carried out by the 9th West Yorkshire Regiment and the 6th Yorkshire Regiment, both of the 32nd Brigade, which had landed at B beach and marched up along the coast. The assault succeeded at once and without much loss, but both battalions deserve great credit for the way it was delivered in the inky darkness of the night.

The 32nd Brigade was now pushed on to the support of the 34th Brigade, which was held up by another outpost of the enemy on Hill 10 (117 R and S), and it is feared that some of the losses incurred here were due to misdirected fire. While this fighting was still in progress the 11th Battalion Manchester Regiment, of the 34th Brigade, was advancing northwards in very fine style, driving the enemy opposed to them back along the ridge of the Karakol Dagħ towards the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Beyond doubt these Lancashire men earned much distinction, fighting with great pluck and grit against an enemy not very numerous, perhaps, but having

an immense advantage in knowledge of the ground. As they got level with Hill 10 it grew light enough to see, and the enemy began to shell. No one seems to have been present who could take hold of the two brigades, the 32nd and 34th, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack. Consequently there was confusion and hesitation, increased by gorse fires lit by hostile shell, but redeemed, I am proud to report, by the conspicuously fine, soldierly conduct of several individual battalions. The whole of the Turks locally available were by now in the field, and they were encouraged to counter-attack by the signs of hesitation, but the 9th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 11th Manchester Regiment took them on with the bayonet, and fairly drove them back in disorder over the flaming Hill 10.

As the infantry were thus making good, the two Highland mountain batteries and one battery, 59th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, were landed at B Beach. Day was now breaking, and with the dawn sailed into the bay six battalions of the 10th Division, under Brigadier-General Hill, from Mitylene.

Here, perhaps, I may be allowed to express my gratitude to the Royal Navy for their share in this remarkable achievement, as well as a very natural pride at staff arrangements, which resulted in the infantry of a whole division and three batteries being landed during a single night on a hostile shore, whilst the arrival of the first troops of the supporting division, from another base distant 120 miles, took place at the very psychological moment when support was most needed, namely, at break of dawn.

The intention of the Corps Commander was to keep the 10th Division on the left, and with it to push on as far forward as possible along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt towards the heights above Ejelmer Bay. He wished, therefore, to land these six battalions of the 10th Division at A beach, and, seeing Brigadier-General Hill, he told him that as the left of the 34th Brigade was being hard pressed he should get into touch with General Officer Commanding 11th Division, and work in support of his left until the arrival of his own Divisional General. But the naval authorities, so General Stopford reports, were unwilling, for some reason not specified, to land these troops at A beach, so that they had to be sent in lighters to C beach, whence they marched by Lala Baba to Hill 10, under fire. Hence were caused loss, delay, and

fatigue. Also the angle of direction from which these fresh troops entered the fight was not nearly so effective

The remainder of the 10th Division, three battalions (from Mudros), and with them the General Officer Commanding, Lieut.-General Sir B. Mahon, began to arrive, and the naval authorities having discovered a suitable landing place near Ghazi Baba, these battalions were landed there, together with one battalion of the 31st Brigade, which had not yet been sent round to C beach. By this means it was hoped that both the brigades of the 10th Division would be able to rendezvous about half a mile to the north-west of Hill 10.

After the defeat of the enemy round and about Hill 10, they retreated in an easterly direction towards Sulajık and Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, followed by the 34th and 32nd Brigades of the 11th Division and by the 31st Brigade of the 10th Division, which had entered into the fight, not, as the Corps Commander had intended, on the left of the 11th Division, but between Hill 10 and the Salt Lake. I have failed in my endeavours to get some live human detail about the fighting which followed, but I understand from the Corps Commander that the brunt of it fell upon the 31st Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division, which consisted of the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the last-named battalion being attached to the 31st Brigade.

By the evening General Hammersley had seized Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hills) after a fight for which he specially commends the 6th Lincoln Regiment and the 6th Border Regiment. At the same time he reported that he was unable to make any further progress towards the vital point, Ismail Oglu Tepe. At nightfall his brigade and the 31st Brigade were extended from about Hetman Chair through Chocolate Hills,* Sulajık, to near Kuchuk Anafarta Ova.

This same day Sir B. Mahon delivered a spirited attack along the Kiretch Tepe ridge, in support of the 11th Battalion Manchester Regiment, and, taking some small trenches en route, secured and established himself on a position extending from the sea about 135 p., through the high ground about the p. of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, to about 135 Z 8. In front of him, on the ridge, he reported the enemy to be strongly entrenched. The 6th Royal Munster Fusiliers have been named as winning special distinction here. The whole advance was well carried out by the Irishmen

over difficult ground against an enemy—500 to 700 Gendarmerie—favoured by the lie of the land.

The weather was very hot, and the new troops suffered much from want of water. Except at the southernmost extremity of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, there was no water in that part of the field, and although it existed in some abundance throughout the area over which the 11th Division was operating, the Corps Commander reports that there was no time to develop its resources. Partly this seems to have been owing to the enemy's fire; partly to a want of that *nous* which stands by as second nature to the old campaigner; partly it was inevitable. Anyway, for as long as such a state of things lasted, the troops became dependent on the lighters, and upon the water brought to the beaches in tins, pakhals, etc.

Undoubtedly the distribution of this water to the advancing troops was a matter of great difficulty, and one which required not only well-worked-out schemes from Corps and Divisional Staffs, but also energy and experience on the part of those who had to put them into practice. As it turned out, and judging merely by results, I regret to say that the measures actually taken in regard to the distribution proved to be inadequate, and that suffering and disorganisation ensued. The disembarkation of artillery horses was therefore at once, and rightly, postponed by the Corps Commander, in order that mules might be landed to carry up water.

And now General Stopford, recollecting the vast issues which hung upon his success in forestalling the enemy, urged his Divisional Commanders to push on. Otherwise, as he saw, all the advantages of the surprise landing must be nullified. But the Divisional Commanders believed themselves, it seems, to be unable to move. Their men, they said, were exhausted by their efforts of the night of the 6th-7th, and by the action of the 7th. The want of water had told on the new troops. The distribution from the beaches had not worked smoothly. In some cases the hose had been pierced by individuals wishing to fill their own bottles; in others lighters had grounded so far from the beach that men swam out to fill batches of water-bottles. All this had added to the disorganisation inevitable after a night landing, followed by fights here and there with an enemy scattered over a country to us unknown. These pleas for delay were perfectly well founded,

But it seems to have been overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front of us were equally exhausted and disorganised, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving the water trouble and every other sort of trouble. Be this as it may, the objections overbore the Corps Commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (two of them mountain batteries), and the great guns of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow, which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. The Divisional Generals were, in fact, informed that, "in view of the inadequate artillery support," General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with.

Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of August 8th. Normally it may be correct to say that in modern warfare infantry cannot be expected to advance without artillery preparation. But in a landing on a hostile shore the order has to be inverted. The infantry must advance and seize a suitable position to cover the landing, and to provide artillery positions for the main thrust. The very existence of the force, its water-supply, its facilities for munitions and supplies, its power to reinforce, must absolutely depend on the infantry being able instantly to make good sufficient ground without the aid of the artillery other than can be supplied for the purpose by floating batteries.

This is not a condition that should take the commander of a covering force by surprise. It is one already foreseen. Driving power was required, and even a certain ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for a respite for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia. And inertia prevailed.

Late in the evening of the 7th the enemy had withdrawn the few guns which had been in action during the day. Beyond half a dozen shells dropped from very long range into the bay in the early morning of the 8th, no enemy artillery fired that day in the Suvla area. The guns had evidently been moved back, lest they should be captured when we pushed forward. As for the entrenched positions, these, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, were non-existent. The General Staff officer whom I had sent on to Suvla early in the morning of the 8th reported by tele-

graph the absence of hostile gun fire, the small amount of rifle fire, and the enemy's apparent weakness. He also drew attention to the inaction of our own troops, and to the fact that golden opportunities were being missed. Before this message arrived at general headquarters I had made up my mind, from the Corps Commander's own reports, that all was not well at Suvla. There was risk in cutting myself adrift, even temporarily, from touch with the operations at Anzac and Helles, but I did my best to provide against any sudden call by leaving Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the General Staff, in charge, with instructions to keep me closely informed of events at the other two fronts, and, having done this, I took ship and set out for Suvla.

On arrival, at about 5 P. M., I boarded His Majesty's ship *Jonquil*, where I found corps headquarters, and where General Stopford informed me that the General Officer Commanding 11th Division was confident of success in an attack he was to make at dawn next morning (the 9th). I felt no such confidence. Beyond a small advance by a part of the 11th Division between the Chocolate Hills and Ismail Oglu Tepe, and some further progress along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge by the 10th Division, the day of the 8th had been lost. The commander of the 11th Division had, it seems, ordered strong patrols to be pushed forward so as to make good all the strong positions in advance which could be occupied without serious fighting; but, as he afterwards reported, "little was done in this respect." Thus a priceless twelve hours had already gone to help the chances of the Turkish reinforcements which were, I knew, both from naval and aerial sources, actually on the march for Suvla. But when I urged that even now, at the eleventh hour, the 11th Division should make a concerted attack upon the hills, I was met by a non possumus. The objections of the morning were no longer valid, the men were now well rested, watered, and fed. But the Divisional Commanders disliked the idea of an advance by night, and General Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force their hands.

So it came about that I was driven to see whether I could not, myself, put concentration of effort and purpose into the direction of the large number of men ashore. The Corps Commander made no objection. He declared himself to be as eager as I could be to advance. The representations made by the Divisional Commanders had seemed to him insuperable. If I could see my way to get over them no one would be more pleased than himself.

Accompanied by Commadore Roger Keyes and Lieut -Colonel Aspinall, of the Headquarters General Staff, I landed on the beach, where all seemed quiet and peaceful, and saw the Commander of the 11th Division, Major-General Hammersley. I warned him the sands were running out fast, and that by dawn the high ground to his front might very likely be occupied in force by the enemy. He saw the danger, but declared that it was a physical impossibility, at so late an hour (6 P M), to get out orders for a night attack, the troops being very much scattered. There was no other difficulty now, but this was insuperable; he could not recast his orders or get them round to his troops in time. But one brigade, the 32nd, was, so General Hammersley admitted, more or less concentrated and ready to move.

The General Staff Officer of the Division, Colonel Neil Malcolm, a soldier of experience, on whose opinion I set much value, was consulted. He agreed that the 32nd Brigade was now in a position to act. I therefore issued a direct order that, even if it were only with this 32nd Brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment, so that a portion at least of the 11th Division should anticipate the Turkish reinforcements on the heights and dig themselves in there upon some good tactical point.

In taking upon myself the serious responsibility of thus dealing with a detail of divisional tactics I was careful to limit the scope of the interference. Beyond directing that the one brigade which was reported ready to move at once should try and make good the heights before the enemy got on to them I did nothing, and said not a word calculated to modify or in any way affect the attack already planned for the morning. Out of the thirteen battalions which were to have advanced against the heights at dawn four were now to anticipate that movement by trying to make good the key of the enemy's position at once and under cover of darkness.

I have not been able to get a clear and coherent account of the doings of the 32nd Brigade, but I have established the fact that it did not actually commence its advance till 4 A M. on August 9th. The reason given is that the units of the brigade were scattered. In General Stopford's despatch he says that "One company of the 6th East Yorks Pioneer Battalion succeeded in getting to the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagu, but the rest of the battalion and the 32nd Brigade were attacked from both flanks during their advance, and fell back to a line north and

south of Sulajik Very few of the leading company or the Royal Engineers who accompanied it got back, and that evening the strength of the battalion was 9 officers and 380 men."

After their retirement from the hill north of Anafarta Sagır (which commanded the whole battlefield) this 32nd Brigade then still marked the high-water level of the advance made at dawn by the rest of the division When their first retirement was completed they had to fall back further, so as to come into line with the most forward of their comrades The inference seems clear Just as the 32nd Brigade in their advance met with markedly less opposition than the troops who attacked an hour and a half later, so, had they themselves started earlier, they would probably have experienced less opposition Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that had the complete division started at 4 A M on the 9th, or, better still, at 10 P M on the 8th, they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them

That night I stayed at Suvla, preferring to drop direct cable contact with my operations as a whole to losing touch with a corps battle which seemed to be going wrong

At dawn on the 9th I watched General Hammersley's attack, and very soon realised, by the well sustained artillery fire of the enemy (so silent the previous day) and by the volume of the musketry, that Turkish reinforcements had arrived, that with the renewed confidence caused by our long delay the guns had been brought back, and that, after all, we were forestalled This was a bad moment Our attack failed, our losses were very serious. The enemy's enfilading shrapnel fire seemed to be especially destructive and demoralising, the shell bursting low and all along our line Time after time it threw back our attack just as it seemed upon the point of making good. The 33rd Brigade at first made most hopeful progress in its attempt to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe. Some of the leading troops gained the summit, and were able to look over on to the other side Many Turks were killed here. Then the centre seemed to give way. Whether this was the result of the shrapnel fire, or whether, as some say, an order to retire came up from the rear, the result was equally fatal to success As the centre fell back the steady, gallant behaviour of the 6th Battalion, Border Regiment, and the 6th Battalion, Lincoln Regiment, on either flank was especially noteworthy. Scrub fires on Hill 70 did much to harass and hamper our troops When the 32nd Brigade fell back before attacks from the slopes

of the hill north of Anafarta Sagır and from the direction of Abriyka they took up the line north and south through Sulayık. Here their left was protected by two battalions of the 34th Brigade, which came up to their support. The line was later on prolonged by the remainder of the 34th Brigade and two battalions of the 159th Brigade of the 53rd Division. Their right was connected with the Chocolate Hills by the 33rd Brigade on the position to which they had returned after their repulse from the upper slopes of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Some of the units which took part in this engagement acquitted themselves very bravely. I regret I have not had sufficient detail given me to enable me to mention them by name. The Divisional Commander speaks with appreciation of one freshly-landed battalion of the 53rd Division, a Hereford battalion, presumably the 1/1st Herefordshire, which attacked with impetuosity and courage between Hetman Chair and Kaslak Chair, about Asmak Dere, on the extreme right of his line.

During the night of the 8th-9th and early morning of the 9th the whole of the 53rd (Territorial) Division (my general reserve) had arrived and disembarked. I had ordered it up to Suvla, hoping that by adding its strength to the 9th Corps General Stopford might still be enabled to secure the commanding ground round the bay. The infantry brigades of the 53rd Division (no artillery had accompanied it from England) reinforced the 11th Division.

On August 10th the Corps Commander decided to make another attempt to take the Anafarta ridge. The 11th Division were not sufficiently rested to play a prominent part in the operation, but the 53rd Division, under General Lindley, was to attack, supported by General Hammersley. On the 10th there were one brigade of Royal Field Artillery ashore, with two mountain batteries, and all the ships' guns were available to co-operate. But the attack failed, though the Corps Commander considers that seasoned troops would have succeeded, especially as the enemy were showing signs of being shaken by our artillery fire. General Stopford points out, however, and rightly so, that the attack was delivered over very difficult country, and that it was a high trial for troops who had never been in action before, and with no regulars to set a standard. Many of the battalions fought with great gallantry, and were led forward with much devotion by their officers. At a moment when things were looking dangerous two battalions of the 11th Division (not specified by the Corps Commander) rendered very good service on the left of the Terri-

torials. At the end of the day our troops occupied the line Hill east of Chocolate Hill—Sulajik, whilst the enemy—who had been ably commanded throughout—were still receiving reinforcements, and, apart from their artillery, were three times as strong as they had been on August 7th

Orders were issued to the General Officer Commanding 9th Corps to take up and entrench a line across the whole front from near the Asmak Dere, through the knoll east of the Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the 10th Division about Kiretch Tepe Sirt. General Stopford took advantage of this opportunity to re-organise the divisions, and, as there was a gap in the line between the left of the 53rd Division and the right of the 10th Division, gave orders for the preparation of certain strong points to enable it to be held.

The 54th Division (infantry only) arrived, and were disembarked on August 11th and placed in reserve. On the following day—August 12th—I proposed that the 54th Division should make a night march in order to attack, at dawn on the 13th, the heights Kavak Tepe—Teke Tepe. The Corps Commander having reason to believe that the enclosed country about Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and the north of it was held by the enemy, ordered one brigade to move forward in advance, and make good Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, so as to ensure an unopposed march for the remainder of the division as far as that place. So that afternoon the 163rd Brigade moved off, and, in spite of serious opposition, established itself about the A. of Anafarta (118m. 4 and 7), in difficult and enclosed country.

In the course of the fight, creditable in all respects to the 163rd Brigade, there happened a very mysterious thing. The 1-5th Norfolks were on the right of the line, and found themselves for a moment less strongly opposed than the rest of the brigade. Against the yielding forces of the enemy Colonel Sir H. Beauchamp, a bold, self-confident officer, eagerly pressed forward, followed by the best part of the battalion. The fighting grew hotter, and the ground became more wooded and broken. At this stage many men were wounded or grew exhausted with thirst. These found their way back to camp during the night. But the colonel, with sixteen officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst these ardent souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the King's Sandringham estates. Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them.

They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not one of them ever came back.

The night march and projected attack were now abandoned, owing to the Corps Commander's representations as to the difficulties of keeping the division supplied with food, water, etc., even should they gain the height. General Birdwood had hoped he would soon be able to make a fresh attack on Sari Bair, provided that he might reckon on a corresponding vigorous advance to be made by the 11th and 54th Divisions on Ismail Oglu Tepe. On August 13th I so informed General Stopford. But when it came to business, General Birdwood found he could not yet carry out his new attack on Sari Bair—and, indeed, could only help the 9th Corps with one Brigade from Damakjelik Bair. I was obliged, therefore, to abandon this project for the nonce, and directed General Stopford to confine his attention to strengthening his line across his present front. To straighten out the left of this line, General Stopford ordered the General Officer Commanding the 10th Division to advance on the following day (August 15th), so as to gain possession of the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the 54th Division to co-operate.

The 30th and 31st Infantry Brigades of the 10th Irish Division were to attack frontally along the high ridge. The 162nd Infantry Brigade of the 54th Division were to support on the right. The infantry were to be seconded by a machine-gun detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service, by the guns of His Majesty's ship *Grampus* and His Majesty's ship *Foxhound* from the Gulf of Saros, by the Argyll Mountain Battery, the 15th Heavy Battery, and the 58th Field Battery. After several hours of undecisive artillery and musketry fighting, the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward with loud cheers, and captured the whole ridge, together with eighteen prisoners. The vigorous support rendered by the naval guns was a feature of this operation. Unfortunately, the point of the ridge was hard to hold, and means for maintaining the forward trenches had not been well thought out. Casualties became very heavy, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers having only one officer left, and the 5th Inniskilling Fusiliers also losing heavily in officers. Reinforcements were promised, but before they could arrive the officer left in command decided to evacuate the front trenches. The strength of the Turks opposed to us was steadily rising, and had now reached 20,000.

On the evening of August 15th General Stopford handed over command of the 9th Corps

The units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their mettle when they leaped into the water to get more quickly to close quarters, or when they stormed Lala Baba in the darkness. They had shown their resolution later when they tackled the Chocolate Hills and drove the enemy from Hill 10 right back out of rifle range from the beaches

Then had come hesitation. The advantage had not been pressed. The senior commanders at Suvla had had no personal experience of the new trench warfare, of the Turkish methods, of the paramount importance of time. Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied. These were the reasons which induced me, with your Lordship's approval, to appoint Major-General H. de B. De Lisle to take over temporary command

I had already seen General De Lisle on his way from Cape Helles, and my formal instructions—full copy in Appendix—were handed to him by my Chief of the General Staff. Under these he was to make it his most pressing business to get the Corps into fighting trim again, so that as big a proportion of it as possible might be told off for a fresh attack upon Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta spur. At his disposal were placed the 10th Division (less one brigade), the 11th Division, the 53rd and 54th Divisions—a force imposing enough on paper, but totalling, owing to casualties, under 30,000 rifles.

The fighting strength of ourselves and of our adversaries stood at this time at about the following figures. Lieut-General Birdwood commanded 25,000 rifles, at Anzac, Lieut-General Davies, in the southern zone, commanded 23,000 rifles, whilst the French corps alongside of him consisted of some 17,000 rifles. The Turks had been very active in the south, doubtless to prevent us reinforcing Anzac or Suvla, but it is doubtful if there were more than 35,000 of them in that region. The bulk of the enemy were engaged against Anzac or were in reserve in the valleys east and north of Sari Bair. Their strength was estimated at 75,000 rifles.

The Turks, then, I reckoned, had 110,000 rifles to our 95,000, and held all the vantages of ground, they had plenty of ammunition, also drafts wherewith to refill ranks depleted in action within two or three days. My hopes that these drafts

would be of poor quality had been every time disappointed. After weighing all these points, I sent your Lordship a long cable. In it I urged that if the campaign was to be brought to a quick, victorious decision, large reinforcements must at once be sent out. Autumn, I pointed out, was already upon us, and there was not a moment to be lost. At that time (August 16th) my British divisions alone were 45,000 under establishment, and some of my fine battalions had dwindled down so far that I had to withdraw them from the fighting line. Our most vital need was the replenishment of these sadly depleted ranks. When that was done I wanted 50,000 fresh rifles. From what I knew of the Turkish situation, both in its local and general aspects, it seemed, humanly speaking, a certainty that if this help could be sent to me at once we could still clear a passage for our Fleet to Constantinople.

It may be judged, then, how deep was my disappointment when I learnt that the essential drafts, reinforcements, and munitions could not be sent to me, the reason given being one which prevented me from any further insistence. So I resolved to do my very best with the means at my disposal, and forthwith reinforced the northern wing with the 2nd Mounted Division (organised as dismounted troops) from Egypt and the 29th Division from the southern area. These movements, and the work of getting the 9th Corps and attached divisions into battle array took time, and it was not until the 21st that I was ready to renew the attack—an attack to be carried out under very different conditions from those of August 7th and 8th.

The enemy's positions were now being rapidly entrenched, and as I could not depend on receiving reinforcing drafts, I was faced with the danger that if I could not drive the Turks back I might lose so many men that I would find myself unable to hold the very extensive new area of ground which had been gained. I therefore decided to mass every available man against Ismail Oglu Tepe, a *sine qua non* to my plans whether as a first step towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved impossible, towards securing Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove from shell fire.

The scheme for this attack was well planned by General De Lisle. The 53rd and 54th Divisions were to hold the enemy from Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt while the 29th Division and 11th Division stormed Ismail Oglu Tepe. Two brigades, 10th Division and the 2nd Mounted Division, were retained in Corps

Reserve I arranged that General Birdwood should co-operate by swinging forward his left flank to Susuk Kuyu and Kaiajik Aghala. Naturally I should have liked still further to extend the scope of my attack by ordering an advance of the 9th Corps all along their line, but many of the battalions had been too highly tried and I felt it was unwise to call upon them for another effort so soon. The attack would only be partial, but it was an essential attack if any real progress was to be made. Also, once the Anafarta ridge was in my hands the enemy would be unable to reinforce through the gap between the two Anafartas, and then, so I believed, my left would find no difficulty in getting on.

My special objective was the hill which forms the south-west corner of the Anafarta Sagır spur Ismail Oglu Tepe, as it is called, forms a strong natural barrier against an invader from the Ægean who might wish to march direct against the Anafartas. The hill rises 350ft from the plain, with steep spurs jutting out to the west and south-west, the whole of it covered with dense holly oak scrub, so nearly impenetrable that it breaks up an attack and forces troops to move in single file along goat tracks between the bushes. The comparatively small number of guns landed up to date was a weakness, seeing we had now to storm trenches, but the battleships were there to back us, and as the bombardment was limited to a narrow front of a mile it was hoped the troops would find themselves able to carry the trenches and that the impetus of the charge would carry them up to the top of the crest.

Our chief difficulty lay in the open nature and shallow depth of the ground available for the concentration for attack. The only cover we possessed was the hill Lala Baba, 200 yards from the sea, and Yilghın Burnu, half a mile from the Turkish front, the ground between these two being an exposed plain. The 29th Division, which was to make the attack on the left, occupied the front trenches during the preceding night, the 11th Division, which was to attack on the right, occupied the front trenches on the right of Yilghın Burnu.

By some freak of nature Suvla Bay and plain were wrapped in a strange mist on the afternoon of August 21st. This was sheer bad luck, as we had reckoned on the enemy's gunners being blinded by the declining sun and upon the Turkish trenches being shown up by the evening light with singular clearness, as would have been the case on ninety-nine days out of a hundred.

Actually we could hardly see the enemy lines this afternoon, whereas out to the westward targets stood out in strong relief against the luminous mist. I wished to postpone the attack, but for various reasons this was not possible, and so, from 2-30 P M to 3 P M a heavy but none too accurate artillery bombardment from land and sea was directed against the Turkish first line of trenches, whilst twenty-four machine-guns in position on Yilghin Burnu did what they could to lend a hand.

At 3 P M. an advance was begun by the infantry on the right of the line. The 34th Brigade of the 11th Division rushed the Turkish trenches between Hetman Chan and Aire Kavak, practically without loss, but the 32nd Brigade, directed against Hetman Chan and the communication trench connecting that point with the south-west corner of the Ismail Oglu Tepe spur, failed to make good its point. The brigade had lost direction in the first instance, moving north-east instead of east, and, though it attempted to carry the communication trench from the north-east with great bravery and great disregard of life, it never succeeded in rectifying the original mistake. The 33rd Brigade, sent up in haste with orders to capture this communication trench at all costs, fell into precisely the same error, part of it marching north-east and part south-east to Susuk Kuyu.

Meanwhile the 29th Division, whose attack had been planned for 3-30 P M, had attacked Scimitar Hill (Hill 70) with great dash. The 87th Brigade, on the left, carried the trenches on Scimitar Hill, but the 86th Brigade were checked and upset by a raging forest fire across their front. Eventually pressing on, they found themselves unable to advance up the valley between the two spurs owing to the failure of the 32nd Brigade of the 11th Division on their right. The brigade then tried to attack eastwards, but were decimated by a cross-fire of shell and musketry from the north and south-east. The leading troops were simply swept off the top of the spur, and had to fall back to a ledge south-west of Scimitar Hill, where they found a little cover.

Whilst this fighting was in progress the 2nd Mounted Division moved out from Lala Baba in open formation to take up a position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu. During this march they came under a remarkably steady and accurate artillery fire. The advance of these English Yeomen was a sight calculated to send a thrill of pride through anyone with a drop of English blood running in their veins. Such superb martial spectacles are rare.

in modern war. Ordinarily it should always be possible to bring up reserves under some sort of cover from shrapnel fire. Here, for a mile and a half, there was nothing to conceal a mouse, much less some of the most stalwart soldiers England has ever sent from her shores.

Despite the critical events in other parts of the field, I could hardly take my glasses from the Yeomen, they moved like men marching on parade. Here and there a shell would take toll of a cluster; there they lay, there was no straggling, the others moved steadily on, not a man was there who hung back or hurried. But such an ordeal must consume some of the battle-winning fighting energy of those subjected to it, and it is lucky indeed for the Turks that the terrain, as well as the lack of trenches, forbade us from letting the 2nd Mounted Division loose at close quarters to the enemy without undergoing this previous too heavy baptism of fire.

Now that the 11th Division had made their effort, and failed, the 2nd South Midland Brigade (commanded by Brigadier-General Earl of Longford) was sent forward from its position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu, in the hope that they might yet restore the fortunes of the day. This brigade, in action for the first time, encountered both bush fires and musketry without flinching, but the advance had in places to be almost by inches, and the actual close attack by the Yeomen did not take place until night was fast falling. On the left they reached the foremost line of the 29th Division, and on the right also they got as far as the leading battalions. But, as soon as it was dark, one regiment pushed up the valley between Scimitar Hill and Hill 100 (on Ismail Oglu Tepe), and carried the trenches on a small knoll near the centre of this horseshoe.

The regiment imagined it had captured Hill 100, which would have been a very notable success, enabling, as it would, the whole of our line to hang on and dig in. But when the report came in some doubt was felt as to its accuracy, and a reconnaissance by Staff officers showed that the knoll was a good way from Hill 100, and that a strongly-held semicircle of Turkish trenches (the enemy having been heavily reinforced) still denied us access to the top of the hill. As the men were too done, and had lost too heavily to admit of a second immediate assault, and as the knoll actually held would have been swept by fire at day-break, there was nothing for it but to fall back under cover of

from the Kaiajik Aghala to Susuk Kuyu was gradually strengthened, and eventually joined on to the right of the 9th Army Corps, thereby materially improving the whole situation. During this action the 4th Australian Brigade, which remained facing the Turks on the upper part of the Kaiajik Aghala, was able to inflict several hundred casualties on the enemy as they retreated or endeavoured to reinforce.

On August 21st we had carried the Turkish entrenchments at several points, but had been unable to hold what we had gained, except along the section where Major-General Cox had made a good advance with Anzac and Indian troops. To be repulsed is not to be defeated, as long as the commander and his troops are game to renew the attack. All were eager for such a renewal of the offensive, but clearly we would have for some time to possess our souls in patience, seeing that reinforcements and munitions were short, that we were already outnumbered by the enemy, and that a serious outbreak of sickness showed how it had become imperative to give a spell of rest to the men who had been fighting so magnificently and so continuously. To calculate on rest, it may be suggested, was to calculate without the enemy. Such an idea has no true bearing on the feelings of the garrison of the peninsula. That the Turks should attack had always been the earnest prayer of all of us, just as much after August 21st as before it. And now that we had to suspend progress for a bit, work was put in hand upon the line from Suvla to Anzac, a minor offensive routine of sniping and bombing was organised, and, in a word, trench warfare set in on both sides.

On August 24th Lieut.-General the Hon. J. H. G. Byng, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., assumed command of the 9th Army Corps.

The last days of the month were illumined by a brilliant affair carried through by the troops under General Birdwood's command. Our object was to complete the capture of Hill 60, north of the Kaiajik Aghala, commenced by Major-General Cox on August 21st. Hill 60 overlooked the Biyuk Anafarta valley, and was therefore tactically a very important feature.

The conduct of the attack was again entrusted to Major-General Cox, at whose disposal were placed detachments from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and the 5th Connaught Rangers. The advance

was timed to take place at 5 P M on August 27th, after the heaviest artillery bombardment we could afford. This bombardment seemed effective, but the moment the assailants broke cover they were greeted by an exceeding hot fire from the enemy field guns, rifles, and machine-guns, followed after a brief interval by a shower of heavy shell, some of which, most happily, pitched into the trenches of the Turks.

On the right the detachment from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades could make no headway against a battery of machine-guns which confronted them. In the centre the New Zealanders made a most determined onslaught, and carried one side of the topmost knoll. Hand-to-hand fighting continued here till 9-30 P M, when it was reported that nine-tenths of the summit had been gained. On the left the 250 men of the 5th Connaught Rangers excited the admiration of all beholders by the swiftness and cohesion of their charge. In five minutes they had carried their objective, the northern Turkish communications, when they at once set to and began a lively bomb-fight along the trenches against strong parties which came hurrying up from the enemy supports and afterwards from their reserves.

At midnight fresh troops were to have strengthened our grip upon the hill, but before that hour the Irishmen had been out-bombed, and the 9th Australian Light Horse, who had made a most plucky attempt to recapture the lost communication trench, had been repulsed. Luckily, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles refused to recognise that they were worsted. Nothing would shift them. All that night and all next day, through bombing, bayonet charges, musketry, shrapnel, and heavy shell, they hung on to their 150 yards of trench. At 1 A M on August 29th the 10th Light Horse made another attack on the lost communication trenches to the left, carried them, and finally held them. This gave us complete command of the underfeature, an outlook over the Anafarta Sagır valley, and safer lateral communications between Anzac and Suvla Bay.

Our casualties in this hotly contested affair amounted to 1,000. The Turks lost out of all proportion more. Their line of retreat was commanded from our Kaiajik Dere trenches, whence our observers were able to direct artillery fire equally upon their fugitives and their reinforcements. The same observers estimated the Turkish casualties as no less than 5,000. Three Turkish machine-guns and forty-six prisoners were taken, as well as three

trench mortars, 300 Turkish rifles, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and 500 bombs. Four hundred acres were added to the territories of Anzac. Major-General Cox showed his usual forethought and wisdom. Brigadier-General Russell fought his men splendidly

My narrative of battle incidents must end here. From this date onwards up to the date of my departure on October 17th the flow of munitions and drafts fell away. Sickness, the legacy of a desperately trying summer, took heavy toll of the survivors of so many arduous conflicts. No longer was there any question of operations on the grand scale, but with such troops it was difficult to be downhearted. All ranks were cheerful; all remained confident that, so long as they stuck to their guns, their country would stick to them and see them victoriously through the last and greatest of the crusades.

On October 11th your Lordship cabled asking me for an estimate of the losses which would be involved in an evacuation of the peninsula. On October 12th I replied in terms showing that such a step was to me unthinkable. On October 16th I received a cable recalling me to London for the reason, as I was informed by your Lordship on my arrival, that His Majesty's Government desired a fresh, unbiassed opinion, from a responsible commander, upon the question of early evacuation.

In bringing this despatch to a close I wish to refer gratefully to the services rendered by certain formations whose work has so far only been recognised by a sprinkling of individual rewards.

Much might be written on the exploits of the Royal Naval Air Service, but these bold fliers are laconic, and their feats will mostly pass unrecorded. Yet let me here thank them, with their commander, Colonel F. H. Sykes, of the Royal Marines, for the nonchalance with which they appear to affront danger and death, when and where they can. So doing, they quicken the hearts of their friends on land and sea—an asset of greater military value even than their bombs or aerial reconnaissances, admirable in all respects as these were.

Within them I also couple the Service de l'Aviation of the Corps Expéditionnaire d'Orient, who daily wing their way in and out of the shrapnel under the distinguished leadership of M^{le} Capitaine Césari.

The Armoured Car Division (Royal Naval Air Service) have never failed to respond to any call which might be made upon them. Their organisation was broken up; their work had to be

carried out under strange conditions—from the bows of the River Clyde, as independent batteries attached to infantry divisions, etc,—and yet they were always cheerful, always ready to lend a hand in any sort of fighting that might give them a chance of settling old scores with the enemy

Next I come to the Royal Artillery. By their constant vigilance, by their quick grasp of the key to every emergency, by their thundering good shooting, by hundreds of deeds of daring, they have earned the unstinted admiration of all their comrade services. Where all fought so remarkably, the junior officers deserve a little niche of their own in the Dardanelles record of fame. Their audacity in reconnaissance, their insouciance under the hottest of fires, stand as a fine example, not only to the Army, but to the nation at large.

A feature of every report, narrative, or diary I have read has been a tribute to the stretcher-bearers. All ranks, from Generals in command to wounded men in hospital, are unanimous in their praise. I have watched a party from the moment when the telephone summoned them from their dug-out to the time when they returned with their wounded. To see them run light-heartedly across fire-swept slopes is to be privileged to witness a superb example of the hero in man. No braver corps exists, and I believe the reason to be that all thought of self is instinctively flung aside when the saving of others is the motive.

The services rendered by Major-General (temporary Lieut.-General) E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Inspector-General of Communications, and all the departments and services of the lines of communication assured us a life-giving flow of drafts, munitions, and supplies. The work was carried out under unprecedented conditions, and is deserving, I submit, of handsome recognition.

With General Altham were associated Brigadier-General (temporary Major-General) C. R. R. McGregor, C.B., at first Commandant of the Base at Alexandria and later Deputy Inspector-General of Communications, and Colonel T. E. O'Leary, Deputy Adjutant-General, 3rd Echelon. Both of these officers carried out their difficult duties to my entire satisfaction.

My Military Secretary, Lieut.-Colonel S. H. Pollen, has displayed first-class ability in the conduct of his delicate and responsible duties.

Also I take the opportunity of my last despatch to mention two of my aides-de-camp—Major F. L. Makgill-Crichton-

Maitland, Gordon Highlanders, Lieutenant the Hon G St. J Brodrick, Surrey Yeomanry

I have many other names to bring to notice for distinguished and gallant service during the operations under review, and these will form the subject of a separate communication.

And now, before affixing to this despatch my final signature as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, let me first pay tribute to the everlasting memory of my dear comrades who will return no more. Next, let me thank each and all, generals, staff, regimental leaders, and rank and file, for their wonderful loyalty, patience, and self-sacrifice. Our progress was constant, and if it was painfully slow—they know the truth. So I bid them all farewell with a special God-speed to the campaigners who have served with me right through from the terrible yet most glorious earlier days—the incomparable 29th Division, the young veterans of the Naval Division, the ever-victorious Australians and New Zealanders, the stout East Lances, and my own brave fellow-countrymen of the Lowland Division of Scotland—I have the honour to be, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON, GENERAL,

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

The War Office issued on the 27th March a despatch from Sir Ian Hamilton supplementing and correcting the despatch published above. The War Office also issued a list of 60 corrections of mistakes, of rank or name, which occurred amongst the names of the Australian officers and men mentioned in the last despatch.

In his supplementary despatch Sir Ian Hamilton explains that he was unable to set seriously to work upon his main despatch until after his return home in October last and that he was then hampered in preparing it by his separation from his late General Headquarters. He says:—

“My main difficulty lay in the lack of properly authenticated facts relating to the actions and identities of some of the units

which had borne the brunt of the fighting. In the Suvla Bay area especially so many senior commanders had gone under in one way or another that it seemed as if the story must be left half-told. But now, since my despatch has been studied by many who were themselves engaged, fresh light has been thrown upon several episodes hitherto obscure. I have sifted the evidence, and have satisfied myself that full justice has not been done to certain individuals and units."

The corrections are as follows :—

1—In the assault upon the Turkish trenches between the Mal Tepe Dere and the west branch of the Kanlı Dere on August 7th, the 125th and the 127th (not the 129th as previously given) were the Brigades engaged.

2—In the description of the fight for Lone Pine the praise given to the 2nd New Zealand Battery under Major Sykes should have been given to the 1st New Zealand Battery under Major McGilp.

3—It was the 6th Royal Irish Rifles (not, as given, the 10th Hampshire Regiment), together with two companies of the 6th East Lancashire Regiment, that charged up the slope with the bayonet at Chunuk Barr on August 9th.

4—Brigadier-General Hill's 31st Brigade consisted of the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers, *plus* the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers, which were temporarily attached thereto. Of these battalions the 5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers joined General Mahon, and were therefore not present during the fighting at Chocolate Hill. In addition to units already singled out for commendation, the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers deserve special mention for the energy and boldness which characterised their attack.

5—In the attack on Hill 70, on August 9th, the 6th Royal Irish Fusiliers and the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers of the 31st Brigade (both attached to the 32nd Brigade for this day's operations) rendered distinguished service.

6—The 9th Battalion Sherwood Foresters had constantly maintained stout hearts and a soldierly spirit in spite of the

heavy losses they had suffered when carrying out their costly duty of closing the big gap between the left of the Anzac troops and Chocolate Hill from August 8th to 14th. On August 21st this same Battalion, together with the 6th Battalion Border Regiment, displayed a vigorous initiative combined with very steady discipline during the attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Sir Ian Hamilton makes especial mention of the following officers :—

Brigadier-General R P Maxwell, commanding the 33rd Brigade. He evinced coolness as well as energy throughout the heavy fighting of August, and stuck to his duty afterwards until, through sickness, he was literally unable to stand.

Brigadier-General H Haggard, commanding the 32nd Brigade. He was severely wounded on August 7th, but not before he had had time to give sure proof of leadership and daring.

The following mentions of officers have only lately come to hand, as the original documents went astray owing to successive casualties amongst the senior officers to whom they were addressed :—

29TH BRIGADE.

STAFF—Captain A. H McCleverty, 2nd Rajput Light Infantry, Brigade-Major

10TH (SERVICE) BATT, HAMPS R—Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) W D Bewsher, Temp Captain F M Hicks, No. 4410 Sgt.-Major J Smith, No 4291 Col Sgt.-Major W. T Groves (killed).

6TH (SERVICE) BATT, R IRISH RIFLES—Lieut -Colonel E C Bradford, Captain (temp Major) W. Eastwood (killed), Captain (temp. Major) A. L. Wilford, 5th L I., Indian Army (attached), Regimental Sgt.-Major P. Mulholland.

11TH DIVISION.

STAFF.—Captain J. F. S. D. Coleridge, 8th Gurkha Rifles.

32ND BRIGADE.

STAFF.—Captain B. W. Shuttleworth, 45th Rattray's Sikhs

6TH (SERVICE) BATT, YORK AND LANCASTER R —Temp Captain W H Toohey, Temp. Captain W P Baldock (Lieut. Reserve of Officers) (killed), No. 4324 Sgt A Ollernshaw

33RD BRIGADE

STAFF —Temp Captain A Hoade

6TH (SERVICE) BATT, LINGS R —Major A. E Norton, West India R. (attached).

9TH (SERVICE) BATT., SHERWOOD FORESTERS (NOTTS AND DERBY R.).—Temp Major A. S Murray (Captain, Reserve of Officers), Captain F. F. Loyd

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S FAREWELL ORDER.

THANKS TO ALL RANKS.

“NO RISK HAS BEEN TOO DESPERATE, NO SACRIFICE TOO GREAT.”

The following Farewell Order by Sir Ian Hamilton was issued to the troops on October 17th :—

On handing over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force to Sir Charles Monro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a few farewell words to the Allied troops with many of whom he has now for so long been associated

First, he would like them to know his deep sense of the honour it has been to command so fine an Army in one of the most arduous and difficult campaigns which have ever been undertaken, and, secondly, he must express to them his admiration at the noble response they have invariably given to the calls he has made upon them. No risk has been too desperate, no sacrifice too great.

Sir Ian Hamilton thanks all ranks, from generals to private soldiers, for the wonderful way they seconded his efforts to lead them towards a decisive victory, which under their new chief he has the most implicit confidence they will achieve.

THE EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI AND LANDING AT SALONIKA.

The War Office made the following announcement on 20th December 1915 :—

All the troops at Suvla and Anzac, together with their guns and stores, have been successfully transferred with insignificant casualties to another sphere of operations

The following further announcement was made by the War Office subsequently —

Some further details of the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla have been received.

Without the Turks being aware of the movement a great army has been withdrawn from one of the areas occupied on the Gallipoli Peninsula, although in closest contact with the enemy

By this contraction of front operations at other points of the line will be more effectively carried out

Sir Charles Monro gives great credit for this skilfully conducted transfer of Forces to the Generals Commanding and the Royal Navy

The following official communiqué was issued on the 9th January :—

General Sir Charles Monro reports that the complete evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula has now been successfully carried out.

All guns and howitzers were got away, with the exception of 17 worn-out guns which were blown up by us before leaving.

Our casualties amounted to one British rank and file wounded. There were no casualties among the French troops

Sir C. Monro states that the successful accomplishment of this difficult task is due to Generals Birdwood and Davies, and to the invaluable assistance rendered in an operation of the highest difficulty by Admiral de Robeck and the Royal Navy.

The following was issued by the War Office on the night of 11th January.—

A further report received from General Sir Charles Monro states that the Turks attempted a heavy attack on our lines at Helles on January 7th. Between 1.30 P.M. and 3 P.M. our trenches were continuously shelled, and from 3 P.M. to 4 P.M. the bombardment became intense and the Turks opened heavy musketry fire.

At 4 o'clock they sprang two mines near Western Birdcage and Fusilier Bluff, and a quarter of an hour later fixed bayonets all along our front. Their officers were seen apparently endeavouring to make their men assault, but they were only successful in doing so opposite Fifth Avenue and Fusilier Bluff. The Staffordshires completely repulsed the attack and a large proportion of the Turks who attacked were killed or wounded.

Our casualties were five officers and 130 men killed and wounded.

Aeroplane reports show that the naval fire on the left flank was most accurate, and it is probable that the enemy suffered considerably.

The night of the 7th-8th was fine; the evacuation and operations were quietly and successfully continued.

The 8th was fine with calm sea until after 4 P.M. when the weather suddenly grew worse, and at 11 P.M. the wind had increased to 35 miles per hour. From midnight onwards it was only just possible to use piers and lighters and impossible to carry out the programme of embarking troops in destroyers alongside sunken ships at W Beach owing to the connecting piers being washed away.

Embarkation at Gully Beach became impossible. One lighter went ashore there, and the remaining troops had to march to W Beach for embarkation.

In spite of these difficulties the programme at W Beach and Y Beach was completed by 2.30 A.M., and troops from Gully Beach and all beach parties were embarked by 4 A.M.

A hostile submarine was reported off Cape Helles about 9 P.M.

The Turkish artillery was practically silent the whole night until the stores were fired simultaneously by a time fuse after the evacuation had been completed. The Turks then fired red lights all along their line and at once opened heavy shelling on our

beaches and second-line trenches. The red lights continued for one and a half hours, and the shelling until after daybreak.

The French embarkation were carried out by their own Navy, who also greatly assisted us by embarking some of our animals.

In a Special Order of the Day, dated December 21st, General Sir Charles Monro, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, expressed as follows his appreciation of the way in which the withdrawal from the Anzac and Suvla positions was carried out:—

The arrangements made for withdrawal, and for keeping the enemy in ignorance of the operation which was taking place, could not have been improved. The General Officer Commanding the Dardanelles Army, and the General Officers Commanding the Australian and New Zealand and 9th Army Corps, may pride themselves on an achievement without parallel in the annals of war. The Army and Corps Staffs, Divisional and subordinate Commanders and their Staffs, and the Naval and Military Beach Staffs proved themselves more than equal to the most difficult task which could have been thrown upon them. Regimental officers, non-commissioned officers, and men carried out, without a hitch, the most trying operation which soldiers can be called upon to undertake—a withdrawal in the face of the enemy—in a manner reflecting the highest credit on the discipline and soldierly qualities of the troops.

It is no exaggeration to call this achievement one without parallel. To disengage and to withdraw from a bold and active enemy is the most difficult of all military operations, and in this case the withdrawal was effected by surprise, with the opposing forces at close grips—in many cases within a few yards of each other. Such an operation, when succeeded by a re-embarkation from an open beach, is one for which military history contains no precedent.

During the past months the troops of Great Britain and Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, Newfoundland and India, fighting side by side, have invariably proved their superiority over the enemy, have contained the best fighting troops in the Ottoman Army in their front, and have prevented the Germans from employing their Turkish allies against us elsewhere.

No soldier relishes undertaking a withdrawal from before the enemy. It is hard to leave behind the graves of good comrades, and to relinquish positions so hardly won and so gallantly main-

tained as those we have left. But all ranks in the Dardanelles Army will realise that in this matter they were but carrying out the orders of His Majesty's Government, so that they might in due course be more usefully employed in fighting elsewhere for their King, their country, and the Empire.

There is only one consideration—what is best for the furtherance of the common cause. In that spirit the withdrawal was carried out, and in that spirit the Australian and New Zealand and the 9th Army Corps have proved, and will continue to prove, themselves second to none as soldiers of the Empire.

SIR CHARLES MONRO'S DESPATCH

A despatch from General Sir Charles Monro was issued by the War Office on the 10th April. It covers the period (October 28th, 1915, to January 9th, 1916) in which General Monro was in command in the Eastern Mediterranean and deals with two subjects—(1) the withdrawal of the Allied troops from the Gallipoli Peninsula, and (2) the landing of troops at Salonika and their operations up to the time of their withdrawal within the Greek frontier.

The following is the text of the despatch —

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST ARMY, FRANCE, *March 6th, 1916.*

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit herewith a brief account of the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean from the 28th October, 1915, on which date I assumed command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, until the 9th January, 1916, when in compliance with your directions, I handed over charge at Cairo to Lieut-General Sir Archibald Murray, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.

On the 20th October in London, I received your Lordship's instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

My duty on arrival was in broad outline —

(a) To report on the military situation in the Gallipoli Peninsula.

(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated, or another attempt made to carry it

(c) The number of troops that would be required—

- (1) to carry the Peninsula,
- (2) to keep the Straits open, and
- (3) to take Constantinople

Two days after my arrival at Imbros, where the headquarters of the M E F was established, I proceeded to the Peninsula to investigate the military situation. The impressions I gathered are summarised very shortly as follows:—

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The Force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the Field Engineer.

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes:—

(a) It was not in the first place possible to withdraw them from the shell-swept area as is done when necessary in France, for every corner on the Peninsula is exposed to hostile fire.

(b) They were much enervated from the diseases which are endemic in that part of Europe in the summer.

(c) In consequence of the losses which they had suffered in earlier battles there was a very grave dearth of officers competent to take command of men.

(d) In order to maintain the numbers needed to hold the front, the Territorial Divisions had been augmented by the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades. Makeshifts of this nature

very obviously did not tend to create efficiency. Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to pursue.

(a) It was obvious that the Turks could hold us in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Baghdad or Egypt, or both.

(b) An advance from the positions we held could not be regarded as a reasonable military operation to expect

(c) Even had we been able to make an advance in the Peninsula, our position would not have been ameliorated to any marked degree, and an advance on Constantinople was quite out of the question

(d) Since we could not hope to achieve any purpose by remaining on the Peninsula, the appalling cost to the nation involved in consequence of embarking on an Overseas Expedition with no base available for the rapid transit of stores, supplies, and personnel, made it urgent that we should divert the troops locked up on the Peninsula to a more useful theatre

Since, therefore, I could see no military advantage in our continued occupation of positions on the Peninsula, I telegraphed to your Lordship that in my opinion the evacuation of the Peninsula should be taken in hand

Subsequently I proceeded to Egypt to confer with Colonel Sir H. McMahon, the High Commissioner, and Lieut.-General Sir J. Maxwell, Commanding the Forces in Egypt, over the situation which might be created in Egypt and the Arab world by the evacuation of the Peninsula

Whilst in Egypt I was ordered by a telegram from the War Office to take command of the troops at Salonika. The purport of this telegram was subsequently cancelled by your Lordship on your arrival at Mudros, and I was then ordered to assume Command of the Forces in the Mediterranean, east of Malta, and exclusive of Egypt.

Consequent on these instructions, I received approval that the two Forces in the Mediterranean should be designated as follows :—

(a) The original Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which comprised the Forces operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula and those employed at Mudros and Imbros as the "Dardanelles Army," under Lieut.-General Sir W. Birdwood, K C B, etc., with headquarters at Imbros.

(b) The troops destined for Salonika as the "Salonika Army," under Lieut-General Sir B Mahon, K C B., with headquarters at Salonika.

The Staff of the original M.E F. was left in part to form the Dardanelles Army, and the remainder were taken to make a General Headquarters Staff for the increased responsibilities now assumed. Other officers doing duty in this theatre with the necessary qualifications were selected and with no difficulty or demands on home resources, a thoroughly efficient and adequate Staff was created.

Mudros was selected as being the most suitable site for the establishment of headquarters, as affording an opportunity, in addition to other advantages, of daily consultation with the Inspector-General, Line of Communications. The working of the services of the Line of Communications presented difficulties of an unique character, mainly owing to—

- (a) the absence of pier and wharfage accommodation at Mudros and the necessity of transferring all Ordnance and Engineer Stores from one ship to another,
- (b) the submarine danger;
- (c) the delay caused by rough weather

Close association with General Altham was therefore most imperative, and by this means many important changes were made which conduced to greater efficiency and more prompt response to the demands of fighting units.

A narrative of the events which occurred in each of the two Armies is now recorded separately for facility of perusal and reference.

SALONIKA ARMY.

Early in October the 10th Division, under Lieut-General Sir B Mahon, K C.B., was transferred from Suvla to Salonika, and fully concentrated there. The dislocation of units caused by the landing on the Peninsula and the subsequent heavy fighting which occurred prevented this division being despatched intact. The organisation of the Infantry and the Royal Engineers was not disturbed, but the other services had to be improvised from other divisions as found most accessible.

The arrival of the 10th Division had been preceded by two French divisions under General Sarrail, whose Force was subsequently augmented by another division. These three divisions were then moved into Serbia under the understanding arranged

between the Allies' Governments, which was to the effect that the French Forces were to protect the railway between Krivolak and Veles, and to ensure communication with the Serbian Army, whilst the British were to maintain the position from Salonika to Krivolak, and to support the French right. If communication with the Serbian Army could not be opened and maintained, the Allied Forces were to be withdrawn.

With this object, two Battalions of the 10th Division were moved from Salonika on 27th October, and took over the French front from Kosturino to Lake Doiran. The remainder of the division was sent to Serbia on 12th November and following days, and took over the French front eastwards from Kosturino.

The task of moving troops into Serbia and maintaining them there presented many difficulties. No road exists from Salonika to Doiran, a few miles of road then obtains, which is followed within a few miles by a track only suitable for pack transport. Sir B. Mahon had therefore to readjust his transport to a pack scale, and was dependent on a railway of uncertain carrying power to convey back his guns and all wheeled traffic in case of a withdrawal, and to supply his troops whilst in Serbia.

Very soon afterwards reinforcements commenced to arrive. The disembarkation of these new divisions was an operation which taxed the powers of organisation and resources of the staff at Salonika to the highest degree possible, and it speaks highly for their capacity that they were able to shelter and feed the troops as they arrived.

During November and the early part of December the 10th Division was holding its position in Serbia, and the disembarkation of other divisions was proceeding with difficulty.

In order to gain time for the landing of the troops, and their deployment on the positions selected, I represented to General Sarraill and Sir B. Mahon the urgent need of the divisions withdrawing from Serbia being utilised as a covering force, and retaining their ground as such until the Forces disembarking were thoroughly in a position to hold their front.

It had been evident for some time that the power of resistance of the Serbian Armies was broken, and that the Allied Forces could afford them no material assistance. It was also clear from all information received that the position of our troops was becoming daily more precarious owing to a large German-Bulgarian concentration in the Strumnitza valley. I, therefore, again pressed

General Sarrail to proceed with his withdrawal from the positions he was holding. The British Division, operating as it was, as the pivot upon which the withdrawal was effected, was compelled to hold its ground until the French Left was brought back.

Before our withdrawal was completed the 10th Division was heavily attacked on the 6th, 7th, and 8th December by superior Bulgarian Forces. The troops had suffered considerably from the cold in the Highlands of Macedonia, and in the circumstances conducted themselves very creditably in being able to extricate themselves from a difficult position with no great losses. The account of this action was reported by wire to you by General Mahon on the 11th December no further reference is therefore necessary to this incident.

As soon as I was informed that the 10th Division was being heavily pressed, I directed Sir B. Mahon to send a Brigade up the railway line in support, and to hold another Brigade ready to proceed at short notice. The withdrawal was, however, conducted into Greek territory without further opposition from the Bulgarians.

Meanwhile, the operation of disembarkation at Salonika was being carried out with all possible speed, and the Greek authorities through their representative from Athens, Colonel Pallis, were informed by me that we intended to proceed to the defensive line selected. This intimation was received in good part by the Greek Generals. They commenced to withdraw their troops further to the East where they did not hamper our plans, and they showed a disposition to meet our demands in a reasonable and friendly spirit.

Whilst dealing with the events above enumerated, I desire to give special prominence to the difficulties to which General Sir B. Mahon was exposed from the time of his landing at Salonika, and the ability which he displayed in overcoming them. The subjoined instances, selected from many which could be given, will illustrate my contention, and the high standard of administrative capacity displayed by the G.O.C. and his Staff.—

(a) From the date on which the 10th Division first proceeded into Serbia until the date of its withdrawal across the Greek frontier, personnel, guns, supplies, and material of all kinds had to be sent up by rail to Doran, and onwards by march, motor lorries, lumbered wagons, and pack animals. This railway, moreover, was merely a single track, and had to serve the demands

of the local population as well as our needs. The evacuation of the wounded and sick had to be arranged on similar lines, yet the requirements of the troops were fully satisfied.

(b) The majority of the divisions were sent without trains to Salonika, most units without first line transport, in spite of this, part of the Force was converted into a mobile condition with very little delay.

(c) The complications presented by the distribution and checking of stores, supplies, ammunition, etc., discharged from ships on to quays, with insufficient accommodation or storehouses, and with crude means of ingress and egress therefrom, and served by a single road which was divided between the French and ourselves, constituted a problem which could only be solved by officers of high administrative powers. I trust, therefore, that full recognition may be given to my recommendation of the officers who rendered such fine service under such arduous conditions.

DARDANELLES ARMY.

On my arrival in the Mediterranean theatre a gratifying decline in the high rate of sickness which had prevailed in the Force during the summer months had become apparent. The wastage due to this cause still, however, remained very high.

The Corps Commanders were urged to take all advantage of the improved weather conditions to strengthen their positions by all available means, and to reduce to the last degree possible all animals not actually required for the maintenance of the troops, in order to relieve the strain imposed on the Naval Transport Service.

During the month of November, beyond the execution of very clever and successful minor enterprises carried out by Corps Commanders with a view to maintaining an offensive spirit in their commands, there remains little to record—except that an increased activity of the Turkish artillery against our front became a noticeable factor.

On the 21st November the Peninsula was visited by a storm said to be nearly unprecedented for the time of the year. The storm was accompanied by torrential rain, which lasted for 24 hours. This was followed by hard frost and a heavy blizzard. In the areas of the 8th Corps and the Anzac Corps the effects were not felt to a very marked degree owing to the protection offered by the surrounding hills. The 9th Corps was less favourably situated,

the water-courses in this area became converted into surging rivers, which carried all before them. The water rose in many places to the height of the parapets and all means of communications were prevented. The men, drenched as they were by the rain, suffered from the subsequent blizzard most severely. Large numbers collapsed from exposure and exhaustion, and in spite of untiring efforts that were made to mitigate the suffering, I regret to announce that there were 200 deaths from exposure and over 10,000 sick evacuated during the first few days of December.

From reports given by deserters it is probable that the Turks suffered even to a greater degree.

In this period our flimsy piers, breakwaters, and light shipping became damaged by the storm to a degree which might have involved most serious consequences, and was a very potent indication of the dangers attached to the maintenance and supply of an army operating on a coast line with no harbour, and devoid of all the accessories such as wharves, piers, cranes, and derricks for the discharge and distribution of stores, etc.

Towards the latter end of the month, having in view the possibility of an evacuation of the Peninsula being ordered, I directed Lieut-General Sir W. Birdwood, Commanding the Dardanelles Army, to prepare a scheme to this end, in order that all details should be ready in case of sanction being given to this operation.

I had in broad outline contemplated soon after my arrival on the Peninsula that an evacuation could best be conducted by a sub-division into three stages.

The first during which all troops, animals, and supplies not required for a long campaign should be withdrawn.

The second to comprise the evacuation of all men, guns, animals, and stores not required for defence during a period when the conditions of weather might retard the evacuation, or in fact seriously alter the programme contemplated.

The third or final stage, in which the troops on shore should be embarked with all possible speed, leaving behind such guns, animals, and stores needed for military reasons at this period.

This problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which were within

effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or south-west, the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

The attitude which we should adopt from a naval and military point of view in case of withdrawal from the Peninsula being ordered, had given me much anxious thought. According to text-book principles and the lessons to be gathered from history it seemed essential that this operation of evacuation should be immediately preceded by a combined naval and military feint in the vicinity of the Peninsula, with a view to distracting the attention of the Turks from our intention. When endeavouring to work out into concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our Forces, I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless, and there was the obvious danger that the suspicion of the Turks would be aroused by our adoption of a course the real purport of which could not have been long disguised.

On the 8th December consequent on your Lordship's orders, I directed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to proceed with the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac at once.

Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the *Ægean*. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. Even a mild wind from the south or south-west was found to raise such a ground swell as to greatly impede communication with the beaches, while anything in the nature of a gale from this direction could not fail to break up the piers, wreck the small craft, and thus definitely prevent any steps being taken towards withdrawal.

We had, moreover, during the gale of the 21st November, learnt how entirely we were at the mercy of the elements with the slender and inadequate means at our disposal by which we had endeavoured to improvise harbours and piers. On that day the harbour at Kephalos was completely wrecked, one of the ships which had been sunk to form a breakwater was broken up, and the whole of the small craft sheltered inside the breakwater were washed ashore. Similar damage was done to our piers, lighters, and small craft at Suvla and Anzac.

Lieutenant-General Birdwood proceeded on receipt of his orders with the skill and promptitude which is characteristic of all that he undertakes, and after consultation with Rear-Admiral Wemyss, it was decided, provided the weather was propitious, to complete the evacuation on the night of the 19th-20th December

Throughout the period 10th to 18th December the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of the 18th December found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.

The arrangements for the final withdrawal made by Corps Commanders were as follows :—

It was imperative, of course, that the front line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the very last moment, and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line. To ensure this being done, Lieut-General Sir W. Birdwood arranged that the withdrawal of the inner flanks of corps should be conducted to a common embarking area under the orders of the G.O.C., 9th Corps.

In the rear of the front line trenches at Suvla the General Officer Commanding 9th Corps broke up his area into two sections divided roughly by the Salt Lake. In the Southern Section a defensive line had been prepared from the Salt Lake to the sea and Lalà Baba had been prepared for defence, on the left the second line ran from Kara Kol Dagħ through Hill 10 to the Salt Lake. These lines were only to be held in case of emergency—the principle governing the withdrawal being that the troops should proceed direct from the trenches to the distributing centres near the beach, and that no intermediate positions should be occupied except in case of necessity.

At Anzac, owing to the proximity of the trenches to the beach, no second position was prepared except at Anzac Cove, where a small keep was arranged to cover the withdrawal of the rearmost parties in case of necessity.

The good fortune which had attended the evacuation continued during the night of the 19th-20th. The night was perfectly calm with a slight haze over the moon, an additional stroke of good luck, as there was a full moon on that night.

Soon after dark the covering ships were all in position, and the final withdrawal began. At 1-30 A.M. the withdrawal of the

rear parties commenced from the front trenches at Suvla and the left of Anzac. Those on the right of Anzac who were nearer the beach remained in position until 2 A M By 5-30 A.M the last man had quitted the trenches

At Anzac four 18-pr guns, two 5-in howitzers, one 1'7 Naval gun, one anti-aircraft, and two 3-pr Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked In addition, 56 mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies which were set on fire, were also abandoned

At Suvla every gun, vehicle, and animal was embarked, and all that remained was a small stock of supplies, which were burnt.

Early in December orders had been issued for the withdrawal of the French troops on Helles, other than artillery, and a portion of the line held by French Creoles had already been taken over by the Royal Naval Division on the 12th December On the 21st December, having strengthened the 8th Corps with the 86th Brigade, the number of the French garrison doing duty on the Peninsula was reduced to 4,000 men These it was hoped to relieve early in January, but before doing so it was necessary to give some respite from trench work to the 42nd Division, which was badly in need of a rest. My intention, therefore, was first to relieve the 42nd Division by the 88th Brigade, then to bring up the 13th Division, which was resting at Imbros since the evacuation of Suvla, in place of the 29th Division, and finally to bring up the 11th Division in relief of the French. Helles would then be held by the 52nd, 11th and 13th Divisions, with the Royal Naval Division and the 42nd Division in reserve on adjacent islands

On the 24th December, General Sir W. Birdwood was directed to make all preliminary preparations for immediate evacuation, in the event of orders to this effect being received

On 28th December your Lordship's telegram ordering the evacuation of Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possibility of bad weather intervening, I instructed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible He was reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pr and 18-pr. guns, 6-in. and 4'5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules and A. T. carts, limbered wagons, etc. In addition, I expressed my

wish that the final evacuation should be completed in one night, and that the troops should withdraw direct from the front trenches to the beaches, and not occupy any intermediate position unless seriously molested. At a meeting which was attended by the Vice-Admiral and the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army, I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions, and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore.

I gave it as my opinion that in my judgment I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success. Time, the uncertainty of weather conditions in the Aegean, the absence of a suitable locality, and the withdrawal of small craft from the main issue for such an operation were some of the reasons which influenced me in the decision at which I arrived. With the concurrence of the Vice-Admiral, therefore, it was decided the Navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensive orders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in war requires.

He primarily arranged with General Brulard, who commanded the French Forces on the Peninsula, that in order to escape the disadvantages of divided command in the final stage, the French infantry should be relieved as early as possible, but that their artillery should pass under the orders of the General Officer Commanding 8th Corps, and be withdrawn concurrently with the British guns at the opportune moment.

On the 30th December, in consequence of the instructions I had received from the Chief of the General Staff to hand over my command at Alexandria to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Murray, who,

it was stated, was to leave England on the 28th December, I broke up my Headquarters at Mudros and proceeded with a small staff, comprising representatives of the General Staff, the Quarter-master-General, and Adjutant-General branches, on H M S Cornwallis to Alexandria. The rest of the Staff were sent on in front so as to have offices in working order when my successor should arrive.

In the meantime the evacuation, following the same system as was practised at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the Peninsula were relieved on the night of the 1st-2nd January, and were embarked by the French Navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration that General Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation. They then determined to fix the final stage of the evacuation for the 8th January, or for the first fine night after that date.

Meanwhile the 8th Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On the 29th December the 52nd Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counter-attacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.

The method of evacuation adopted by Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., Commanding 8th Corps, followed in general outline that which had proved successful in the northern zone. As the removal of the whole of the heavy guns capable of replying to the enemy's artillery would have indicated our intentions to the enemy, it was decided to retain, but eventually destroy, one 6-inch British gun and six French heavy guns of old pattern which it would be impossible to remove on the last night. General Brulard himself suggested the destruction of these French guns.

The first step taken as regards the withdrawal of the troops was the formation of a strong Embarkation Staff and the preparation of positions covering the landings, in which small garrisons could maintain themselves against attack for a short time should the enemy become aware of our intention and follow up the movement.

Major-General the Hon H A Lawrence, commanding the 52nd Division, was selected to take charge of all embarkation operations. At the same time the services of various staff officers were placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding 8th Corps, and they rendered very valuable assistance

The General Officer Commanding 13th Division selected and prepared a position covering Gully Beach. Other lines were selected and entrenched, covering the remainder of the beaches from the sea north of Sedd-el-Bahr to "X" Beach inclusive. Garrisons were detailed for these defences, those at Gully Beach being under the General Officer Commanding 13th Division, and those covering the remainder of the beaches being placed under the command of a selected officer, whose headquarters were established at an early date, together with those of the General Officer Commanding, Embarkation, at Corps Headquarters.

As the withdrawing troops passed within the line of these defences they came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding, Embarkation, which were conveyed to them by his Staff Officers at each beach.

In addition to these beach defences four lines of defence were arranged, three being already in existence and strongly wired. The fourth was a line of posts extending from De Tott's Battery on the east to the position covering Gully Beach on the west.

The time fixed for the last parties to leave the front trenches was 11-45 P.M., in order to permit the majority of the troops being already embarked before the front line was vacated. It was calculated that it would take between two and three hours for them to reach the beaches, at the conclusion of which time the craft to embark them would be ready.

The Naval arrangements for embarkation were placed in the hands of Captain C. M. Staveley, R.N., assisted by a staff of Naval Officers at each place of embarkation.

On the 7th January, the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by the 13th Division, while the Asiatic guns

shelled those occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to be the heaviest experienced since we landed in April, lasted from noon until 5 P.M., and was intensive between 3 P.M. and 3-30. Considerable damage was done to our parapets and communication trenches, and telephone communications were interrupted. At 3-30 P.M. two Turkish mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff, and the Turkish trenches were seen to be full of men whom their officers appeared to be urging to the assault. No attack, however, was developed except against Fusilier Bluff, where a half-hearted assault was quickly repulsed. Our shortage of artillery at this time was amply compensated for by the support received from fire of the supporting squadron under Captain D. L. Dent, R.N. Our casualties amounted to 2 officers and 56 other ranks killed, and 4 officers and 102 other ranks wounded.

The 8th January was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south. There was every indication of the continuance of favourable conditions, and in the opinion of the Meteorological Officer, no important change was to be expected for at least 24 hours. The Turkish artillery were unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage were complete.

The embarkation was fixed at such an hour that the troops detailed for the first trip might be able to leave their positions after dark. The second trip was timed so that at least a greater portion of the troops for this trip would, if all went well, be embarked before the final parties had left the front trenches. The numbers to be embarked at the first trip were fixed by the maximum that could be carried by the craft available, those of the second trip being reduced in order to provide for the possibility of casualties occurring amongst the craft required to carry them.

The numbers for the third trip consisted only of the parties left to hold front trenches to the last, together with the garrisons of the beach defences, the Naval and Military beach personnel and such R.E. personnel as might be required to effect the necessary repairs to any piers or harbour works that might be damaged.

About 7 P.M. the breeze freshened considerably from the south-west, the most unfavourable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 P.M., was despatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 P.M., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at "W" Beach was washed

away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11-30 P M, were carried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly. Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the Straits, and about midnight H M S Prince George, which had embarked 2,000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers, and made it necessary for the Vice-Admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuated positions.

At 1-50 A M., Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2-10 A M a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be refloated. The N.T.O. at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was, as a matter of fact, done within an hour, but in the meantime at 2-30 A M it was decided to move the 160 men, who had been relanded from the grounded lighter, to "W" Beach and embark them there.

From 2-40 A M the steadily increasing swell caused the N.T.O. the greatest anxiety as to the possibility of embarking the remainder of the troops if their arrival was much deferred.

At 3-30 A.M the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuses after the last man had embarked. Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 A.M. These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately discharged from the enemy's trenches, and heavy artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6-30 A.M.

Apart from four unserviceable 15-pounders, which had been destroyed earlier in the month, 10 worn-out 15-pounders, one 6-in Mark VII gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were previously blown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned.

It would have been possible, of course, by extending the period during which the process of evacuation proceeded to have reduced the quantity of stores and material that was left behind on the Peninsula, but not to the degree that may seem apparent at first sight. Our chances of enjoying a continuity of fine weather in the Aegean were very slender in the month of January, it was indeed a contingency that had to be reckoned with that we might very probably be visited by a spell of bad weather which would cut us off completely from the Peninsula for a fortnight or perhaps for even longer.

Supplies, ammunition, and material to a certain degree had therefore to be left to the last moment for fear of the isolation of the garrison at any moment when the evacuation might be in progress. I decided therefore that our aim should be primarily the withdrawal of the bulk of the personnel, artillery, and ammunition in the intermediate period, and that no risks should be taken in prolonging the withdrawal of personnel at the final stage with a view to reducing the quantity of stores left.

The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realisation two important military essentials—viz, good luck and skilled disciplined organisation—and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvellous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these accidents of fortune.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Birdwood and his Corps Commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K.C.B., Vice-Admiral Wemyss, and a body of Naval Officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.

The Line of Communication Staff, both Naval and Military, represented respectively by Lieutenant-General E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Commodore M. S. FitzMaurice, R.N., principal Naval Transport Officer, and Captain H. V. Simpson, R.N., Superintending Transport Officer, contributed to the success of the operation by their untiring zeal and conspicuous ability.

The members of the Headquarters Staff showed themselves, without exception, to be officers with whom it was a privilege to be associated; their competence, zeal, and devotion to duty were uniform and unbroken. Amongst such a highly trained body of officers it is difficult to select and discriminate. I confine myself, therefore, to placing on record the fine services rendered by—

Colonel (temporary Major-General) Arthur Lynden Lynden-Bell, C.B., C M G, Chief of General Staff, G H Q,

Colonel (temporary Major-General) Walter Campbell, C.B., D S O, Deputy Quartermaster-General, G H Q, M.E F,

Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) W. Gillman, C M.G., D S O, Brigadier-General, General Staff;

Brevet Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) G P Dawnay, D S O, M V O, General Staff;

and whilst bringing to notice the names of these officers to whom I am so much indebted, I trust I may be permitted to represent the loyal, cordial, and unswerving assistance rendered by General J. M. J. A. Brulard, Commanding the French Troops in the Peninsula.

Before concluding this inadequate account of the events which happened during my tenure of command of the Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, I desire to give a brief explanation of the work which was carried out on the line of communications, and to place on record my appreciation of the admirable work rendered by the officers responsible for this important service

On the Dardanelles Peninsula it may be said that the whole of the machinery by which the text-books contemplate the maintenance and supply of an army was non-existent. The zone commanded by the enemy's guns extended not only to the landing places on the Peninsula, but even over the sea in the vicinity

The beaches were the advanced depôts and refilling points at which the services of supply had to be carried out under artillery fire. The landing of stores as well as of troops was only possible under cover of darkness.

The sea, the ships, lighters, and tugs took, in fact, the place of railways and roads, with their railway trains, mechanical transport, etc., but with this difference, that the use of the latter is subject only to the intervention of the enemy, while that of the former was dependent on the weather.

Between the beaches and the Base at Alexandria, 800 miles to the south, the line of communications had but two harbours, Kephalos Bay, on the Island of Imbros, 15 miles roughly from the beaches, and Mudros Bay, at a distance of 60 miles. In neither

were there any piers, breakwaters, wharves, or store houses of any description before the advent of the troops. On the shores of these two bays there were no roads of any military value, or buildings fit for military usage. The water-supply at these islands was, until developed, totally inadequate for our needs.

The Peninsula landing places were open beaches. Kephalos Bay is without protection from the north, and swept by a high sea in northerly gales. In Mudros Harbour, transhipments and disembarkation were often seriously impeded with a wind from the north or south. These difficulties were accentuated by the advent of submarines in the Aegean Sea, on account of which the Vice-Admiral deemed it necessary to prohibit any transport or store ship exceeding 1,500 tons proceeding north of Mudros, and although this rule was relaxed in the case of supply ships proceeding within the netted area of Suvla, it necessitated the transshipment of practically all reinforcements, stores, and supplies—other than those for Suvla—into small ships in Mudros Harbour.

At Suvla and Anzac, disembarkation could only be effected by lighters and tugs. Thus for all personnel and material there was at least one transshipment, and for the greater portion of both two transshipments.

Yet notwithstanding the difficulties which have been set forth above, the Army was well maintained in equipment and ammunition. It was well fed, it received its full supply of winter clothing at the beginning of December. The evacuation of the sick and wounded was carried out with the minimum of inconvenience, and the provisions of hospital accommodation for them on the Dardanelles Line of Communication and elsewhere in the Mediterranean met all requirements.

The above is a very brief exposition of the extreme difficulties with which the officers responsible were confronted in dealing with a problem of peculiar complexity. They were fortunate in being associated in their onerous and anxious task with a most competent and highly trained Naval Staff. The members of the two Staffs worked throughout in perfect harmony and cordiality, and it was owing to their joint efforts that the requirements of the troops were so well responded to.

In accordance with the instructions received from your Lordship by telegram on 10th January 1916, I had the honour of

telegraphing the names of the undermentioned officers who rendered most valuable and distinguished service in connexion with the evacuation of Gallipoli, to be specially submitted for His Majesty's gracious consideration for promotion and reward, viz :—

Colonel (temporary Major-General) Arthur Lynden Lynden-Bell, C.B., C.M.G., Chief of General Staff, G.H.Q., M.E.F.

Colonel (temporary Major-General) Walter Campbell, C.B., D.S.O., Deputy Quartermaster-General, G.H.Q., M.E.F.

Lieutenant-General Sir William Riddell Birdwood, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., Commander, Dardanelles Army

Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Edward Altham Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Inspector-General of Communications, M.E.F.

Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Hon. Sir Julian Hedworth George Byng, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., Commander, 9th Army Corps

Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Sir Alexander John Godley, K.C.M.G., C.B., Commander, A and N Z Army Corps

Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Sir Francis John Davies, K.C.B., Commander, 8th Army Corps

Brevet-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) George Fletcher MacMunn, D.S.O., R.A., D.A. and Q.M.-G., Dardanelles Army

Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Hamilton Lyster Reed, V.C., C.M.G., R.A., Brigadier-General, General Staff, 9th Army Corps.

Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Cyril Brudenel Bingham White, R.A., D.S.O., Brigadier-General, General Staff, Anzac.

Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Robert John Tudway, C.B., D.S.O., D.A., and Q.M.-G., 8th Army Corps

Brevet-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Harold Edward Street, R.A., Brigadier-General, General Staff, 8th Army Corps

Major (temporary Brigadier-General) Arthur George Preston McNulty, A.S.C., Acting D.A. and Q.M.-G., 9th Army Corps

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) Cecil Faber Aspinall, Royal Munster Fusiliers, Acting Brigadier-General, General Staff, Dardanelles Army

ROYAL NAVY

Captain F. H. Mitchell, D.S.O., R.N., Naval Adviser at G.H.Q., M.E.F.

Captain Edwin Unwin, R.N., V.C., attached to Headquarters, Dardanelles Army

FRENCH ARMY.

J. M. J. A. Brulard, Général de Division, Grand Officier de la Légion d'Honneur.

In the course of a few days I propose to forward recommendations for gallant and distinguished conduct performed by officers and men in the period under reference.

I have the honour to be,

Your Lordship's most obedient servant,

C. C. MONRO, GENERAL,

THE CONQUEST OF THE CAMEROON.

THE STORY OF THE OPERATIONS.

The Press Bureau announced on the 19th February that the garrison at Mora, the last of the German forces to hold out against the Allied troops in the Cameroon, had surrendered. This completed the conquest of that German Protectorate by British, French and Belgian troops. Many of the Germans had escaped to the Spanish territory of Muni and the arrangements for their internment on the island of Fernando Po were made by the Spanish authorities.


The Press Bureau also announced that the Governor-General of the island had requested General Dobell, on behalf of Herr Ebermaier, the German Governor of the Cameroon, to send a telegram to Berlin stating that want of munitions had compelled him (Herr Ebermaier) to enter Spanish territory with his troops and staff.

The Cameroon is a valuable colony in which the Germans became established in the eighties; it has an area of 191,130 square miles and a Negro population of 2,540,000. In 1912 the imports of the Cameroon were valued at £1,629,895 and the exports at £1,102,803; and the country has vast resources awaiting development.

When war broke out the Germans in the Cameroon found themselves almost completely surrounded by enemies. Where the land frontiers of the Cameroon do not march with British Nigeria, which is on the north-west, they are coterminous with those of French Equatorial Africa, which lies to the east and south, except for a short distance where Rio Muni, a small block of Spanish territory on the coast, divides French and German territory. At one point also the boundary of the Belgian Congo touches that of the Cameroon. The campaign, which resulted in the complete defeat of the Germans in the Cameroon and the driving of the remnants of the enemy forces, which had not surrendered or been captured or killed, into Muni for internment, was a long and arduous one; and the operations were conducted by so many different columns operating in so many different directions that they were by no means easy to follow.

Hostilities in the Cameroon started in August 1914. On the 25th of that month a British column took the offensive from Yola

The Conquest of the Cameroon.



H.M.S. Cumberland and Dwarf reconnoitred the Cameroon Bay and the approaches to Dualla, the principal town of the Protectorate, which is situated on the Bay at the mouth of the Wuri River. After bombardment Dualla, which comprises various trading stations and native towns close to one another on the south bank of the river, surrendered unconditionally to an Anglo-French force. Bonaberi, a neighbouring post, also surrendered at about the same time. The invaders subsequently proceeded towards Jabassi, a post some distance up the Wuri. The first attack on Jabassi made on the 8th October 1914 failed, but a second attack on the 14th October was successful. Meanwhile a force advancing in another direction took Susa, on the railway which runs north from Bonaberi. The important post of Edea, 56 miles eastwards from the coast on the Sanaga river (which flows into the Bight of Biafara, a little to the south-east of the Cameroon Bay) fell to two further French and British columns on the 26th October. Preparations were then made for extensive operations north and north-west of Dualla, and on the 13th November 1914, after a bombardment by the French cruiser Bruix and the Nigerian Government yacht, Ivv, a force of Royal Marines seized Victoria, the seaport of Buea. Buea itself, the seat of the German Government of the Protectorate and 3,000 feet above the sea on the slopes of the Cameroon mountain, was captured two days later. On the 13th November also a column advancing from Susa occupied Mujuka on the railway, 50 miles north of Bonaberi. This advance was continued and by the 10th December the whole of the railway from Bonaberi, with a considerable amount of rolling-stock and two aeroplanes, was in the Allies' hands. The Germans did not confine themselves entirely to defensive tactics. They made a determined but unsuccessful effort to retake Edea. From this summary it will be seen that rapid progress was made with these main operations. Within a few months of their being undertaken not a single town or post of importance on or near the coast remained in the hands of the Germans, who had retreated to the high plateaux in the centre of the Protectorate and transferred their capital to Yaunde, a post 150 miles inland and about the same distance from Spanish Muni.

Besides the Expeditionary Force operating from the coast and the British and French columns invading the Protectorate in the north, French troops from Equatorial Africa, which have been known as the Sanga Column, advanced westward from the south-eastern corner of the Cameroon. Belgian troops from the Congo

co-operated with the Sanga Column and General Aymenich, the leader of the column, has spoken very highly of their bravery, and the great assistance they have given him.

The Allies' forces advancing from the various directions mentioned gradually gained possession of all the places of importance surrounding Yaunde in a large circle. Yaunde was eventually occupied by the Allies on the 1st January last. The Germans, both military and civil, had fled. Columns of the Allies, which tried to cut off their retreat, succeeded in releasing some batches of French and British prisoners, but, as already indicated, many of the Germans escaped into Muni.

**THE FIGHTING ON THE
WESTERN FRONTIER
OF EGYPT.**

THE FIGHT AT AGAGIA.

The only fighting of any importance that has occurred on the Egyptian frontiers has taken place on the western frontier, where a force under General Peyton has succeeded in completely defeating the Tripolitan Arabs, led by Turkish officers, and re-occupying Solloum.

The following account of the important success gained by the British force at Agagia, about 15 miles to the south of Sidi Barrani, is taken from the *Pioneer's* Cairo correspondent —

“ On the morning of the 26th February our forces came into contact with the enemy, who were under the command of Nuri Bey, the brother of the redoubtable Turkish War Minister, Enver Pasha, and Gaafar Pasha who has directed the operations of all the Arabs with whom we have fought so far on this frontier. The enemy were in a strong position but could not stand up against our attack, which was carried out most adroitly by the 3rd South African Infantry. The deciding factor was an exceedingly brilliant charge by the Dorsetshire Yeomanry, who completely routed the Arabs and drove them out of their position in headlong flight towards the west. During the charge Gaafar Pasha was wounded and made prisoner. The enemy suffered very heavily, leaving over 200 dead and wounded on the field. We captured several Turkish officers, 33,000 rounds of ammunition, and machine-guns and a vast quantity of livestock and provisions. Our losses were two officers killed and eight wounded and about 140 other ranks killed and wounded. Our prisoners included a cousin of the Grand Sheikh of the Senussi, who had been given a commission in the Turkish Army during the war with Italy four years ago.

“ This success, which has swept all hostile bodies from the district, has enabled us to re-occupy Sidi Barrani, and it will not be long before we are once more in possession of our old frontier post, Solloum, which we vacated together with Sidi Barrani, when the Arab aggressions first started. Nuri Bey has for the past year been the main disturbing element in the Senussi camp. He had been sent by his brother to stir up the Arabs to revolt.

first against the Italians and then against ourselves. Right loyally he carried out his task and the aggressive attitude taken up by the Tripolitans and the temporary secession of the \ulad Ali were entirely due to his influence. The Turkish officers have throughout been the mainstay of the resistance shown by these Arabs, and since every officer captured means so much less influence being brought to bear for the continuance of that resistance, the important haul of officers we have made in this last fight should have a calming effect on the tribes concerned and possibly stop the recrudescence of activity which we thought might take place after the harvest next month."

ARMoured CARS IN THE DESERT.

The following account of the exploit by armoured cars in the final stage of the operations leading to the re-occupation of Solloum by General Peyton's force was issued by the War Office towards the end of March :—

Reports have been received from officers who have returned from Solloum which show that the armoured cars' action on March 14th, under the Duke of Westminster, was a very dashing affair. Aeroplane reconnaissance discovered early in the morning that the camp at Birwar was empty. Orders were at once given to push forward in pursuit "with reasonable boldness". The going was bad for the first eight miles. After that, however, the cars then struck the Derna road and the pace was increased, reaching nearly 40 miles an hour. The cars passed some hundreds of Beduins flying westward, many of them being armed, but no notice was taken of them.

The main camp was seen about a mile south of the road, 25 miles west of Solloum. Direction was immediately changed and all but two of the cars advanced in line. These latter went about two miles further along the road before turning south, acting on a preconcerted plan. As the cars approached, one gun and two machine-guns came into action. These were smartly handled by the enemy, but the whole gun teams were shot down while the cars were 400 yards away.

The cars then dashed into the camp. The hostile forces scattered in every direction, and the pursuit was carried on. After about ten miles there was danger of the petrol supply giving out. It was found, when the cars were again concentrated, that all the enemy's artillery had fallen into our hands.

This amounted to three guns and nine machine-guns, with 24 spare barrels and some 40 revolvers and a large quantity of ammunition. Ninety-one prisoners, who formed part of the shipwrecked crews who had landed on the Cyrenaica coast and had been seized by the Senussi, were rescued.

Our force consisted of eight officers and 32 of other ranks, the casualties being an officer slightly wounded. The enemy's casualties have been already reported as 50 killed.

A very skilful little campaign has thus been brought to a successful conclusion by this action. In three weeks General Peyton's force has captured the hostile commander, and killed or captured quite 50 per cent of the Turkish subordinate commanders, has driven the scattered remnant of his force far beyond the Egyptian border, and has taken all his artillery and machine-guns. During the operations the force has advanced 150 miles.

The work of the infantry was rendered supremely arduous by lack of water, but all difficulties were met and overcome with splendid spirit.

The previous report of the death of Nuri Bey has proved to be untrue. He was seen disappearing from the field of action on 14th March.

The following further details regarding the above exploit have been supplied by the *Pioneer's* Cairo correspondent:—

The prediction that I made in these notes a little over a fortnight ago that it would not be long before we regained possession of our station on the western frontier at Solloum has come true. Solloum was re-occupied by the composite force under Major-General Peyton on the 14th instant, almost five months to the day after our withdrawal to Mersa Matruh.

The final operations in connection with and following the re-occupation appear by all accounts to have been most ably and brilliantly carried out. Sidi Barrani, it may be recollected, was re-occupied on the 28th February after a fight at Agagia, in the course of which the enemy was badly routed. It was decided to move on westwards as soon as all the necessary supplies had been received. These were put into Sidi Barrani by sea and the force was ready to advance on the 8th instant.

The plan of attack was for the armoured cars, which were under the direction of the Duke of Westminster—whose train had replaced the naval one that had accompanied the expedition from the start,—to cross the plain to the Bir Hamed Pass—the shore road was too bad going—and move along the plateau in touch with the main column which passing *viâ* Baqbaq would assemble with the rest of the force and the cars at Neqb-el-Halfaiya. Thence the attack was to be launched against Solloum, and the warships, which were meanwhile to move round to the Gulf, were to lend support in the event of the heights being held by the enemy.

The armoured cars reached Bir Hamed Pass on the 11th at noon, and joining up with the main column and the Camel Corps at Medean on the following day reached the point of assembly at Halfaiya on the morning of the 14th. No opposition was encountered. The enemy had had wind of our approach and had burned his camp at Msead and had moved off hurriedly to the west. The cars then proceeded to Bir Warr, some five miles to the west of Solloum, where the Arabs had set up a standing camp. Bir Warr had also been vacated and all that was found were the remains of a motor-car and stores which had been set fire to by the enemy before retirement. Meanwhile the cavalry and camel corps reconnoitred the heights and finding them undefended the infantry and guns moved into Solloum and hoisted the Egyptian flag.

As soon as they found Bir Warr unoccupied the armoured cars, which had received information from the aeroplanes, followed up the retiring Arabs in order to disperse them and get hold of their guns and ammunition. They proceeded along the motor road and soon came up with hundreds of Beduin on both sides of the road who were fleeing west with their families and belongings and many of whom had come from the camp at Msead. A few shots were fired at the cars as they passed, but no notice was taken of these fugitives, who, truth to tell, appeared dismayed at the sight of these armoured cars tearing along the road. The cars' objective was the main enemy camp and about nineteen miles west of Bir Warr it was sighted a mile or so inland from the road at a place called Bir Azizia.

Without a moment's hesitation the cars wheeled off the road and moved across the broken desert towards the camp, where their appearance caused great confusion. Camels were hurriedly loaded up and driven off and Arabs fled in all directions. The enemy managed to bring to bear on the cars a quick-firing gun and two machine-guns, but they did no damage and by the time the cars got to within 400 yards these guns had all been put out of action. The cars continued the pursuit after they had captured the camp and all the stores and ammunition there.

Their object was not so much to capture or further disperse the enemy as to rescue the shipwrecked survivors of the Tara and the Moorma who had been held prisoners by the Arabs during the past five months. These unfortunate folk had been kept in the most distressing circumstances about four days' camel ride west

of Solloun. The last news received from them was in the latter part of February, when they were reported to be suffering from dysentery and had no drugs or proper food. The cars carried out their object with the greatest success, and managed to rescue all the prisoners, whose number had by that time been reduced to ninety-one

This brilliant and daring exploit has fittingly crowned what since its start has been a most successful campaign. All arms concerned in the expedition have acquitted themselves in a most admirable manner, though the palm must be given to the armoured car train consisting of nine cars under the Duke of Westminster, which has shown what a valuable asset it is, even in desert warfare, and contributed in a great measure, both by its daring tactics and by the almost supernatural appearance it assumed in the eyes of these ignorant Arabs, to the utter confusion which now reigns in their midst.

The cars captured three guns, nine machine-guns and over a quarter of a million rounds of rifle and gun ammunition. The enemy forces in this the northern area are completely disintegrated, all their guns and ammunition have been captured and their camps and supply bases destroyed. Throughout the area the headmen are flocking in with their families and asking for pardon and food and shelter, and, I think, we can safely say, especially as we have captured three more Turkish officers, that the curtain has been rung down on this phase of the western frontier campaign.

**THE MESOPOTAMIAN
CAMPAIGN.**

A SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS TO THE FALL OF KUT.

For a considerable time the history of the campaign in Mesopotamia was a record of unbroken success. The fact that the Expeditionary Force was furnished entirely from India invested the operations with special interest for us in this country, and the steady progress made was matter for ever-increasing satisfaction. Due foresight was shown after the outbreak of war in Europe in preparing to meet a dangerous position in the Persian Gulf region, for it was plain in the early autumn of 1914 that Turkey's participation in hostilities was a question of weeks only. A stage of war between the Allies and the Porte was declared on the 1st November, following upon the unprovoked attack on Odessa on the 29th October; and the Expeditionary Force from India that had been lying ready at Bahrein began its voyage up the Gulf. There were the oil-fields in the Karun valley to be protected, and time was pressing. As we have since heard, German intrigue was active in Western Persia and schemes had been laid in collusion with the Turkish Government to work all possible mischief at the head of the Gulf. The destruction of the pipeline from the oil-fields and the wrecking of the works had been planned, the idea being to cut off an important supply of oil for the British Navy. It did not concern the Germans that the fields were in Persian territory. The local Turkish forces could easily cross the frontier and stir up the tribesmen of Arabistan, at the same time threatening Muhammarah, which was under British protection. The urgency for action by the Indian authorities was therefore declared from the first and the necessary measures were taken with a promptitude that had the best results. The force under the command of Sir Arthur Barrett, assisted by warships, quickly appeared off Fao, which was occupied on the 6th November; and thereafter operations in the Shatt-el-Arab proceeded vigorously, while troops were despatched in the Ahwaz direction to deal with Turkish and tribal raiders.

It was, of course, in the Shatt-el-Arab that the more important operations took place at this stage of the expedition.

The 'Turks, in spite of the presence of German officers in their midst, were taken by surprise. There were excellent defensive positions along the creeks and inlets which might have been held, but the resistance offered was ineffective and Basra was occupied on the 23rd November. This was a success which at once had marked results locally; and the further advance to Qurnah, which was captured on the 9th December, added to the effect produced. Qurnah is at the old junction of the Tigris and Euphrates and its importance strategically made its occupation imperative. The Arab tribes were impressed and on more than one occasion they turned on the defeated Turks and harassed them in their retirement. They were, indeed, allies on whom little reliance could be placed by their Turkish masters for whom they had no great affection. There was a lull in the operations after the Turkish defeat at Qurnah, steps being taken to consolidate the position and give effect to administrative measures for the control of such parts of the Basra province as had passed into our hands. Lord Hardinge paid a visit to Mesopotamia in the course of the winter of 1914-15 and the Chiefs of Muhammarah and Koweit received from the Viceroy warm acknowledgments for their loyalty and such assistance as they had been able to render. The action which Great Britain had been compelled to take consequent on the hostility of Turkey was made clear, and some of the local Arab chiefs realised how matters stood and how their best interests would be served by co-operating with our forces. But in the East inaction is generally construed as a sign of weakness and the pause in our operations was closely watched, doubtless with a view to estimating the chances of any further advance. The pause was a necessary one as the Expeditionary Force was not of a strength to justify any rash adventures, but it tempted the Turks to make an effort to recapture Basra. On the 12th April they advanced from Nakhailah in considerable force and delivered a determined attack on Shaiba. Fighting was continued on the 13th, but that evening the attack had spent itself and the Turks began to retire. Accordingly next day the British force moved out of Shaiba to Barjisayah, where a fierce action was fought with great gallantry on the part of the troops engaged. The enemy received severe punishment and retreated in disorder upon Nasiriyah on the Euphrates, 100 miles west by north from Basra.

Sir Arthur Barrett's health had meanwhile broken down and Sir John Nixon assumed command on the 9th April. The early part of the summer was spent in completing the preparations for

a further move, and on the 3rd June Amarah, some 80 miles up stream from Qurnah, was captured. It then became apparent that attention would have to be paid to the Euphrates valley as it was reported that the enemy were in strength at Nasiriyah and that they had induced a considerable body of Arabs to join them. They could not be left in this position as they might possibly have again threatened Basia. A carefully planned attack was, therefore, arranged upon Nasiriyah, and on the 24th July another successful action was fought. The enemy forces were completely broken up and all danger on the Euphrates line was removed. This fully justified a fresh advance up the Tigris, and on the 28th September the operations culminated in the victory of Kut-el-Amarah.

The decision was now arrived at to advance upon Baghdad. It was doubtless felt that the moral effect of the capture of that city would be wide-reaching and that the adventure should be risked. There has been much controversy as to the responsibility for this movement. On this point we have had two statements made in Parliament by the Secretary of State for India. One of these statements runs: "The first proposal to advance on Baghdad after the battle of Kut-el-Amarah was made neither by the Government of India nor by His Majesty's Government, but by the General Commanding-in-Chief in Mesopotamia. General Townshend was under the command of Sir John Nixon, and did not communicate with either the Government of India or with His Majesty's Government." Now Mr. Chamberlain had previously told the House of Commons that "all the military authorities, the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, the military authorities in India and the military authorities at Home concurred in the orders for the advance towards Baghdad with the troops which were then at the disposal of the General Officer in command." All that one can therefore reasonably conclude from Mr. Chamberlain's two statements is that the suggestion of an advance to Baghdad "first" came from General Nixon. whether other proposals were subsequently made and by whom, we are not told, but as the idea of an advance was finally concurred in by "all the military authorities" at Home and in India the responsibility for what subsequently happened cannot fairly be said to rest on any one individual.

The battle of Ctesiphon on the 22nd November clearly showed the defensive power of the enemy. They lost a division and

retired towards Baghdad, but they had large reinforcements at hand and General Townshend found himself in a critical position. He could look for no immediate help as all available troops had been supplied to his division when he started from his advanced base at Azizieh, half-way between Kut-el-Amarah and Baghdad, and his only safety lay in withdrawal. He had won to within twenty miles of Baghdad, but his losses had been heavy at Ctesiphon and the enemy were in great force. He conducted his retirement in admirable order, fighting successful rearguard actions, and on the 3rd December he reached Kut. There he decided to stay as his troops were worn out with fighting and marching. A further withdrawal to Sheikh Sa'ad and even to Amarah might have been wiser—judging by the light of after-events,—but he was encumbered with his wounded, and he knew that at Kut, in a bend of the Tigris, he would have a very strong position. He was very soon attacked but no impression was made on his defences, and after Christmas Day no assault appears to have been made upon him. He was secure within his lines, and the only question was as to the length of time his supplies of food and ammunition would last.

The Turks had had the advantage of the presence of Von der Goltz to direct their movements, and it cannot be doubted that he and his special staff brought about a great change in the general arrangements. Kut was systematically invested and the Turks at the same time moved down the river to Sheikh Sa'ad. They had thus not only isolated Kut, but had also taken up positions below it which blocked the approaches. They were being constantly reinforced as troops were released from Gallipoli and they could patiently await the starving out of General Townshend's force. Relief for the latter then became an all important consideration. A change of the British command in Mesopotamia took place, General Lake succeeding General Nixon, and the fighting force on the Tigris being given to General Aylmer. It was understood that the garrison of Kut were in great stress for supplies and that immediate action was very necessary. This proved not to be the case as food-stuffs had been found locally which were enough to meet the wants of the troops for three or four months; but this was not known until afterwards. The relief movements were accordingly begun. The enemy was forced out of Sheikh Sa'ad on the 7th January and a week later they were driven from El Orah after a three days' fight. They fell back on entrenchments at Umm-el-Hannah and these could not be taken. From the 21st

January onwards until early in March there was a lull. The abnormal weather, with heavy rain storms, interfered with the operations, but on the 8th March General Aylmer made his great effort to reach Kut by a route south of the Tigris. He was within an ace of succeeding in his turning movement against the right of the Es Sinn lines, but his force was in desert country and exhaustion told upon it. They had to withdraw towards the river, though they had been within seven or eight miles of Kut.

The history of events since then is still so fresh that the outstanding facts need only be recapitulated. General Gorringe, who succeeded General Aylmer in command of the forces acting beyond Sheikh Sa'ad, attacked the triple line of entrenchments which faced him. The Umm-el-Hannah and Falahiyah positions were captured on the 5th April, but the Sannaiyat line resisted attack. General Gorringe now made a determined effort to advance by way of the southern bank. Some ground was gained, and it seemed within the range of possibility that a determined thrust might break through the remaining lines. The Sannaiyat entrenchments were again attacked on the 22nd April, but by this time the Tigris was in high flood and the assaults had necessarily to be delivered on a narrow front. The ground operated on was a swamp and everything favoured the defence. Success under these conditions was almost impossible of attainment and, though Sannaiyat was again bombarded all day on the 23rd, no further progress could be made. The fact was, as "Eye-witness" accounts had shown, that heavy rain storms with hurricanes had added enormously to the difficulties already experienced from the spring floods on the Tigris. The river was rapidly rising and spreading over its banks. The inundations might occasionally flood the Turkish trenches but they were also protective as hindering any turning movements by General Gorringe. The relieving force which had pushed on so doggedly, fighting frequent actions, found indeed in the floods and swampy ground obstacles more serious than the enemy's trenches. The reports spoke of our men attacking through water up to their waists and of some actually swimming. The rapid movement of artillery must have been impossible and one cannot but be amazed that the fighting should have been persisted in against such heavy odds, but General Gorringe's force had ever before them one objective, Kut-el-Amarah, with its garrison daily reduced to increasingly severe straits, and every nerve was strained to win through. They had a task which would have been difficult enough if the season had been favourable, but the abnormal weather fought

against them and their difficulties only increased as they continued their advance. It is evident that their efforts were never relaxed and that even with the drawback of a long line of communication along a flooded river the advance was continued with unfailing determination. The troops did all that men could do and it is not too much to say that they would have succeeded had the weather been normal. The weather was, however, anything but normal. The record of rainfall was quite out of keeping with the reports which showed what the average was during winter and spring months and the storms lasted much later than usual. It was this which militated against success and made it impossible for the Tigris Field Force to accomplish the work to which they had addressed themselves.

On the 29th April, with no prospect of relief arriving, the gallant garrison of Kut were forced to capitulate. So long as his supplies held out General Townshend had no thought of surrender. His nine thousand troops opposed a resolute resistance and in the last phase of the investment they cheerfully bore the privations inseparable from the failure of food. If supplies could have reached them they would have been equal to protracting still longer a defence which had effectually hindered the enemy from any general offensive in Mesopotamia. So hemmed in was the garrison that it could not co-operate with the force advancing to its relief or attempt to cut its way out, but its latent powers of offence were still so great that the Turks were obliged to keep large bodies of men watching Kut itself. Their strategy was to hold back the relieving force by entrenching themselves at various points on each side of the Tigris and, in particular, by forming lines at Es Sinn astride of the river. In fact, they took up an entirely defensive attitude, trusting to the extraordinary difficult nature of the country and to floods and storms to hamper the relieving force. Their task, therefore, was a comparatively simple one. They declined to risk defeat by attempts at an offensive and waited until the endurance of the garrison at Kut should be worn down.

"Eye-witness" has outlined for us in graphic language the story of the siege of Kut from the vigorous repulse of the early attacks to the final wearing down of the garrison's resistance by the gradual process of starvation. It is a story that is well worthy to find its place among the cherished records of the British and Indian Armies. If General Townshend's force eventually had to make its submission it submitted, not because it had to acknowledge any

defeat in the field, but because it had been literally reduced to the verge of starvation. Every device that could increase the resources of the beleaguered garrison and prolong its resistance—with the one exception of turning out the 6,000 Arab inhabitants of Kut to meet short shrift at the hands of the enemy—was adopted. All stores were carefully conserved and vegetable seeds planted. In the later phases of the siege aeroplanes were employed to make good wherever possible the deficiencies in the garrison's supplies. But the carrying capacity of aeroplanes is necessarily limited and the food question became to General Townshend and his staff a problem of daily increasing anxiety. Nor was the shortage of food supplies the only difficulty to be faced. "Before the 5th February," writes "Eye-witness," "scurvy had set in." As the days went by the garrison had to endure a decreasing scale of daily rations; on the 16th April this had dropped to four ounces of flour and a certain amount of meat. "On the 21st April the four ounces grain ration gave out. From the 22nd to the 25th the garrison subsisted on the two days' reserve ration issued in January and from the 25th to the 29th on the supplies dropped by aeroplane. The troops were so exhausted when Kut capitulated that the regiments who were holding the front line had remained there a fortnight without being relieved. They were too weak to carry back their kit."

Surrender in such circumstances is no dishonour and everyone will join in the tribute paid by Lord Kitchener and other high authorities to the garrison for their pluck and determination. For 143 days they held on to a position which was completely enveloped and their immunity from attack, after the first eighteen days, shows how the enemy recognised their indomitable spirit. When the end came the guns and ammunition were destroyed and a formal surrender was then carried out.

GENERAL BARRETT'S DESPATCHES.

THE CAPTURE OF QURNAH.

The following appeared in the *Gazette of India*, dated the 26th June 1915 :—

The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 8th June 1915, submitting despatches from Lieutenant-General Sir A A Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing certain operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D" up to the 31st March 1915. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were carried out and the conduct of the troops engaged. His Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine

No. 11854-1, dated Simla, the 8th June 1910

From—The Chief of the General Staff,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," up to 31st March 1915.—

- (i) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A A Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on the operations resulting in the capture of Qurnah, 9th December 1914;
- (ii) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A A Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on an engagement north of Qurnah on 20th January 1915;
- (iii) Officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers brought to notice by Lieutenant-General Sir A A Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., for good services rendered during the operations from November 1914 to 31st March 1915.

2 His Excellency considers that the operations in question were skilfully carried out and that the conduct of the troops reflects credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes to invite attention to the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Marine.

3 His Excellency recommends that these reports be treated as despatches and published in the *Gazette of India*

Headquarters, Basra, No 174-G, dated 29th December 1914.

From—Lieutenant-General SIR A. A. BARRETT, K C B,
K C V O, Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force
“D,”

To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters,
Delhi.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the accompanying reports by Major-General C. I. Fry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer and Commander W. Nunn, R.N., on the operations which resulted in the capture of Qurnah, and the surrender of the Turkish garrison with its commander, the late Vali of Basra.

The force originally despatched from Basra on the evening of the 3rd December for this purpose consisted of 2 guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, 1 company of Norfolks, half company 3rd Sappers and Miners, the 104th Rifles and the 110th Mahrattas under command of Colonel G. S. Frazer. Two of the transports containing these troops were armed with 2 field guns each, to be placed at the disposal of the Senior Naval Officer as soon as the landing of the troops had been completed.

Colonel Frazer's orders were to land at a spot, selected by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., on the left bank of the river a few miles below Qurnah, and, acting in concert with the naval force, to clear the left bank of the enemy up to and beyond Qurnah, after which he had a free hand to decide whether to cross the river and attack the village of Qurnah, or to hold on and await reinforcements.

It will be seen from Colonel Frazer's report that the clearing of the left bank was carried out most successfully.

The enemy on this bank, after being driven from his entrenchments and from the village of Muzaira'ah, fell back to the north, while our leading troops got engaged with those holding the village of Qurnah on the right bank. Owing to the thick groves of palm trees at this spot, intersected as usual by numerous creeks, touch was lost with the retreating Turks, who were thus enabled to cross the river unmolested higher up stream; while Colonel Frazer, being unable to cross the river under a heavy fire, withdrew for the night. It will be seen from the report of Captain Nunn, R N, that although the naval guns and the field guns on the transports were able to afford most efficient support during the first part of the action, the ships and armed launches, one of which was disabled, could not, owing to being exposed to heavy shell fire, go far enough up stream to bring an effective fire to bear upon the enemy holding this village.

I consider that Colonel Frazer accomplished all that could have been expected of him, having regard to the limited number of troops under his command. The Turks had been reinforced before the action commenced and were in greater strength than was expected.

As soon as the transports containing wounded and prisoners returned to Basra, I ordered General Fry to take up reinforcements consisting of 4 more field guns, the remaining 3 companies of the Norfolk Regiment, the 7th Rajputs and a half battalion of the 120th Infantry.

His orders were to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly before renewing the engagement, and to let me know if he considered more troops would be required. He asked for a Mountain Battery and some transport mules, which were despatched as quickly as possible.

The further course of the action is fully described in General Fry's report and it only remains for me to express my high appreciation of the skilful manner in which they were carried out and of the excellent behaviour of the troops engaged. I consider that the crossing of the river was a most creditable performance and I trust that the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Campbell and the non-commissioned officers and men of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, who swam the river, will meet with due recognition.

I also wish to endorse General Fry's commendations of other officers and men who distinguished themselves during this engagement, although, as I have already mentioned in a previous report,

I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations as a whole have been concluded. I much regret that the force has now lost the services of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., and the officers and men of H M S Ocean, who have now rejoined their ship and quitted the Gulf

I.

Report on the operations of General Fry's column on 6th, 7th and 8th December 1914, culminating in the surrender of Qurnah

The troops despatched from Basra on the 5th December to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's Column (104th Rifles, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry and section 82nd Battery) arrived at Camp Shaib at 5 A.M. on 6th December and disembarked, extending the existing perimeter camp to the north. Colonel Frazer had arranged for a reconnaissance of the enemy's position by 3 companies under Major Hill at 8 A.M., and during this I and one of my staff went on board H.M.S. Lawrence to confer with Sir P. Cox and Captain Hayes-Sadler, Senior Naval Officer.

The enemy had re-occupied Muzaira'ah after Colonel Frazer's operation of the 4th December and appeared to be actively engaged in entrenching the position.

At 10-30 A.M. the enemy opened fire with 2 guns from the southern end of Muzaira'ah on Major Hill's reconnaissance, firing about 6 groups of 2 shots of well-timed shrapnel, and at 11 A.M. opened on the Lawrence firing 6 groups of 2 shots. They appeared to be ranging new guns.

The reconnaissance returned to camp, while the Lawrence withdrew a short distance down stream.

At 2-30 P.M. the Senior Naval Officer reported that about 500 enemy with 2 guns were advancing from Muzaira'ah across the plain. The 110th were sent forward to reinforce the outposts with 2 sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. After some brief long range fire the enemy retired, and beyond a small affair of outposts just before dusk, when the enemy advanced too close, necessitating the reinforcement of the outposts by 1 double company, there was no sniping or other disturbing element during the ensuing night.

From my intelligence it appeared that the enemy had been considerably reinforced since Colonel Frazer's action on 4th, and were now estimated at 1,200-1,500 about Muzaira'ah with 6 guns, and about 800 in Qurnah with 4 guns

As any forward movement from Muzaira'ah would enable the enemy to shell the camp (though the danger was a night one only) and to prevent any further reinforcement of the enemy, I decided that an early attack on Muzaira'ah, with the clearing of the left bank of the Tigris river was essential to further operations. This, however, would have been ineffectual unless I was prepared to remain in possession of captured ground. The opening of a short line of communication to Shaib Camp would be essential, and consequently 320 mules were wired for, being the minimum estimated requirement (For the working of this line see Appendix "A").

On 7th December, the force (Appendix "B"), less one half double company per battalion and details of other units left in camp, assembled on the further side of the creek just north of the camp at 9 A M. Considerable delay occurred owing to difficulties experienced by the field artillery in crossing this shallow creek, filled by an exceptionally high tide

My plan of attack was for the 2nd Norfolk Regiment and the 120th Infantry to attack the village of Muzaira'ah and the trenches south of that place, while the 110th Light Infantry, echeloned back on the right of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was to carry out a turning movement against the north of the village, the 7th Rajputs and 104th Rifles being held in reserve. The section, 82nd Battery, was directed to support the left attack, the 2 sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, the right attack. The Mountain Battery and transport mules asked for had arrived at camp, and I must here express my thanks for the prompt despatch of these, the latter being especially necessary for my plans. The 30th Mountain Battery at once joined the force for the action, and was placed between the field batteries to support either flank as required

Close co-operation had been arranged for with the Senior Naval Officer.

The advance commenced at 11 A M over an absolutely level and bare open plain without a vestige of cover, and at 11-15 A M 82nd Battery opened fire on Muzaira'ah at a range of 2,750 yards.

Ten minutes later the enemy opened rifle fire from the village and trenches covering it, and at 11-45 A.M. the 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, came into action at 3,800 yards range. Two of the enemy's guns then opened fire on the 76th Battery from the north end of Muzaira'ah, the flashes being visible, but they were silenced in 10 rounds and did not re-open fire, being subsequently captured intact.

The infantry were meanwhile steadily advancing and all artillery advanced to closer ranges. As the infantry came into action each line successively dropped their blankets to facilitate movement and these were collected after the action.

The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 120th Infantry came under some enfilade from trenches on the enemy's right, but the prompt switching of fire on to that flank by the 82nd Battery and guns from the ships, combined with vigorous action on the part of the 120th Infantry reinforced by a double company 7th Rajputs, with Maxim guns, effectually checked any danger from that direction.

Meanwhile the 110th Light Infantry executed their turning movement against trenches on the north of Muzaira'ah, till at 12-50 P.M. the whole of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment being now merged in the firing line, the village was stormed at the point of the bayonet, the enemy not waiting to receive the charge.

The pursuit through the palm groves was vigorously carried out by the 120th Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment, while the 110th Light Infantry cleared the trenches immediately north of Muzaira'ah. The 104th Rifles followed closely after the 110th Light Infantry and, as the latter regiment swung towards the river, moved northwards clearing further trenches occupied by the enemy in their retirement. All the artillery moved round the north of Muzaira'ah and shelled the fleeing enemy.

At 2 P.M. two hostile guns opened fire from the north-north east, the flashes only being visible. These were silenced in 7 minutes by searching fire from 76th Battery at 4,100 yards range and teams were seen galloping away, leaving the guns. A squadron of cavalry or even a troop during this pursuit would have been invaluable, for the 2 guns could undoubtedly have been captured and probably a large body of the enemy (estimated from 1,000 to 1,500) could have been rounded up, with their line of retreat up the river bank cut.

Major Maule, 82nd Battery, had meanwhile placed one of his guns in position on the left bank of the Tigris at the northern edge of the palm groves and effectually raked the river front of Qurnah at a range of 2,300 yards

The 7th Rajputs, except for one double company reinforcement to the 120th, were in reserve throughout the action

Through the palm groves the fighting continued till nearly dusk, the enemy bringing a heavy fire to bear from Qurnah and along the river bank

Camp was arranged for the force in some gardens between Muzaira'ah and the palm groves, where though within shell fire from Qurnah, it was hidden from view and covered by the glare of the burning village. By 5 P M all units were settling into camp except the 110th Light Infantry, who were covering the operation from the north-west and who came in after dark. About this time two enemy's shells were burst outside the north-west corner of camp and at 9-30 P M five shells were fired over the glowing village - no damage was done and the ensuing night was devoid of incident.

The captures this day included 3 field guns, about 130 prisoners and a large number of rifles which were destroyed

The enemy are estimated to have had about 2,000 troops on the left bank, and subsequent information places their casualties at about 200 killed and 300 wounded, but the latter is probably under-estimated. Our casualties were British Officers wounded 5; Indian officers wounded 3, rank and file killed 8, wounded 112, of whom 2 have since died.

I must acknowledge the admirable support extended by the Artillery and the Navy, which seems to have paralysed all artillery resistance.

From my intelligence this evening it appeared that about 1,500 of the enemy escaped northwards up the left bank of the Tigris and that the majority had embarked and fled north, while in Qurnah itself were some 800 regulars with 4 guns.

I decided to attempt a crossing of the Tigris without delay

Early on the morning of 8th December the half Company (No 17) Sappers and Miners were despatched to the northern edge of the palm groves to get a line across the river. The 104th Rifles were to reconnoitre and cover the operations from the north, the 110th Light Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment were moved to

the edge of the palm groves, the former to cross and the latter to cover the crossing, while the artillery moved to positions in support, and the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were to distract attention opposite Qurnah itself in combination with the naval force.

At 11-30 A M Havildar Ghulam Nabi swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by Lance-Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haidar, and in spite of a strong current and the possibility of a heavy fire being brought on them at any moment, they succeeded in swimming the 130 yards of river and landing on the right bank. Lieutenant Campbell, R E, then went across and the 1½" wire cable, especially brought up for the purpose, was hauled over and made fast; a difficult feat in the strong current on an ebb tide.

A dhow was secured with the assistance of two or three friendly Arabs, and being brought across, the first party of some 70 men, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer and Captain Cochran, General Staff Officer, 3rd grade, for Intelligence, successfully landed on the right bank at 1-20 P.M. under some rifle fire from dhows down stream. Though the operation was tedious, the rest of the Battalion was gradually pushed over.

Meanwhile the Navy and a Double Company of each of the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were distracting the enemy's attention in front of Qurnah successfully; for the crossing did not appear to have been realised by the enemy till too late, though some rifle and ineffectual shell fire was experienced.

The 104th Rifles had earlier reported that they could cross about 1½ miles up stream by 3 dhows, the crews of which were friendly. They were directed to cross and come up on the right of the 110th Light Infantry for the advance on Qurnah, while the 2nd Norfolk Regiment detached half a Battalion to replace them.

The single gun, 82nd Battery, only returned the enemy's fire and it was not found necessary for the other guns to disclose themselves. One Section, 30th Mountain Battery, without mules, followed the 110th Light Infantry across the river but were not employed, as Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, meeting with some opposition north of Qurnah, decided it was too late in the day to storm the town with the probability of street fighting.

The 104th Rifles, 110th Light Infantry and Section 30th Mountain Battery accordingly went into camp on the right bank

near the flying bridge One Double Company, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Britten, however, moving down the right bank, did not get the order to retire, and entering the enemy's position on their right, enfiladed their northern defence and occupied three towers in this part of their position. This Double Company, being isolated, later withdrew to camp without casualty for the night.

To support this force on the right bank, the 2nd Norfolk Regiment were left to camp at the end of the palm groves on the left bank, other units resuming their camp at Muzaira'ah.

The ensuing night was devoid of incident

Our casualties this day were 23 rank and file wounded.

At 5 A.M. on 9th December, as I was about to resume operations, I received intimation from the Senior Naval Officer that a deputation of officers from Subhi Bey, the late Vali of Basra and Turkish Commander, had boarded H.M.S. *Espiegle* about midnight, stating that the Vali was prepared to surrender unconditionally

I met a deputation, consisting of the Chief Staff Officer and two Lieutenants on board at 8-30 A.M. when arrangements for surrender were made and all movements of troops stopped

At 1-30 P.M., accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Captain Hayes-Sadler (Senior Naval Officer) and Staffs, I landed at the Vali's house and received his surrender, returning to him his sword in recognition of his able defence.

Meanwhile the 104th Rifles and 110th Light Infantry had moved into Qurnah, and piquets were posted round the town, the remainder of the battalions being drawn up round the Turkish force which had fallen in with piled arms on the open square at the south corner of the town

At 2-30 P.M., the Union Jack was formally hoisted and the transference of the prisoners to the paddle steamer *Blosse-Lynch* was proceeded with. The detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah are shown in Appendix "C."

General remarks and recommendations —I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops throughout these operations and their steadiness under heavy fire. Their tactical formations were admirably adapted to the ground which afforded no cover, and the units were handled with marked ability.

My thanks are due to Captain Hayes-Sadler, R N , for his very close co-operation with his naval force throughout these operations, which was of invaluable assistance

The fact that there were so few casualties was due to the splendid co-operation of the field and mountain artillery. Their fire was rendered very difficult owing to mirage, but in spite of this they maintained an accurate fire on the enemy's trenches right up to the moment of assault. They also immediately silenced any of the enemy's guns which opened fire

Major St. T. B. Nevinston, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, acted as Commander Royal Artillery and directed this co-operation with great skill and ability.

Major St. J. Maule, 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, throughout showed great initiative, and his action in bringing a gun to bear on the river front of Qurnah on the 7th and 8th December had much to do with the decisive issue of the operations.

Major H. J. Cotter, 30th Mountain Battery, and *Captain E. V. Sarson*, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, gave valuable services.

No. 98166 Battery Sergeant-Major H. E. Haggett, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, is noted for exceptionally able and energetic assistance

No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.—I cannot speak too highly of the services rendered by this half Company throughout, under the command of *Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E.* They have had very hard work and their devotion to it has been of incalculable assistance.

Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E., acted as my A. C. R. E. and ably directed the operation of bridging the river-Tigris.

Havildar Ghulam Nabi, No. 2632, swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by *Lance-Naik Nur Dad*, No. 3743, and *No. 3898 Sapper Ghulam Hardar*. There was a strong current in the river which was about 130 yards wide, and the enemy were occupying the opposite bank only a short distance down stream. Although they were not fired on, there was every reason to expect they would be, as the ground on the opposite bank was densely wooded and favoured the approach of an enemy. It was owing to their gallant action that the steel cable was got across and the flying bridge constructed. I recommend *Havildar Ghulam Nabi*

for the "Order of Merit" and *Lance-Naik Nur Dad* and *Sapper Ghulam Hardar* for the "Distinguished Conduct Medal."

Lieutenant M. G. G. Campbell, R E, deserves special recognition for his gallant crossing over the Tigris, holding on to the log line only, when a strong current was running, to superintend the hauling over of the steel hawser and fix the running tackle for the flying bridge—he was for some time under fire while performing this difficult operation.

2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment—This fine Regiment has throughout been an example to others, both in the field and in camp. Their cohesion and the precision in their movements showed that they have attained a very high standard of efficiency in their peace training, the credit for which is due to *Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Peebles, D S.O*, who has commanded the Regiment with marked ability and energy.

Captain W. J. O'B. Daunt (severely wounded) proved himself a gallant leader.

Captain and Adjutant G. de Grey was particularly conspicuous in taking messages to the firing line, and conveying ammunition to it when it was short.

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother for bold handling of his machine-gun section over absolutely open ground.

No 5008 *Sergeant W. Bailey* (twice wounded) for work with machine-guns.

No. 5223	Lance-Sergeant L. Snell	} for exceptionally gallant and useful work during the attack on Muzarra'ah.
" 5973	Sergeant A. Cornwall	
" 7226	Lance-Sergeant Leveridge	
" 7345	Corporal W. Frislin	
" 7521	Musician Mullinger	
" 7784	" Sharpe	} did particularly well attending to Captain Daunt when wounded.
" 8049	Private A. Dawson	
" 8335	Private F. Pryor	
" 8632	" A. George	

Captain D. Arthur, I.M.S, was particularly conspicuous in attending Captain Daunt and other wounded when exposed to heavy fire, and throughout the action.

7th Rajputs—This Regiment was held in reserve throughout, but one Double Company under *Lieutenant-Colonel Parr* did well when it reinforced the 120th Infantry.

Lieutenant W. L. Harvey.—For the very efficient manner in which he brought up his machine-gun section in support of the 120th Infantry; he was wounded just after adjusting a jam in one of his guns.

Subadar Brijmohan Singh handled his company in a very efficient manner when brought up in support of the 120th Infantry and acted throughout with conspicuous bravery and coolness

104th Rifles.—This Regiment has been engaged in every action which has taken place during this campaign and has met with very heavy casualties. Their work under my command during these operations has throughout been excellent and quite up to the fine traditions of the Regiment. During the action of the 7th they were in reserve, but were thrown in towards the end of the action and carried out the pursuit well. On the 8th *Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Clery* showed great initiative in securing the 3 dhows up stream and his action greatly facilitated the rapidity of crossing.

Captain T. M. Butler (severely wounded) for exceptional skill and gallant leading of his Double Company in the attack on Muzaira'ah.

Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit, I.M.S.D. —During the attack on Muzaira'ah on the 7th December 1914, Rifleman Ghos Mahmud was shot by an Arab, who was hiding in one of the huts. Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit called on a sepoy of another regiment to enter the hut and clear it. The sepoy seemed reluctant to do so, and this Sub-Assistant Surgeon took his rifle and bayonet, entered the house and closed with the Arab. The sepoy followed and between them they killed him. He has also shown exceptional bravery in attending wounded under fire.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.—This Regiment carried out the turning movement on the enemy's left flank on the 7th with great intelligence and dash and worked well on the 8th.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten.—His action on 8th December 1914, in capturing 3 towers on the right of the enemy's position at Qurnah shows him to be a resourceful and dashing leader.

Captain K. E. Cooper showed great dash and bravery attacking through the north end of Muzaira'ah. He approached one small house from which fire was being kept up, climbed a wall at the back and shot 4 Turks, who were occupying it, with his revolver.

Subadar Hari Savant and *Jemadar Vishnu Ghone* for conspicuous coolness and ability in handling their half Double Companies on 7th and 8th December 1914.

No. 2089 Lance-Naik Bhan Sawant (since killed), a young soldier who showed much dash and spirit in command of the scouts of his company.

No. 1148 Lance-Naik Hander Beg, a signaller, who on two occasions signalled an important message from the firing line to the artillery, standing up fearlessly in the open under heavy fire, doing so, as he could not see properly in any other position.

120th Rajputana Infantry—This Regiment, consisting of only Headquarters and 2 Double Companies, acted with great boldness and spirit on our left flank and ably supported the 2nd Norfolk Regiment when the latter came under enfilade fire from the enemy's right.

Lieutenant and Adjutant W. L. Miskin showed great dash and capacity. After Captain Macready was wounded he took command of that officer's Double Company and handled it well, having twice to change direction to meet enfilade fire, and on each occasion succeeded in turning out the enemy.

Subadar Dunga Rawat for conspicuous bravery and coolness in handling his half Double Company.

No. 978 Havildar Gunesh for marked capacity as a leader.

Medical Services.—The Field Ambulances under *Major E. Bennett, R A M.C.*, worked with great devotion on the 7th and were under shell fire for a short time that night.

Transport.—I must recognise the good work done by the portion of the 10th Mule Corps under *Jemadar Allah Din* and endorse the recommendations to notice of individuals mentioned in paragraph 12 of Appendix "A."

Headquarters.—Finally I would bring forward the names of *Captain E. G. Dunn*, Royal Irish Rifles, my Brigade-Major, who again gave most valuable and energetic assistance in the working out of the details of the operations. His clear conveyance of my orders materially assisted in the successful issue of the operations. Also *Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist*, 52nd Sikhs (F. F.), my Staff Captain, who again proved himself an able, energetic and resourceful Staff Officer; he in the absence of either a Supply or Transport Officer organised and maintained an unfailing supply to the troops from my original camp at Shaub.

Captain H G Morrell, 119th Infantry, in command of the 18th Brigade Section of the 34th Divisional Signal Company, carried out his duties under difficult circumstances very ably and with untiring energy.

Captain G W Cochran, 81st Pioneers, General Staff Officer, 3rd Grade for Intelligence, worked unsparingly and the information he collected turned out to be very accurate. He also gave me much assistance in other ways.

APPENDIX A

Report on the working of the transport between Shaib Camp and Muzaira'ah

1. On arrival at Shaib on the morning of the 5th December 1914, General Fry decided to get up three hundred mules, his intention being, when the village of Muzaira'ah was captured and the troops reached the left bank of the Tigris, to maintain himself there and attempt to cross above Qurnah.

2. A demand for 320 mules was therefore sent to Basra at 1 P M on December 5th.

3. These mules (320) arrived on the morning of the 7th at 7 A.M. They were disembarked by 9 A M

4. I ordered them to feed and saddle up at 12 noon. Captain Lanyon of the Norfolk Regiment was put in charge of the mules to distribute them. I gave him a distribution list showing how mules were to be allotted.

5. At 1 P.M. orders were telephoned to camp to load up the mules as it was seen that Muzaira'ah would soon be in our possession.

6. About 4-30 P M the mules began to arrive in Camp Muzaira'ah. As it was getting dark and spasmodic firing was going on the confusion was considerable.

All the mules were unloaded, however, and in the dark assembled by the duffadars and taken back to camp.

This evening the Regiments got each—

16 loads rations,
8 „ ammunition,
8 „ tools,
8 „ cooking pots.
some kits,

and so were amply provided for.

7. The orders for the 8th, 9th and 10th were to send up one day's rations each day.

8. As it was feared that the horses might not be able to get full forage rations on 8th, 190 loads of forage were sent for and arrived after dark on 8th.

With them came 48 mules for duty in Muzaira'ah as 1st line mules in case of a further advance across the river. The mules this day therefore did a double trip.

9 There being ample forage in camp, the mules on 9th and 10th only brought up men's rations from Shaib, while 48 mules assisted in carrying up kits of units as they were sent across the Tigris.

10 Eventually all the mules were taken to the right bank of Tigris on the 12th, having been used to ration the troops left on the left bank and to bring up the remains of kits left in camp.

11. On the 8th, when two units were passed over to the right bank, all available mules and the 30th Mountain Battery baggage were used to send up their kits, so that by the evening the troops across the river were rationed and had their blankets that night.

12. Captain Lanyon speaks very highly of the work done by *Jemadar Allah Din* who commanded the mules. His work was of the greatest help.

The Kote-Duffadars—
2193 Busaki Ram,
6417 Jamal Din,
205 Mir Dad,

were of the greatest help to me in collecting their mules in the dark and in constantly moving backwards and forwards

The men, of whom I saw a certain amount, were cheery and worked well, and though they were under spasmodic shell fire on 7th and 8th and had to cross the plain where bullets, though spent, were falling, behaved very well indeed.

Prisoners of War.

Subhi Bey, late Vali of Basra and Turkish Commander.

	Officers	Rank and file
1st Battalion, 26th Regiment (Anatolia) ..	12	353
2nd Battalion, Murrattab Regiment (Baghdad) (Amarah)	13	345
1st Company, 1st Battalion 28th Regiment Artillery.	2	63
Turkish Navy	1	3
Basra Battalion Gendarmerie	7	177
Medical	4	11
Supply, etc. .. .	3	11
Vali's Staff	1	5
Wounded in hospital	2	21
Total ..	45	989

II

Copy of Report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, Commanding Qurnah Column, on the operations of the 4th December 1914, dated Camp Um Rash, 5th December 1914.

I have the honour to report as follows on the operations yesterday —

2. My Staff Officer, Captain Branson, who was wounded, has already taken to you most of the details, and I sent you a wireless in code last night.

3. The disembarkation yesterday morning was carried out quickly and without confusion.

Two small creeks delayed the advance of the column till they could be rendered passable.

My Advanced Guard was, in the first instance, directed so as to pass well to the east of Muzaira'ah.

As all the scouting had to be done with infantry, the advance was not very quick.

It was first reported that there was no enemy in Muzaira'ah and I then changed the direction of the Advanced Guard so that their right passed to the east of Muzaira'ah

It was then discovered beyond a doubt that the enemy were in position along the edge of the date-palms between Muzaira'ah and Qurnah.

I directed the Advanced Guard to clear the village and brought up the other half Battalion of the 110th on their left, and attacked the enemy on their left flank.

It then became known that Muzaira'ah was occupied by the enemy.

I sent the Norfolks, 1 D. C., to support the half Battalion 110th attacking the village.

Eventually the Sappers and Miners also joined the right attack.

The village was cleared and also the trenches in front of the date trees, where the 110th captured 69 prisoners and 2 abandoned field guns (9 prs.).

In the meantime, the ships had been shelling Qurnah and the date groves, and the Royal Field Artillery Muzaira'ah, and the practice of all guns seemed to be excellent

The troops after this did not come under shell fire, but the rifle fire opposed to them was considerable

When the troops entered the date grove I reinforced the left half of the 110th by half Battalion of 104th, and the enemy was driven back to the Tigris river, where they quickly effected a crossing by means of boats arranged as flying bridges.

At 2-10 P.M. I ordered a retirement to the place near where we disembarked and there formed camp.

After my infantry entered the date grove my Field Artillery was unable to render any further assistance.

The Tigris east of Qurnah is from 200 to 300 yards wide and field guns cannot operate against Qurnah owing to the date trees.

My retirement to camp was well and steadily carried out.

I am of opinion that until guns can be brought up to demolish the houses of Qurnah, the only way to effect a landing would be to do so with country boats north of Qurnah.

All the troops under my command performed their duty most thoroughly.

Captain Branson, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, my Staff Officer, afforded me the greatest assistance and was wounded shortly after I had decided to retire, while I was issuing the orders.

I attach a report from the Officer Commanding 104th.

The Officer Commanding 110th reports as follows :—

“Of the officers who came under my observation I should like to particularly mention Major Hill and Lieutenant Hind in the company firing line, and Lieutenant Ball who handled the machine-guns most efficiently.”

No. 959 Lance-Naik Apa Bagive displayed great bravery during the attack on the enemy's position in the date groves, and in the subsequent advance towards Qurnah. He was carrying the flag on the left of the line in order to indicate the position of the line to the warships. The flag was a very conspicuous mark, and drew a heavy fire from the enemy. Lance-Naik Apa Bagive carried the flag absolutely in the open. Had he taken cover, the flag might not have been visible.

I am sending down all prisoners on Blossie-Lynch, Malomir and Medijeh under command of Captain Bayley, Royal Field Artillery.

APPENDIX D.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Clery, Commanding 104th Rifles, to the Staff Officer, Qurnah Column, dated 5th December 1914

As requested I have the honour to forward the names of the following officers and men of the Regiment under my command who were conspicuous for their gallant conduct during the action on the 4th instant opposite Qurnah :—

Captain E. G. J. Byrne —This officer in the face of a heavy and accurate fire brought his machine-guns right up to the firing line on the river bank opposite Qurnah. From here his fire was so galling to the Turks that they brought up a field gun and endeavoured to silence the machine-guns. Several of the shells hit the parapet where the machine-guns were; notwithstanding this, Captain Byrne kept his guns in action, and did not retire

from his position until ordered to retire. This officer on two previous occasions on which the Regiment has been in action, has brought his detachment forward most intelligently and gallantly. On this occasion he received one bullet through his helmet and one cut his puttee.

2 Subadar Ghulam Rasul.—This Indian Officer was conspicuous for the gallant manner in which he led his men forward in the face of a heavy accurate and short range fire from the Turks.

This officer was subsequently killed.

3. Jemadar Kishna Ram.—Conspicuous pluck under fire, and assisted a wounded man to rear under heavy fire during the retirement.

4. No. 2317 Lance-Naik Guman Singh

5. No. 2866 Rm. Khota Ram.

6. No. 2578 Rm. Dhanna Ram.

7. No. 2090 Rm. Maula Dad.

8 When ordered to retire, the two machine-guns had to be carried by hand some 250 yards back to the mules under heavy fire. Not having enough men to take away all the ammunition boxes as well as guns, the machine-gun officer asked four men to return to the position and recover the ammunition boxes. They did so under a heavy gun and rifle fire and brought back all the boxes to the mules, although the troops had left the trench.

9. No. 2435 Havildar Mohru Ram, when left in command of a long mixed firing line, performed meritorious service in controlling this line and opening very heavy, accurate fire on the Qurnah position, thus keeping the enemy's fire down while other parts of the firing line retired.

10 No 1615 Reservist Jhonta Singh, "B" Coy.—Meritorious conduct during the retirement from the river in carrying Rm. Jai Singh, who was severely wounded through the chest, on his shoulders for 600 yards under heavy fire, over a number of water nullahs, finally handing him over to some dhoolie bearers.

Reservist Jhonta Singh was previously recommended by his Double Company Commander for good work during the action of November 15th when he carried ammunition forward to the firing line from mules that had fallen into a canal.

11. No. 2263 Bugler Narsu Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in taking written orders regarding the retirement

under a heavy fire along the firing line on two occasions—once to extreme right and again later on to the machine-guns on the left.

12. No. 3241 Rm. Sobh Singh, "A" Coy., and No. 2981 Rm. Kan Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in carrying between them Rm. Jat Singh, "A," who was severely wounded in the head, under a heavy fire during the retirement for some 300 yards to the dhoolie

14. No. 3195 Rm. Ratna Ram.

15. No. 2112 Rm. Dunga Ram.

16. No. 2670 Rm. Kheta Ram

17. No. 3143 Rm. Kema Ram.

18. No. 2422 Rm. Jowana Ram.

The above men for meritorious conduct, who, in the absence of Indian Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, were conspicuous in taking the place of Non-Commissioned Officers in leading their commands forward under a heavy and accurate fire.

19. No. 2463 Bugler Kala Khan, for meritorious conduct On November 15th this man with another during retirement from Saihan carried Captain Maclean out of action. On 17th November and 4th December he again performed meritorious work in carrying messages backwards and forwards from the Officer Commanding to the officers in the firing line.

III.

Dated H.M.S. Espiegle, Qurnah, 15th December 1914.

From—Commander W. NUNN, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division,

To—The General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade.

In the absence of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. Ocean, who was Senior Naval Officer at the time, I beg to forward a short report from the Naval point of view on the Qurnah operations from 3rd December to the 9th December 1914.

The names of H. M. ships engaged were as follows :—

H. M. S. Espiegle	... Commander W. Nunn, R. N.
„ Odin	... Commander C. R. Wason, R. N.
„ Lawrence	... Commander R. N. Suter, R. N.

H. M. Armed Launch Lewis Pelly Lieutenant in Command, J. F. B.
Carslake, R. N.

„ „ Miner ... Lieutenant in Command, C. H.
Heath-Caldwell, R. N.

„ „ Shaitan Lieutenant Commander in
Command, F. G. S. Elker,
R. N. R. (killed in action)

I have the honour to report as follows on the part taken in the operations for attack and occupation of Qurnah by H. M. S. Espiegle under my command.

On Thursday, 3rd December, H. M. S. Espiegle left Basra at 3-50 P. M., and anchored to northward of Dair, about 10 miles south of Qurnah, at 7-45 P. M., and weighed, and proceeded at 5-5 A. M., on 4th December towards Qurnah, followed by H. M. ships Odin and Lawrence and armed launches Miner, Lewis Pelly and Shaitan and the four Lynch's steamers Medijieh, Blosse-Lynch, Malomir and Salami, carrying the troops.

Medijieh and Blosse-Lynch each had two 18-pr. field artillery guns mounted in the forepart of the deck house.

On rounding the river bend near Um Rash, fire was opened on us by two Turkish guns mounted to the south-west of Muzaira'ah village, and we at once replied, opening fire at 6-45 A. M.

The transports went alongside the bank just south of Um Rash village and disembarked troops, and at 9-20 A. M., they had disembarked and were advancing towards enemy.

The Blosse-Lynch and Medijieh came up and anchored off our port quarter at 9-55 A. M., and opened fire. At this point the enemy's fire was fairly accurate, and they were firing on us from the two Muzaira'ah guns and also from Qurnah.

At 10-5 A. M., Espiegle was hit on port bow but not damaged, and was also hit several times later, Lawrence also being hit several times.

Odin had been left in a position to guard the camp which was formed at the place of disembarkation.

At 1 P. M., the armed launches were ordered up to assist in the attack as our troops were seen to have practically reached the left bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah. The launches opened a rapid, accurate fire and a hot fire was opened on them by the Turkish guns and riflemen,

At about 1-40 P.M., Miner was seen to be listing and she returned towards ships and grounded just ahead of Espiegle and reported that she had been hit and that a shell had penetrated starboard side into engine room.

Assistance was at once sent by Espiegle and leak stopper placed over hole and Miner was, later on, able to raise steam again and proceed down river where during the night she was patched by Odin.

All this time Espiegle was in extremely shallow water and unable to move nearer Qurnah. The Espiegle's fire had been directed on the enemy's guns at Qurnah, which had been several times temporarily silenced, also those at Muzaira'ah.

During the advance of our troops Espiegle and Lawrence also shelled the enemy's trenches.

At 2-37 P.M. extremely heavy firing was heard near the bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah and at 3 P.M., a signal was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, Commanding Troops, that he had decided to retire to Shaib Camp south of Um Rash.

Espiegle and Lawrence at once directed a heavy fire on the only Qurnah houses which could be seen plainly enough to be sure of not hitting our troops, and ordered the armed launches back at 4 P.M.

At 6-15 P.M., the retirement had been effected and Blosselynch and Medjeh and launches had gone down river, as Espiegle proceeded towards the camp and remained there for the night.

Reinforcements were asked for from Basra and the river steamers sent down for them on 5th December, bringing up four more 18-pr. guns and two and a half battalions of troops, with General Fry in command, on Sunday morning 6th December, and disembarked on arrival.

On Sunday forenoon General Fry held a conference on board Lawrence during which the enemy opened fire, and in the afternoon at 2-10 P.M., Lawrence which was anchored just to north-west of camp reported that the enemy were advancing with guns across the plain from Muzaira'ah.

Espiegle at once proceeded to a position north-west of camp and opened fire with shrapnel on the enemy at 2 P.M., Lawrence also firing on them.

Espiegle was hit twice by enemy's shell, one piercing the side of port bow near 3-pr. gun port. This shell had been fired by enemy's guns near Muzaira'ah village. At 3-10 P.M., one of them was silenced and, it is thought, put out of action by a shell by Espiegle. Lawrence was also hit.

Our field artillery had also got into action and the enemy retired across the plain with considerable loss.

Espiegle ceased fire at 3-25 P.M., and returned to anchorage for protection of Shaib Camp. More reinforcements arrived in the river steamers about 6-30 P.M. on 7th December, and the troops left the camp at 9 A.M. to advance for attack on Turks' position in accordance with scheme arranged, so that Navy and Army could co-operate as much as possible.

Espiegle weighed at 9-45 A.M., and proceeded up river and anchored at 10-10 A.M. to north-west of Um Rash with Lawrence astern and launches and Odin to south-east.

The enemy at once opened fire from the guns at Qurnah and Muzaira'ah, and we at once replied attacking the guns with lyddite and co-operating with the field guns in the river steamers Blossc-Lynch and Medjeh in shelling enemy's trenches during the advance of our troops, Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., of H.M.S. Espiegle, directing the gun fire from the mast-head.

At 11-30 A.M., a very heavy musketry fire was opened on our troops from Muzaira'ah village, and Espiegle moved further up the river at 11-50 A.M., and again at 2-10 P.M., although in very shallow water, in order to support the troops.

The armed launches were sent forward at 2 P.M., and at this time Lieutenant G. E. Harden, R.N., of H.M.S. Espiegle, went in the steam-cutter to locate and sound round the dredger which the Turks had sunk in the river between us and Qurnah.

A heavy fire was being kept up by the Turkish guns and at 3-30 P.M., the Shaitan returned with her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander F. O. S. Elkes, R.N.R., killed and several wounded, and steaming gear disabled. Her wounded were taken and treated on board Espiegle.

The launches were recalled at 2-45 P.M., and Espiegle remained in the same position for the night, the enemy firing a few shells when the moon rose.

The enemy's fire had been very heavy and fairly accurate during the day and Espiegle was hit several times, two men being

wounded by a segment of shell which hit spreader of main topmast rigging and burst over afterpart of the ship. Another shell pierced foremast cowl and lodged in netting.

Great difficulty was experienced in keeping signal communication with the Army, but we ascertained during the night that they had camped near Muzaira'ah and would advance on Qurnah in the morning.

At 8-30 A. M. on 8th December, the armed launch Lewis Pelly was ordered to reconnoitre towards Qurnah and was heavily fired on by Turkish guns and riflemen at 9 A. M.

Espiegle therefore opened fire and ordered Lewis Pelly back. Heavy firing in the woods indicated that our troops were engaged and we received information from General Fry that he intended to attempt to cross the Tigris above Qurnah and advance on the town.

Espiegle proceeded further up the river and Lieutenant G. E. Harden, of Espiegle, placed a buoy on the outer side of the sunken lighter, and, with Lewis Pelly sounding ahead, Espiegle passed it about 11 A. M. and anchored to northward of it, opening fire on the guns at Qurnah and firing lyddite at the houses. Blosse-Lynch and Medjeh also moved up and assisted, and Lawrence anchored some cables astern. Firing continued intermittently until sunset, and heavy rifle fire and the burning buildings indicated that the troops were progressing. The guns did not fire till after sunset and early in the middle watch a small steamer with all lights burning was observed to be coming down the river from the direction of the town blowing her siren to attract attention.

Espiegle's siren pipe had been cut by shell so Blosse-Lynch was directed to sound her siren in reply, and I sent an armed boat away under Lieutenant G. H. Harden, R. N., to board her as she approached. She was found to have on board a deputation of three Turkish Officers to discuss terms of surrender of Qurnah.

They came on board at 12-35 A. M., and were interviewed by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R. N., of H. M. S. Ocean, who is directing Naval operations from Espiegle, and agreed to an unconditional surrender and to meet General Fry on board Espiegle at 8-30 A. M.

At 8-30 A. M. on 9th December the three Turkish Officers, viz., Major Hussain, Lieutenant Kornal, and Lieutenant Ismail Haki,

returned on board and met General Fry and Staff and arranged details as to surrender.

Espiegle went further up the river at high water with Lewis Pelly again sounding ahead, and although very shallow was able to reach the deeper water near Qurnah and entered the Tigris, anchoring off Qurnah at 10-50 A.M.

In the afternoon, General Fry landed from H.M.S. Espiegle and received the sword of the Turkish Vali and Officers, the Turkish troops were disarmed and sent down the river as prisoners of war, and the Union Jack was hoisted over Qurnah.

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Endorsement dated Qurnah, 15th December 1914.

From—The General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade,

To—The General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D"

Forwarded. In my report on these operations I have already mentioned the great assistance and co-operation extended by the Naval Force under Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N. I much admired the intrepidity shown by the Commanders of the armed launches in ascending the Shatt-al-Arab river under shell fire each day, and sincerely regret the death of one of these, Lieutenant Elkes, R.N.

No. 204 (G), dated Basra, 3rd February 1915.

From—Lieutenant-General SIR A. A. BARRETT, K.C.B.,
K.C.V.O., Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force
"D,"

To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report on an engagement with the Turks north of Qurnah on the 20th January.

Reports from naval and cavalry reconnaissances were to the effect that Turkish outposts had occupied some sand-hills about six miles north of Muzaira'ah on the left bank of the Tigris. I thought it advisable to drive them back, and to impress upon our troops, as well as upon our adversaries, that it was not our intention merely to maintain a passive defence of our prepared position at Qurnah—Muzaira'ah.

The cavalry of the advanced guard, after drawing the enemy's fire from his trenches on the sand-hills, moved eastward to cover our right flank, sending a patrol to the west to watch the villages near the river bank. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry then advanced direct on the sand-hills, which were speedily cleared of the enemy. The 103rd Light Infantry prolonged the line to the left, with the 22nd Punjab and 119th Infantry in second line, and the Norfolk Regiment and half a battalion of the 7th Rajputs in reserve. The Turkish guns, six in number, opened fire from a position near the village of Rotah and were heavily shelled by the Espiegle and by our batteries. As our infantry advanced they came under fire from the Turkish main trenches.

These were at the time believed to be north of the Rotah creek, but a comparison of reports received since the action leads to the conclusion that some of them must have been on the south bank. A large extent of ground in front of the creek was marshy, so that the men of our leading battalions were over their knees in water.

The cavalry were also in wet ground. Our artillery were in action at a range of 3,500 yards, engaging the enemy's guns and shelling his trenches and camps, which were plainly visible beyond the creek. The 4-inch guns of the Espiegle, firing lyddite, were also within effective range, with two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, mounted on the deck of the S S Medique. The enemy's guns were temporarily silenced, and some of his troops were seen to be retiring to the north-east.

At this stage I was inclined to order a general advance on Rotah village, with a view to destroying the Turkish camp, and possibly capturing his guns. But I had warned the troops beforehand that I had no intention of crossing the creek, and an advance through marshy ground without cover would probably have entailed considerable loss. I also had to consider that our force was hardly strong enough to hold a position at Rotah as well as at Qurnah in the event of more troops being brought down from Baghdad.

I therefore issued orders to stand fast and prepare to withdraw to camp. Our second line took up a position on the sand-hills and our first line withdrew almost unmolested, except for an occasional shell from the enemy's guns, their infantry fire being well kept down by our artillery and the guns of the Espiegle. Shortly after

noon the engagement ceased, and by 2 o'clock the last of our troops were back in camp at Muzana'ah

Arab reports gave the strength of the enemy at about 5,000, and variously estimated his losses at from 100 to 300 killed, besides many wounded. These numbers may be exaggerated, but it is evident that his troops were much demoralised by our fire. Askari Bey, who had recently arrived from Constantinople to take command, was wounded, and is said to have returned to Baghdad.

I was much pleased with the behaviour of the troops on this occasion. General Dobbie handled his brigade skilfully, and the rapid and spirited advance of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the 103rd Mahattas is worthy of mention.

I am greatly indebted to Captain Nunn, R.N., for the valuable assistance afforded by H.M.S. *Espiegle* and the armed launch *Miner*.

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Copy of a report from Captain W. Nunn, Royal Navy, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," dated Qurna'h, 21st January 1915

I have the honour to forward the following report on the Naval operations in the Shatt-al-Arab on the 20th January:—

At 6-50 A.M. H.M.S. *Espiegle* (Captain W. Nunn, R.N., Senior Naval Officer) followed by H.M. Armed Launch *Miner* (Lieutenant-in-Command S. N. Heath-Caldwell) and *Medijeh*, having on board two 18-pr. Royal Field Artillery guns, proceeded up the river from anchorage off Tigris Camp.

At 7-30 the ships came under fire of the enemy's guns posted on south side of Rotah village, and at 7-58 A.M. *Espiegle* anchored in reach of Tigris beyond Bahran village heading E. N. E. in a position in which her whole broadside bore on enemy's position, and opened fire on enemy's guns.

At 8-15 A.M. *Medijeh* anchored as previously arranged about a quarter of a mile to southward of *Espiegle* and warped her stern round to bring her guns to bear and then opened fire.

At 8-20 A.M. *Miner* anchored off Bahran village and was attacked by twenty armed Arabs who ran out from the village. *Miner* drove them away with a well directed fire and then con-

tinued to engage parties of armed Arabs and cavalry on the right bank of Tigris.

Espiegle's fire was at first directed entirely on enemy's guns, of which five were plainly visible from the ship in pits south of Rotah village (just north of Rotah Creek), Medijeh assisting.

Later on Espiegle and Medijeh also shelled enemy's trenches and parties of Turks, who came forward close along left bank of river under cover of the raised bank and sniped at the ship.

After 10-45 A M the enemy's guns seldom fired. Their fire had been fairly good for direction, but badly laid for elevation, and shots and fragments of shell often fell near the ship but did no damage.

About 10-45 A M the signal arrived that our forces were retiring to camp, so Espiegle shelled the trenches vigorously and ordered Miner and Medijeh to drop down river firing as they went.

A large body of the enemy's infantry were observed about 10 A.M. to be leaving the camp near Sakhricha marching in column and numbering between one and two thousand. They marched to south-eastward round Pear Drop bend and reinforced the trenches and position near Rotah about noon. Espiegle was able to put a few shells amongst them and they scattered and took cover.

On their left was a large scattered body of enemy, presumably Arabs, numbering several thousand. On our departure they appeared to march into Rotah with red and green flags flying.

At noon the Miner was ordered to set Bahran village on fire, which she did and took two Arabs in Turkish uniform prisoners who were fighting for the Turks; at the same time the Royal Engineers were destroying Halla village.

At 12-10 P.M. Espiegle weighed and followed the others down river, the enemy keeping up gun and rifle fire as we left.

No 860-A , dated Basra, 31st March 1915.

From—The General Officer Commanding, I. E. F. "D,"

To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters,
India, Simla.

As I am about to relinquish the command of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," I have the honour to submit, for the favour-

able consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of those officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, whose good services during the operations from November 1914 to 31st March 1915, I desire to bring to notice, in addition to those who have already been mentioned in my reports No. 101-G, dated 7th December 1914* and 174-G, dated 29th December 1914* :—

Commanders, Headquarters Staff, etc.

- | | |
|--|---|
| Major General C. I. Fry | . Has done excellent service throughout. He commanded during the highly successful engagements which led to the surrender of Subhi Bey at Qurnah in December 1914 |
| Brigadier-General W. H. Dobbie, C B. | A keen and capable Brigade Commander, and a good leader of troops in the field. |
| Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C B, D S O | Commanded the Force before my arrival, and showed great skill and resource in his arrangements for overcoming the resistance of the Turks, and landing his troops in face of considerable difficulties. Has shown much dash and gallantry when leading his Brigade in action. |
| Brigadier-General C. T. Robinson | A very capable Artillery Commander. When in command of a mixed force at Ahwaz he was greatly outnumbered by the enemy, and succeeded in extricating his troops from a very difficult situation with much coolness and decision. |
| Colonel R. N. Gamble, D S.O. | His services as senior General Staff Officer have been carried out to my entire satisfaction, and have contributed greatly to the success of the operations. He is full of tact and resource, and possesses all the qualities that go to make a good staff officer. |
| Colonel L. W. Shakespear . . | His duties as Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Force in connection with the landing, movement and location of troops have been of a most onerous and responsible nature, and he has spared no pains to carry them out successfully in face of many difficulties. |

* Published in the *Gazette of India*, dated 26th February 1915.

- Colonel P. Hehir, M D. . As senior medical officer he has done much to promote the general efficiency of the Force by his unceasing care for the physical welfare of the troops and followers, and for the treatment of the sick and wounded. He possesses great administrative ability and is an extremely valuable officer
- Colonel U. W. Evans .. A thoroughly capable and energetic Engineer Commander with high abilities and full of resource. Owing to the difficult nature of the country the work of the technical troops has been throughout of a most arduous nature, and has been carried out with thorough success.
- Lieutenant-Colonel H. L D. Fordyce Has performed his important duties as Assistant Director of Supplies in a highly satisfactory manner. He has good administrative ability.
- Lieutenant Colonel A. S. R. Annesley. A very competent and energetic transport officer, with a thorough knowledge of the duties connected with his Branch. Under his able direction the transport has been kept in a highly efficient state, and its organisation and work in the field has left nothing to be desired.
- Major J. H. M. Davie . An officer of great administrative ability, whose most arduous and responsible duties as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General to the Force have been carried out to my entire satisfaction.
- Major G A F. Sanders .. An officer of great talent and resource, whose general professional ability and knowledge of staff duties in the field are much above the average. I cannot speak too highly of the quality of his work.
- Major C. C R. Murphy .. Has done valuable work as head of the Intelligence Branch. He has been successful in obtaining accurate information of the enemy's strength and movements and his local knowledge of the country and people has been of great assistance.
- Major J. F Tyrrell His most responsible duties as head of the Ordnance Branch have been performed to my entire satisfaction.

Major d'A. C. Brownlow	.. In addition to his work as Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Force, he has filled the important appointment of Military Governor of Basia with marked success
Captain H. S. Cardew	His work as Assistant Director of Army Signals has been thoroughly satisfactory. He has good abilities and considerable powers of organisation
Lieutenant C. K. Greenway	As Aide-de-Camp this Officer has proved himself to be a most energetic and capable young officer

2. The following staff and regimental officers are also worthy of special commendation —

Adamson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M., M.B.	Khan, Lieutenant Muntaza.
Ali, Risaldar Mahomed.	Lundale, Lieutenant C. H.
Anthony, Major W. S.	Lyttle, Lieutenant W. J.
Arthur, Captain D., M.B.	Lloyd, Major J. H.
Barber, Captain C. H., M.B.	McCreery, Captain A. T. J., M.B.
Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Wogan	Messenger, Captain H. T. K.
'Browne-Mason, Major H. O. B.	Ogg, Captain A. C.
Booth, Captain F.	O'Keefe, Major D. S. A., M.P.
Collins, Major D. J., M.B.	Puri, Lieutenant Colonel H. O.
Cook, Captain W. K.	Peel, Captain B. G.
Dallas, Major A. E.	Purce, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W.
Dent, Captain W. •	Pocock, Major P. F.
Donegan, Lieutenant Colonel J. F.	Pogson, Lieutenant C. A.
Fairmar, Major W. C. R.	Radcliffe, Major F. W.
Gillies, Captain F. G.	Riddell, Major H. J.
Goldsmith, Captain H. A.	Roe, Captain J. W.
Grey, Captain A. J. H.	Shah, 2nd-Lieutenant Abdul Samad
Gribbon, Captain W. H.	Shanp, Major H. F.
Harward, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N.	Shuttleworth, Major A. R. B.
Hewett, Captain G.	Singh, Lieutenant Jiwan
Horton, Major J. H., D.S.O.	Singh, Risaldar Hukum.
Irvine, Lieutenant-Colonel G. B.	Stace, Captain R. E.
Khan, Lieutenant Abdul Majid (Nawab of Savanur).	Sykes, Lieutenant-Colonel C. A.
	Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E.
	Whiteley, Captain E. C.
	Wright, Lieutenant R.

The following departmental warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men have rendered valuable service, for which I recommend suitable departmental promotion in each case in the order named —

Medical Services.

No 854 1st Class S.A.S Mohun Lal	2nd Class Assistant Surgeon S. C. Raphael.
3rd Class Assistant Surgeon E.A. Cotton.	3rd Class Assistant Surgeon H. Vincent.
1st Class S. A. S Ganga Ram Hariba.	1st Class S. A. S. V Sambasiva Nayakar.

Ordnance Department.

Sub-Conductor A. T. Bardens.	Conductor W. J. Chambers.
Arm. Staff Sergeant L R. Anderson.	

Supply and Transport Corps.

Conductor S. Fowles.	Sub-Conductor F. Carey.
Sub-Conductor J A. P. Day.	

India Miscellaneous List.

Conductor H. Joyner.	Sub Conductor J. Bryce.
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No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

No. 1. Sergeant-Major J. McConville.	Jemadar Murugesan.
No. 40 2nd Corporal W. Fletcher	No 78 Sapper Adimulam.
No. 45 Private H. J. Newstead.	No 48 Lance-Naik Joshua.

Searchlight Section.

Staff Sergeant J. Houghton.	Sapper J Mulhern.*
Sergeant F. N. Booth.*	Sapper W. J. Mooney.*
Sapper T. G. Pendrigh.*	

3. The following officers are specially brought to notice for gallantry in the field :—

Major M. H. Anderson, 33rd Cavalry.	In the operations from Mezeia on the left bank of the Tigris on 30th January 1915, he led a successful charge against the enemy with conspicuous gallantry and resolution—he had two horses shot under him.
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* Volunteers

- Captain W. M. Hunt, 23rd Mountain Battery At Ahwaz, on the 3rd March 1915, this officer displayed conspicuous coolness and bravery in repeatedly checking the enemy with his own rifle, although severely wounded, and thus enabling his section of the 23rd Mountain Battery to withdraw at a most critical stage of the fight.
- 2nd-Lieutenant H. J. Baillic, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, Near Ahwaz, on the 3rd March 1915, displayed conspicuous courage. With a handful of men he gallantly checked the advance of overwhelming numbers of the enemy and was thus instrumental in saving many of our wounded from falling into their hands.
- Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Stack, 33rd Cavalry. Severely wounded near Shaiba on 3rd March 1915, whilst displaying great personal gallantry and handling his regiment in a most skilful manner. This officer did extremely good work whilst commanding the Shaiba Post for over two months.
- Captain H. E. Shortt, I.M.S. In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on 30th January 1915, this Medical Officer displayed great devotion and courage in attending wounded in the open, in face of rifle fire at comparatively close quarters.
- Captain A. R. Thomson, 7th Rajputs. Near Ahwaz, on the 3rd March 1915, was acting as Signalling Officer on the Staff of the Column Commander. At a critical moment he displayed great initiative in collecting as many men as he could and holding a position to cover the retirement. He next gallantly led a bayonet charge against a party of the enemy who were blocking the road to camp and succeeded in clearing them out.
- Captain H. C. West, "S" Battery, R.H.A. Near Shaiba on the 3rd March 1915, at a critical moment of the operations, when the teams of a gun and a wagon were down, displayed conspicuous coolness and courage in keeping the enemy at bay with his revolver, whilst he enabled his defenceless drivers to escape on foot.
- Lieutenant R. H. Sheepshanks, 12th Cavalry (attached 33rd Cavalry). Was conspicuous for his gallantry and skilful handling of a small body of cavalry near Ahwaz on the 3rd March 1915. Reforming his troop he repeatedly charged the foremost lines of the enemy and inflicted heavy loss on them.

4 In a previous report, I mentioned the good services of the officers and men of the Royal Navy. Since the departure of Captain Hayes-Sadler, the duties of Senior Naval Officer have been most ably performed by Captain Nunn, R N , of H.M S Espiegle, whose valuable advice and ready co-operation in all our undertakings has contributed so greatly to the success of the operations.

5. I am also much indebted to the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, who have shown zeal and energy in organising a most efficient river transport service, and in making all arrangements for the berthing and unloading of the large fleet of vessels that has been employed on transport duties. The whole has been under the able direction of Captain Hamilton, R I.M , and among those serving under him I would specially mention Captains Goldsmith and Marsh.

6. I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to the officers and crews of the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company which conveyed the troops from India at the outset of the operations, while the Turks were still in occupation of the country. At this time there was much risk owing to the difficult navigation of the river, and to the fact that the banks were often held by the enemy. The one desire of the Captains of these vessels was to push forward as rapidly as possible, and to afford us all the help that was in their power. The same remark applies to the Captains of Lynch Bros steamers and of the other river craft which have been in constant employment on transport duties, and have many times been in situations of considerable danger.

The following are those who are worthy of special commendation :—

Captain R. W. Coope	..	. H. T. Elephanta.
Captain G. R. Elton H. T. Umara.
Captain J. S. Kilner	.	. H. T. Ekma
Lieutenant S. L. Mills, R N R.	.	. H. T. Varela
Captain J. S. Reddock		.. H. T. Erumpura.
Captain C. J. Swanson	..	. H. T. Torilla,

Captain C. H. Cowley	Medijieh.
Captain E. C. P. D'Eye	Blosse Lynch.
Captain F. W. Lyte	Shushan.
Captain O. Sczulczewski	..	.	Malamir.
Captain Hassan bin Ghulam		.	Salimi.
Captain Tahir bin Bangool	.		Mozaffari.

7. In a previous report I expressed my great indebtedness to Sir Percy Cox for his valuable advice and assistance. His intimate knowledge of local politics, and his remarkable personal influence over the surrounding tribesmen, have smoothed over many difficulties, and greatly assisted the military operations.

I also wish to mention the good services of Mr. E. G. Gregson of the Indian Police, Mr. D. Gunley of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, Mr. E. Clerici of the Postal Department, and Mr. Thomas Dexter, Personal Assistant and Interpreter to the Military Governor of Basra.

Doctor Arthur Bennett, of the American Mission Hospital, has helped us greatly by undertaking the treatment of wounded Turkish and Arab officers and men.

8. Several recommendations of Indian ranks for the Indian Order of Merit and Indian Distinguished Service Medal on account of recent acts of gallantry, which are now being recorded, will be submitted in due course.

THE FIGHTING AT SHAIBA.

FROM

GENERAL SIR JOHN ECCLES NIXON, K.C.B.,
Commanding Force "D."

TO

THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, SIMLA.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, the accompanying despatches from Major-General C. I. Fry, regarding the fighting at Shaiba on the 12th April, and from Major-General C J Melliss, V.C., C.B., regarding the action at Shaiba on the 13th followed by the defeat of the Turkish forces on the 14th at the battle of Barjisayah.

2. The Shaiba garrison on the 11th April 1915 consisted of

6th Division 16th Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O. —
2nd Dorset Regiment
104th Wellesley's Rifles.
117th Mahrattas.

the troops named in the margin, the whole under the command of Major-General Fry.

18th Brigade.

Major-General C I Fry —
2nd Norfolk Regiment.
110th Mahratta Light Infantry
120th Rajputana Infantry.
48th Pioneers
63rd Battery, Royal Field
Artillery (less 1 gun) }
76th Battery, Royal Field } 10th Brigade, Royal
Artillery } Field Artillery.
23rd Mountain Battery
17th Company, Sappers and Miners
22nd Company, Sappers and Miners
No 34 Divisional Signal Company

The defensive perimeter, in which this force was camped, extended over 3½ miles

During the flood season from February to June, water, varying in depth from one to four feet, lies between Basra and the further shore, and two methods of approach are in use across this lagoon, one by wading across 6 miles and landing near Old

Basra, whence troops and convoys have to march another 4 miles to reach Shaiba; the other by using the native boat, known as

"bellum," which is punted by two men and carries 8 to 10 armed men or then equivalent in stores or ammunition. This latter line of approach passes through nearly 8 miles of water, and is traversed transversely by a creek too deep to wade.

3. I took over command of this Force on the 9th April at Basra from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., who was granted leave on the 10th by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief owing to ill health.

The same morning, about daybreak, a party of the horsemen reconnoitred close to Shaiba, but retired before our cavalry.

On the 11th it was reported that the enemy's cavalry had occupied Barjisayah wood, and that some 4,000 infantry were moving into Shwebda, later in the day Major-General Fry, who had succeeded to the command of the 6th Division, reported that he considered them to be the advanced guard of the enemy's main forces, and that a serious engagement was probable within the next day or two.

I ordered the 30th Brigade, reinforced by the 30th Mountain Battery, under the command of Major-General Melliss, V.C., C.B., to move to Shaiba the following morning, and since he, as senior officer, would command all the forces there, I placed at his disposal the staff of the 6th Division and ordered them to proceed to Shaiba with him.

4. At about 7-30 A.M. on the 12th, General Fry reported that he was attacked from the south in force, and at 11-20 A.M. that he was confident of being able to resist all attacks but was unable to prevent the occupation of Old Basra by the enemy.

Meanwhile, General Melliss' Brigade, having marched from Makina Masus, commenced its crossing about 9 A.M.

The water was high and the enemy disclosed guns and infantry near Old Basra; at about 10 A.M. General Fry sent word to say that the enemy were in force between Shaiba and Old Basra, and that he could not spare more than two battalions to co-operate with General Melliss' Brigade.

As, owing to the distance, I was unable to cover with guns the crossing of General Melliss' Brigade, and, moreover, as he could make no use in the water of the Mountain Battery which accompanied him, I ordered him to return after he had accomplished about one-third of the journey, and to cross by "bellum" by the second route.

The boatmen refused to assist and only about 80 "bellums" were available, I therefore ordered men of the 20th Punjabis, who readily came forward, to punt them. By about 4 P M General Melliss, accompanied by the Staff of the 6th Division and most of the 24th Punjabis, started and got successfully across to Shaiba that evening by about 10-30 P M. During the return journey these "bellums" were attacked by the enemy in some force.

These were the only reinforcements which I found it possible to send by the evening of the 14th. The enemy in "bellums" were in considerable force in the lagoon on the route taken on the 13th, and it was therefore necessary to organise better protection for the next day in the shape of a special guard with mountain guns placed on "bellum" rafts. This convoy got across on the 14th with gun ammunition and the remainder of the 24th Punjabis and the arrangements made would have allowed this convoy to be continued daily.

5. The actions themselves are described by the Commanders, and I will now pass on to the part played by the Euphrates Blockade Flotilla, consisting of armed launches, small steamers and gun barges on which were mounted two 4'7", one 12-pr. and three 3-pr. naval guns, one 5" B L and one 18-pr gun. This flotilla, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel R P Molesworth, R G.A., was enabled to do good service, aided as it was by the valuable assistance of Lieutenant A G Seymour, R.N., H.M.S. *Espegte*, officers and men of the Royal Navy on this station.

When the fighting commenced round Shaiba on the 12th, this Flotilla was operating off Nakhailah intercepting supplies, which were coming to the enemy across the water in "mahailas" (country boats of from 30 to 80 tons burthen).

The Officer Commanding the Blockade, having observed the action of Barjisayah on the 14th, approached Nakhailah early on the morning of the 15th and finding that many of the enemy were escaping in native craft, at once gave chase and pursued them to Ratawi, destroying 8 and capturing 4 large "mahailas"; a heavy gale on the following day forced him to lie to.

On the 17th he reached Chubashiah but found it entirely deserted. The enemy were seen retiring in scattered groups across the desert, and though he fired a few rounds at them, they offered no target. It would appear, from subsequent information, that, during their retreat, the enemy were harassed and robbed by their former allies, the Arabs, and that they fled across the desert.

in wild confusion, scarcely halting until they reached Kamsieh, a distance of close on 90 miles from the scene of their defeat, so thoroughly disorganised were they.

It is now known that Suleiman Askeri, the Turkish Commander, shot himself at Nakhailah after assembling his officers and denouncing the faithlessness of the Arabs

A large quantity of ammunition, both gun and rifle, was captured upon the battlefield at Barjisayah and subsequently at Nakhailah, this was either brought in or destroyed on the spot. The total in round numbers amounts to some—

1,500 shell—4·5", 15-pr, and Mountain gun

400—500,000 rounds S A A.

3,000 hand-grenades, some boxes of lyddite and a number
of bombs, fuzes and primers

6. I cannot speak too highly of the steadiness, spirit and pluck shown by the troops in these actions, nor of the able manner in which they were handled by their Commanders

In the battle of Barjisayah our troops had to attack over open ground a superior force of the enemy, skilfully entrenched and concealed, on a front of over 3 miles

The Turkish troops showed themselves well trained and exhibited tenacity and courage; while their musketry and machine-gun fire were remarkably effective.

In driving such an enemy from his position by a bayonet charge, after a steady advance in the face of a hot fire, the British force performed a feat of which any troops might be proud.

7. The races, from which the portion of the Southern Army engaged here are drawn, have shown, in the stiffest fight which has fallen to their lot for years, a steadfastness and gallantry worthy of all praise.

Mahrattas, Dekhani Mahomedans, men from Rajputana, Gujars and Mers have earned for themselves in these operations a proud reputation. They vied with their British comrades in this field, the Royal Artillery—the Norfolks—the Dorsets, in spirit and resolution, and have added lustre to their former traditions

8. Major-General Fy, under whose orders the defences of Shaiba had been organised, made a very successful defence against the enemy's constant attacks for the first 21 hours, during which the enemy suffered heavy losses and were everywhere repulsed.

9. I would specially bring to notice the services of Major-General C. J. Melliss, V C , C.B , who at once seized the opportunity of taking the offensive and, after driving the enemy from the vicinity of Shaiba on the 13th April, followed up this success the next day by attacking the Turkish forces in the strong position to which they had retired.

The determination and skill with which he handled his troops on the 14th April resulted in the complete defeat of the enemy after a very hard-fought action, and I fully endorse his recommendation that Barjisiyah be commemorated as a battle honour for the corps engaged.

10 I entirely agree with the recommendations made by Major-Generals Fry and Melliss in the despatches I am now forwarding and I will only add remarks with regard to the following officers :—

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—This officer has consistently distinguished himself in command of his Brigade throughout the campaign, and has shown marked ability as a Commander.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D S.O., General Staff Officer, 6th Division, was Senior Officer to Major-General Melliss, who speaks most warmly of the services he rendered throughout the hard-fought and successful operations of the 13th and 14th April I would also add that his thorough knowledge of the locality, of the troops, and of earlier operations has been of the greatest assistance to me.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, Royal Field Artillery.—This officer has shown himself an exceptionally able Artillery Commander, who, until disabled by a wound on the 14th April, handled his guns, not only to the admiration of his own side, but also to that of the officer commanding the opposing artillery. That Turkish officer, when taken prisoner, particularly requested that he might be presented to the officer who had directed the fire of the British guns, as our artillery fire, he said, had silenced the Turkish batteries in rapid succession in a way that he would not have considered possible.

11. In addition I wish to mention the following who prominently came to my notice, and who were not under the orders of either Major-General Fry or Major-General Melliss :—

Major-General G. F. Gorringe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.—In addition to the command of his own Division, he ably commanded the local defence troops and also undertook the temporary organisation of the Communications and Base. His experience of river expeditions rendered him most valuable in arranging the despatch of troops and supplies across the lagoon between Basra and Shaiba.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. Molesworth, R.A., for some weeks commanded the Euphrates Blockade Flotilla, which, with the aid of the Royal Navy, often under extremely arduous and hazardous conditions, did excellent service in stopping the enemy's supplies and harassing his retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Molesworth has shown much enterprise and energy in these duties and also in reconnaissance work which has been most valuable.

Captain C. A. Pogson, 117th Mahattas, has done very valuable intelligence work in connection with the Euphrates Blockade and showed much enterprise and daring. He has probably undergone more continuous hardships than any other individual in the force.

Lieutenant R. H. Dewing, Royal Engineers—On April 15th, the Euphrates Blockade guns drove two "mahallas" (large country cargo boats) into the reeds. Lieutenant Dewing went in after them and destroyed them with explosives.

Lieutenant-Commander A. G. Seymour, R.N. (H.M.S. Espiegle).—The guns and gun crews of the Royal Navy under this officer have contributed largely to the success of the Euphrates Blockade, while his advice on naval matters and constant support were most valuable to the Officer Commanding.

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) L. H. Queripel, R.A., Deputy Director of Army Signals, Headquarters, has shown energy and capability in meeting the sudden strain thrown on the signal service by the operations round Shaiba.

Captain F. Booth, The King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment), No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company.—His zeal and unremitting supervision successfully disposed of the heavy traffic that was unceasing between 12th and 16th April.

2nd-Lieutenant F. McConville, The King's (Liverpool Regiment), No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, from 12th to 16th April never left his station day or night, doing very valuable work,

No. 46, *Sergeant A Butcher, No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company*, between 12th and 16th constantly helped the Signallers in their work besides directing traffic and supervising the repair of lines. His services were of the greatest use.

Jemadar Marugesan, No. 34 (Divisional Signal) Company, made two brave attempts on 12th April to repair the Shaiba line, but on both occasions was recalled by the General Officer Commanding 30th Brigade. Between that date and the 16th supervised his station with unremitting zeal.

No. 370, *Naik Sher Ali, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis)* behaved with initiative and gallantry during the attack on a "bellum" convoy on night of the 12th-13th April.

Colonel P. Hehir, Indian Medical Service, Acting Deputy Director of Medical Services, materially assisted the operations by the ability and untiring energy which he displayed in the working of the important department over which he at the time was presiding.

Major H. A. Bransbury, Royal Army Medical Corps, commanded the sections of No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital that carried out the evacuation of the wounded after Shaiba—attended himself to all cases (over 1,100 wounded including those of the enemy) as they arrived, displaying much initiative and resource.

4th Class Assistant Surgeon H. N. Murphy, Indian Subordinate Medical Department, was attached to No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital during the evacuation of wounded from Shaiba—worked with untiring energy and marked intelligence, proving himself to be very capable and reliable.

12. Others of the Medical Service I consider worthy of commendation are.—

Lieutenant-Colonel H. M. Adamson, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Commanding No. 3 A, British General Hospital, up to 21st April)

Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. Irvine, Indian Medical Service.—(Commanding No. 9, Indian General Hospital.)

Lieutenant-Colonel D. J. Collins, Royal Army Medical Corps.—(Commanding No. 3 A, British General Hospital, after 21st April.)

Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Palmer, Royal Army Medical Corps —(Surgical Specialist, No 3 A, British General Hospital.)

Major H. R. Brown, Indian Medical Service.—(Commanding No 19 Combined Clearing Hospital)

Captain C. C. C. Shaw, Indian Medical Service.—(No. 19 Combined Clearing Hospital.)

Captain G. F. Graham, Indian Medical Service —(Medical Officer, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, Brownlow's Punjabis)

1st Class Assistant Surgeon W. H. Brown, Indian Subordinate Medical Department.—(In charge of Depôt of Medical Stores)

13. In conclusion I cannot fail to mention the great assistance I received from Major-General G. V. Kemball, C.B., D.S.O.—Major-General, General Staff, and Brigadier-General W. G. Hamilton, D.S.O., Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, to whom I am much indebted for their able support, also to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., the Chief Political Officer.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN NIXON, GENERAL,

Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D."

*Report on the Operations at Shaiba on 11th and 12th April 1915,
by Major-General C. I. Fry, Indian Army, Commanding at
Shaiba.*

No 1815 (Confidential), dated Dirhamiyah, 21st April 1915

From—Major-General C. I. Fry, Commanding at Shaiba,

To—Major-General, General Staff, Indian Expeditionary
Force "D."

I have the honour to submit this report which deals with the first portion of the operations at Shaiba and covers the period during which I was in command of the garrison.

2. The first indication of the advance of the Turkish forces from Nakhailah was a message received from my normal protective cavalry reconnaissance at 7 A M , to the effect that Barjisayah Wood and Shwebda were occupied by hostile cavalry and that further troops were advancing on the latter place from the north-west.

The protective cavalry were reinforced by the 33rd Cavalry and at 9 A M information was received that a large body of the enemy's cavalry had been located in Barjisayah Wood, another body behind it, a large body of Arabs to the north-west of Shwebda and a large column of regular infantry estimated at 4,000 men was advancing on Shwebda from the direction of Nakhailah. No guns could be distinguished and there were no signs of enemy in other directions.

Except for the approach of the columns on Shwebda, the situation remained unchanged till about 3-30 P.M., when our advanced patrols were driven back by hostile cavalry

At 4 P.M. , the 6th Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier-General H Kennedy moved out, supported by a small mixed column always held in readiness for the occasion. The enemy, however, retired into Barjisayah Wood and by 7 P.M. all was quiet.

3 My intelligence this evening pointed to an attack during the later portion of the night by a force of some--

12,000 Regulars (mostly Kurds).

12 Field Guns.

10,000 Tribesmen.

The plan of attack was said to be—

- (a) An attack by the Turkish Regulars direct on the Fort.
- (b) Saiyid Yezdi and his following were to attack, from Ana's Tomb, the north of our position.
- (c) Ajaimi's tribesmen on the south of Shaiba from Zubair.
- (d) Yusuf, with the "beni malick," from Old Basra

All tents were struck and troops occupied their alarm posts.

The distribution of the garrison, which varied only slightly during the ensuing day, is given in the sketch map of Shaiba Defences.

4. The expected attack was actually made at 5 A.M., on 12th April 1915, and turned out to be very much on the above plan. Heavy fire was opened on the Fort Section of the defences from the west and south-west just as it was becoming light, our two piquets in this direction making the enemy disclose themselves and retiring without loss.

The enemy's advanced line reached to about 900 yards of the position and were then checked

At 5-45 A.M. enemy's gun fire was opened on the Fort from 2 guns to the westward and these were engaged by our Field Artillery.

A determined advance of the Turkish infantry was made at 6-10 A.M., supported by heavy rifle fire mainly against South Salient, but their attacking line was extended round the west of the Fort up to Kiln Post.

Large bodies of enemy's infantry were seen advancing over the horizon to the westward and masses were also seen occupying the ridge of hills immediately north of Old Basia.

By 7 A.M. the enemy were definitely repulsed and retired leaving small parties in observation, who entrenched themselves about 1,700 yards from the west and south-west of our position. The attack against Cairn Post was not very determined and broke up about 8 A.M., considerable numbers, however, collecting in the tamarisk wood to the south of that post

5 Hitherto on the northern face of the position all had been quiet and the defences at Kiln Post and West Work had not been seriously engaged, but at 9 A.M. a large force of irregulars with 6 standards occupied North Mound and houses in the vicinity. Here they remained all day and the subsequent night, making various attempts to advance on our position, but they were easily checked by rifle and machine-gun fire.

6. Meanwhile further enemy's guns had opened on the position till it was estimated that they had two heavy 4 5", six Field and four Mountain guns dispersed mostly in pairs in an arc extending from west to the south.

Their heavy guns kept up a good and accurate fire but never exactly located our batteries, which were under cover, while their other guns did little harm, their shells in most cases bursting too high. Our artillery observing officers on Kiln Post located the

flashes of the enemy's artillery and in most cases their detachments were driven off, and 6 guns were completely silenced—these guns were withdrawn in the middle of the day while the mirage rendered their position invisible. Two guns of 23rd Mountain Battery, which had been placed for the night immediately south of the Fort, were withdrawn about 11 A.M. without difficulty.

7. Preparations had been made for the despatch of a column of all arms towards Old Basra to cover the landing of the 30th Brigade and a Mountain Battery, which were known to have left Basra. This, however, was not put into effect as that force was recalled to Basra.

8. The enemy resumed their attack at 2-15 P.M., mainly directed as before on the South Salient, and to prevent them establishing themselves on the western portion of the Dorset position I sent half Battalion 2nd Norfolk Regiment from the reserve to occupy this place, replacing them in my General Reserve by half Battalion 2nd Dorset Regiment from 16th Brigade.

9. Up to this time nothing of note had occurred on the Eastern Defence work beyond some sniping, but at 2-30 P.M. as the snipers had become troublesome to the artillery observation post, Major Wheeler, 7th Lancers, volunteered to take his squadron and clear them. The movement was made at the gallop, but the original objective was covered by enemy's irregulars in a hidden position—these were ridden over and many lanced, while "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and machine-guns repelled an attempted counter-attack by hostile horsemen. The manoeuvre was very effective and the squadron was admirably led with great dash by Major Wheeler, who lost only one man and three horses wounded.

10. At 3 P.M. the attack died away and sniping tactics were resorted to—and soon afterwards about 3-25 P.M. further enemy's guns opened fire from a southerly direction, and at 4 P.M. the enemy's artillery appeared to be registering ranges on various portions of the positions with percussion fuze without doing much damage.

11. For the ensuing night I reinforced Cairn Post with a Double Company 120th Infantry from the southern portion of East Work, their place being taken by a Double Company 110th Light Infantry. The half Battalion 2nd Norfolk Regiment was withdrawn from Dorset position to their original position and the half Battalion, 2nd Dorset Regiment, rejoined the 16th Brigade. To increase my reserve, however, I asked General Delamain for half

Battalion from 16th Brigade and this, furnished by the 117th Infantry, was placed centrally between the two portions of Piquet Hill Works. During the earlier part of the night the 24th Punjabis arrived in "bellums" from Basra and bivouacked near the Cavalry Camp

12. About 5 P.M. a distinct rearward movement was noticed in front of our north defensive line and fourteen big "bellums" were seen going off in a northerly direction filled with Arabs from North Mound vicinity.

13. At dusk a furious attack was made from the western extremity of Dorset position, supported by fire from south-west and west, heavy rifle and machine-gun fire being brought to bear on the South Salient and ground immediately east and west of the Fort, but they made no progress and the attack died away to intermittent firing. The machine-gun in South Salient was out of action from 7 P.M. to 9 P.M. but was replaced by one from the 48th Pioneers during this time, and the searchlight here too was put out of action by rifle fire 15 minutes after it had opened up.

14. Throughout the night intermittent firing, with occasional heavy bursts with machine-gun fire, took place to cover bold attempts to cut our wire entanglements, especially on South Salient where the enemy's main efforts were concentrated, though these attacks extended to the north end of the Fort on our right and to Cairn Post on the left. The brunt of these attacks fell on the 48th Pioneers and 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, which units with ceaseless vigilance repelled every effort of the enemy. During the heavier periods of the attacks the star shell fired by Field and Mountain Artillery greatly assisted in the defence. The machine-gun of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment at the southern extremity of South Salient did most excellent service throughout the day and night in a very exposed position. The 120th Infantry and portion of the 110th Light Infantry in East Work and Cairn Post were less heavily engaged, but frequently repelled the efforts of wire-cutters and were throughout alert for developments.

15. At 11 P.M. the enemy were heard digging off South Salient and a half Double Company 48th Pioneers was held in readiness to meet any penetration by the enemy, while I held one Double Company 2nd Norfolk Regiment ready for particular support in this direction.

16. The night thus passed with occasional lulls till 3-30 A.M., when the final attempt was made and small parties were seen

close up to the entanglements (one party was heard to call out in Hindustani "Do not fire") After this no further attacks were made and all became quiet.

17 From 4-30 A M Major-General Melliss, V.C , C B., who had arrived late the previous evening with the 6th Divisional Staff, took over command of the garrison, but not being *au fait* with the defence arrangements, had left the conduct of the operations for the night to me, and my report on subsequent operations has been submitted to him.

18. The casualties during this action were comparatively slight and were, approximately, British officers, wounded, 4; rank and file, killed 5, wounded 62.

19. The artillery expended some 1,495 shrapnel and 15 star shell during the above period of the action.

20. The 6th Cavalry Brigade were not employed during the day except one squadron 7th Lancers and "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel C A. Sykes, Royal Horse Artillery, which did good work in co-operation with the infantry and other artillery; they however came in for many casualties among their horses as, unfortunately, their camp was situated directly behind the Fort Section of the defence and in line with the main hostile attacks. I wish to mention—

Major G G. M. Wheeler, 7th Lancers —For the gallant and admirable leading of his Squadron in the charge against a body of the enemy south of Piquet Works, who had been causing much annoyance to our artillery observation post, with a most successful and effective result.

21 The artillery afforded, as has been my experience throughout the campaign, a magnificent support and their rapid location of the enemy's guns was followed by a slackening and in many cases a cessation of their fire. *Lieutenant-Colonel F S. Cleeve, R F.A.*, most efficiently directed the artillery during the defence as my C. R. A. and I would also mention—

Major E. V. Sarson, R F A	} For their clever handling of their batteries and accuracy of fire in silencing the enemy's guns and repelling his attacks.
Major H. Broke Smith, R.F A	
Major E. E. Edlmann, D S O , R G A.	

22 The 16th Infantry Brigade were not seriously engaged during the day or night and the General Officer Commanding has no recommendations to make. I would like however to pay tribute

to Brigadier-General W S Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., and his Brigade, who originally constructed the defences which the 18th Infantry Brigade were occupying

23 I wish to bring forward to special notice the very gallant defence made by the 48th Pioneers and 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, who bore the brunt of the enemy's attacks. All ranks behaved with great steadiness and their vigilance and good shooting repelled all attempts of the Turkish forces to break through the defences. This section of the defence was admirably commanded by *Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N. Harward, 48th Pioneers*

The following further names are brought forward for recognition.—

No 365 Naik Hukmī, 48th Pioneers, when at dawn No 7 Piquet retired, refused to leave the piquet until the last man had got away safely under a heavy fire

No 345 Havildar Harchand, 48th Pioneers, commanded No 7 Piquet and withdrew his men with skill and coolness so well that the enemy continued to fire into the piquet position after its evacuation.

No. 1686 Sepoy Chanda Singh } 48th Pioneers, stretch-
No. 1406 Sepoy Naram Singh } bearers, brought in a dangerously wounded man to the aid post for 100 yards under very heavy enfilade fire.

24 The 17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners (with 48th Pioneers), withstood all the shocks of the Turkish attacks, being in occupation of the South Salient, with utmost coolness and steadiness and were ably commanded by *Captain E. J. Loring, R.E.* I would mention—

No 31125 Sapper C A. Wells, R.E., Searchlight Section, who did excellent work under heavy fire till his light was put out of action

Jemadar Mohammed Din, No 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners.—For his coolness under heavy fire and the able way in which he directed the fire of his men under trying circumstances in a particularly exposed part of the defences.

25 The 120th Rajputana Infantry under Major P. F. Pocock, though not very seriously attacked during the day, were frequently assailed at night in attempts of the enemy to cut their wire

entanglement. They occupied a somewhat exposed position at Cairn Post and behaved very steadily and with great coolness.

26 The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 110th Light Infantry, excepting 1 Double Company of the latter under Lieutenant-Colonel Britten, who were engaged during the night in repelling attempts on their obstacles, were not seriously engaged, though kept continually on the alert, especially at night, to meet developments I mention—

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, for his skilful handling of the machine-gun at South Salient until seriously wounded.

No. 6592 Lance-Corporal R. Waller, 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was in charge of the machine-gun at South Salient after Lieutenant Farebrother was wounded and handled his gun exceedingly well and assisted largely in keeping off the attack when it was heaviest. Though wounded, he still continued to direct the work of the gun throughout the night 12th-13th.

The action of Lieutenant Farebrother and Lance-Corporal Waller has also been brought to my notice by Lieutenant-Colonel Harward, Commanding the Fort Section, in which this machine-gun was employed in a very important and exposed position. He reports that the accuracy and intensity of the fire was remarkably good.

27. *Medical*.—I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of the Medical Department in all its ranks. There was no flinching during the bombardment and perfect steadiness, and their work was done in a most efficient manner under the able direction of *Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hennessey, R.A.M.C.* As I have already noted during this campaign, the Army Bearer Corps and Hospital Corps behaved excellently. I would particularly bring to notice the good work done by—

Major T. G. Foster, R.A.M.C., and *Captain R. E. Wright, I.M.S.*, No 3 Field Ambulance, who were working in the Fort Section of the defence and most exposed to fire

28 *34th Divisional Signal Company*—I wish to specially notice the excellent work done by the 18th Brigade Section of this company. Throughout the operations under report they were constantly engaged in the dual capacity of Brigade Signal Section and Divisional Signal Section, being the link between me and my whole force. They were consequently exceedingly hardworked and

Report on Operations on 13th and 14th April near Shaiba.

No 250-G.

HEADQUARTERS 6TH DIVISION,

Shaiba, 24th April 1915.

FROM

THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,

SHAIBA FORCE,

To

THE MAJOR-GENERAL, GENERAL STAFF,

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D."

SIR,

I have the honour to submit reports on the operations of the Shaiba Force on 13th and 14th April 1915.

I arrived at Shaiba by "bellum" convoy at 8-30 P.M. on the 12th April with the 24th Punjabis (less 1 Double Company) and 6th Divisional Staff, placed at my disposal by the Army Commander. A general all-round night attack on the landward sides of the defensive perimeter was in progress at the time of my arrival. This attack was nowhere pressed home, but continued with varying intensity throughout the night of 12th-13th, the enemy endeavouring without success to cut the barbed wire entanglement at various points.

As senior, I assumed command from Major-General C. I. Fry that night, after making myself acquainted with the distribution and disposition of the troops.

The night attack died away at 4 A.M.

The Cavalry Brigade,* in pursuance of orders issued by Major-General Fry on the afternoon of the 12th instant and approved by me that night, moved out at 7 A.M. towards North Mound in order to clear our right flank and ascertain the enemy's strength and dispositions to the north-west. The 104th Rifles (Lieutenant-Colonel Clery) followed as a support and were placed under the orders of the Cavalry Brigadier.

*"S" Royal Horse Artillery, 7th Lancers, 16th Cavalry, 23rd Cavalry, 3 squadrons each unit

The Cavalry, 7th Lancers leading, remainder following in support, on nearing North Mound came under a very heavy rifle fire from superior forces advancing from North Mound, the broken ground near House A, and from House B.

The 7th Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cook, made a gallant charge on North Mound and vicinity and a large number of hostile Arabs were put to flight. Trenches, however, immediately behind North Mound and House A were strongly held, and a hot fire was poured into the Cavalry ranks. A squadron of the 7th Lancers most gallantly led by Major Wheeler actually charged the mound itself. Major Wheeler, closely supported by Jemadar Sudhan Singh, 7th Lancers, rode at the enemy's standard planted on the mound and both were shot dead in their gallant attempt. The remaining squadrons of the 7th Lancers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cook's command, made a gallant attempt to clear the enemy from the palm groves, but from good cover the enemy's fire at short range proved so effective that the 7th Lancers had to retire and Brigadier-General Kennedy, realising that the enemy in force were firmly established and that his main body (16th and 33rd Cavalry) were exposed to a severe flanking fire from entrenched infantry, decided not to press the attack and to withdraw his Brigade. I had previously instructed him verbally not to commit his Brigade at this phase of the action if serious opposition were encountered. This took place at 7-45 A.M.

The actions of the Cavalry Brigade were well supported by "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sykes, while the 101th Rifles, posted just north of House C, covered the retirement by a well sustained and accurate fire. I ordered the withdrawal to camp of this battalion on the retirement of the Cavalry.

From Kiln Post, where I established my Headquarters, an excellent view of the whole of the terrain to the north of Shaiba is obtainable and large bodies of the enemy were visible advancing near North Mound and to the east of it. At 8-30 A.M. I ordered Brigadier-General Delamain, Commanding 16th Brigade, to move out from the defensive perimeter with 3 battalions (2nd Dorsets, 104th Rifles and 24th Punjabis) with North Mound as his first objective, covering his advance with the concentrated fire of the 63rd and 76th Batteries, Royal Field Artillery, and 23rd Mountain

Battery, whilst "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, also co-operated. The concentrated fire of the guns and the engaging of successive enemy's targets was most skilfully controlled and directed by the Divisional Artillery Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Cleeve, whose valuable assistance throughout the operations of the 13th I particularly desire to bring to notice

The co-operation between infantry and artillery in the attack and indeed throughout the action of the 13th was most marked, and very largely contributed to the success of the operations. By 11 A.M. Brigadier-General Delamain was in occupation of North Mound and the enemy, many of whom had clung to their trenches with great tenacity, were in full retreat to the northward. Over 90 of his dead were found on North Mound itself. Meanwhile constant sniping and desultory attacks were in progress to the west-south-west, and south of my perimeter, and troops, computed at 3 battalions, were visible to the south-west of the Brick Kiln and a considerable force to the westward. I now decided to continue the clearing movement against this unbroken enemy, and incidentally to capture two of their guns, which their teams owing to our accurate shell fire had been unable to remove.

With this object I ordered the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, to make a partial left wheel pivoting on North Mound, which was to be held to protect his right flank. I pushed a half Battalion 119th Infantry (Lieutenant-Colonel Chitty) to reinforce Brigadier-General Delamain's left and ordered 1½ Battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Norfolks, 2 Double Companies 48th Pioneers) under Lieutenant-Colonel Peebles to prolong the line of the 16th Brigade to the left, co-operating with their advance. The Cavalry Brigade were again moved forward and placed under Brigadier-General Delamain's orders, to protect his right flank. Supported by a sustained and accurate shrapnel fire from our batteries, the enemy, though in considerable force in well-constructed trenches, were unable to withstand the *élan* of our infantry. Many surrendered and the two abandoned mountain guns were secured. The Cavalry Brigade on the right flank succeeded in getting home into the now broken enemy and accounting for more than 100 of them.

By 2-30 P.M. the whole vicinity of the camp was clear of the enemy, but large numbers could still be seen to the southward in the direction of South Mound, where 2 Turkish guns had been located. The General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, reported at 2-35 P.M.

that he was advancing on South Mound some 3 miles distant and hoped to capture these guns

I decided that at this late hour it was not desirable to undertake a general engagement with the enemy's main forces with my troops who had been under arms continuously throughout the previous night and were in need of a rest

I therefore issued orders to break off the engagement for the day and ordered a general retirement to the Fort at 3 P.M.

The enemy's casualties were estimated at 1,000, many of their dead being left on the field while over 400 prisoners, 2 guns and a standard fell into our hands

The night of the 13th-14th, in marked contrast to the previous night, was entirely undisturbed by hostile sniping or shell fire.

From personal observation shortly after dawn on 14th April 1915, from the Kiln Post, considerable bodies of the enemy were seen in the direction of South Mound some 2½ miles south-west of Shaiba Fort, while the immediate vicinity of the Fort was practically clear of the enemy.

The exact whereabouts of the enemy's main force was uncertain. On the 12th April a large force had been reported to be at Old Basra, while all reports pointed to the Barjisiyah Woods being strongly held, but it was evident that the enemy had been severely shaken by the action of the 13th April. I decided therefore to continue the offensive without awaiting the arrival of the remainder of the 30th Brigade (2 battalions). These reinforcements would, I was aware, be necessarily delayed by the difficulty of transport through the area which is inundated to a depth of from 2 to 4 feet and which extends for some 8 miles between Shaiba and Basra. Moreover the necessary line of advance to Shaiba from Old Basra had been, as I was aware, hitherto closed by the enemy, while reports of withdrawal from Barjisiyah Wood in a north-west direction rendered it desirable to advance without further delay.

I therefore ordered the whole force (less 104th Rifles, 48th Pioneers and 3 field guns as Camp Garrison) to start at 9 A.M. to engage the enemy wherever found.*

Operation Orders were issued accordingly. 300 rounds rifle ammunition and water pakhals were taken by the troops, who carried a haversack ration.

* Note.—6th B. Battery had only 5 guns

The troops moved off at 9-30 A.M. in preparatory formation for Artillery fire, the 16th Brigade, with the 23rd Mountain Battery, 22nd Company Sappers and Miners and 24th Punjabis attached, moving with their left directed on a point 300 yards to the west of South Mound, while the three battalions of the 18th Brigade, with 17th Company Sappers and Miners, moved off on the left of the 16th Brigade, echeloned back, left refused. The Cavalry Brigade was moved wide on the right flank of the 16th Brigade, detaching half squadron to protect our extreme left flank, guns in rear of centre and Divisional Headquarters with the guns.

The 16th Brigade were directed on South Mound, with 18th Brigade refused on my left, as I apprehended a possible attack from the direction of Old Basra or Zubair. The advance on South Mound took place under ineffective long range rifle fire from the enemy's advanced troops—mostly mounted men who soon gave way before our advance, South Mound being occupied and Divisional Headquarters established there by 10-30 A.M.

It now became apparent that the enemy's main force was in position in the vicinity of Barjisayah Wood and that Old Basra and Zubair were not strongly held. I accordingly ordered the left of the 16th Brigade to be directed somewhat north of the Watch Tower while I ordered 2 battalions of the 18th Brigade (2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment, and 120th Rajputana Infantry) to pass from left to the right rear of the 16th Brigade and the remaining battalion of the 18th Brigade (110th Mahratta Light Infantry) to remain echeloned on left of 16th Brigade. Whilst these movements were in progress I rode forward to where the Cavalry Brigade were in position on my right flank, engaged in dismounted fire action. From this point I endeavoured to make a reconnaissance of the enemy's position but owing to the mirage this proved extremely difficult. It was not possible to locate any of the enemy's trenches but I was able to determine that his right extended as far south as the high Watch Tower, but where his left rested I could not ascertain. On returning to Divisional Headquarters I therefore ordered General Delamain to direct the left of his advance on the Watch Tower and requested General Fry, Commanding 18th Brigade, to pass over his remaining battalion (110th Mahratta Light Infantry) to the right rear of his own Brigade. My plan of operations was to engage the enemy along his front extending from a point to the west of the Watch Tower, while I drove back his left with the 18th Brigade and thereby threatened his line of

retirement towards Nakhailah I ordered my Cavalry Brigade to co-operate with this object, while giving the Brigadier a free hand to seize any opportunity for vigorous action which might offer.

It soon became evident that the enemy occupied a very extensive front of some $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles and considerably overlapped our line. The 18th Brigade had to come up into line with and on the right of the 16th Brigade in order to engage the enemy along his front—the 110th Infantry being my sole reserve. By 11-15 A.M. I discovered definitely that the enemy's line covered over 3 miles, extending from west of Watch Tower to the north end of Barjisayah Wood.

The 18th Brigade having come into line with the 16th Brigade a general advance from South Mound was continued for a mile without incident. By 11-30 A.M. the two battalions in the front line of the 16th Brigade (2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment and 24th Punjabis) became suddenly heavily engaged with the enemy in position at 900 yards distance from the Dorsets and 600 from the Punjabis, while on the right the 18th Brigade were also fully engaged, the Norfolks and 120th Infantry coming under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from trenches some 400 yards to their front.

The enemy's trenches were well sited and practically invisible from the front, while the glacis-like slope of the ground trending towards the Barjisayah Woods afforded them an ideal position for defence, and a large proportion of our casualties occurred at this stage.

At 1 P.M. I ordered the 18th Brigade to advance direct on the gap in the trees near the north end of Barjisayah Wood and the 16th Brigade to close the gap between the 2 Brigades—both to co-operate in the attack. Heavy firing now became general all along the line, the whole of our Artillery being engaged in close support of the Infantry attack. At 11-30 P.M. three casualties occurred in the Divisional Staff, my C. R. A., Lieutenant-Colonel Cleeve, being wounded and his successor Major Edlmann being hit before he could take over his duties, while Captain Cardew, Assistant Director, Army Signals, was also wounded. At this period the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, ordered the 22nd Company Sappers and Miners to prolong the right of the 24th Punjabis, and half battalion, 117th Mahrattas, to reinforce on the right of the Sappers and Miners, and with these reinforcements

a further advance was effected in this part of the field. The General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, now pushed forward half battalion of 110th Mahratta Light Infantry on the right of the 120th Infantry, holding the remaining wing of the 110th and No 17 Company, Sappers and Miners, in reserve, but owing to an enfilading fire from the right flank the advance of the 18th Brigade was checked

At 2-30 P M I called on the Cavalry Brigade for vigorous action to assist the forward movement of the 110th on the extreme right flank. The Cavalry assisted by dismounted rifle fire, while "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, also co-operated.

At 3 P.M. the fight was practically stationary, the enemy clinging to his trenches with desperate tenacity—while the Cavalry reported their inability to press forward on the enemy's left flank owing to severe shell fire and the mud line. The Artillery were supporting our Infantry attack to the utmost, but such support was extremely difficult to render owing to the mirage and the invisibility of the enemy's trenches. Our gunners did splendid work and I must mention one of many instances of it. The Norfolks were losing heavily and asked for further Artillery support. Lieutenant Gilpin, 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, went forward into the Norfolk firing line for observation of fire, and communication with his Battery Commander was maintained by Captain De Grey, Adjutant of the Norfolks, who from the firing line flag signalled back to the battery the result of Lieutenant Gilpin's observations. Many were the gallant deeds of resolute courage by all ranks on this day, but this appears a striking example of the right kind of Infantry and Artillery co-operation.

The day was now waning and I told both Infantry Brigadiers that the enemy's position in advance of Barjisiyah Woods must be taken and that a general advance with the whole of the Artillery in close support must now be made. The troops responded most gallantly to this fresh call, the 76th Battery in action close to the Watch Tower supporting the 16th Brigade, the 63rd Battery and 23rd Mountain Battery, the 18th Brigade.

At 4-15 P M. the 2nd Battalion, Norfolks, and 120th Infantry under Colonel Peebles and Major Pocock respectively, dashed at the enemy's trenches with the bayonet, while the 110th, also under heavy fire, pressed unflinchingly forward on the right supported by "S" Battery and dismounted Cavalry fire. Almost simultaneously part of the 16th Brigade consisting of the 2nd Battalion,

Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 119th Infantry (less 1 Double Company in reserve) and 1 Double Company, 117th Mahrattas, withdrawn from the left flank guard, made a general advance and by 5 P.M. the enemy abandoned the front trenches all along the line and fled, many surrendering.

In the meantime at 4 P.M., in view of the necessary withdrawal before nightfall, the 48th Pioneers with all available Jaipur carts were ordered out from Shaiba. The Pioneers were directed to take up a rear guard position about South Mound to cover the retirement of the main body and the carts were also directed there to be ready to assist in the collection and evacuation of the wounded. The arrangements for the collection and disposal of the large numbers of wounded were ably arranged for by Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. B. Browne-Mason, Royal Army Medical Corps, Officiating Assistant Director of Medical Services.

The retirement timed for 5-30 actually commenced at 6 P.M. owing to the difficulty of collection and removal of the wounded scattered over a wide area. Our withdrawal was entirely unmolested and the troops reached Shaiba with all wounded by 8-30 P.M.

It is impossible to conceive a more exposed tract of ground than the plain devoid of cover over which our Infantry had to attack the Turkish trenches, cleverly concealed and sited. Our advance in the last 400 yards was down a glacis-like slope. It was on the crest of this slope that so many of our losses occurred. Splendid dash, combined with resolute courage, alone carried our men across that bullet-swept glacis. It was a sheer dogged soldiers' fight and no words of mine can adequately express my admiration of the conduct of those gallant regiments who won through, viz., 2nd Battalion, Norfolks, 2nd Battalion, Dorsets, 24th Punjabis, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, 119th Infantry, 117th Mahrattas, 120th Infantry, 17th and 22nd Companies of the 3rd Sappers and Miners.

It is gratifying to record the fact that all the Indian troops engaged (24th Punjabis excepted) are old Bombay Presidency Regiments. They have proved on this occasion that they are worthy to stand shoulder to shoulder with the best troops that the Empire can produce and I trust that these Corps may be permitted to inscribe the battle honour of Barjisiyah on their colours as a fitting tribute to their gallant conduct on this hard-fought field.

RECOMMENDATIONS.

I desire to bring to notice the specially good services of the following :—

COMMANDERS, STAFF, ETC.

Major-General C. I. Fry—Commanded his Brigade to my entire satisfaction during the battle of Barjisiyah on the 14th; his Brigade behaved admirably under his direction.

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—A very able Brigade Commander handled his troops during the action of 13th and the battle of 14th with marked success.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O.—I am much indebted to this officer for the invaluable assistance he afforded during the operations of the 13th and the battle of the 14th April. He is a Staff Officer of marked ability and character, very cool and collected. He should be in command of troops and I strongly recommend him for promotion.

Major G. A. F. Sanders, R.E.—An excellent Staff Officer of great ability, very cool and collected. His services on my Staff during the operations of 13th and battle of 14th were most valuable to me.

Captain B. G. Peel, 81st Pioneers—A very useful Staff Officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. S. Cleeve, R.A.—A very capable Artillery Commander. As my Divisional Artillery Commander his services during the operations of 13th were of great value, the handling of the Artillery on that day being a decisive factor in the success of the operations. I greatly felt the loss of his services on the 14th after he was wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel U. W. Evans, R.E.—A very able Engineer Commander of great energy and resource. He gave me great assistance during the operations of 13th and 14th April.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. O. B. Browne-Mason, R.A.M.C.—Acted as my Assistant Director of Medical Services during the operations of 13th and at the battle of the 14th. His arrangements for evacuating the large number of our wounded during the battle of Barjisiyah showed marked ability and organising power. I feel greatly indebted to him.

Major H. A. Holdich, Brigade-Major, 16th Brigade.—A cool and able Staff Officer.

Captain J. H. Carruthers, Staff Captain, 16th Brigade.

Shaikh Ibrahim El Abdullah El Ibrahim of Zubair.— Regularly furnished information of the enemy's movements. The information was almost always correct and the Shaikh must have incurred great trouble and expense in procuring it.

Major H. Smyth—Intelligence Officer at Shaiba.

Interpreter Mirza Ali—Headquarters, 16th Infantry Brigade.

I also desire to bring to notice the names of the following officers who throughout the day conveyed my orders to various parts of the battlefield with promptitude and despatch at considerable personal risk:—

Major A. T. S. Dickinson, Brigade-Major, 30th Infantry Brigade.

Captain A. J. Shakeshaft, 2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.

Lieutenant H. D. Hickley, 2nd Battalion, 7th Gurkhas.

Lieutenant H. H. Rich, 120th Infantry.

2nd-Lieutenant Lemon, attached 104th Rifles.

ARTILLERY.

Major O. S. Lloyd, Adjutant, 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery

63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery—

Major H. Broke-Smith.

Lieutenant R. Gulpin. | No. 52668 Gr. J. Stanley.

76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery—

Major E. V. Sarson. | No. 55119 Gr. E. Kirk.

23rd Mountain Battery—

Major E. E. Edlmann, D.S.O., R.G.A. (Since died of wounds.)

Captain A. V. Jarrett .. Although twice slightly wounded and on the second occasion partially stunned, continued to command his Section with great ability and energy.

No. 535 Gunner Harnam Singh. | No. 30 Cr.-Havildar Latif.

No. 226 Dr. Naik Sher Khan.

CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Sykes.. "S" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
Able commanded his battery throughout the operations.

7th Lancers—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Chesney Cook.

Major G. G. M. Wheeler (killed in action). The initiative, dash and gallantry of this officer marked him out for special recognition had he survived. I now recommend him for the posthumous grant of the V. C. which forms the subject of a separate application.

Lieutenant and Adjutant G. L. B. Stones.

Jemadar Sudhan Singh (killed in action).	Recommended for posthumous grant of Indian Order of Merit
No 3574 L.-Daffadar Ram Singh.	No 3548 Sowar Bakhtawar Singh.
No 1103 Kot-Daffadar Kala Singh	No 2108 Sowar Amrik Singh.

ENGINEERS.

Searchlight Section—

No 31125 Sapper C. A. Wells, R.E., Searchlight Section.

17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners—

Captain E. J. Loing, R.E.	Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E.
Jemadar Mohammad Din	

22nd Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners—

Captain E C Whiteley, R.E. (killed in action)	Quite an exceptionally promising officer, killed whilst gallantly leading his men
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Lieutenant K. B. S. Crawford, R.E.	Jemadar Ramswami Naidu.
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No. 1930 Havildar Gangaji Rao Khanvalkar	No 2899 Naik Narayan Halatkar.
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No. 3955 L.-Naik Said Hussain.

INFANTRY.

2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment—

Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Rosher (killed in action).	An able and most gallant Commanding Officer whose death is a great loss to the Service.
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Captain H. K. Utterson.	No. 8328 Private Burt
Captain G. M. Herbert.	No 8483 Private Joliffe.
Lieutenant H. H. Dean.	No. 8662 Private Lloyd.
No. 5349 C.-S.-M. W. Warren.	No. 8406 Private Scudden (killed in action).
No. 6701 C-S-M W. Daniel.	No. 9059 Private Scovell
No. 8744 Corporal H. Scott.	No 7909 Private Sedgbeer.

2nd Norfolk Regiment—

Lieutenant-Colonel E C Peebles, D.S.O.	Ably commanded his regiment which under his direction attacked with great dash and spirit in spite of heavy losses
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Major F. De B Bell (since died of wounds)	Captain R. D. Marshall.
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Captain and Adjutant C De Grey.	Captain A. B. Floyd.
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Lieutenant R. T. Fiere

Lieutenant M. Burnett, R.A.M.C.	For conspicuous courage attending to the wounded in the open in the firing line under very heavy fire where his work necessitated his being very exposed. He lost his life in the firing line doing so, and his work was beyond praise.
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3rd Class Assistant Surgeon J. V. Fernandez, I S M D.	No. 7040 Drummer A Barker.
No 7014 L.-Corporal C Woodward.	No 7879 Private T Bindley.
No. 7609 L Corporal J H Preston	No. 7925 Private H Farnes
No 5359 Sergeant C. Aldridge	No 8390 Private C Smith (wounded).
No 6331 Sergeant J. Auey	No 7840 Private S. Chapman.
No 6161 Sergeant H. Solomon.	No 8200 Private J Chard.
No 5676 Sergeant J. Savage	No. 7359 Private J Murphy.
No 6789 Seigeant F. Bolingbroke	No. 8416 Private E. Harper.

24th *Punjabis*—

Lieutenant-Colonel S H. Climo (wounded).	A proved soldier who commanded his regiment with coolness and courage.
Captain W F. B. Edwards (killed in action)	I recommend him for a posthumous honour in recognition of conspicuously gallant leading of his men
Lieutenant M. Birkbeck.	Sub-Major Sakt Chand Bahadur (wounded).
Lieutenant D. Hobart (dangerously wounded).	Subadar Gul Akhoar
Jemadar Sohan Singh.	No. 4943 L-Naik Lal Singh (wounded severely).
No. 137 Naik Dula Singh, 19th Punjabis (killed in action)	No 405 Sepoy Vir Singh (wounded severely).
No. 514 Sepoy Pal Singh.	No. 4909 Sepoy Labh Singh.
No 318 Sepoy Yarak.	No 4847 L-Naik Bela Singh
No. 4886 Naik Saidar Khan.	No. 141 L-Naik Lal Khan.

48th *Pioneers*—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N. Harward.	Ably commanded the Fort Section of the Defences throughout the night 12th-13th.
Major H J. Riddell	Sub.-Major Dula Singh.
Subadar Ganga Singh	

104th *Rifles*—

Lieutenant-Colonel C B. L. Clery.	An exceptionally good Commanding Officer and in the field a cool and reliable commander.
Captain A. M. Cheeke	No. 2898 L-Naik Teja Ram.
Jemadar Chothu Singh.	

110th *Mahratta Light Infantry*—

Lieutenant-Colonel T. X Britten (died of wounds).	Subadar Shaikh Yasin.
Major H C. Hill.	Jemadar Dattaji Rao Kaurvkar.
Captain R. Knowles, I M S	Jemadar Ramchander Hase.
Captain and Adjutant A C. S. Hind (killed in action).	No. 1498 L-Naik Sakaram More.
Sub-Assistant Surgeon Keshan Rao Kuperkar	No. 2050 Sepoy Hari Sawant.

117th Mahrattas—

- Lieutenant-Colonel H. K. MacGeorge. Commanded his regiment with skill and determination
- Captain A. W. White, For conspicuous gallantry when in command of his double company. This double company reinforced the Dorset left and joined in the successful assault capturing 73 prisoners. The Officer Commanding Dorset Regiment specially remarks on the dash shown by this double company
- Captain W. B. Benton (105th Mahratta Light Infantry). For conspicuous gallantry and coolness when working the machine-gun section on April 12th, 13th and 14th. He is quite an exceptionally good officer. His name came up for gallantry at the action of Sahil.
- Lieutenant N. K. Bal, I.M.S. For conspicuous bravery in attending wounded men under a heavy fire in the open. He attended the wounded of the 22nd Coy., 3rd Sappers and Miners, as well as those of his own regiment.
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|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Subadar-Major Balwantrao Savant. | No. 2742 Havildar Dadu Aggave. |
| Subadar Sakhaiaam Rao Jagtap Bahadur. | No. 2437 Sepoy Jarram Dalbi. |
| Jemadar Sita Ram Sellar. | No. 2474 Sepoy Ithu Kadam |
| No. 1883 Havildar Vishun Aire. | No. 2915 Sepoy Abdul Gaffur. |

119th Infantry—

- Lieut.-Colonel W. W. Chitty An, able and efficient commander whose regiment behaved admirably under his direction.
- Captain J. J. Harper Nelson, I.M.S. | Captain T. De B. Carey.
Lieutenant A. De St. Croix.
- Lieutenant M. Eccles . . . Successfully carried messages under fire from the Brigade Commander to his unit. Subsequently displayed great gallantry in bringing ammunition mules close up to the firing line although 9 of the mules were killed on the way, and finally led a double company in the assault on the trenches.
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| Subadar-Major Bhano Singh Bahadur, I.O.M. | No. 3887 Naik Nathu Singh. |
| Subadar Uma Rawat. | S. A. S. Munishwamy Ramaswamy, I.S.M.D. |
| No. 3639 Havildar Uma Rawat | No. 3846 Sepoy Ramlal Singh. |
| No. 4339 L.-Naik Mukna Rawat | No. 4112 Sepoy Dhanna Rawat. |
| No. 4025 L.-Naik Dewa Rawat. | No. 4166 Sepoy Gokal. |
| No. 2940 Ward Orderly Sirpulrao Bhosle. | |

120th Infantry—

Major P. F. Pocock .. An able leader who has rendered valuable services which are deserving of recognition.

Captain W. Andrews (95th Russell's Infantry), (died of wounds). For conspicuous gallantry on 14th in leading a charge across the open against the enemy position with machine-guns

Captain W. L. Miskin.

Subadar-Major Khitab Gul Bahadur	No. 1712 Sepoy Lachman Singh
Subadar Sri Bahadur Singh.	No. 1531 Sepoy Koom Singh.
No 873 Cr -Hav. Gunesh Ram	No. 1511 Sepoy Gangadhar
No 1089 L.-Naik Bhima Rawat.	No. 1202 Sepoy Rawat Singh.
No. 1243 L.-Naik Suja Rawat.	No 1800 Sepoy Padma Rawat.
No. 840 L -Naik Panne Khan	No. 1549 Sepoy Channan Singh.
No 1662 Naik Seolal	No. 1111 Sepoy Sujan Singh
No. 1474 Naik Allah Bakhsh.	No. 1742 Sepoy Jagdeo (killed).

34th Divisional Signal Company, 18th Brigade Section—

No. 16 Corporal J. Steven.

No. 28 Sapper Abdul Jabbar | No 45 Sapper Rangasami.

16th Brigade Section, attached as Despatch Riders—

No. 966 Sowar Phuman Singh (16th Cavalry). | No. 1289 Sowar Nikka Singh (16th Cavalry).

21st Mule Corps—

No 190 L.-Naik Aladad (killed). The Dorset Regiment being in want of ammunition the General Officer Commanding, 16th Brigade, sent up 16 mules with ammunition boxes. The behaviour of the drivers of these mules has been brought to notice by the Officer Commanding, Dorset Regiment, and the Officer Commanding, 24th Punjabis, the latter describing them as heroes. Nine mules were killed. One driver was killed, and three wounded, one escaping unhurt. The greater part of the ammunition reached the firing line, the drivers showing the greatest courage. One driver was seen holding on to his mules, some of whom wounded, although wounded himself and under very heavy fire.

MEDICAL SERVICES.

Captain R. E. Wright I.M.S. Displayed exceptional ability in handling his sub-division of No. 3 Field Ambulance throughout the day. He displayed particular initiative in proceeding to the firing line of the 18th Brigade under a heavy fire and, by ascertaining personally the position of the groups of wounded, was able to conduct a detachment of Jaipur Transport Carts direct to the place where they were most required

when speedy evacuation was most essential. He afterwards superintended the main advanced dressing station at South Mound in a most efficient manner.

Captain F. C. Fraser, I.M.S. Displayed great coolness in bringing his sub-division forward under heavy shell and rifle fire and was in close touch with the 16th Brigade throughout the day. I was particularly struck by the steadfast behaviour of the A. B. C. men of this sub-division and attribute it in great part to his excellent example and leading.

Royal Army Medical Corps—

Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hennessey.

Major F. G. Foster Major F. C. Lambert.

Indian Medical Service—

Major L Cook Captain H. E Stanger Leathes.

Lieutenant L. A. P Anderson.

Indian Subordinate Medical Department—

4th Class Assistant Surgeon A. E. Phaure.	No 972, 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Sundar Singh.
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No. 402, 3rd class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Shaikh Mahomed Dada Sahib

Pack Store Sergeants—

No 5887 Sergeant F. Hayter, 2nd Battalion, Hampshire Regiment.

Nursing Orderlies—

No. 9166 Lance-Corporal Parkes, 1st Oxford and Bucks. Light Infantry
No. 8601 Private E. Lock, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment.

Pack Store Havildars—

No 911 Havildar Ram Lal Singh, 2nd Rajputs.
No. 2154 Havildar Mahomed, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

Ward Orderlies—

No. 2399 Sepoy Nabi Bux, 119th Infantry.

Hospital Store keepers—

Sergeant J. A. Bloomfield, Great Indian Peninsula Railway Volunteers
Private Moos, Poona Volunteer Rifles.
2nd Class Hospital Store-keeper B. F. Ghyara, Supply and Transport Corps.

Army Bearer Corps—

No. 9339 Bearer Samedin.	No. 9344 Bearer Dhonde.
No. 4485 Bearer Subhan Singh.	No 1196 Bearer Ram Charan.
No. 7480 Bearer Gariba.	No. 7485 Bearer Rafawa.

Army Hospital Corps—

No. 6147, 2nd grade Ward Servant Abba Pina.	No. 6352, 3rd grade Ward Servant Gangaram Gamu
No. 5308, 1st grade Ward Sweeper Mohan Singh.	No. 6428, 2nd grade Ward Sweeper Mohan Nathu
No. 5207, 1st grade Water-carrier Bhondoo.	No. 6032, 1st grade Water-carrier Gamoo Baloo.
No. 263 Bhusti Rajah Prussal, Supply and Transport Corps.	No. 266 Bhusti Shaikh Amur.

2 I desire to record the valuable services of the Jaipur Transport Corps in the collection and removal of wounded from the battlefield. The transport drivers worked backwards and forwards to the firing line with great dash and devotion to duty.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient servant,

C. J. MELLISS, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding Shaiba Force.

BATTLES ON THE KARUN AND EUPHRATES AND THE ADVANCE TO KUT.

The following despatch from General Sir John Nixon, K C B , relative to the operations in Mesopotamia from the middle of April to the end of September 1915 was forwarded by the Government of India and published by the War Office on the 5th April.—

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

I E F "D," *January 1st, 1916.*

From—General SIR JOHN NIXON, K.C.B., A -D.-C., General
Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D,"

To—The Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters,
India

SIR,—I have the honour to forward a report on the operations of the Forces under my command for the period from the middle of April 1915 up to the end of September 1915.

1. The floods of last season, which are said to have been the highest for 30 years, formed an inland sea of water and reeds varying from two to six feet deep, which extended for 40 miles north of Qurnah, down to Basra, and stretching from Nasriyah in the west to Hawizeh (50 miles north-east of Qurnah) in the east. Consequently, until the subsidence of the floods at the end of July, operations in this area were of an amphibious nature

2. During the month of April a Brigade at Ahwaz, first under Major-General Davison and subsequently under Brigadier-General Lean, had been containing a hostile force consisting of some eight battalions of Turks with eight guns and about 10,000 Arab auxiliaries, which had advanced from Amarah *via* Bisartin and Khafajiyah (on the Kharkeh river) into Persian Arabistan.

At this time another British detachment was at Qurnah, where it had been opposed since January by a Turkish force of some six battalions with 10 guns and the usual following of Arab tribesmen, which had descended the Tigris from Amarah,

By the defeat of the Turks at Barjisayah (20 miles south-west of Basra) on the 14th April the hostile forces in the vicinity of Basra had been dispersed and driven to Nasiriyah, enabling me to take active measures against the enemy detachments on the Karun and on the Tigris

I decided to deal first with the former and placed Major-General Gorringe in command of the operation

3. Directly the Turks had been defeated at Barjisayah the concentration of the 12th Division on the Karun was commenced. The Turkish force near Ahwaz retreated across the Kharkeh river on hearing of the defeat of their army at Barjisayah

General Gorringe followed in pursuit. By the 7th May the 12th Division and the Cavalry Brigades had reached Illah on the Kharkeh. This river was 250 yards wide with a rapid and deep stream, which presented a formidable obstacle to the passage of troops

4 General Gorringe overcame the difficulties of passage and skilfully crossed his troops and guns to the other bank. The Turks continued their retreat towards Amarah on discovering that our column had crossed the river.

General Gorringe now found himself under the necessity of dealing with a recalcitrant and pugnacious branch of the Beni Taruf Arabs, who had identified themselves very strongly with the Turkish cause.

He advanced down the Kharkeh river operating on both banks

Major-General Melliss commanded the column on the right bank and Brigadier-General Lean that on the left bank.

The occasion of the successful attack on the Arab stronghold, Kharajihay, in extremely hot weather, when the temperature in tents was 120 degrees, was a display of dogged gallantry and devotion on the part of the troops engaged

Among other intrepid deeds was the exploit of Subadar-Major Ajab Khan and 20 men of the 76th Punjabis, who swam the river under heavy fire, and brought back a boat in which troops were ferried across until sufficient were collected to assault a stout mud fort which was strongly held.

5. After the defeat and dispersion of the hostile tribesmen who had molested his advance, General Gorringe, in accordance

with my instructions, made a series of demonstrations with a portion of his force from Bisantin against the Turkish force which lay between him and Amarah. This action was in co-operation with the impending advance of our detachment from Qurnah (commanded by Major-General Townshend) on Amarah. It had the desired result of preventing reinforcements from joining the Turkish forces on the Tigris in time to oppose General Townshend's advance. It was largely due to these demonstrations that the enemy's retreat up the Tigris, after their defeat on the 31st May, was so precipitate, and that General Townshend was enabled to enter Amarah practically unopposed. The Turkish force opposing General Goringe was so delayed in its march to Amarah that when it eventually reached there it was surprised by General Townshend, who was already in occupation of the town. A part of the advance guard was captured, and the remainder had to seek safety in dispersion with the loss of two guns.

6. General Goringe's operations extended over a period of seven weeks. As a result, Persian Arabistan had been cleared of the enemy, and the Arab tribes forced to submit, thus enabling the pipe line to be repaired and normal conditions to be resumed at the Oil Fields, and most effective assistance had been given to General Townshend's advance from Qurnah.

7. I consider that General Goringe showed marked ability and determination in conducting these operations. The successful result is due to his able leadership and to the zeal and energy displayed by all ranks under his command.

The troops were compelled to undergo severe exertions, and overcame many obstacles during very hot and trying weather with undiminished resolution and zeal that was admirable.

8. While the 12th Division was advancing by the Karun and Kharkéh rivers, preparations were in progress for an advance up the Tigris by the 6th Division under command of Major-General Townshend. Owing to the limited amount of river transport available at that time the movement and collection of troops was a slow and difficult process, and the flooded country around Qurnah presented many problems which required careful attention before operations could be commenced.

9. "Bellums"—long, narrow boats of the country—were collected and armoured with iron plates, to be used for carrying infantry to the assault of the enemy's position; troops were trained

in punting and boat work, various types of guns mounted on rafts, barges, tugs, and paddlers; floating hospitals had to be improvised, and many other details of construction and equipment had to be thought out and provided for

By the end of May preparations for the advance were complete.

10 The Turkish force was entrenched north of Qurnah on islands formed where high ground stood out from the inundation which covered all lower-lying country

These fortified localities were in two groups, the most southerly group forming an advanced position some two miles from the British lines, the main position being some three miles further to the north

The flooded state of the country rendered it a position of some strength, necessitating a carefully organised attack in successive phases by combined naval and military operations.

General Townshend's plan was to capture the advanced position by a frontal attack combined with a turning attack against the enemy's left flank, supported by the naval flotilla and the artillery afloat, and that on land within the Qurnah entrenchments

11 In the early morning of 31st May, after a heavy preparatory bombardment, the infantry advanced to the attack in the flotilla of improvised war "bellums," supported by admirably directed gun fire.

The 17th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Climo, 24th Punjabis, made the frontal attack. The 22nd Punjabis and the Sumur Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant-Colonel Blois Johnson, 22nd Punjabis, captured One Tree Hill, on the enemy's left flank and enfiladed Norfolk Hill, the first objective of the 17th Infantry Brigade, which was carried at the point of the bayonet by the 1st Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry after poling their boats for over a mile through thick reeds and landing waist deep in water

12. The bold action of the mine-sweepers, which preceded the naval sloops and armed tugs, enabled the latter to keep pace with the troops, and their fire, combined with that of the Royal Artillery ashore and afloat, ensured the capture of the whole of the enemy's advanced position by noon.

It was entirely due to careful preparation and organisation of artillery fire of all kinds that our casualties were very few.

These operations form a good example of the co-operation of the Royal Navy with infantry and artillery.

13. An aeroplane reconnaissance on the morning of the 1st June discovered that the enemy had evacuated his main position and was in full retreat up the Tigris

The Naval Flotilla, led by H M S. Espiegle (Captain Nunn, R.N), pushed in pursuit, followed by the shipping with troops

On the morning of the 2nd June when some 10 miles below Qalat Salih, the deeper draught vessels could proceed no further owing to shoal water and the pursuit was continued by the naval armed tugs Up to this time the Espiegle had engaged and sunk the Turkish gunboat Marmaris and had captured two steamers and a number of lighters laden with munitions and stores.

14. Qalat Salih was reached on the afternoon of the 2nd June, and after some hostile troops outside the town had been dispersed the pursuit was continued.

H M.S. Comet (Captain Nunn, R.N) with General Townshend on board, and three armed tugs, occupied Amarah in the afternoon of the 3rd June, capturing there some 700 troops and 40 officers This is a most excellent instance of courage and pertinacity in pursuit, and very creditable to all who took part in it. .

The leading infantry (2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment) of the 6th Division arrived at Amarah at 6-30 A M. on the 4th June, not a moment too soon, as the inhabitants were beginning to realise the size of the force which had cowed them into submission on the previous day.

15. The captures resulting from the action at Qurnah, the pursuit and the occupation of Amarah, included 17 guns, 2,718 rifles, 1,773 prisoners, four river steamers (exclusive of the gunboat Marmaris and another steamer, which was sunk), a number of lighters and boats, besides quantities of ammunition and stores

The weather throughout these operations was intensely hot—a sweltering sun all day, followed by still and sultry nights; but in spite of this the spirit and energy of all ranks was excellent

16 I consider that General Townshend carried out these operations in a highly creditable manner His prompt and

vigorous pursuit is worthy of high praise, and it was largely due to his dash and enterprise that Amarah was entered unopposed

The part played by General Gorringe's force to help General Townshend's operations has been described in an earlier part of this despatch.

17 Immediately after the capture of Amarah, preparations were taken in hand for the capture of Nasiriyah, on the Euphrates, the dominant place on this flank. Its importance lies in the facts that it is the base from which a hostile force threatening Basra must start, it is the centre from which influence can be exercised among the powerful Arab tribes which lie along the Euphrates, standing at one end of the Shatt-al-Hai, it closes communication between the Tigris and Euphrates, and is thus of strategic value, and, lastly, it was the headquarters of the civil administration of a large part of the Basra Province

18 To General Gorringe and his troops was allotted this objective. The route from Qurnah to Nasiriyah is by water, through the low-lying valley of the Old Euphrates Channel for 30 miles to Chahbaish, across the Hammar Lake for 15 miles to its western side, thence by the Haqiqah—a tortuous channel, some 50 yards wide and 15 miles long—until the main channel of the Euphrates is reached some 25 miles below Nasiriyah. From Qurnah to Chahbaish, deep draught vessels can go up the old Euphrates, beyond this, at the time the operations commenced, on the 27th June, the Hammar Lake was passable by all river steamers drawing less than 5 feet, as far as the entrance to the Haqiqah Channel. By the middle of July the channel across the lake held little more than 3 feet of water, and only the smallest steamers could cross. In many cases steamers were aground for days at a time, and the small tugs fitted as gunboats could only be taken across by removing guns, ammunition, armour plating, fuel and water, and using light-draught stern-wheelers to tow them. Later, troops and stores could only be transported in “bellums,” which for some distances had to be dragged over mud and water by men.

The Haqiqah Channel was blocked by a solidly constructed “bund” half a mile from its entrance to the Lake, which had to be removed before the passage could be used by shipping.

19 Above its junction with the Haqiqah the Euphrates has an average width of 200 yards. Along its banks are numerous gardens, patches of cultivation, and several small villages within

walled enclosures. On the left bank belts of date-palms, with an occasional fringe of willow trees, are the prevailing features. On the right bank the country is more open. During July, except for a belt of dry ground along the river banks a few hundred yards wide, on either side the country was completely under water. Numerous irrigation channels intersect this belt of dry land at right angles to the river presenting a series of obstacles to an advance. Such was the nature of the country where the Turks offered their main opposition to our advance on Nasiriyah.

20. On the 26th June General Gorrings's Force was concentrated at Qurnah, and proceeded on the 27th June across the Hammar Lake preceded by gunboats under the command of Captain Nunn, R.N. Hostile armed launches above the Haqiqah bund were driven back. The bund was occupied, and the work of demolition commenced.

During the 28th a channel 150 feet wide and 4 feet deep was made. The rush of water through the opening created a strong rapid, almost a cataract, up which parties of men were successful in hauling up the naval craft on the 29th.

It was not until the 4th July that all vessels and troops were passed over the Haqiqah obstruction, and established about two and a half miles from the junction with the Euphrates. Covering this entrance reconnaissances proved that the enemy had established themselves with guns on the right bank of the Euphrates commanding both banks of the Haqiqah, and the mine field which they had prepared about a mile down it.

21. At 4-45 A.M. on the 5th July the 30th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General Melliss, advanced to attack the enemy; on the left bank, the 76th Punjabis and the 24th Punjabis, the latter moving in "bellums" through the inundation accompanied by the 30th Mountain Battery. The 2-7th Gurkhas supported by the 1-4th Hants moved up the right bank. Considerable opposition was encountered, especially on the left bank, and it was not until 1-20 P.M. that our troops forced the enemy on the right bank of the Euphrates to hoist the white flag.

The 24th Punjabis had to carry their "bellums" across some 60 yards of dry land before they could cross the Euphrates to take possession of the enemy's positions and battery. After the right bank had been cleared our naval craft were able to sweep for mines, an operation rendered easier for us as a captured Turkish officer assisted to indicate their position.

By 9 P.M. the channel was clear. The ships came up and the troops embarked.

22 The detachment of the enemy which had opposed our advance consisted of 1,000 regular Turkish troops, 2,000 Arabs, four guns and two Thornycroft launches armed with pom-poms. Four guns and 130 prisoners fell into our hands at a cost to us of 26 killed and 85 wounded.

The second phase of these operations was commenced on the morning of the 6th July by the occupation of Suk-Esh-Sheyukh by Captain Nunn, with two gunboats, and afterwards the whole flotilla moved up the Euphrates.

23 The Turks had taken up a series of positions astride the river about five miles below Nasiriyah, with both flanks resting on marshes. In front of their trenches were broad deep channels difficult to turn or assault.

The ground on the right bank was devoid of cover, that on the left bank fringed by a narrow belt of palms.

24. General Goringe established his force some two miles below the enemy's advance positions and occupied entrenchments on both banks. Up to the 13th July continual reconnaissances were made and our entrenchments gradually extended nearer to the enemy.

25. On the night of 13th-14th an attack was made by our troops on both banks. On the right bank we secured an entrenched position within 400 yards of the Turkish trenches. A gallant attempt by the 24th Punjabis under Lieutenant-Colonel Climo, supported by four guns of the 30th Mountain Battery under Captain E. J. Nixon, to capture some sand-hills behind the enemy's right flank met with unexpectedly strong opposition, and they were attacked in rear by Arab tribesmen and had to withdraw.

The Mountain guns covering the withdrawal rendered invaluable support.

26. Until the 23rd, General Goringe was perfecting arrangements for his decisive attack. Gun positions were moved forward, infantry trenches extended and communications improved. The working parties were subjected to a continual fire, but our snipers established ascendancy over those of the enemy. The heat night and day throughout was intense.

27. At 5 A M on the 24th July the attack was launched. By 7-30 A.M the 12th Infantry Brigade operating on the left bank of the river had occupied the enemy's advanced trenches at Wiyadiyah. The 30th Infantry Brigade then pushed its attack up the right bank, covered by well-directed artillery fire, and by 9-30 A M had captured the advanced trenches after forcing the passage of the Mejmineh Channel. During this operation the gunboat Sumana carrying bridging materials fought her way up to the entrance of the creek under a very heavy fire, and, supported by the fire from the gunboats, the 17th Company Sappers and Miners threw a bridge across.

28. The attack was continued by both banks. The main position was captured by noon, in spite of a stubborn resistance. The enemy clung to their trenches, where some 500 were killed. After reorganising the troops pushed forward to the Sadanawiyah position—the enemy's final line of defence, which was also captured. During the attack at Sadanawiyah Captain Nunn, in the Shushan, a small stern-wheeler, laid his ship alongside hostile trenches on the river bank and engaged them at close range.

29. By 6-30 P M the enemy was in full retreat across the marshes, and our troops bivouacked on the position they had won.

Severe losses had been inflicted on the enemy, while our casualties were not heavy considering the nature of the fighting, the total number of our killed and wounded being under 600.

Our captures included over 1,000 prisoners, 17 guns, five machine-guns, 1,586 rifles, and quantities of ammunition and stores.

Nasiriyah was occupied on the 25th without further opposition.

30. General Gorringe conducted the task assigned to him with skill and determination and his troops responded to the strenuous calls that were made upon them in a gallant and devoted manner.

Seldom, if ever, have our troops been called upon to campaign in more trying heat than they have experienced this summer in the marshy plains of Mesopotamia.

But the spirit of the troops never flagged, and in the assault of the entrenchments which the Turks thought impregnable, British and Indian soldiers displayed a gallantry and devotion to duty worthy of the highest traditions of the Service.

31. I have to place on record the excellence of the work performed by the officers and men of the Royal Flying Corps, whose valuable reconnaissances materially assisted in clearing up the situation before the battle of the 24th July

32 And I have to express my deep appreciation of the valuable and wholehearted co-operation of the officers and men of the Royal Navy under the command of Captain Nunn, D S O., Senior Naval Officer. It was in a great measure due to the excellent work performed by the Royal Navy that these amphibious operations, like those at Quinah, at the end of May, were brought to so successful a conclusion.

33 The capture of Nasiriyah had established British control on the western side of the Basra Vilayet, but the district lying north of the line Amarah-Nasiriyah still remained outside our control, and strong Turkish forces under Nur-ed-Din Bey were reported to be concentrating at Kut-el-Amarah, at the junction of the Shatt-al-Hai with the Tigris, the possession of which strategic centre is necessary for the effective control of the northern part of the Basra Vilayet. Nur-ed-Din had attempted to cause a diversion by pushing strong detachments to within thirty miles of Amarah, while my principal attention was concentrated on the Euphrates.

The defeat of Nur-ed-Din and the occupation of Kut-el-Amarah became my next objective as soon as Nasiriyah was secured, and I commenced the transfer of troops towards Amarah on the following day.

34 After the month of June the Shatt-al-Hai ceases to be navigable for some six months, and the only line of advance by water on Kut-el-Amarah is by the river Tigris.

On the 1st August a detachment from the 6th Division, accompanied by a naval flotilla, occupied Ali-al-Gharbi. Covered by this detachment, the concentration of the 6th Division under General Townshend for the advance on Kut-el-Amarah was carried out.

35. The transfer of troops from the Euphrates to the Tigris was a slow process, owing to the difficulties in crossing the shallow Hammar Lake during the low-water season.

By the 12th September the force was concentrated at Ali-al-Gharbi. Thence the advance was continued by route march along

39 On the 26th September General Townshend advanced to within 4 miles of the Turkish position. His plan was to make a decisive attack on the left bank by enveloping the Turkish left with his main force, but in order to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the real attack, preliminary dispositions and preparatory attacks were made with the object of inducing the Turks to expect the principal attack on the right bank.

40 On the morning of the 27th our troops advanced by both banks. The principal force on the right bank made a feint attack on the trenches south of the river while the left bank detachment entrenched itself within 3,000 yards of the enemy. Meanwhile a bridge had been constructed, and under cover of night the main force crossed from the right bank and deployed opposite the enemy's left flank.

41. On the morning of the 28th September a general attack was made against the enemy on the left bank. The 18th Infantry Brigade under Major-General Fry, with its left on the line of the river, made a pinning attack, while Brigadier-General Delamain, commanding the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades, advanced in two columns against the enemy's left, one column being directed frontally against the flank entrenchments while the other moved wide round the flank and attacked in rear. General Delamain's right flank was protected by the Cavalry Brigade.

42 The first troops to enter the enemy trenches were the 1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment, 117th Mahrattas and 22nd Company Sappers and Miners, who made a brilliant assault, well supported by the artillery, and soon after 10 A.M. captured a redoubt and trenches on the enemy's extreme left, inflicting heavy losses and taking 130 prisoners.

43. A combined attack by the 16th and 17th Infantry Brigades was then made, and, after hard fighting, during which the enemy made several unsuccessful counter-attacks, the whole of the northern part of the enemy's position was in our hands by 2 P.M.

44 General Delamain reorganised his troops on the captured position and gave them a much-needed rest, as they were exhausted by the great heat, the long march and hard fighting. After a brief rest General Delamain moved his column southwards to assist the 18th Infantry Brigade by attacking the enemy opposed to it in the rear. Before this attack could develop strong hostile

reserves appeared from the south-west in the direction of the bridge General Delamain immediately changed his objective and attacked the new troops, supported by his guns firing at a range of 1,700 yards.

45. The sight of the approaching enemy and the prospect of getting at him in the open with the bayonet put new life into our infantry, who were suffering from weariness and exhaustion after their long and trying exertions under the tropical sun. For the time thirst and fatigue were forgotten.

The attack was made in a most gallant manner with great dash. The enemy were routed with one magnificent rush which captured four guns and inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. The enemy fought stubbornly, and were saved from complete destruction by the approach of night.

46 General Delamain's troops bivouacked for the night on the scene of their victory about two miles from the river, both men and horses suffering severely from want of water, as the brackish water of the marshes is undrinkable. In the morning the column reached the river and the horses got their first water for forty hours.

47. Throughout the battle the Naval Flotilla co-operated with the land attack from positions on the river. Late in the evening of 28th, led by the Comet (Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Cookson, R.N., Acting Senior Naval Officer), the flotilla advanced up stream and endeavoured to force a passage through the boom construction. The ships came under a terrific fire from both banks at close range. The Comet rammed the boom, but it withstood the shock.

Lieutenant-Commander Cookson was shot dead while most gallantly attempting to cut a wire cable securing the barges.

48 The Turks evacuated their remaining trenches during the night and escaped along the bank of the Tigris. On the morning of the 29th a pursuit was organised, troops moving in ships preceded by cavalry on land.

The cavalry, consisting of four weak squadrons, overtook the enemy on the 1st October, but had to wait for the support of the river column, as the Turks were making an orderly retreat, covered by a strong rearguard with infantry and guns.

49. The progress of the river column was so delayed by the difficulties of navigation due to the constantly shifting shallows in the river that it was unable to overtake the retreating enemy.

When the ships reached Aziziyah on the 5th October the enemy had reached their prepared defensive position at Ctesiphon, covering the road to Baghdad, where they were reinforced.

50. The Turks lost some 4,000 men in casualties, of whom 1,153 were prisoners captured by us. In addition we took 14 guns and a quantity of rifles, ammunition, and stores. Considering the severity of the fighting our casualties were comparatively small. They amounted to 1,233, including a large proportion of men only slightly wounded.

51. The defeat of Nur-ed-Din Bey completed the expulsion of Turkish troops from the Basra Vilayet. Apart from material gains won at Kut-el-Amarah, our troops once again proved their irresistible gallantry in attack and added another victory to British arms in Mesopotamia.

52. I am glad to place on record my appreciation of the ability and generalship displayed by Major-General C. V. F. Townshend, C.B., D.S.O., throughout these operations. His plan for turning the Turkish left was the manoeuvre whereby the position could best be captured without incurring very heavy losses.

53. Brigadier-General Delamain, who commanded the main attack, showed himself to be a resolute and resourceful commander. His leadership during the battle was admirable.

54. The troops under the command of Major-General Townshend displayed high soldierly qualities, and upheld the reputation they have earned during this arduous campaign.

55. The conduct of the Infantry in the attack was particularly noteworthy. They were set a task involving prolonged exertion and endurance, and performed it with an alacrity and resolution which must have been most disconcerting to the enemy.

56. The artillery has established a high reputation for good shooting. The infantry rely on their accuracy and skill; during the attack they welcome the close support of the guns, and press forward with the narrowest margin dividing them from the curtain of bursting shells, in a manner that is a tribute to their comrades in the artillery.

57. The services of the Royal Flying Corps, not only during the battle but also in the frequent reconnaissances which preceded the fighting, also call for notice.

The Flying Officers displayed courage and devotion in the performance of their duties, which were often carried out under

a heavy fire. The accurate information obtained during air reconnaissances was of the utmost value in planning the defeat of the enemy, and the remarkable skill and powers of observation displayed by Flight Commander Major H L Reilly, Royal Flying Corps, contributed in no small degree to the success of the operations.

58. The work of the Royal Navy fully maintained the high standard they have established in these rivers. I much regret the loss of Lieutenant-Commander E C Cookson, whose gallant act has already been referred to

59. Acknowledgments are due to the excellent work done by the Commanders and personnel of the river steamers for their unremitting work in connection with operations on the rivers of Mesopotamia.

60. Accompanying this despatch is a list of officers and men whose names I wish to bring to notice in connection with the operations undertaken during the period under report

I have, etc.,

(Signed) JOHN NIXON, GENERAL,

Commanding I. E. F. "D."

MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES.

OPERATIONS KHAFAJIYAH

24th April—19th June 1915.

Divisional and Brigade Headquarters Staff, etc—Browne, Major (temp. Lieut.-Colonel) H. J. P.; Dent, Captain W.; Gorringe, Major-General G. F., K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Hendley, Colonel C. E.; Melliss, Major-General C. J., V.C., K.C.B.; McKenna, Captain J. C.; St. John, Major R. S.; Wilson, Captain A. T.

33rd Q. V. O. Light Cavalry.—Edward-Collins, Lieut. G., Meiklejohn, Lieut. J. F.

No 6 Ammunition Column—Corbould-Warren, Captain E

Royal Engineers.—Bapty, Lieut. P (I. A. R. O.), Pemberton, Captain S.; Sykes, Lieut. A. C.

66th Punjabis—Chatterton, Lieut.-Colonel G. D. L.; Dempster, Lieut. J. L. C.; Paterson, Captain F. W. J.; 1940 Sepoy Lal Khan; 1813 Sepoy Gulzar Khan, 817 Naik Mohbat Singh; 1282 Naik Ramnath Singh; 2168 Sepoy Fateh Khan, 2045 Sepoy Amar Singh; 1723 Sepoy Ghulam Mahomed, 2210 Sepoy Natha Singh, 1181 Lance-Naik Channan Singh

76th Punjabis—Darrell, Lieut R. D. E., Perrin, Major C. L. (since killed); Smithett, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. H. (since died of wounds), Subadar-Major Ajab Khan, Jemadar Mehdi Khan, 991 Havildar Kesar Singh; 709 Lance-Naik Ghajja Singh, 1029 Lance-Naik Kaiam Dad; 1815 Sepoy Karim Khan, 198 Bugler Gul Sher, 172 Lance-Naik Lal Khan, 991 Lance-Naik Bari Sher, 999 Sepoy Afsar Khan, 996 Sepoy Bostan Khan, 1231 Lance-Naik Nawais Ali, 1549 Sepoy Shiv Ram, 1588 Sepoy Badhan, 1638 Sepoy Gobur Dhan, 1792 Sepoy Harphool, 1302 Naik Hamidullah, 259 Havildar Said Zaman, 589 Naik Bakar Khan, 1610 Sepoy Bela Singh, 536 Naik Sunder Singh, 1009 Sepoy Burhan Ali (killed), 1761 Sepoy Sujawal Khan, 1495 Sepoy Sher Dil, 688 Sepoy Firoze Khan, 1499 Sepoy Mah Wali, 1866 Sepoy Madar Ali.

2-7th Gurkha Rifles—Harcourt, Captain E. S.; 664 Rifleman Budhuman Rai.

Medical Services—Brown, Major H. R., I. M. S.

Supply and Transport Corps—Goldsmith, Captain H. A. (95th Russell's Infantry), Innes-Lillingston, Major F. F., Phillips, Captain J. W., Stewart, Captain A. F.

(Signed) JOHN NIXON, GENERAL,

Commanding I. E. Force "D."

OPERATIONS AMARAH

31st May—4th June 1915

General Headquarters Staff, etc—Beach, Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) W. H., Cox, Lieut.-Colonel Sir P. Z., K. C. S. I., K. C. I. E.; Douglas, Colonel J. A., C. M. G., Hamilton, Brigadier-General W. G., C. B., D. S. O., Hopwood, Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) H. R., Kemball, Major-General G. V., C. B., D. S. O., Queipel, Major (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) L. H.; Walker, Lieut. G. B.; Williams, Captain L. G., Annesley, Lieut.-Colonel A. S. R., Barnes, Captain L. E., Bastow, Captain H. V., Begg, Captain R. H. (since killed), Chitty, Lieut.-Colonel W. W., Climo, Lieut.-Colonel S. H., D. S. O., Cochran, Captain G. W., Davie, Major J. H. M., Delamain, Brigadier-General W. S., C. B., D. S. O.; Evans, Colonel U. W., Forbes, Major E. E., Gamble, Colonel R. N., D. S. O., Leachman, Captain G. E., Peel, Captain B. G.; Smith, Brigadier-General G. B.; Stapleton, Captain F. H.; St. John, Major R. S., Townshend, Major-General C. V. F., C. B., D. S. O., Whittall, Captain G. E.

Royal Navy—Harden, Lieut. G. E.; Lalley, Sub-Lieut. R. H.; Nunn, Captain W., D. S. O.; Palmer, Lieut. I. M., Singleton, Lieut. M., D. S. O.

Royal Indian Marine—Goldsmith, Commander O.; Marsh, Lieut. B. C.; Poyntz, Lieut. A. R. C.

Royal Flying Corps—Broke-Smith, Major P. W. L., Bunn, Lieut. W. W. A. (since killed); Petre, Captain H.; Reilly, Major H. L.

Royal Artillery—Cotter, Major H. J., Gilpin, Lieut. R. (since killed), Grier, Colonel H. D., Nixon, Captain E. J.; Thomson, Major H. G., Jemadar Daya Singh, 30th Mountain Battery, Jemadar Kishan Singh, 30th Mountain Battery.

Royal Engineers—Campbell, Captain M. G. G., Colbeck, Captain C. E.; Cumberlege, Major A. F., Slater, Lieut. O.; Spink, 2nd-Lieut. H. H. M. (I. A. R. O.); Winsloe, Major H. E.

Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire L. I.—Brooke, Captain R. R. M. (killed); Courtis, Lieut. J. H. (since killed); Henley, Captain C. F., Lethbridge, Lieut.-Colonel E. A. E., D. S. O., Morland, Captain, W. E. T.; Powell, Lieut. J. J., Arlett, 5766 Sergeant H., Shilcock, 5787 Coy. Sergeant-Major T. J., Cowley, 8411 Sergeant A. J., Purseglove, 6907 Corporal A. E., Stevens, 7478 Sergeant E. W. (since dead).

Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment)—Bax, 8840 Corporal T., Pannett, 9103 Private R. H. J.

22nd Punjabis—Blois-Johnson, Lieut-Colonel T G, Wallace, Captain C W Subadai Maya Singh, 117 Havildar Said Ahmed, 4489 Havildar Fazal Hussain, 4651 Naik Mansa Singh

103rd Mahratta Light Infantry—Brown, Lieut-Colonel W H, Jackson, Lieut-Colonel C C (since killed), Subadai Ramchandrar Rao Mohite, 2802 Colour-Havildar Eshwant Rao Bhosle, 2897 Havildar Gunajji Parab

119th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment)—De St Croix, Lieut. A, Darley, Major J R, Haddon, Lieut H E (since killed)

Signal and Telegraph Services—Bagshawe, Mr L, Booth, Captain F, Cardew, Captain H S, Duke, Captain V W H

Medical Services—Browne-Mason, Lieut.-Colonel H O B, R.A.M.C., Donegan, Colonel J F, R.A.M.C., Hahir, Colonel P, I.M.S., Martin, Lieut R V, I.M.S., Wilson, Captain G, R.A.M.C., Cotton, 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon E A, Shede, 2nd Class Assistant Surgeon E. S; Sanger, 7558 Corporal W J, Dorsetshire Regiment, Jolly, 7321 Private W, Norfolk Regiment; 1835 Colour-Havildar Shaikh Haidar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

Army Bearer Corps—9402 Bearer Balu, 1578 Bearer Ghowr; 1436 Bearer Umar Din, 1582 Bearer Balore.

Suwar Sappers and Miners—Jemadar Durga Singh, Jemadar Dhyan Singh; 326 Havildar Molai Singh, 223 Havildar Kulbir, 404 Naik Inder Singh

River Transport Service—King, Mr. W K, Cowley, Mr C. H, Grimmett, Mr. E. T, Brown, Mr J. H, Cowley, Mr R G.

EUPHRATES OPERATIONS.

26th June—25th July 1915

General Headquarters Staff, etc—Cassels, Major R A, Cox, Lieut-Colonel Sir P. Z., K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.; Davison, Major-General K S, C.B., Duffy, Dep Commissary and Captain T A, Gribbon, Captain W H, Norris, Lieut R. J N, Shah, Lieut A. S., Thompson, Captain R C, Baker, Conductor C H; Hewitt, Staff Sergeant R W, McCarthy, Staff Sergeant W T, Roffey, Conductor H R, Belgrave, Captain H D, Browne, Major (temporary Lieut-Colonel) H. J. P., Chitty, Major A W., Costello, Major E W, V.C., Dent, Captain W, Dickinson, Major A T. S. (since killed), Dunlop, Lieut-Colonel H H, Glynton, Captain G. M, Gorringer, Major-General G F, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Hendley, Colonel C E, Hickley, Lieut. H D, Kirby, Captain J T.; MacGeorge, Lieut-Colonel H K, Macrae, Captain J C, McKenna, Captain J. C., Melliss, Major-General C J., V.C., K.C.B., Moberly, Major H S., Ogle, Captain N, Tyrell, Major J F, Wilson, Captain R E, Wilson, Captain A. T.

Royal Navy.—Curry, Lieut. H F.; Harris, Lieut. W V H.; Heath-Caldwell, Lieut. C. H.; Nunn, Captain W, D.S.O., Seymore, Lieut-Commander A G., Wason, Commander C. R.

Royal Indian Marine—Campbell, Lieut. C R.; Hamilton, Commander A., D.S.O., Hickman, Commander C S

Royal Flying Corps.—Atkins, Captain B S, 11th Rajputs (attached); Burn, Lieut W W A. (since killed), Merz, Lieut G F (since killed), Palmer, Captain W G., 113th Infantry (attached), Reilly, Major H L; Wells, Lieut. T R, Heath, No 2 Staff Sergeant C. V., Palmer, 4473 Sergeant T N; Tomlinson, 4474 Sergeant R. J.

Royal Artillery.—Akerman, Captain W. P J.; Blanford, Major C. E. (died of wounds); Broke-Smith, Major H, Buckland, Captain G N, Cock, Major H C L (since killed); Cotter, Major H J; Flux, Lieut. R. L; Garnett, Captain C L, Gilpin, Lieut R (killed), Grier, Colonel H D; Harvey, Captain A. F B; Nevinston, Lieut-Colonel T St. A B L; Nixon, Captain E. J, Thomson, Major H G; Atherston, 21788 Regimental Sergeant-Major G; Channing, 14017 Sergeant P C, Genese, 21633 Battery Sergeant-Major J; Gibbons, 53863 Gunner, A, Gold, 4563 Gunner F, Goodwin, 30833 Bombardier G.; Jones, 6875 Sergeant H.

Maxim Battery—Henry, 2nd-Lieut F C. (I A R O), Paterson, Captain F. W. J; Builack, 9871 Lance-Corporal J, 2nd Battalion R. West Kent Regiment; Jones, 6671 Lance-Corporal A, 2nd Battalion R. West Kent Regiment; Price, 30686 Corporal B, R F A, 1046 Lance-Naik Ranbahadur, 2-7th Gurkha Rifles

Royal Engineers—Atkin, Lieut A B, Bapty, 2nd-Lieut P (I A R O); Cumberlege, Major A. F, Cusins, Captain A F, Lord, Captain R C, Loring, Captain E J, Pemberton, Captain S

Hampshire Regiment (T F)—Barton, Captain F St J. (killed); Bowker, Lieut-Colonel F J, Bucknill, 2nd-Lieut J C, Burrell, Captain G P, Forbes, Lieut A G, Osborne, Lieut H J (died of wounds); Stilwell, Major W B; Armstrong, 2142 Lance-Corporal R.; Applegate, 2900 Private S, Bowers, 1954 Corporal M J., Butler, 1827 Quartermaster-Sergeant J, Cox, 1918 Private H; Elkins, 2825 Private H. W.; Feasey, 2130 Corporal H, Giddens, 2188 Corporal E G, Goddard, 1949 Private G W; Ham, 411 Sergeant F R, Hill, 2665 Private J., Long, 2538 Private C, Marshall, 1951 Corporal C, Newman, 2490 Lance-Corporal J.; Norgate, 1518 Corporal F; Passingham, 2483 Private F, Peg, 2909 Private A, Player, 1942 Private N. W, Porter, 2902 Private J. T., Rogers, 1060 Coy. Quartermaster-Sergeant H, Scrace, 1926 Private H., Seale, 1947 Lance-Corporal H; Snow, 1492 Corporal R, Verrall, 2887 Private E G, Wigmore, 975 Coy Sergeant-Major H, Woodward, 2460 Colour-Sergeant (Acting Coy. Quartermaster-Sergeant), Wooldridge, 2030 Private H G, Wooldridge, 2031 Corporal H J

Queen's Own (Royal West Kent) Regiment—Balbernie, Lieut. A G, Bredon, Captain A S, Dinwiddy, Captain M J, Graham, Captain M. W. (killed), Hardy, Captain A E, Hart, 2nd-Lieut A C, Howell, Lieut N. B. (killed), Kitson, Major C E, Madgett, 2nd-Lieut. C, Nelson, Captain J. W; Pedley, Lieut-Colonel S H., Andrews, 7326 Private G J.; Bond, 9203 Private C. W.; Borrett, 9861 Private G W, Bridger, 8725 Bandsman W, Bye, 9511 Bandsman E T.; Clear, 7680 Sergeant A, Croucher, 8096 Private W.; Edwards, 6460 Lance-Sergeant J, Elliott, 5619 Coy Sergeant-Major A G, Golding, 9514 Bandsman H, Howe, 8739 Private G, Humphreys, 9699 Private T.; Hunt, 4471 Sergeant R, Kennard, 8883 Private G, Langton, 9735 Private H A H; Lewis, 6630 Lance-Sergeant L H; McCarthy, 8350 Private J; Medhurst, 9007 Private A H, Newbrook, 5706 Coy Sergeant-Major E. J; Obce, 9066 Private G H, Owen, 9745 Private G; Packham, 8353 Private J, Page, 8439 Private C R, Rutherford, 9218 Private G A.; Salisbury, 9575 Bandsman H, Shand, 8968 Private J, Wannell, 7361 Sergeant W; Wells, Staff Sergeant P G (30th Mule Corps, attached) late 6690, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, Whitehorn, 8110 Lance-Corporal A J; McKelvey, 9372 Private J. M

30th Mountain Battery—Jemadar Daya Singh; Jemadar Krishan Singh; 592 Gunner Phuman Singh, 480 Gunner Mota Singh; 141 Gunner Sardar Khan; 752 Driver Hakim Khan, 425 Naik Lal Beg, 561 Assistant Pay-Havildar Kirpa Singh; 330 Havildar Kahar Singh, 342 Havildar Baryam Singh; 201 Havildar Siwa Singh.

2nd (Q V. O.) Sappers and Miners—2650 Havildar Lakshmanaya; 3324 Naik Raman, 2408 Sapper Chinnasawmi, 3292 Sapper Munisawmi; 3641 Sapper Said Guffar

3rd Sappers and Miners—Subadar Baiyam Singh, Jemadar Muhammad Din, 4193 Lance-Naik Han Tungari, 2151 Havildar Krishna Bousle, 4012 Lance-Naik Bagga Singh.

24th Punjabis—Birkbeck, Lieut. M (killed); Climo, Lieut-Colonel S. H., D.S.O., Cooke, Major H W F (killed); Morton, Major S (killed); Pim, Lieut L. M.; Rind, Lieut E S (since killed); 4358 Lance-Naik Goshan; 4812 Sepoy Parmodh Singh, 4974 Sepoy Gheba Khan, Subadar Sawan Singh, I.O.M., Subadar Sohan Singh; 4022 Sepoy Mangal Singh; 242 Sepoy Lachman Singh; 4510 Naik Khairak Singh, 4810 Lance-Naik Gunda Singh, 4666 Naik Ulas Mir; 4755 Naik Labh Singh, 4650 Naik Haidar Khan, 709 Sepoy Sohnu, 39 Sepoy Lala; 131 Sepoy Ram Singh; 4487 Naik Gindu, 4874 Sepoy Gharba; 386 Sepoy Purab Singh, 4950 Sepoy Siama, 4956 Sepoy Jiwan Singh; 544 Sepoy Yar Akhmad, 663 Sepoy Nawab Ali, 318 Lance-Naik Yarak; 514 Lance-Naik Pal Singh, 474 Naik Khajun Singh, 3490 Sepoy Feroz Khan

48th Pioneers—Hewett, Captain G., Raynor, Lieut C. A., Riddell, Major H. J. (since killed), Subadar Lehna Singh, Subadar Ganga Singh, Jemadar Sahib Singh, Jemadar Girdhara Singh, 604 Havildar Bhag Singh, 613 Naik Nand Singh, Subadar-Major Dhula Singh, 9994 Havildar Dial Singh; 279 Havildar Dewa Singh, 680 Sepoy Jhanda Singh, 1119 Lance-Naik Nand Singh

67th Punjabis—Arbuthnott, 2nd-Lieut. H. H. (since died of wounds); Atkins, Captain R. F., Colan, Captain H. N., Cox, Major C. E. S., Crowther, Lieut. A. H., Gibbon, Captain M. C., McLean, Lieut. F. G. S., Subadar Lachman Singh, Jemadar Khem Singh, 1154 Naik Gauhar Ali; 163 Havildar Sharif Khan, 777 Havildar Indar Singh, 29 Havildar Piaru, 1559 Lance-Naik Fazl Elahi; 580 Havildar Khansi Ram, 1087 Lance-Naik Sadhu Singh; 132 Havildar Mahan Singh, 1610 Sepoy Fazal Khan, 898 Lance-Naik Chartu, 90 Sepoy Allah Ditta.

76th Punjabis—Darell, Lieut. R. D. E., Gosney, 2nd-Lieut. R. W. (I.A.R.O.) (since killed), Hathorn, 2nd-Lieut. N. McD., Laing, Captain S. Van B., McElwane, Lieut. E. J. D., Perrin, Major C. L., Reyne, Captain G. Van R., Rybot, Major N. V. L., Smithett, Lieut.-Colonel A. C. H. (since died of wounds), Subadar-Major Ajab Khan, Subadar Bahadur Shah, Subadar Hussain Shah, Jemadar Gulzara Singh, Jemadar Mehdi Khan, Jemadar Ram Sarup, 880 Naik Ram Singh (killed), 1326 Sepoy Jalam (killed), 298 Sepoy Bagga Khan, 533 Lance-Naik Hukam Singh, 333 Colour-Havildar Harnam Singh (killed), 512 Lance-Naik Hukam Singh (killed), 514 Sepoy Basant Singh (killed); 915 Lance-Naik Ganga Singh, 313 Havildar Ganda Singh, 536 Naik Sundar Singh (killed), 510 Lance-Naik Majja Singh, 1546 Sepoy Dharan Singh, 1365 Sepoy Thakal Singh, 529 Sepoy Isar Singh, 762 Havildar Hukam Dad, 883 Lance-Naik Zaman Khan, 733 Havildar Allah Dad, 1218 Naik Firoze Khan, 1053 Sepoy Sattar Muhammad, 673 Sepoy Faiz Talab, 294 Sepoy Jabra Khan; 1530 Sepoy Mir Zaman, 1494 Sepoy Karam Khan, 1268 Sepoy Kala Khan, 1151 Sepoy Kewal, 1988 Sepoy Atar Singh, 1561 Sepoy Kalu Khan, 473 Lance-Naik Badlu, 253 Sepoy Ranjit, 280 Lance-Naik Mathra

90th Punjabis—Butterfield, Captain E., Hill, 2nd-Lieut. A. L. (I.A.R.O.), Poiteous, Lieut. D. G., Wigley, Lieut. P. J. R.; Jemadar Kishan Singh, Jemadar Muhammad Azam, 2478 Sepoy Pertab Singh, 1558 Lance-Naik Kunda Singh (killed), 1431 Naik Diwan Singh (killed), 1155 Havildar Bishen Singh, 1282 Naik Sobha Singh, 976 Havildar Pada Singh, 2215 Sepoy Mangal Singh; 2211 Sepoy Gurdit Singh, 1482 Lance-Naik Ghulam Muhammad; 1378 Sepoy Fazal Din.

2-7th Gurkha Rifles—Channer, Lieut. G. O. De R., Exham, Captain H.; Hockin, Lieut. G. C. (since killed), Johnston, Captain W., McLeod, Major T. J.; Whitaker, Captain S. S.; Wilson, Captain N. M., Subadar Balbahadur Limbu, Subadar Bagbir Rai, Jemadar Chunahang Limbu, Jemadar Bhawesor Limbu (1-7th Gurkha Rifles), Jemadar Rahardan Rai, 1961 Lance-Naik Kamrup Negi, 1037 Lance-Naik Narman Rai, 1542 Rifleman Harakbahadur Gurnney; 858 Havildar Harkrai Rai, 1085 Rifleman Narman Rai, 1428 Lance-Naik Jagit Rai; 1169 Lance-Naik Lalbahadur Limbu, 1379 Rifleman Talab Limbu; 2005 Lance-Naik Harakdhoj Rai, 778 Naik Ramdal Rai, 1159 Naik Jaimardan Rai; 2263 Rifleman Mehrdhoj Rai; 1302 Rifleman Harknand Limbu; 1714 Rifleman Nauter Rai; 1388 Rifleman Rangbahadur Limbu (1-7th Gurkha Rifles), 1562 Lance-Naik Jaibahadur Limbu (1-7th Gurkha Rifles), 706 Naik Barandhoj Limbu; 1206 Lance-Naik Bhudidan Rai, 793 Naik Panchadhoj Rai; 382 Havildar Manbir Limbu

Signal Services—Crawford, Lieut. J. G. (since killed), Day, Captain C. L., Pocock, 2nd-Lieut. J. A.; Radley, Lieut. H. P.; Sykes, Lieut. A. C.; Andrews, 8196 Lance-Corporal H., Ball, 8115 Rifleman H., King's Royal Rifle Corps; Hilliard, 8232 Private L., Marwood, 5 Corporal C. T., Russell, 9115 Private S., Oxford and Bucks L. I., Shilcock, 9091 Lance-Corporal J., Oxford and Bucks L. I.; Slater, 32 Corporal W., Younger, 38 Private G., Jemadar Asir Ram, 1759 Lance-Naik Angamathu, 105 Sapper Khan Bahadur, 39 Naik Muhammad Shah, 94 Sapper Gobindu

Medical Services—Adamson, Colonel H. M., R.A.M.C., Bharucha, Captain P. B., I.M.S., F.R.C.S.; Clifford, Captain R. C., I.M.S.; Flowerdew, Captain R. E., I.M.S.; Jennings, Lieut.-Colonel E., I.M.S.; Robinson, Captain F. A., R.A.M.C.; Spitteler, Major A., I.M.S.; 854 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon

Mohan Lal, 1080 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Barkatullah, 316 3rd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Fazl Ahmad, 1301 Ward Orderly Rahla Singh, 76th Punjabis

Telegraph Department—Hopkins, M₁ J W, Johnson, Mr W. E
River Transport Service—Brown, Mr J H, Coombs, Mr. G., Cowley, Mr C H, Cowley, M₁ R G, D'Eyc, Mr E R, Gimmnett, M₁ E. T., King, Mr W K, Lyte, Mr F W; Szulczewski, Mr O, Waters, M₁ E

(Signed) JOHN NIXON, GENERAL,

Commanding I. E Force "D."

OPERATIONS KUT-EL-AMARAH

28th September 1915.

General Headquarters Staff, etc—Brownlow, Major d'A C, Cox, Lieut.-Colonel Sir P Z, KCSI, KCIE, Davison, Major-General K S, CB, Dexter, Mr T, Dick, Captain R N; Greenstreet, Major C B L, Hathaway, Surgeon-General H G, CB, Julius, Major S de V A, Lahore, the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of, Macnullen, Lieut.-Colonel F. C K, Macrae, Captain J C, Mowat, Captain J S, Norton-Fagge, Lieut F W L (I.A.R.O.), Rimington, Brigadier-General J C, Charman, Schoolmaster J L; Eldenfield, 2795 Lance-Corporal (Local Sergeant) P L, Hants Regiment (TF), Foid, 8241 Private (Local Sergeant) F, Dorset Regiment, Jackson, Staff Sergeant S B, Meaking, Staff Sergeant E G, Naracott, Staff Sergeant A H, Wallace, Staff Sergeant R, Annesley, Lieut.-Colonel A S R; Bridge, Rev H N, Cleeve, Lieut.-Colonel E. S, Carruthers, Captain J H de W, Courtenay, Lieut.-Colonel M. H; Dunn, Major E G, Gilchrist, Captain W F C, Goldfrap, Captain H W, Harvey, Captain A F B, Hibbert, Captain O Y; Hoghton, Brigadier-General F A, Holdich, Major H A, Johnson, Captain M. E S., Leachman, Captain G E, MacGeorge, Lieut.-Colonel H K, Morland, Captain W. E. T, Smith, Brigadier-General G B; Spooner, Rev H., Townshend, Major-General C. V F., C.B., DSO, Wingate, Captain G F. R.; Winter, Major C. B.; Dykes, 47492 Driver (Local Sergeant) A A, R.F.A.; Gate, 58433 Gunner A. B, R F A, North, Sergeant W, Redmond, Sergeant T N

Royal Navy—Cookson, Lieut.-Commander E C, DSO (killed), Harris, Lieut. W V. H.; Singleton, Lieut M.

Royal Indian Marine—Goad, Lieut.-Commander C R

Royal Naval Air Service—Blackburn, Lieut V G; Gordon, Major R.

Royal Flying Corps—Fulton, Lieut. E J; Petre, Captain H, Reilly, Major H L; Yeats-Brown, Captain F C C. (17th Cavalry), attached, Palmer, 4473 Sergeant T. N; Wardell, 6 1st Class Mechanic C E

7th Hariana Lancers—Carnegy, Major G P O, Simonds, Captain M H; Risaldar-Major Muhammad Akbar Ali Khan Bahadur, Jemadar Nautra Singh, 3120 Daffadar Sewa Singh (killed), 2762 Kot-Daffadar Lal Singh; 3074 Lance-Daffadar Ranjit Singh

16th Cavalry—Willoughby, Lieut M G. P., 10th Lancers, attached

Royal Field Artillery—Atherstone, 21788 Regimental Sergeant-Major G. H (now 2nd-Lieut), Horsman, 59184 Gunner W A, Akerman, Captain W P. J; Carlisle, Captain T R M, Ayres, 29632 Battery Sergeant-Major G.; Collis, 24528 Sergeant W, Gibbons, 53862 Gunner A; Munro, 55231, Bombardier C; Gordon, Lieut H G, Sarson, Major E V; Moran 20841 Battery Quartermaster-Sergeant A; Reilly, 52021 Acting Bombardier M T, Baylay, Captain E J L; Maule, Lieut.-Colonel H N. St. J.; Wakeline, 53798 Gunner E G.; Wheeler, 61795 Bombardier C F, Wilford, 2445 Battery Sergeant-Major F

Hampshire (Howitzer) Battery (TF.)—Hill, 89235 Battery Sergeant-Major A; Medway, 4374 Sergeant W.

Ammunition Column—Martin, Captain E T.; Corbould-Warren Major E.; Morley, 13858 Farrier Quartermaster-Sergeant J.

Royal Garrison Artillery—Dorington, 28776 Bombardier W., Smith, 23655 Bombardier R. E.; Farmar, Major W. C. R., Johnston, Lieut. M. A. B. (Commanding 4-7 Naval Guns), Butterfield, 28772 Bombardier G.

Maxim Battery—Stockley, Captain C. H., 66th Punjabis, Lincoln, 8644 Private C, Norfolk Regiment, Miles, 9459 Private C, Royal West Kent Regiment, 1931 Sepoy Dhir Singh, 66th Punjabis.

Royal Engineers—Dunhill, Captain C. M. G. (since killed), Sandes, Captain E. W. C.; Stace, Captain R. E., Baker, Sergeant R. H.

3rd Sappers and Miners—Subadar Ramaswamy Naidu, I O M. (killed), 2878 Sapper Son Singh.

34th (Divisional Signal) Company.—Duke, Captain V. W. H., Cheshire Regiment, Cox, 5025 Lance-Corporal F., Donaghey, 8883 Private J., McCombie, 8 Sergeant J. K., Murphy, 41 Coy. Sergeant-Major F., Reed, 24 Corporal S. T., 3254 Lance-Naik Shaik Farid, 20 Lance-Naik Abdul Jabbar, 81 Sapper Sayed Abdul Raheem.

Norfolk Regiment—Clifton, Lieut. H. A. (attached); de Grey, Captain G., Lodge, Major F. C., Aldridge, 5369 Sergeant (Acting Coy. Q. M. S.) C., Dermott, 6031 Sergeant W. F.; Friston, 7345 Corporal (Lance-Sergeant) W. (since killed), Kirk, 8323 Private E. R., Neave, 6565 Corporal (Acting Sergeant) W. W.; Porter, 3817 Coy. Sergeant-Major H.

Dorsetshire Regiment.—Powell, Captain F. G.; Radcliffe, Major F. W.; Sweetman, Major M. J. (attached) (since died of wounds), Utterson, Major H. K., Clench, 9038 Lance-Corporal W., Cole, 7728 Private W.; Curtis, 2243 Private W., Dear, 8826 Private J., Eno, 311 Sergeant H. (Somerset L. I.) attached, Higgs, 8921 Private A. G.; Langston, 5239 Sergeant C.; Maidment, 6440 Sergeant R.; Murphy, 7831 Private H. (Cameron Highlanders) attached, Richardson, 6767 Bandsman F., Wesley, 8279 Private W., White, 8526 Corporal W. F.

Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry—Courtis, Captain J. H. (since killed); Foljambe, Captain the Hon. J. C. W. S.; Hyde, Major A. C. (since killed); Dixon, 8037 Corporal A.; Donohoe, 7452 Lance-Corporal W.; Draper, 8347 Private G. F.; Farrant, 8929 Lance-Corporal W. J.; Grace, 6830 Sergeant H., Horwood, 9037 Lance-Corporal J.; Hussey, 8777 Private F. J.; Kidd, 793 Sergeant J.; Neale, 8732 Private J. W., Upstone, 8986 Lance-Corporal J.

7th Duke of Connaught's Own Rajputs—Norris, Lieut. R. J. N.; Thomson, Captain A. R., Tregear, Major F. C.; Subadar-Major Shiuambar Singh, Subadar Sardar Singh, Bhisti Kahar Dhanaya.

20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry (Brownlow's Punjabis)—Stewart, Captain C. C. (since killed), St. John, Major R. S., Subadar Mota Singh, Acting Subadar-Major Masin Khan, Subadar Brahman; 204 Havildar Mewa Singh; 1483 Lance-Naik Kirpa, 1099 Lance-Naik Ghulam Haidar, 1058 Lance-Naik Radhu, 1937 Sepoy Bhima.

22nd Punjabis.—Blois-Johnson, Lieut.-Colonel T. G., Furney, Major J. L., Harman, 2nd-Lieut. S. H., I.A.R.O.; Subadar-Major Asadulla Khan, Subadar Badan Singh, Jemadar Suhel Singh, 4489 Havildar Fazal Hussain, 117 Havildar Sayed Ahmad, 4157 Havildar Rhoda Singh, 4440 Havildar Gul Sher; 131 Lance-Naik Bostan Khan, 465 Sepoy Mela Singh.

48th Pioneers—Subadar Lehna Singh.

103rd Mahratta Light Infantry—Brown, Lieut.-Colonel W. H.; Crichton, Major McV.; Wilson, Captain J. H. G. (since deceased), Subadar Ramchandrarao Mohite, Subadar Bapurao Gaekwad, 2836 Colour-Havildar Gopal Rao Palande; 2038 Colour-Havildar Shaikh Maktum; 2373 Havildar Hamid Khan, 3060 Colour-Havildar Atmaran Chatge; 3109 Havildar Umaji Sawanth; 2460 Bugle-Major Sayed Lal, 3173 Sepoy Dhondi Dhanande.

104th Wellesley's Rifles—Bailey, Major G. (since killed), Clery, Lieut.-Colonel C. B. L., Stoddart, Captain G., Subadar Rahim Buksh, Subadar Mukh Ram, Subadar Harchand Jat, 1624 Havildar Raotan Singh, 2245 Lance-Naik Khru Singh, 2095 Rifleman Chandgi Ram, 2907 Rifleman Chokha Ram, 628

Rifleman Uda Ram, 2614 Rifleman Mangej Singh, 3087 Lance-Naik Ramlal Ram; 1625 Lance-Naik Moula Baksh

110th Mahratta Light Infantry—Frazier, Lieut-Colonel G S, Frost, Lieut C D (since killed), Heion-Jones, 2nd-Lieut C. V., I A R O; Subadar Sayed Razak, 1668 Sepoy Luximan Zoti, 2254 Sepoy Shaikh Omer

117th Mahrattas—Hall, Captain E G, Robinson, Major C E B (killed), Subadar-Major Balwant Rao Savant Bahadur, Subadar Mahadeorao Nalaode, Jemadar Yenkatrao Kadam, 1741 Sepoy Ganpat Khedkar, 2074 Sepoy Sakharam Savant, 2432 Sepoy Abajirao Kadam, 2271 Lance-Naik Marauti Savant; 1776 Sepoy Ganpat Rane, 2790 Sepoy Anandirao Kadam, 2262 Lance-Naik Lakshman Panaskar

119th Infantry (The Mooltan Regiment)—Brickman, Captain F. I. O; Taylor, Captain J McL G, Subadar Unad Singh, Subadar Sarfaraz Khan, 2004 Havildar Gul Muhammad, 3603 Havildar Muhammad Saffi Khan.

120th Rajputana Infantry—Coddington, Lieut-Colonel E, Mosse, Lieut C O R, Subadar Pitah Rawat, 1719 Sepoy Juma Baksh, Bhusti Mangla.

Medical Services—Anderson, Major S, I M S, Donegan, Lieut-Colonel J F, R A M C, Lambert, Major F C, R A M C, Mukerji, Captain K. K., I M S, Simpson, Lieut F T, R A M C, Startin, Captain J, R A M C; 1st Class Assistant Surgeon Amba Shankar Moiraji, 4th Class Assistant Surgeon li J Lusa, I S M D, 4th Class Assistant Surgeon S A de Souza, I S M D, 1032 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Mitthu Lal, 1343 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Mannikhan

Army Beare Corps—2380 Havildar Lal Din, 5049 Naik Noondi, 1495 Lance-Naik Shei Ahmed, 1013 Beare Devi Din

Army Hospital Corps—252 Pukali Bhusti Amboo Succaram, 184 Bhusti Husain Bapoo

Supply and Transport Corps—Evans, Lieut R J, I A R O, Goldsmith, Captain H A (95th Russell's Infantry), Stewart, Captain A F., Kee, Conductor W J., Mitchell, Sergeant S E, Sly, Conductor W J.

30th Mule Corps—Cole, Sub-Conductor R F; 1181 Driver Afridi, 1158 Driver Allah Ditta, 1299 Driver Sayed Walayat Khan

Mechanical Transport (Armoured Cars Section)—Trevor, Captain A. C. H., 24th Punjabis, Herwood, 2nd-Lieut J C, I A R O

Bharatpur Indian Service Transport Corps—1377 Driver Birju

Jaipur Transport Corps—Lieut Hukum Singh; 3986 Lance-Daffadar Hukma

Ordinance Department—Mouhey, Conductor H J, Jones, Sub-Conductor R W

Military Works Services—Abbott, Staff Sergeant T. W., Kearsley, Staff Sergeant E

Telegraph Department—Hanvey, Mr W C, Rowlands, Mr F; Sub-Inspector Shei Khan

River Transport Service—Cice, Mr T D; Brown, Mr J H; Denne, Mr. G H, Chalmers, Mr C

(Signed) JOHN NIXON, GENERAL,
Commanding I E. Force "D."

6. On the 19th November the advance was continued, moving by both banks of the river, and Zaur was occupied. The enemy's advanced troops withdrew towards Ctesiphon after offering slight opposition. On 20th November the force on the left bank reached Lajj (9 miles from Ctesiphon), the shipping and the right bank detachment arrived on the 21st, the latter crossing the river and joining the main body on the left bank.

7. The Turkish position at Ctesiphon lay astride the Tigris covering the approach to Baghdad, which is situated some 18 miles to the north-west. The defences had been under construction for some months. They consisted of an extensive system of entrenchments forming two main positions. On the right bank the front position extended from the river for about three miles in a south-west direction, the second line trenches lying some five miles further up stream. On the left bank a continuous line of entrenchments and redoubts stretched from the river for six miles to the north-east, the left flank terminating in a large redoubt. On this bank the second line was about two miles behind the front position and parallel to it for three miles from the Tigris, thence it turned northwards to the Dialah river. Close to the Tigris, on the left bank and midway between the two defensive lines, was situated the Arch of Ctesiphon—a prominent landmark.

A mile in rear of the second line of trenches a bridge of boats connected the two wings of the Turkish army. Further in rear, the Dialah river near its junction with the Tigris was bridged at two points and entrenchments commanded the crossings.

During General Townshend's concentration at Aziziyah accurate information had been obtained by aerial observation regarding the position of the Turkish defences.

8. The officers employed on these reconnaissances displayed the same intrepidity and devotion to duty that has been commented on in previous despatches. Unfortunately during the actual period of the battle at Ctesiphon a series of accidents deprived the Royal Flying Corps of several officers and machines. Among those forced to descend within the enemy's lines was Major H. L. Reilly, a Flight Commander of exceptional ability who has much distinguished service to his credit.

9. It was reported that the enemy had over 13,000 regular troops and 38 guns in the Ctesiphon position. There were reports of the early arrival of further reinforcements. Though information

on this point was indefinite and lacked confirmation, it was advisable that there should be no delay in attacking and defeating Nur-ed-Din before the arrival of possible reinforcements.

10 General Townshend, after a night march from Lajj on 21st-22nd November, attacked the hostile position on the left bank at the centre and on the north-east flank. A severe fight lasted throughout the day, resulting in the capture of the front position and more than 1,300 prisoners

Our troops pressed on and penetrated to the second line, capturing eight guns and establishing themselves in the enemy's trenches. Here they were subjected to heavy counter-attacks by fresh troops. The captured guns changed hands several times. Finally, they had to be abandoned, as shortly before nightfall it was found necessary, owing to diminished numbers, to order the withdrawal of our troops from the forward positions, to which they had penetrated, back to the first position.

11. On the 23rd November our troops were reorganised in the position they had captured, and the work of collecting the numerous casualties was continued.

Owing to heavy losses in killed and wounded it was inadvisable to renew the offensive.

There is no doubt that the Turkish troops who had fought on the previous day were in no condition to resume the fight. The battlefield was littered with their killed and wounded and many of the trenches were choked with dead. The 45th Turkish Division, which had held the front trenches, was practically destroyed. But reinforcements came up and heavy attacks were made all along General Townshend's line throughout the night 23rd-24th November. These were repulsed and the enemy must have lost heavily.

12 On the 24th November, wounded and prisoners were evacuated from Ctesiphon to Lajj, where the shipping flotilla was banked in; and General Townshend consolidated the position he had taken up on the battlefield. His left flank, which had been near the Ctesiphon Arch, in advance of the main position, moved back into the general alignment. Owing to the interruption of a water channel which had supplied the trenches on the north-east flank, our troops there suffered from want of water; so the right flank was brought nearer the river. This movement was

successfully effected under the cover of an offensive movement pushed out from the centre of the position. The enemy displayed little activity throughout this day, except for shell fire. Most of this came from guns on the right bank which prevented the steamers advancing up stream from Lajj.

13. On the 25th November the remainder of the wounded were sent back to Lajj. Up to this time it appeared from hostile movements to their rear—reported by air reconnaissance—that the Turks contemplated a retirement from their remaining positions. But they received some fresh reinforcements on the 25th. During the afternoon large columns were seen advancing down the left bank and also inland, as if to turn our right flank, while hostile cavalry threatened our rear.

14. General Townshend was nine miles from his shipping and source of supplies at Lajj, faced by superior forces of fresh troops. He decided to avoid an engagement, and, under cover of night, withdrew to Lajj.

Here he remained during the 26th.

15. A position so far from bases of supply, with a vulnerable line of communication along the winding shallow river, was unfavourable for defence. It was necessary to withdraw further down stream to a more secure locality until conditions might enable a resumption of the offensive.

16. General Townshend withdrew unmolested during the night of 27th-28th to Aziziyah.

On the 29th the cavalry brigade, under Brigadier-General Roberts, east of Kutun engaged and drove back the enemy's advanced mounted troops, who were attacking a stranded gunboat. The 14th Hussars and the 7th (Hariana) Lancers made a successful charge. Some 140 casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

17. On the morning of the 30th, continuing the retirement, the main force halted at Umm-at-Tubal, a mixed brigade under Major-General Sir C. Melliss pushing on towards Kut to deal with hostile mounted troops which had interrupted the passage of steamers at Chubibat, about 25 miles below Kut.

18. The troops had to remain at Umm-at-Tubal, as the ships were in difficulties in shoal water in this vicinity, and the enemy's whole force came up during the night. They attacked in great strength at daylight on the 1st December.

A fierce fight ensued, the Turks losing heavily from our artillery fire at a range of 2,500 yards. General Townshend took advantage of a successful counter-attack, made by the cavalry brigade against a column which attempted to envelop his right flank, to break off the fight and retire by echelons of brigades. This was carried out in perfect order under a heavy shell fire, and by midday the enemy had been shaken off. General Townshend reports that it was entirely due to the splendid steadiness of the troops and to the excellence of his Brigadiers that he was able to repulse the enemy's determined attacks and extricate his force from the difficult situation in which it was placed.

The mixed brigade commanded by General Melliss consisting of—

30th Infantry Brigade,

1-5th Hants (Howitzer) Battery, R. F. A. and the 16th Cavalry,

which had been despatched to Chubibat on the morning of 30th November, was recalled on the night of 30th November-1st December. This brigade marched 80 miles in three days including the battle of December 1st. At the end of it their valour and discipline was in no way diminished and their losses did not include a single prisoner.

19. After a march of 30 miles, Shadi was reached on the night of 1st-2nd December and on the morning of 3rd December General Townshend was installed at Kut-el-Amarah, where, it was decided, his retirement should end.

20. The Naval Flotilla on the Tigris operated on the left flank of the troops throughout the operations that have been described.

From November 22nd to November 25th the gunboats from positions below Bustan (two miles east of Ctesiphon) were engaged against hostile artillery, particularly against concealed guns on the right bank which prevented ships from moving above Bustan.

21. During the retreat from Ctesiphon to Kut the gunboats under Captain Nunn, D.S.O., Senior Naval Officer, rendered valuable services in protecting the steamers and barges and in assisting when they grounded. The Naval gunboats were employed at this work day and night, frequently under fire from snipers on both banks.

Owing to numerous loops and twists in the course of the river, it was impossible for the flotilla to remain in touch with the troops during the retirement

22. On the evening of the 28th November, Shaitan went aground about eight miles above Aziziya and could not be refloated. Throughout November 29th, Firefly and Shushan salvaged Shaitan's guns and stores under heavy sniping from both banks, until the situation was relieved in the afternoon by the action of the cavalry brigade which has already been referred to.

The hull of Shaitan eventually had to be abandoned as the Turks opened fire with guns on the ships which had remained behind.

23. On the occasion of the Turkish attack on the morning of December 1st at Umm-at-Tubal, Firefly and Comet made good practice with lyddite at a large body of Turks at a range of 3,000 yards. The ships came under a heavy and accurate shell fire, and, at 7 AM, a shell penetrated the boiler of Firefly disabling her. H M S Comet (Captain Nunn) took Firefly in tow and, in endeavouring to turn in the narrow river, both ships took the ground. Firefly was got clear and sent drifting down stream; but Comet would not move from the bank, against which she had been wedged by Firefly.

24. Sumana came up and made several unsuccessful attempts to drag Comet off the bank. The enemy's fire increased in intensity, they brought up several field guns to short range; the ships were surrounded by Turkish troops and fired on at a range of 50 yards. Comet and Firefly were badly damaged and on fire. They were abandoned after the guns had been rendered useless and the crews were taken on board Sumana, which succeeded in effecting her escape.

Subsequently Sumana did most valuable work in salvaging shipping which had got into difficulties further down stream.

25. Throughout these operations Captain Nunn, Lieutenant Eddis, who was wounded, and all officers and men of the Naval Flotilla behaved with great coolness and bravery under most trying circumstances.

26. The valour of the troops who fought under General Townshend at the battle of Ctesiphon is beyond praise. The 6th Division exhibited the same dauntless courage and self-sacrifice

in the attack that has distinguished it throughout the campaign in Mesopotamia.

The dash with which the Indian troops (enlisted from all parts of India) have attacked a stubborn foe in well entrenched positions, I attribute largely to the confidence with which they have been inspired by the British battalions of the force

When forced by greatly superior numbers to act on the defensive, and during the retreat to Kut under the most trying conditions, the troops responded to the calls made on them with admirable discipline and steadiness.

They proved themselves to be soldiers of the finest quality

27 These fine troops were most ably commanded by Major-General C V F Townshend, C.B., D S O I have a very high opinion indeed of this officer's capabilities as a commander of troops in the field He was tried very highly, not only at the battle of Ctesiphon, but more especially during the retirement that ensued Untiring, resourceful and even more cheerful as the outlook grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a commander

He is imperturbable under the heaviest fire and his judgment is undisturbed.

28 With great regret, I have been forced, by reasons of ill-health, to resign the command of the British Forces in Mesopotamia—an appointment I have had the honour of holding during the past nine months.

In order to complete the record of events during my period in command, I will now give a brief narrative of the operations on the Tigris from the time that General Townshend's force reached Kut-el-Amarah on December 3rd until the date of my departure from Mesopotamia

29 When General Townshend reached Kut on December 3rd, measures were taken to withstand a siege until the arrival of relief from reinforcements which were coming from over-seas

Defences were improved Shipping was despatched to Basra, evacuating the sick and wounded, and also the Turkish prisoners (1,350 were captured at Ctesiphon and all were safely brought away in the retreat)

The armed tug Sumana was the only vessel left at Kut.

The cavalry brigade and a convoy of transport animals were marched down to Ali-al-Gharbi, before the enemy could effect an investment.

The cavalry left on December 6th. On that day the enemy closed on the northern front and by December 7th the investment of Kut was complete.

30. The cavalry at Ali-al-Gharbi was reinforced with infantry and guns from Basra. Behind this advanced detachment, a force under the command of Major-General F. J. Aylmer, V.C., was collected on the line Amarah—Ali-al-Gharbi, for the relief of Kut as soon as its concentration was completed.

31. The entrenched camp at Kut is contained in a "U" shaped loop of the Tigris, the town stands at the most southerly end of the peninsula so formed. The northern defences are some 3,200 yards from the town, the peninsula is about a mile in width.

A detached post was established at a small village on the right bank of the river opposite Kut. East of the town was a bridge of boats, covered by a bridge-head detachment on the right bank.

32. On December 8th, the enemy carried out a heavy bombardment from three sides, and Nur-ed-Din Pasha called upon General Townshend to surrender.

33. On December 9th, our detachment on the right bank, covering the bridge, was forced to retire before a heavy attack. The enemy occupied the right bank at the bridge-head.

During the night December 9th-10th, the bridge was successfully demolished by a party gallantly led by Lieutenant A. B. Matthews, R.E., and Lieutenant R. T. Sweet, 2-7th Gurkha Rifles.

34. During the following days Kut was subjected to a continuous bombardment and several attacks were beaten off. The enemy's losses were heavy, especially in the abortive attacks on December 12th, when, it is estimated, their casualties amounted to 1,000.

35. Operations were then conducted on the lines of regular siege warfare. A redoubt at the north-east corner of the defences became the special objective of Turkish shell fire and sapping operations,

36 On the night of December 14th-15th a successful sortie was made against trenches facing the detached post on the right bank, and, on the night December 17th-18th, two sorties, from the redoubt previously referred to, cleared the enemy's nearest trenches. About thirty Turks were bayoneted and ten were captured.

37. Heavy fire was concentrated on the redoubt during the night December 23rd-24th and throughout the 24th. The parapet was breached and the Turks effected an entrance, but they were driven out by a counter-attack, leaving 200 dead behind. Attacks were renewed later, and throughout the night of December 24th-25th, a fierce struggle took place around the redoubt. The enemy again effected a lodgment, but by morning they had been ejected and the assault was finally defeated.

38 No decisive attacks have been attempted by the Turks since their failure at Christmas, which, it is reported, cost them about 2,000 casualties.

39 On December 28th, a movement of troops, which was continued for several days, took place from the Turkish main camp (six miles above Kut), to Shaikh Sa'ad, which had been occupied by enemy mounted troops for some time.

40. On January 4th, General Aylmer's leading troops, under Major-General Younghusband, advanced from Ali-al-Gharbi towards Shaikh Sa'ad, moving by both banks.

General Younghusband's column, got in touch with the enemy on the morning of January 6th. The Turks were entrenched astride the Tigris, three and a half miles east of Shaikh Sa'ad. An attempt to turn the Turkish right flank did not succeed owing to the presence of hostile cavalry and Arabs in superior force on this flank.

41 General Aylmer arrived on the morning of January 7th with the remainder of his force and ordered a general attack; Major-General Younghusband commanding on the left bank, and Major-General Kemball on the right bank.

Very heavy fighting lasted throughout the day. By evening the enemy's trenches on the right bank had been captured and some 600 prisoners and two guns taken.

On the left bank our troops were entrenched opposite the enemy who still held their positions on that bank. Attempts to

turn then flank had been checked by counter enveloping movements from the north

42. The troops were very fatigued next day and little progress was made.

On January 9th, the Turks were forced to abandon their remaining positions and retired up stream, followed by General Aylmer's force. But heavy rain now fell, making the alluvial soil of the roads almost impassable, and prevented active operations for the next two days. It is estimated that the enemy's losses during the three days' fighting at Shaikh Sa'ad amounted to 4,500.

43. The enemy fell back about ten miles to the Wadi,—a tributary which joins the Tigris on the left bank. They took up a new position behind the Wadi and on the right bank of the Tigris, opposite the mouth of the Wadi.

44. General Aylmer concentrated his whole force on the left bank and attacked the Wadi position on the 13th. After hard fighting the Turks were driven out on the 14th and retired five miles further west and entrenched across a defile bounded on the north by a marsh and on the south by the Tigris. They were followed to this position by General Aylmer's force.

45. Throughout these operations the weather was very bad. The heavy rain and high wind caused great discomfort to the troops and made movement by land and by river most difficult. Up to January 17th there was no improvement in the weather and active operations were at a standstill.

46. As, owing to ill-health, I am about to relinquish command of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," I desire to place on record my warm appreciation of the able and devoted assistance afforded me by the staff at General Headquarters and officers of the various Administrative Services and Departments.

I wish specially to bring forward the names of the following officers who have rendered very valuable services:—

Major-General G. V. Kemball has proved himself to be a very gallant officer and has the true offensive spirit. As a commander of troops in the field I consider him to be a leader of great ability and power.

I am indebted to Major-General M. Cowper for the assistance which his knowledge of administrative staff work and organisation has afforded me.

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) W. H. Beach is at all times a hardworking, capable and thoroughly reliable Staff officer whose services have been invaluable to me. As head of the Intelligence Branch he has shown exceptional powers of insight and organisation.

Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) H. R. Hopwood has performed his important duties in a highly satisfactory manner. He is thoroughly capable and full of tact and resource, in fact possesses all the qualities that go to make a good Staff officer.

Major R. A. Cassels has in the field proved himself to be a bold and resourceful Staff officer, and the manner in which he has acquitted himself of duties falling to hand outside the ordinary scope of his work is highly satisfactory and of value to the State.

Major W. C. Croly, R.A.M.C., has been in medical charge of the Staff at General Headquarters and has shown himself always the right man in the right place, and to have taken the keenest interest in his work and care of those whom he had in charge.

To my Personal Staff I am under great obligations for their willing and able assistance in quarters, on the march, and in the fight, and I draw attention to the recommendations for rewards which I have already made.—

Captain L. G. Williams.

Captain E. J. Nixon.

Lieutenant G. B. Walker.

The Medical Services have had to face very trying and unusual conditions. On more than one occasion the number and severity of the casualties have thrown the greatest strain on them, but the organisation and efficiency of the arrangements have ensured as speedy an evacuation of the wounded as the means placed at their disposal permitted. In this connection I wish to bring forward the name of Surgeon-General H. G. Hathaway.

The work of the Royal Engineers has been excellently carried out under the able direction of Brigadier-General J. C. Rimmington, and I take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by this branch of the service as a whole.

The British General Hospital has throughout been in the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel D J Collins, R A M.C , whose zeal, energy and organising power have rendered it a model hospital of its kind Credit is also due to Lieutenant-Colonel G. B. Irvine, I M.S , for his devoted and careful supervision of the Indian General Hospital.

I have before expressed my indebtedness to Major-General K. S Davison and his staff and I must now do so again for their able and efficient management of the lines of communication under the most difficult and trying circumstances In Captain J. C. Macrae he has a good and able Staff Officer

It must be remembered that, as a port, Basra has no facilities for the discharge of stores or the disembarkation of troops and animals. The officers of the Royal Indian Marine consequently have had no easy task in improvising wharves and berths, and dealing with the large number of transports which have recently arrived and have had to be unloaded with the utmost expedition They have, nevertheless, overcome these many difficulties and the greatest credit is due to them for what they have accomplished

The officers and crews of the Tigris steamers belonging to Messrs Lynch Brothers and of the other river craft have always displayed gallantry of a high order in bringing their ships on, often under heavy fire, and it is not too much to say that without this assistance, and the indefatigable manner in which they have worked, the movements of troops and supplies would not have been possible.

I cannot praise too highly the work done by the Telegraph and Postal Departments, the state of completeness of which has done much to promote the general efficiency of the force.

All demands made on the Telegraph Department have been rapidly and effectively met at the cost of much hard labour under trying conditions and at great personal risk, which reflects the greatest credit on Mr L. Bagshawe and the important department over which he presides.

The exigencies of field service have thrown a great strain on the Postal Department, but owing to the hard work done and the excellent organisation built up by Mr. E. Clerici and his staff the results have been most satisfactory.

Finally, I am very grateful to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir P. Z. Cox for his able co-operation and willing assistance. The force has largely profited by his deep knowledge of local conditions and peoples, and by the tact and bold resource which he has displayed in all he has undertaken.

The names of the following officers, all of whom have performed good service, are brought to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief —

Booth, Brevet Major F
 Branson, Captain L. H.
 Dick, Major R. N.
 Duffy, Deputy Commissary and Captain T. A.
 Goad, Lieutenant C. R., R.I.M.
 Greenstreet, Major C. B. L.
 Gribbon, Major W. H.
 Hamilton, Captain W. H., I.M.S.
 Huddleston, Commander (temporary Captain) W. B.
 Kinch, Lieutenant A. G., R.I.M.
 Marsh, Lieutenant B. C., R.I.M.
 . More, Captain J. C.
 . Mowat, Captain J. S.
 Parsley, 2nd-Lieutenant W. C.
 Queripel, Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) L. H.
 Shah, Lieutenant A. S.
 Thompson, Captain R. C.
 Whittall, Captain G. E.
 Winter, Major (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) C. B.

47. As soon as postal communication is established with General Townshend, I have no doubt that he will have further names to bring to notice.

I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN NIXON, GENERAL,

Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D."

**EAST AFRICAN
CAMPAIGN.**

GENERAL SMUTS' OPERATIONS.

We give below the various official reports that have been issued regarding the progress of General Smuts' campaign :—

A telegram dated March 12th from Lieutenant-General Smuts states that the action which commenced on the morning of March 11th against the German prepared positions on the Kitovo Hills west of Taveta resulted in a most obstinate struggle, which continued until midnight with wavering fortunes

A most formidable obstacle was presented by the hills, densely wooded and steep, which were held by the enemy in strong force. In the course of the engagement portions of the positions were taken and retaken several times. A final attack with the bayonet was made between 9 P.M. and midnight, and two parties, one led by Lieutenant-Colonel Freeth, of the 7th South African Infantry, and the other by Major Thompson, of the 5th South African Infantry, secured a hold which they were enabled to maintain until reinforced the following morning, when it was seen that the German native troops were streaming away towards Kahe, in a south-westerly direction

While the engagement at Kitovo was proceeding one of General Smuts' mounted brigades was engaged in clearing the foothills north-east of Kilima-Njaro of the enemy's forces, which had been cut off from their main body by the rapid British advance on March 8th, 9th, and 10th. Movements are in progress to bar the retreat of these isolated forces to the westward.

Simultaneously with the above actions the strong column under Major-General J. M. Stewart, C.B., from the direction of Longido, appeared on the Arusha-Moshi road in rear of the main German concentration.

The enemy in consequence is retreating southwards towards the Usambara railway. The pursuit is being continued.

* * * * *

Telegrams received from Lieutenant-General Smuts indicate that the German forces dislodged from their strong defensive positions on the Lumi River and Kitovo Hills by the operations commenced on March 7th and concluded on March 12th effected

their retreat through Kahe to a further series of defensive positions constructed in the thick forest belt which lies along the Rufu River. Direct pursuit was rendered difficult by heavy rainfall and the numerous swollen streams, over which the bridges had been destroyed

The period March 12th-17th was spent in reorganising troops and transport, and in repairing roads and bridges for motor traffic

On March 18th forces were pushed south to occupy Kilewo and Unterer Himo in close contact with the enemy on the Rufu River

During the 19th there was a good deal of bush-fighting in the vicinity of Kahe, the enemy maintaining a stubborn resistance

On March 20th a mounted force occupied Arusha, dislodging an enemy detachment

During the night of March 20th-21st strong bodies of infantry bivouacked in the Rufu Forest in close contact with the German entrenchments. The enemy attempted a strong night attack, but was driven off with severe losses

Meantime a strong force of South African mounted troops marched by night from Moshi and traversing the thick bush country reached a point on the Pangani River, five miles south of Kahe Railway station, by daybreak. The railway station itself was seized, and many stores were captured. The railway bridge over the Pangani River had been partially destroyed.

The mounted troops then established themselves on the hills south-south-east of Kahe in contact with the enemy. This threat to their line of retreat decided the enemy to hold on throughout the entire day of the 21st, with a view to effecting a further retirement under cover of darkness. Reinforcements indeed reached him from the south by the railway during operations. Thus we were enabled to inflict heavy losses, which would not have been possible had the Germans been free to abandon their positions earlier. As it was, they maintained an obstinate resistance.

During the night of March 21st-22nd, however, the entire Rufu line was evacuated, and the enemy retired south along the Tanga Railway, leaving a 4.1-in gun, portion of the armament of Komgsberg, in our hands.

Operations are being continued.

Telegraphing on April 6th General Smuts reports that as the result of a movement commenced during the afternoon of April 3rd a portion of dismounted troops under General van der Venter successfully surprised a German force, which with machine-guns was stationed in a mountain stronghold in the Arusha district

This force was surrounded in the course of April 4th, and surrendered on the morning of April 6th

* * * * *

Further reports received from General Smuts indicate that General van der Venter's success in the Arusha district was more extensive than at first appeared.

The German force surrounded and compelled to capitulate was a considerable one. The German casualties were numerous, and already 17 Europeans and 404 native soldiers have surrendered, with machine-guns and large quantities of ammunition, whilst more prisoners remain to be brought in.

* * * * *

Reports have been received from Lieutenant-General Smuts to the effect that the mounted troops under Major-General van der Venter, after their success at Lol Kissale on April 4th/5th, continued their advance, occupying Umbugwe (Kothersheim) on April 12th, and Salanga on April 14th. At each of these places small hostile garrisons were captured or driven off with losses.

The enemy was encountered in some force near Kondoa-Irangi on April 17th, and it became evident that a hostile concentration was being effected in that direction.

Fighting was being continued up to the time of telegraphing.

Nothing of importance is recorded in the other theatres in East Africa. The heavy rains have commenced.

Excellent progress has been made with the construction of the railway from Voi, which has now been carried forward to New Moshi.

* * * * *

Telegraphing on April 23rd Lieutenant-General Smuts reports that the troops under General van der Venter, after defeating the enemy before Kondoa-Irangi on April 19th, occupied that place.

Prisoners were taken and a considerable number of casualties inflicted on the German forces, which retired in the direction of the Central Railway.

General Smuts telegraphs on April 29th that his mounted troops have captured in the vicinity of Kondoa-Irangi various convoys and munitions. These amount to 200 slaughter oxen, 80 rifles and a large amount of ammunition, a herd of 600 mixed cattle, and 210 donkeys with saddlery and supplies.

On the 2nd May General Smuts reported that the rainy season had set in with great violence and was delaying operations but subsequent official reports showed that the operations had been by no means stopped.

On the 13th May it was officially announced that the enemy, after falling back towards the Central Railway, received reinforcements and again approached Kondoa-Irangi.

An official despatch dated 12th May from General Smuts said that German attacks on Kondoa-Irangi under the personal command of the German Commander-in-Chief began on the 5th May and were continued on the 9th, 10th and 11th May, when a determined night attack was repulsed.

THE KONIGSBERG'S END.

A supplement to the *London Gazette* issued in December contained the following despatch from Vice-Admiral King Hall, describing the operations which resulted in the destruction of the German cruiser *Konigsberg* in July 1915.—

CHALLENGER, 15th July 1915.

SIR,—Be pleased to lay before their Lordships the following report of the operations against the *Konigsberg* on the 6th and 11th instant.—

In accordance with orders issued by me, the various vessels concerned took up their appointed stations on the 5th July, in readiness for the operations on the following day. At 4-15 A.M., on the 6th July H.M.S. *Severn*, Captain Eric J. A. Fullerton, R.N., and H.M.S. *Mersey*, Commander Robert A. Wilson, weighed and proceeded across the bar into the Kikunja branch of the Rufiji river, which they entered about 5-20 A.M. The *Severn* was anchored head and stern and fire was opened on the *Konigsberg* by 6-30 A.M. The *Mersey* was similarly moored and opened fire shortly after. Both monitors were fired on with 3-pounders, pom-poms, and machine-guns when entering the river and on their way up, and they replied to the fire.

At 5-25 A.M. an aeroplane, with Flight Commander Harold E. M. Watkins as pilot and carrying six bombs, left the aerodrome on Mafia Island. The bombs were dropped at the *Konigsberg* with the intention of hampering any interference she might attempt with the monitors while they were getting into position. At 5-40 A.M. another aeroplane, with Flight Commander John T. Cull as pilot and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Harwood J. Arnold as observer, left the aerodrome for the purpose of spotting for the monitors.

At 4-45 A.M. I transferred my flag to the *Weymouth*, Captain Denis B. Crampton, and at 6-30 A.M. proceeded across the bar, with the whalers *Echo* and *Fly* sweeping and the *Childers* sounding ahead, the *Pyramus*, Commander Viscount Kelburn, being in

company. The Weymouth grounded on the bar for a few minutes on the way across, but soon came off with the rising tide, and advanced as far as the entrance to the river, where she anchored.

Fire from small guns was opened on her and on the whalers from the shore, but beyond one shell, which struck the Fly, no damage was sustained. A few rounds from the 6-in. guns put a stop to the firing, although it was impossible to locate the position of the guns owing to their being concealed amongst the trees and dense undergrowth. After anchoring, the Weymouth did what was possible to assist the monitors by bombarding at long range a position at Pemba, where a spotting and observation station was supposed to be, and by keeping down the enemy's fire at the aeroplanes. This was done very effectively. At the same time the Pioneer, Commander (Acting) Thomas W. Biddlecombe, R.A.N., under the orders of Hyacinth, Captain David M. Anderson, engaged the defences at the Ssimba Uranga mouth, her fire being returned until the defences were silenced.

Returning to the operations of the monitors; fire was opened, as before stated, at 6-30 A.M., but as the Königsberg was out of sight it was very difficult to obtain satisfactory results, and the difficulties of the observers in the aeroplanes in marking the fall of the shots which fell amongst the trees were very great, and made systematic shooting most difficult. There being only two aeroplanes available, considerable intervals elapsed between the departure of one and the arrival of its relief from the aerodrome thirty miles distant, and this resulted in a loss of shooting efficiency. At 12-35 one of the aeroplanes broke down, and at 3-50 the second one also. I signalled to Captain Fullerton to move further up the river, which he did, until about 12-50 the tops of the Königsberg's masts were visible.

The Königsberg kept up a heavy fire on the monitors until about 12-30, when her fire slackened. At 2-40 P.M. she ceased firing, having for some time limited her fire to one gun. At 3-30 P.M. the monitors ceased fire, and retired out of the river, rejoining my flag off Koma Island at 6 P.M. On their way out they were again attacked by the small guns from the banks. I had returned over the bar in Weymouth at 12-30 P.M., and transferred to Hyacinth at 3 P.M. The Mersey had four men killed and four wounded, two of whom have since died, and her foremost 3-in. gun, at which most of the casualties occurred, was put out of

action. The Severn, fortunately, suffered no losses or damage. The various ships, whalers, tugs, etc., anchored for the night off the delta, and proceeded to their various stations for coaling, etc., the following morning.

In view of the many difficulties in the way, and the heavy and accurate fire to which the monitors were subjected, I consider that the operations on 6th July, though not a complete and final success, are creditable to Captain Fullerton and Commander Wilson.

As it was necessary to make a fresh attack on the Königsberg to complete her destruction, further operations were carried out on the 11th July, by which date the aeroplanes were again ready for service and the monitors had made good certain defects and completed with coal. I reinforced the crew of the Severn by Acting Sub-Lieutenant Arthur G. Mack, with six petty officers and men; and the crew of the Mersey by Lieutenant Richard Ussher and Lieutenant Rundle B. Watson, with six petty officers and men. All the above were drawn from Hyacinth.

The attack was carried out on the same lines as on the previous occasion, and the same mouth of the river was used. The monitors crossed the bar at 11.45 A.M., followed up to the entrance by Weymouth and Pyramus, the latter proceeding three miles inside, and both searching the banks. Hyacinth and Pioneer bombarded the Ssimba Uranga entrance. On this occasion the monitors did not fire simultaneously, the Mersey remained under way, and fired while Severn moored, and ceased fire when Severn commenced. The Severn was moored in a position 1,000 yards closer to the enemy than on the 6th July, which made her fire much more effective.

The observers in the aeroplanes, by their excellent spotting, soon got the guns on the target, and hit after hit was rapidly signalled. At 12.50 it was reported that the Königsberg was on fire. As previously arranged with Captain Fullerton, as soon as they had got the situation well in hand the monitors moved up the river, and completed the destruction of the Königsberg by 2.30 P.M., when I ordered them to withdraw.

The Königsberg is now a complete wreck, having suffered from shells, fire, and explosions, several of which latter were observed. The only casualties sustained were three men slightly wounded in the Mersey. There were no casualties in Severn. By 8 P.M. all ships, except those detached on patrol, had returned.

I have much pleasure in bringing to the notice of their Lordships the names of the following officers and men.—

Captain Eric J A. Fullerton, H.M.S. Severn

Commander Robert A Wilson, H.M.S. Mersey.

Commander Denis B Crampton, M.V.O., H.M.S. Weymouth.

Commander the Hon. Robert O. B. Bridgeman.

Squadron Commander Robert Gordon, in command of the Air Squadron.

Flight Commander John T. Cull.

Flight Lieutenant Vivian G. Blackburn.

Flight Sub-Lieutenant Harwood J. Arnold.

Flight Lieutenant Harold E. M. Watkins

Assistant Paymaster Harold G. Badger, H.M.S. Hyacinth. This officer volunteered to observe during the first attack on the Königsberg, though he had no previous experience of flying.

Acting Lieutenant Alan G. Bishop, Royal Marine Light Infantry, of H.M.S. Hyacinth. This officer volunteered to observe during the second attack on the Königsberg, though he had no previous experience of flying.

Air Mechanic Ebenezer Henry Alexander Boggis, Chatham 14,849, who went up on the 25th April with Flight Commander Cull, and photographed the Königsberg at a height of 700ft. They were heavily fired on, and the engine of the machine was badly damaged.

Most serious risks have been run by the officers and men who have flown in this climate, where the effect of the atmosphere and the extreme heat of the sun are quite unknown to those whose flying experience is limited to moderate climates. "Bumps" of 250 feet have been experienced several times, and the temperature varies from extreme cold when flying at a height to a great heat, with burning, tropical sun, when on land. In the operations against the Königsberg on the 6th July both the *personnel* and *material* of the Royal Naval Air Service were worked to the extreme limit of endurance. The total distance covered by the two available aeroplanes on that date was no less than 950 miles,

and the time in the air, working watch and watch, was 13 hours. I will sum up by saying that the flying officers, one and all, have earned my highest commendations.

Chief Carpenter Willram J. Leverett, H M.S. Hyacinth. This officer was in charge of the fitting out of the two monitors

I also desire to bring to their Lordships' notice the master of the tug Revenger, John Osment Richards, and the following members of her crew, who most readily volunteered to serve in their tug and to proceed into the river to the assistance of the monitors and tow them out if necessary.—

Frank Walker, navigating master; George Edward Milton, mate; Frederick James Kennedy, chief engineer; Lewis John Hills, second engineer; Sidney Robert Rayner, third engineer.

The four tugs Blackcock, Revenger, Sarah Joliffe and T. A. Joliffe, were manned by naval officers and men, with the exception of the above named, and although their services were not called for I consider the example they set was most praiseworthy.—Yours, etc..

H. KING HALL, VICE-ADMIRAL.